

**MEMORY POLITICS:  
CIRCASSIANS OF UZUNYAYLA, TURKEY**

***Eiji Miyazawa***

**A dissertation submitted for the degree of PhD.**

**Department of Anthropology and Sociology  
Faculty of Arts and Humanities  
School of Oriental and African Studies  
University of London**

## MEMORY POLITICS: CIRCASSIANS OF UZUNYAYLA, TURKEY

BY EIJI MIYAZAWA

### ABSTRACT

This thesis explores social memories among Circassians in Turkey. It is based on eighteen months' field research in the Uzunyayla plateau, Pınarbaşı district of Kayseri province, central Turkey. The Circassians (*Çerkez*) settled there are the descendants of refugees who fled from the Russian invasion of the Caucasus in the mid nineteenth century. "Memory" here is used in a broad sense to include the experiences and expressions of historical consciousness in everyday interactions, as well as articulated historical narratives. By interweaving them, the present work aims to analyse the political process involved in the production of knowledge about history and society.

In efforts to reproduce a community in their new homeland, Circassians emphasise their history and collective identity. The local elites from noble (*worq*) families dominate such conservative, essentialist discourses, stressing their status superiority over ex-slave families. They recognise historical significance and identify the driving forces of their history by reference to specific social themes, such as the opposition between the two status groups. They monopolise history as a resource by excluding ex-slaves from the production of authoritative knowledge. Here, memory politics, consisting of space construction, control over interpersonal exchanges, and hierarchized personhood, plays a crucial role. In that process, ex-slaves become muted, made passively to embody a "feudal" past.

By contrast, in Karakuyu, an affluent village also known as "Slave Village", male comrades produce social relations different from elite representations by committing themselves to alcohol drinking. These actors – of various family backgrounds – thus assert the legitimacy of their relationship with the national past. Older villagers' memory narratives about an outstanding ex-slave man demonstrate how disassembling and reassembling physical objects such as sheep stable can help to reconstruct the past; the past thus evoked is composed of the memories symbolised in these mnemonic devices, and produces understandings of history that are empowering for them. The poor, though, often fail to benefit from overall improvements in living conditions, and are thus prevented from having their say within the wider community.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>Chapter 1 Introduction</b>	9
[1] Research Aims	9
1) Aims	9
2) The Fieldwork	10
[2] Circassians in Uzunyayla	12
1) The Caucasus: Its Peoples and History	12
2) Pınarbaşı and Uzunyayla	15
3) Karakuyu	19
[3] Social Memory, Forgetting and Memory Politics	21
1) Overview	21
2) Outline	27
<b>Part I Landscape of Uzunyayla: From Displacement to Emplacement</b>	
<b>Chapter 2 Displacement Discourse on Circassians</b>	30
[1] Introduction: Two Landscapes	30
1) The School Festival	31
2) The Ballad	33
[2] A Contested Landscape: Imposed Displacement	36
[3] The Soil of History	42
1) The Layers of Human Agency	42
2) Gendering Uzunyayla	45
2-1) <i>Dede Yurdu</i> : Gendered Transaction, Gendered Homeland	46
2-2) Seeds of History	48
[4] Representations in Action	54
Case 2: The Abduction of a Circassian Girl in Eski Yassıpınar	57
Case 3: The Murder of Three Circassians by Avşars in Yukarı Karagöz	59
<b>Chapter 3 The Reconstruction of Homeland through Memories</b>	64
[1] From Victim of History to Actors of History	65
1) Migration	65
2) Journey and Settlement	68
3) Reunion	70
[2] Uzunyayla as the Caucasus	73
[3] The Uzunyayla of Circassian Warlords	77
1) Landscape of Memory: Village Names	78
2) Landscape as Memory: Naming Villages	81
3) A Contested Village Name	84
[4] Conclusion: Emplacement as Memory Process	89

## **Part II Historical Memories and Social Forgetting**

### **Chapter 4 Remembering “Bridewealth Issues” 94**

[1] Introduction	94
[2] <i>Wase</i> and the Bridewealth Meeting	96
[3] Memories of Bridewealth Meetings	100
1) The Yahyabey Meeting	100
2) The Karakuyu Meeting	110
3) <i>Worq</i> Memories and Slave Memories	115
[4] Conclusion	120

### **Chapter 5 *The Politics of Forgetting and Remembering* 126**

[1] Social Amnesia in Karakuyu	126
1) The Loss of Social Knowledge, or the Art of Forgetting?	126
2) Absent Lords	129
3) History as the Past	135
[2] <i>Worqs</i> ’ Memories	138
1) The <i>Worq</i> /Slave Dichotomy	138
2) Manipulating Time	142
3) Slave as Category	146
4) <i>Worqs</i> ’ History as Narrative	149
[3] Re-examining Forgetting in Karakuyu	153
1) The Great <i>Seferberlik</i> : the End of the Past	153
2) Land Distribution: the Beginning of the Present	155
3) Raising One’s Voice: Which Dichotomy?	161
4) The Time of the Community	164
[4] Some Perspectives on Future Investigation of <i>Worqs</i> ’ Memories	167
[5] Conclusion	170

## **Part III Everyday Practice of Social Memories**

### **Chapter 6 Everyday Production of Memories and Forgetting 173**

[1] Introduction	173
[2] Slaves as Lesser Persons	175
1)	Personhood 175
2) Metaphors of Slavehood: the Incomplete Personhood of Slaves	178
2-1) “Property”: Materialising Metaphor	178
2-2) Respect and Love: Humanising Slaves’ Subordination	182
2-3) The Objectification of Slaves and the Production of Historical Knowledge	182
[3] “ <i>Kimlerdensin?</i> ”: Everyday Politics of Remembering and Forgetting	188
1) <i>Sofra</i> and <i>Kapı</i> : Politics of Space	190
2) “ <i>Kimlerdensin?</i> ”: the Production of Forgetting and Embodiment of History	198

### **Chapter 7 Drinking Alcohol as Re-membering the Past 210**

[1] Introduction	210
[2] Sociability in <i>Worqs</i> ’ Guest Rooms	214
1) Eating, Drinking and Feeding	214
2) Respect and Love: Honour and Shame	220

[3] Male Sociability in Teahouses	226
1) Tossing “Hot Air”: Declaring Oneself a Social Actor	227
2) Taking: Visualising Male Competence	229
3) <i>Çekememezlik</i> : Masculinity as a Vehicle for Transition of Social Values	237
[4] “Fuck the Past!”: Making Bygones Be Bygones in the Construction of the Past	245
[5] Conclusion	247
<b>Chapter 8 Memories of Huta: Re-construction of the Past through Memory</b>	<b>252</b>
[1] Introduction: Abaza Hajji Huta	252
[2] Reconstruction of the Past through Materialised Memories	255
1) Cigarettes: Materialising the Past	257
2) The Barn: Dismantling and Reconstituting the Past	265
3) <i>Kapı</i> : Rearranging the Social Order	275
4) <i>Lokum</i> : Being a Circassian	283
<b>Chapter 9 Conclusion</b>	<b>288</b>
<b>Glossary</b>	<b>297</b>
<b>Bibliographies</b>	<b>312</b>

## LIST OF TABLES

### TABLE

1	Population of Pınarbaşı District 1935-1997	
1.1	District Population Divided according to Town and Village Population	300
1.2	Ratio of Town/Village Population	300
1.3	Village Population according to Sub-district	300
2.	District Population, divided according to Circassians and Turks	
2.1	Circassians and Turkish Population Total and Ratios	301
2.2	Circassian Population according to Sub-districts	301
2.3	Turkish Population according to Sub-districts	302
3.	Circassian Village Population and Caucasian Language-speaking Population in Rural Kayseri	303
4.	Karakuyulu Population	303
5.	1995 General Election Results	
5.1	Votes Cast according to Party	304
5.2.	Votes Cast according to Percentage of Total Vote of Each Unit	304
5.3	Votes Case according to Ethnic Group	305
5.4	Votes Cast according to Percentage of Total Vote of Each Ethnic Group	305
6.	The Scale of the Land Distribution in Karakuyu organised by the Land Commission in 1953	
6.1	The Size of the Distributed Land according to the Social Categories of the Beneficiaries	306
6.2	Social Boundaries (Us/Them) Presented by Karakuyulus Belonging to Different Categories	306

## LIST OF MAPS AND FIGURES

### MAPS

1.	The Uzunyayla Plateau in Turkey	7
2.	Pınarbaşı District and Uzunyayla	7
3.	Circassian Villages in Uzunyayla	8

### FIGURES

1.	The Circassian Language Family	307
2	Land Distribution of 1953 and Beneficiaries	
2.1	Consolidation of Land to a <i>Xexes Worq</i> Lineage	308
2.2	Some <i>Xexes</i> and Slave-Descendant Beneficiaries	309
3.	Hajji Huta & Some Karakuyulu Narrators	310
4.	<i>Worqs</i> ' Memory and Slaves' Memories	311

One's possession of greater power was often claimed through images of attacking the lesser partner's bodily orifices, not only mouth (*ağız*) but also anus (*göt*) and vagina (*am*). Images of inequality were often presented by the use of metaphors of assaults on one of these points of access. Men frequently used idioms such as "to shit in someone's mouth" (*ağızına sıçmak*), "to fuck someone's ass" (*götünü sikmek*) or "to put something in someone's vagina" (*amina koymak*).

By demonstrating their manful assertiveness, they opened up a moment in which they could stand in a dominating position over others.

The scope of these expressions can be stretched to produce the same gendered image involving the relationship between a person and a collectivity, or between collectivities, including domains related to state politics and the market economy, e.g. between Turks and an ethnic minority: “Put ‘a Turkish soldier’ into PKK’s vagina” (*Mehmetçik*,<sup>1</sup> *PKK’nin amuna koy*), a slogan chanted in a nationalist demonstration (Yelda 1998: 132); between Turkish illegal labour migrants and a host country: “Let me fuck England’s ass from the back” (*İngilterenin götünü arkadan sikeyim*); and the city of Kayseri and Karakuyulu youths, “Once you move to the city, you will give your tail to a ‘real man’ right away” (*Şehire gidince, hemen adama kıvrığını vereceksin*).

These examples demonstrated that an intake of an object beyond the boundaries dividing self and society was an important image used to mark an uneven distribution of power between different actors. Recognition of a greater potency was manifested as a capacity for making the subordinate partner ingest an alien object. As its effect, the latter would be provided with a coherent self. The image of penetration and infringement of bodily boundaries deprived him of fluidity, giving him coherence as an object.

Paradoxically, a series of ideas such as submission to the powerful, a renunciation of autonomy and a failure to achieve self-containedness were also presented in images of break-up of closure (the crumbling of a state of being clearly bounded and thus firmly closed), by which the integrity the recipient had just received was dismantled. In verbal duels, Turkish youths often generated images of destroying their rivals’ bodily orifices by forcing objects into them (see Dundes et al. 1970). “To

---

<sup>1</sup> *Mehmetçik* is the Turkish equivalent to “Tommy Atkins”, an old English term for an English soldier.

## Chapter 1 Introduction

### [1] Research Aims

#### 1) Aims

This thesis is a study of the Circassian community of the Uzunyayla plateau of Inner Anatolia, Turkey and explores political aspects of social memories. Following the Russian conquest of the Caucasus in the nineteenth century, over one million Circassians (*Çerkez/Adyghe*)<sup>2</sup> became refugees, settling in various parts of the Ottoman territories. Uzunyayla, in Pınarbaşı district of Kayseri province, is home to roughly 10,000 Circassians, 2,000 of whom live in the town and the rest in over 50 villages.

Following Luisa Passerini, an Italian oral historian, I understand memory as “an active production of meaning and interpretations, strategic in character and capable of influencing the present” (1983: 195). At the same time, however, I locate the experiences and expressions of the sense of belonging to a community with its own past and history in wider realms without restricting memory to oral narratives. I follow Roger Bastide in understanding social memory as a framework in which the memories of individuals or groups, positioned variously in society, are constituted and linked to each other (cited in Hamilton 1994: 19).

With these understandings, this thesis investigates memory works to which the local Circassians commit themselves in the everyday politics of producing historical knowledge pursued to endorse authority and power in their society. Most local Circassians feel that their society has undergone a major historical cataclysm: the contradiction between ascribed hereditary status and actual socio-economic standing has become ever more starkly apparent. Members of noble families and those descended from their freed slaves evaluate that process in radically divergent ways. In this symbolic struggle for fame and precedence, people are engaged in politics by means of memory; this highlights social memory as a major site of contest. In this thesis, I treat the local elites as central producers of oral historical narratives, who monopolise a cultural resource of prestigious status that backs up their articulacy. I broaden the compass of memory, however, beyond verbal accounts, to include wider social activities and explore other realms of everyday historicity, which may act as foundations of alternative memories for those silenced within the dominant discourse of Circassian national history.

#### 2) The Fieldwork

This dissertation is based on my field research in the Uzunyayla plateau, between September 1997 and April 1999. I also lived in Kayseri between August 1994 and August 1996, working at Erciyes University. In particular, I lived in the district town of Pınarbaşı in the second year, establishing regular contact with many locals as well as with Circassian urban intellectuals involved in various ethnic organisations. My experiences in that period are also incorporated into this work. I lived in and studied the Kabardian-speaking village of Karakuyu in the first half of the research period. I stayed in the town in the second half, visiting many other Circassian villages as well as seeing Circassians of local origin now living in urban areas.

The striking contrast between the difficulties I faced in Karakuyu – locally known as a “slave village” – in getting people to talk about the past and the articulacy of people from noble families of other villages heavily influenced my understanding of Circassian society. I developed a strong bias against accounts presented by the people in Karakuyu (*Karakuyulus*) during the research. I ended up participating in a politics of knowledge aimed at silencing the section of Circassians that the local elites saw as forming a “muted category” (Ardener 1975).<sup>3</sup> This awareness inevitably

---

<sup>2</sup> Circassians call themselves *Adyghe* while they are called Cherkess by Arabs, Turks and Russians. In this thesis, I adopt the local habit of using the term Circassians (*Çerkez* in Turkish) as a generic category encompassing descendants of all displaced people from the Caucasus, including Adyghe (e.g. Kabardian, Hatukoy, Abzekh), Abaza and Chechen, except when these groups need to be distinguished. See n. 3 for the underline of Circassian words.

<sup>3</sup> Ardener uses the term to refer to the subordinate group who have difficulty articulating their views within the dominant mode of communication. Caplan points out that ethnographies on personal narratives, for which the question of human agency is central, have trouble in dealing with accounts given by the socially

turned writing this thesis into a very reflexive process. The painful process I underwent has certainly affected both the structure and the analysis of this work, though I shall not elaborate on the subject of reflexivity in doing field research and writing ethnography. Through this thesis, I hope to fulfil my moral responsibility to restore agency and voice to those people to whose silence I partially contributed.

I used Turkish almost solely for the research. Naturally, questions might be raised concerning my dependence on Turkish to study and write about a minority group with its own language. However, it was in fact while listening to local Circassians' use of Turkish that I gained and deepened much of my understanding of Turkish culture presented here. A significant portion of the central vocabularies (e.g. relating to "respect" and "love". See Chs. 6 and 7) that Circassians constantly employed to negotiate their identity had been taken from Turkish and incorporated into their own language, where these concepts often seemed unelaborated. The difficulty of separating these two languages as cultural idioms seems to reflect Circassians' long-term interaction with the Crimean Tatars and the Ottomans in which Turkish served as the *lingua franca* (Henze 1992: 71), and it remained an important aspect of their everyday language practice in the present.<sup>4</sup>

Circassians did fear "assimilation", but their use of Turkish was not a straightforward matter of cultural loss. It also had a positive aspect: Circassians had acquired a common language through which they compared self with significant other. They had become more conscious of the distinctive qualities of their own culture, elevating them to an abstract level, re-investing in them and thus enabling their further elaboration. Though my understanding of Circassian culture is indirect and thus partial, this complexity seems to resonate with the process of their self-discovery as Circassians in Turkey. By incorporating, wherever possible, what I could learn through my elementary Circassian (Kabardian), as well as observations by other social scientists on the same people, I attempt to show that my interpretations of their society *via* Turkish convincingly capture aspects of their experiences.

Below, I first place the protagonists of the following narrative in a historical context by briefly explaining how Circassians came to form a community in Uzunyayla, and outlining their present social situation. I then present a short overview of recent discussions about social memory, clarifying my research interests. Finally I provide an outline of the thesis as a whole, clarifying how it is constructed to tackle these issues.

## [2] Circassians in Uzunyayla

### 1) The Caucasus: Its Peoples and History

The people of the Caucasus, settled in scattered villages in this mountainous region, belong to a number of small language groups. The native languages, excluding a variety of Turkic, Indo-European and Semitic languages, form their own separate group called Ibero-Caucasian (Figure 1). This is divided into three sub-groups: the Kartvelian languages in the south Caucasus, including Georgian and Laz; the Checheno-Lezgian languages in the north-east; and finally the Abazo-Adyghe languages in the north-west. The last group is itself sub-divided into one branch that includes Abkhaz (*Apsuwa*) and Abaza (*Ashkharwa* and *Ashwa*) on the Black Sea coast and another comprising *Adyghe* (Circassian) in the inland area (Smeets 1984: 38-42).

Adyghe, in turn, has eastern and western dialects: the speakers of the former are Kabardians (*Kabarday*) and Besleney and those of the latter divide into many language-groups including Shapsugh, Abzekh and Hatukoy. The Kabarda region is located in the Central Caucasus, around Nalchik, the present capital of the Kabardino-Balkarian autonomous republic in the Russian Federation, with the River Terek separating the plain into two basins: the Great Kabarda to the west and the Little Kabarda (also known as *Jilax'steney*) to the east. The Kabarda plain links the

---

weak who lack a self-image as social actors (1997: 16). See also Afsar (2000), for an attempt to recover a voice for female slaves in a harem.

<sup>4</sup> I underline Circassian words, as in *Adyghe*, when they appear the first time (and in the glossary), to distinguish them from Turkish words. The distinction is, however, not always clear-cut. Since many words of Arabic or Persian origins are also used as essential idioms in Turkish, the process of hybridisation is more complex than I can handle in this thesis.

East and the West Caucasus, and also bridges the North and the South Caucasus through the Daryal path.

Kabardians had close relations with the Tatar Khanate in the Crimea, the Ottomans and the Russians, which helped them to develop a highly elaborated class system, producing some influential princes and warlords. This “elite of the Caucasus” (Luzbetak 1951: 54) had the largest number of status classes, sometimes quoted as thirteen (İnalçık 1960: 22), whose four principal categories consisted of princes (*pshu*), nobles (*worg*), freemen (*lhakwel'*) and slaves (*pshul'e* and *unaut*). The Kabardians embraced Islam in the sixteenth century, starting with the upper sections of the society. Under Kabardian influence, a class system also developed among the neighbouring groups such as Besleney, Hatukoy and Ashkharwa Abaza.

By contrast, the Circassian groups in the western Adyghe region were separated by mountains and valleys; patrilineal lineages (*l'ako*) remained a principal form of social organisation, and the class structure remained relatively undifferentiated. They lacked princes, the nobles' powers were limited and free villagers formed the dominant section. These western groups are described as “democratic Circassians”, the eastern groups “aristocratic Circassians” (ibid.). The difference in social organisation is also reflected in the languages spoken by these two groups: that of the former divided into many different dialects, that of the latter relatively homogeneous (Kuipers 1960: 8). The adoption of Islam was also delayed among these mountain groups until the seventeenth century.

The Abaza left their original habitat in Abkhazia in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and settled among Adyghe. Since Ashwa were divided into six groups, the Ottomans and Tatars called them *Altikesek* (“Six-sectioned”) Abaza. The name *Altikesek* is still retained in the official Turkish name of the only Ashwa village in Uzunyayla, while the local Circassians themselves call it *Lo-kwaje/kut* (the Lo's village) after the princely family who led their group to Uzunyayla. Ashkharwa Abaza had seven different divisions, including the Basilbey, who settled in Uzunyayla.

Russian engagement in the Caucasus started in the sixteenth century when the Kipchak Khanate dispersed. The Caucasus was seriously threatened by Russian expansionist policy during the latter half of the eighteenth century. Kabardians under the leadership of influential lords played important roles in the strategically situated central Caucasus and the Russians used them to extend their influence in the Caucasus.

Kabardians came under Russian domination by the second half of the eighteenth century and the Ottomans agreed to the annexation of the Kabarda region to Russia in the Küçükaynarca treaty of 1774. The Ottomans lost their important military base in Anapa in the Russo-Ottoman War (1778-1792) and conceded the Russian claim to the Caucasus in the Adrianople Treaty of 1829 (İnalçık 1960: 24-25). As the Ottoman ability to protect the Caucasus declined, especially after the Crimean War (1853-56), the Russians enforced their “pacification” (Goldenberg 1994: 21) policy of colonising the Caucasus by expelling Muslims and settling Christian Slavs known as Cossacks (Barret 1995; Pinson 1972: 71). Sheikh Shamil's Muridist resistance in the Dagestan area, which lasted for about thirty years, collapsed in 1859. The conquest of the mountainous north west Caucasus was also completed by 1864, largely as a result of atrocities carried out by these armed Cossacks.

Flight from the Caucasus to areas under Ottoman protection, which had already started on a small scale in the 1820s, became a mass movement after 1858. The Ottomans signed an agreement with the Russians in 1860, confirming their acceptance of Muslim refugees in their territory, and set up the Immigration Commission to handle their settlement. In 1864 the Russians finally issued a decree commanding Circassians to abandon their homeland, which led to the tragedy that Circassian intellectuals call the “Great Exodus” (*Büyük Göç*). According to one estimation, this mass displacement led to the death of one third of the 1.2 million people who fled their native country (McCarthy 1995: 36).

The refugees were resettled in various parts of the Ottoman territories including Anatolia but also the Balkans and present-day Syria, Jordan and Palestine. The process of settlement was no less chaotic. The Ottoman Porte was totally unprepared for the scale of the immigration, which caused grave resentment among the local population, who were forced to cover the costs of settling the refugees. The Ottoman government estimated in 1867 that 10 percent or roughly

150,000 of the refugees were agricultural slaves (Toledano 1998: 11-12, 84), though the use of the term slave for members of the Circassian underclass remains contested (see Kanbolat & Taymaz 1990: 41).<sup>5</sup>

The Kabardians resisted the Russians less vigorously than other Circassian groups (Habiçoğlu 1993: 28),<sup>6</sup> maintaining amicable relations with them. While other groups such as Shapsugh, Abzekh, Ubukh and Hatukoy were exiled almost wholesale, the policy of mass displacement was not forced on Kabardians. Their migration to Anatolia is said to have “proceeded in peace” (Özbay 1995: 149). A portion of those from Great Kabarda settled in Uzunyayla, while some of those from Little Kabarda settled in Göksun district of Kahraman Maraş province, 100 km south of Pınarbaşı.

While Russian domination was established in the Terek basin in the late eighteenth century, roughly a third of Kabardians escaped to the Kuban basin (in the present Karachai-Cherkessia republic), where Russian control had not yet extended. They formed a group called “Fugitive (*Hijret*) Kabardians”. They mixed among mountain groups and maintained their resistance until 1859, producing a number of noted heroes including the Hatukoshoko, “the prince of the princes”. Most Kabardians who were forcefully exiled were from this section. They settled in both Uzunyayla and Göksun, still living together with those from Nalchik, though the distinction between the two groups is no longer relevant.

## 2) Pınarbaşı and Uzunyayla

Kayseri province is one of the commercial and industrial centres of central Turkey. Its economic prosperity is enmeshed with the cultural conservatism characteristic of Inner Anatolia: i.e. nationalism and religious ardour, manifested in strong support for political parties relying on Islamist or nationalist discourses. Pınarbaşı is a district located in the north east of the province (Map 2), with a small population (36,000 in 1997). The district town is located 100 km east of the provincial centre; the highway that links them stretches straight on to Malatya, while an asphalt road branches off to the south in the district town, running through Sarız, a mountainous district that separated from Pınarbaşı in 1946, to Kahraman Maraş. The construction of the Kayseri-Malatya Highway started during the period of *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (Republican People’s Party) rule (1923-1950), but was completed after the *Demokrat Parti* (Democratic Party) had gained power in 1950. Memories of compulsory labour during the period of single-party rule of CHP were an important part of a local narrative that accounts for the enthusiastic support given to the DP throughout the 1950s.

After passing the town of Pınarbaşı, the highway runs through a plateau named Uzunyayla to the boundaries of Sivas province. Uzunyayla is located at 1550-1630m above sea level, stretching over to the north of the East Toros Range, surrounded on all four sides by mountains reaching 1800 to 2700m (İzbirak 1945: 272). Uzunyayla is a high plateau 50 km in diameter, stretching from Pınarbaşı to Şarkışla and Kangar, two neighbouring districts of Sivas province, though *yayla* usually means a pasture on mountain slopes.

Pınarbaşı district (*ilçe*) is divided into four separate sub-districts (*nahiye*), including the central one (*Merkez*) formed by the villages around the district town (*kasaba*). The Örenşehir sub-district in the north east of the district is almost coextensive with Uzunyayla, bordering the Kaynar sub-district to the north west, which runs along the Şörümşek Valley. Also in the west of the district, near Kayseri, lies the Pazarören sub-district. It is situated in a valley along the Zamantı River, which gathers streams from Uzunyayla to form a branch of the Seyhan River flowing into the Mediterranean near Adana.

The Uzunyayla plateau is located at the centre of the main belt of Circassian settlements in the middle of Anatolia (Map 1), stretching from Samsun on the Black Sea coast, through Tokat, Sivas, Uzunyayla, Göksun (Kahraman Maraş), to Ceyhan (Adana) and Reyhanlı (Hatay) on the

---

<sup>5</sup> Ahmet Midhat Haghur, one of the first men of letters amongst Circassians in Turkey, wrote in 1874 (republished in 1969) that he wished that Circassian “slaves” had not been referred to in terms of slavery (*esaret*) in the Ottoman Empire. *Yeni Kafkas* (1960, 4/20) raises the same issue.

<sup>6</sup> A recent study by a Kabardian author (Jaimoukha 2001: 60) mentions that this traditionally accepted view is a misconception.

Mediterranean coast. This flat high land is also the location of one of the largest communities of Circassians, alongside Bandırma, Adapazarı (Sakarya) and Düzce (Bolu) in western Anatolia.

Kabardians are the largest group in Uzunyayla and founded 41 villages. Other Adyghes (13 Hatukoy and 2 Abzekh) and Abazas (10 Basilbey Ashkharwa and 1 Altıkesek Ashwa) as well as Chechens (4) and Karaçay Turks (1), also founded villages, which makes 71 villages in total (Map 3).<sup>7</sup> Five of these original villages have already changed hands and are now occupied by either Sunni Turks (Avşars or Türkmen) or Alevi<sup>8</sup> Kurds (See Ch. 2), leaving 54 Circassian villages at present within the boundaries of Pınarbaşı district. Members of some other Circassian groups who did not found their own villages here, including Shapsugh, Besleney, Memxagh and Adamey, joined the villages of these dominant groups, settling as individual families. They have now grown to form separate lineages retaining their ethnic names, alongside people from Turkic and Mongolian groups such as Nogoy, Balkar, Kumuk and Kalmuk.

The settlement of these Circassians in Uzunyayla started in 1859 before the Great Exodus of 1864; over ten thousand refugees had already been sent to the region by 1862 (Habiçoğlu 1993: 169). The influx of Circassians increased the area's demographic importance, and it therefore gained the status of a separate district in 1861, named Aziziye after the reigning Sultan, Abdul Aziz (reg. 1861-1876). The population of the district town numbered 1,600 in 1897-98, 400 of whom were non-Muslims (Güler 1997: 53).

In 1907, at the onset of the second constitutional period, a local notable sent a letter to *Çerkes İttihad ve Teavün Cemiyeti* (Circassian Union and Mutual Aid Association), one of the first Circassian organisations in Istanbul, in which he mentioned Aziziye as the region with the largest number of slaves in the whole Ottoman territory (Dumanıç 1999). During my research, Circassians in other parts of Turkey still regarded Uzunyayla as a remote and isolated area whose people pursued past status differences, and they had thus gained a wide-spread reputation for backwardness.

After further resettlement of some Circassian villages from Kars in north eastern Turkey during the Russo-Ottoman war (1877-78), locally known as “the War of (12)93”, small-scale immigration of Circassians continued sporadically until the end of World War II. Amongst four separate sub-districts, Kabardians make up the great majority of the population in Örenşehir, while Hatukoy predominate in Kaynar. Kabardians and Abazas cohabit with Turks in Merkez. Pazarören is inhabited almost solely by Avşar Turks, formerly a nomadic tribal group (*aşiret*), forced to settle in this valley and on mountain slopes in Sarız, where they formed small villages in the second half of the nineteenth century.

Of the districts in Kayseri, Pınarbaşı has the largest number (113) of villages. The population decrease in Pınarbaşı's rural areas is striking; the village population reached its peak in 1960 (44,000), and fell by almost half by 1997 (to 24,000) (Table 1). The Circassian village population also reached its zenith in 1960 (21,000) and has since decreased steadily – by 60% (to 8,500) (Table 2). The Turkish village population, among whom Avşars are dominant, remained stable above 20,000 from 1960 to 1990, registering a peak of 25,000 in 1975 much later than the Circassians. A serious decrease started after 1990, reducing the population by almost 40 percent by 1997 (15,000). The ratio of Circassians among the village population has consistently fallen, from around half before the 1960s to almost one third in 1997.

Local Circassians accounted for most of the depopulation of Uzunyayla due to their greater yearning for modern urban life and enthusiasm for education. They also often emphasised the lasting influence of the previous class system in which the distribution of wealth was very uneven. The population decrease of Circassian villages in the Merkez sub-district, however, showed a parallel pattern to that of Turkish villages in the same sub-district. The variance in labour-migration patterns among different sub-districts corresponded largely to difference in the geographical conditions and thus in the dominant modes of economic activity. This suggested that

---

<sup>7</sup> Since Uzunyayla stretches across different districts, the Circassian villages mentioned here also include those in three districts of Sivas province: Kangar (6), Şarkışla (5) and Gürün (1). The only Chechen settlement in Pınarbaşı shares a village with Kabardians, counted as one village in the total.

<sup>8</sup> Alevi is a distinctive Shiite sect widespread among both Turks and Kurds in Anatolia.

the decrease in population cannot be put down solely to differences in culture and social structure between different ethnic groups.<sup>9</sup>

The town population of Pınarbaşı quadrupled to 12,000 in the last 60 years, though its economic and industrial activities do not create sufficient employment to fulfil the demands of job seekers. An estimated ethnic breakdown of the town population suggests that Avşars make up 40 percent, Alevi Kurds 30 percent,<sup>10</sup> Circassians 20 percent, while the remaining 10 percent is composed of Turkish refugees, either *93 Muhacir* who fled Kars in the War of 1293, or *Bulgar Göçmen* from the Balkans who came as the result of population exchange after the foundation of the Republic in 1923. The Circassian population in the district is around 10,000. The Kayseri branch of an Ankara-based Circassian ethnic organisation, *Kafkas Derneği* (the Caucasus Association), estimates that 30,000 Circassians live in the province.

Lastly, the Turkish census from 1928 to 1965 published a population breakdown in terms of the languages spoken. The state's statistics have been criticised for under-representing the number of people who speak non-Turkish languages (Andrews forthcoming: 671-672). As for the rural area of Kayseri, the statistics for the period between 1938 and 1965 show a considerably smaller number of Caucasian language speakers (*Çerkezce* or *Abazaca*) than the actual population in Circassian villages in Pınarbaşı – by 6-28% – even after excluding the residents of 5 Circassian villages occupied by different groups during the period. Whether these disparities can be accounted for by the state's assimilation policy remains yet to be proven.

### 3) Karakuyu

Karakuyu, the principle focus throughout my research, is situated at the entrance of inner Uzunyayla. A road from Pınarbaşı forks into two branches here, which pass through many Circassian villages, leading to Şarkışla and Kangar. Karakuyu was founded below the site of a Hittite barrage and a modern dam was built just above the settlement in the 1960s.

In 1997, Karakuyu was a small village of some 70 households. It was, nonetheless, known as the largest village or as the one least affected by urban migration owing to the striking decline of population in Uzunyayla as a whole. Its population grew from 369 in 1935 to 657 in 1965, but then fell to the present 279 residents (Table 4). This resembled the pattern of other Circassian villages in the Öreñşehir sub-district to which it belongs, though the fall of population in Karakuyu was less dramatic so far. Karakuyu enjoyed a reputation as the wealthiest village in the region, blessed with fertile, dark soil, ideal for growing wheat, while neighbouring villages had less productive, calcareous soil. Karakuyu was emerging as the new social centre of Uzunyayla.

Karakuyu was one of the first sites in Uzunyayla where displaced Circassians founded camps. The name of the village, “Black Well”, appears in a song written by Dadaloğlu (Sakaoğlu 1986: 95), a nineteenth-century Avşar folk minstrel (*âşık*). This suggests that, prior to the Circassian settlement, the site was already important for the supply of water to the nomadic Turks using Uzunyayla as summer pastures.<sup>11</sup> Six more villages developed from the camp. They were all said to have originated from *Kundet-ey*, a region of the Great Kabarda under the influence of a princely lineage, the Kundet. To this day, they formed a block called “*Kundet-ey* Seven Villages” in the middle of Uzunyayla (Map 3). From Karakuyu, the Kundet moved on to settle in two neighbouring villages, though none remained in these villages.

---

<sup>9</sup> Bates mentions that ethnic differences in the district do not correspond either to geographical particularity or to specific niches in the local economy, because all these groups (Circassians, Avşars, Kurds, and migrants of various Turkish origins) settled in the area relatively recently (1973: 20-21). Bates studied the semi-nomadic Yörük group who migrated between their villages in Gaziantep and the summer pastures in Pınarbaşı. Their travel to Pınarbaşı was prohibited by the governor of Kayseri in the 1990s due to fears that terrorists were moving with the semi-nomadic group.

<sup>10</sup> They have come from villages in Sarız, almost deserted now since many Alevi Kurds there have migrated to the UK as asylum seekers. These Alevi Kurds originally settled in Sarız as refugees from Tuncel in the Dersim region, fleeing from state persecution in the aftermath of the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925. See van Bruinessen (1997) for the historical connection between Dersim and Kurdish Alevis.

<sup>11</sup> Interestingly, all other place-names in Uzunyayla mentioned in Dadaloğlu's ballads also refer to the location of water supplies: i.e. Pınarbaşı “Fountainhead”; Kaynar “Spring”; Pazarsu “Bazaar Stream”.

Karakuyu officially consists of two separate villages, Little Karakuyu (*Küçük Karakuyu*) and Great Karakuyu (*Büyük Karakuyu*), with thirty and forty households respectively, though Karakuyu is administratively represented by one common headman. Villagers who called these two sections the Upper Quarter (*Yukarı Mahalle*) and the Lower Quarter (*Aşağı Mahalle*) knew that they were actually two different villages in the pre-migration Nalchik. These two quarters retained a keen sense of rivalry before they were integrated into a single social space in the 1980s owing to the population decline. The villagers still formed two different congregations (*cemiyet*) with separate mosques and imams.

These two quarters represented two separate villages in the Kabarda plain, *Sharkwa* (the Upper Quarter) and *Shegem* (the Lower Quarter). *Shegem* was named after a branch of the River Terek, said to be facing *Sharkwa* (“Waterwheel”) on the opposite bank of the river. Circassian villages were usually named after the lord who founded the village (see Ch. 3). Since the Kundet was prince of a large region, most of the “*Kundet-ey* Seven Villages” were named after the villages’ own lords. These two quarters of Karakuyu were exceptional cases whose names derived from landmarks, virtually unknown outside the village. This explains why Karakuyu also had the reputation of being a village with no lord.

This reputation reinforced another title imposed upon the village: “slave village” (*kajer kwaje*). More than half the current households in the village were rumoured to have descended from slaves: more than a third in the Upper Quarter and more than half in the Lower Quarter. That Karakuyu came to be associated with slaves may be partially accounted for by the historical fact that its extensive arable lands attracted a number of poverty-stricken, new settlers from other villages prior to 1950, including many ex-slaves and their descendants who lived from hand to mouth as agricultural labourers. Circassians who moved from their natal village and settled in different villages are called *xexes*.<sup>12</sup> Among the twenty-odd *xexes* families still remaining in Karakuyu, more than half were said to have slave origins, amounting to one third of all ex-slave families currently found in the village. The village also featured three households of Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria who settled in the Upper Quarter in 1953.

Residents of the Upper Quarter often ridiculed the Lower Quarter, calling it “the Gypsy Quarter”, “the Greek Quarter”, “the Armenian Quarter” or “the quarter of dark-skinned citizens”. The local *worqs* often said that the ethnic origins of enslaved people were not known. The use of derogatory non-Circassian ethnic names here seemed to reflect the observation that the majority of the families in the Lower Quarter, many of them poor, were of slave origin, accounting for two thirds of ex-slave families in the whole village.

The residents of the Upper Quarter also asserted the precedence of their quarter where some prominent *worq* families retained their wealth and social influence until relatively recently and continued to act with a formal and authoritative air. In contrast, slave-owning *worq* lineages declined or died out earlier in the Lower Quarter; social relations there were said to have loosened. There was known to be estrangement among affluent families, especially among newly wealthy ex-slave families. The use of derogatory ethnic names for the inhabitants of the Lower Quarter also implied that, since a number of families of slave or *xexes* origin had not fully recovered from destitution, the disparity in the distribution of wealth was still greater there, obstructing co-operation between different families, an important aspect of social life in the Circassian community that emphasised “harmony” (*uyum*).

### [3] Social Memory, Forgetting, and Memory Politics

#### 1) Overview

This thesis explores the politics of authority, power and knowledge pursued by means of memory. In this short section, I define how I use the ideas of memory and social memory throughout the thesis. As already mentioned, I understand memory as a symbolic mediation

---

<sup>12</sup> Etymologically, *xexes* derives from the verb *xesin* (to sit in something, to sojourn somewhere). As for the first *xe* of the word, Jaimoukha, the author of the first comprehensive Kabardian-English dictionary, associates it with *xama* denoting “stranger”. Collectively as *xexesxer*, the term also denotes diasporic Circassians (personal communication).

through which meaning is worked out. One aspect of this poetic quality of memory manifests itself as “a verbalized reflection of personal truth and social reality” (Passerini 1983: 195). Recently, it has become acceptable to understand history as a genre of narrative, which “provides a way of temporally experiencing the world by the way it records, recounts, defines, frames, orders, structures, shapes, schematizes, and connects events” (Rapport & Overing 2000: 283. See also White 1981; Brunner 1986; Williams 1988; Zerubavel 1995). As a reflexive process of working over a sequence of events to generate meanings, memory may be seen as almost synonymous to orally expressed, popular narratives of history.

Memories equated with oral histories might reveal some specific qualities such as cyclicity, openness to alteration and fragmentedness in opposition to the linearity, dogmatism and coherence of official state History. Multiple histories on the one hand and History on the other reveal the dual nature of history. Before presuming that contrast *a priori*, it is important first to listen attentively to different versions of historical stories told to endow human life, embedded in time, with meaning and order. This helps to elucidate the “social creativity” (Davis 1994) by which a group of people replenishes its historical imagination with a repertoire of narrative resources and devices: discourses, myths, allegories, fables, idioms, metaphors and other figures of speech, and social and temporal categories.

The diversity of experience of complex relations between the past and the present in a particular society cannot, however, be exhausted only by identifying verbal memory accounts with popular histories as opposed to History. Memory, defined as “an active production of meaning and interpretations”, incorporates a historical consciousness formed around other fields: e.g. custom (*âdet*), tradition (*gelenek*), the established code of conduct (*usull/xabze*) and memory objects (*hatıra*) including landscape and mementoes. These are the means by which people make sense of the flow of time, producing continuities and discontinuities between the past, present and future. Focusing on these categories facilitates an exploration of multi-stranded, everyday historicity in all its complexity.

Constituting a cultural framework of this kind, memory as oral accounts of history also incorporates the subjective experiences of individuals. The act of telling memories in particular reflects an individual’s sense of increasing or decreasing agency with which one commands one’s own life and affects the course of events in the wider society. This fluctuation in the level of social capacity one perceives in oneself may be a result of social and economic transformations, accompanied by changes of values. Like myths explored by Samuel & Thompson (1990), memory is a meeting point between cultural resources, objective social factors and individual subjectivity.

De Certeau examines memory in his discussion of what he calls “everyday practice”.<sup>13</sup> This includes the tactics through which those in weaker positions manipulate constraining situations, situations in which the order of things is defined and imposed on them by the elite. The socially weak do this by appropriating dominant symbolisms and knowledge, and re-using them as a framework for action (1988: 29-39). Reed-Danahay describes such everyday social practices as “artfully creating and wangling cultural meanings and situations” (1993: 223), and further distinguishes two different forms of what de Certeau calls “ways of operating” or the “art of ‘making do’” (1988 30): first, an accommodation to difficult situations by managing with the available resources, even if these are not really suitable for the purpose, which we may term “making do”; secondly, a more active operation, incorporating resistance as well as accommodation, through which people make their way around difficult obstacles with inadequate means, producing positive experiences and turning situations to their own advantage (Reed-Danahay 1993: 227), which might be termed “getting by”, though such everyday practices should be freed from the passivity and resignation implied in these expressions.

De Certeau states that memory is a practical knowledge learned from the multitude of past experiences that one has passed through, which helps one to compute and predict “‘the multiple paths of the future’ by combining antecedent or possible particularities”. Such “practical memory”

---

<sup>13</sup> De Certeau’s idea of “everyday practices” allows a greater flexibility than Scott’s “everyday resistance” (1990), which confines the struggles of subordinates into private realms behind the public contexts.

is a resource one activates and mobilises in response to the exercise of power by the other who originally invokes a particular memory. It is open to alteration so as to produce novel interpretations and experiences flexibly and tactically, transforming a mere chance into an opportunity to bring about favourable situations. Memory enables the socially weak to outwit the socially strong as well as to manipulate dominant discourses (1988: 82-88).

Practical memory need not be confined to linguistic expressions. The past is not only present in the highly elaborated discursive expressions implied in history as a narrative genre. Attention to memory enables one to examine the many different ways in which the presence of the past is perceived in non-linguistic vehicles and experienced in a variety of social practices. Experiences of everyday historicity encompassed in memory in this broader sense may challenge prejudices, omissions, exclusions, generalisations, abstractions, stereotypes and myths incorporated in oral narratives of history.

Alongside its importance as the substance of oral history, memory has another aspect as an action covering both remembering and forgetting. Attention to this active side of memory helps to place memory accounts within a social process in which remembering is actually done, by linking these discursive narratives to two other discursive aspects of memory to which Antze & Lambek draw our attention: the discursive construction of memory and silence, and an identity politics forged through a rhetoric that makes one forget as well as remember (1996: xv).

Attending to the creative nature of memory, this thesis examines social memory in its political aspects. With the recent growth of interest in the social factors in memory construction, Halbwachs's pioneering work on collective memory (1980; 1992) is often cited. He is, at the same time, criticised for his overemphasis on presentism; insufficient treatment of the power structure of a group and the interactive process by which memory is socialised within that structure; and neglect of contestation, politics and change (Connerton 1989: 38; Burke 1989: 107; Tonkin 1992: 104-106; Coser 1992: 25-26; Zerubavel 1994: 4-6).

According to Rapport & Overing, "in sharing the knowledge to produce and read narratives in a particular way, members of a cultural group will share ways of thinking about, of framing, schematizing, and memorizing, experience, and will thus come to share a collective memory" (2000: 288). Memory in society, however, does not naturally achieve a collective quality merely through people passing down individual memories over generations through some media of memory, or by articulating and disseminating these memories through simplification, conceptualisation and generalisation (e.g. See Fentress & Wickham 1992: 47-48; Darian-Smith & Hamilton 1994: 1). The manner in which a particular way of remembering the past is shared by a specific group is often no more than a claim pressed by a dominant section of the group. The process by which a certain memory is made collective is, at best, an imposition by such a group.

The idea of social memory enables one to avoid the notion of "collective memory", which presupposes a consciousness as a collectivity preceding and transcending individuals, ignoring the discontinuities, dissent and conflicts in society. This point is especially relevant to Turkey, where various totalising discourses are recurrently produced, endowing individuals with meanings only in relation to particular collectivities that some nationalists hold to have precedence over their constituents, whether society, nation or nation-state (see Ch. 7). By adopting Bastide's understanding of social memory as a system of objective social relations (cited in Wachtel 1986: 214-217), it is also possible to eschew a cognitive-psychological approach that reduces social memory to the contents of individuals' long-term memory. Social memory is not simply a knowledge about history and society acquired, possessed, handed down and recounted. This idea of social memory further separates itself from an approach that opposes social memory to true history, equating the former with certain myths about which society remains uncritical. Social memory is not a false consciousness that merely serves as an ideology, which prevents people from becoming fully aware of their social conditions.

Social memory is a framework in which memories of different individuals are generated, narrated, linked and opposed to each other, corresponding to their social position and personal experiences (Bastide, cited in Hamilton 1994: 19). Social memory as such relies on the power relations within a group or between groups; the dynamism of contestation and transformation is central to it. Through this understanding, it also becomes possible to grasp social memory as an ongoing process by which a particular representation of the past is imposed as a collective

memory, which purports to swallow those on whom it is enforced as “a shared past” or “our history”. At the same time, people produce alternative “counter memories” (Davis & Starn 1989) through resisting, evading and even appropriating the dominant memory, to open up their own narrative spaces. White mentions that history as a narrative genre needs a coherence, or a narrative closure, to be adequately integrated and gain persuasiveness (1981: 20). Social memory is a process in which different versions of the past compete on unequal terms to achieve this narrative quality in different degrees by repressing, replacing, obscuring, precluding, encompassing and incorporating other versions.

Sutton defines historical consciousness as the diverse ways in which the past is relevant to the present and proposes that it be treated as a subject matter in its own right (1998: 10). A politics of authority and power, however, underlies the presence of the past in the present, as Bloch has demonstrated (1989). The past is often brought into the present and made relevant to it. People expend a tremendous amount of energy producing and promoting a certain history as a common past or a collective memory that empowers one section of society by victimising others (Thomson et al. 1994: 35).

“Memory work” (Irwin-Zarecka 1994: 89-90) can also be located in efforts made by people disempowered within a particular representation of history to work out a favourable framework that connects the past and the present anew, so as to draw positive meanings out of their own relations with history. As Bahloul demonstrates, memory is a tool for manipulating the past and is thus capable of influencing the present (1996: 25-27). Anthropologists can contribute by freeing such memory projects, as part of people’s everyday practice, from confinement to elaborated oral narratives, locating them also in subtler experiences of historicity through divergent social practices.

Social memory serves as a framework for comparison between opposing versions of history and reveals blanks in the articulated version of history. It also positively re-evaluates the silence of those burdened by the imposed version of a shared past. Social memory provides a larger narrative as a context into which these gaps are interwoven, together with fragments of seemingly insignificant remarks. This enables the teller to present, and the listener to read, these lapses and subtle expressions as forming significant stories.

Even the socially weak, treated as a muted category in the dominant representation of society, are conscious agents of social memory, though perhaps to a lesser degree, who generate particular meanings and structure their temporal experiences to their own advantage. The inarticulacy that may be characteristic of their oral accounts is neither a lack nor a loss of historical knowledge. It is not an effect of collective amnesia or of social control, but needs to be re-appraised as an expressive part of an alternative memory, realised in an active process of remembering, in which arts of forgetting play as important a role as arts of telling. As essential constituents of communicative acts, silences, omissions and gaps are all eloquent forms of narrative.

Lastly, like *souvenir* in French, *hatıra* in Turkish suggests that memory links an oral account and a material object, which evokes that historical story. Citing Halbwachs, Douglas mentions that remembering is an effect realised when a mnemonic object helps to retrieve and fit together individuals’ obscure impressions, transforming them into a clearly conceptualised and well-structured story (1980: 5). If so, forgetting may equally be seen as a reverse effect of the same mnemonic process, in which a recollection is turned again into fragmented images, undoing the existing image of the past. Just as material objects serve remembering (Kwint 1999: 2), their manipulation may also promote an active forgetting: an innovation of historical narratives achieved through disassembling, re-assembling, replacing and renewing memories. This is more than a matter of passively waiting for a memory of past events to fall into a state of oblivion. It is part of the social practice of memory work by which people struggle to manipulate the past and operate their present life.

By examining these social aspects of memory, I probe the intentions of human agents who act upon the flow of time. They do so to draw favourable meanings and generate alternative narratives about the way society and history are represented, which often results in restricting an empowering experience to a particular group within society.

## 2) Outline

In Part I, I explore the landscape of Uzunyayla in its dual construction as the setting for memory politics pursued among local Circassians. In Chapter 2, I locate Circassians' settlement in Uzunyayla within broader discourses of identity and history, thereby laying down the *context* for the following discussions. I point out some affinities between the identity politics taken up by urban Circassian intellectuals and the real politics pursued by local Avşars, who appropriate Turkish nationalist discourses to further their own interests.

Shifting the agency to Circassians in Chapter 3, I investigate their creative use of memory in inscribing their history upon the local landscape, turning the new natural environments into a *stage* for their own meaningful activities. The effects are, however, double-edged since this process involves a symbolic reconstruction of community that empowers Circassians unevenly.

Part II analyses different sets of oral accounts which local Circassians produce about their history since settling in Uzunyayla, and examines social memory as a framework in which personal memories are linked to each other in certain social conditions. In Chapter 4, I look at the "bridewealth issue" and examine historicity formed around a custom. From verbal accounts about a past event, I draw some central themes explored in the next chapter.

In Chapter 5, I examine oral accounts about the history of a longer period as site of convergence of cultural and social factors and individual subjectivity, to analyse the politics of memory and knowledge. The articulated narratives of *worqs* form a dominating memory. Against this backdrop I re-assess silence and forgetting in accounts related by Karakuyulus as alternative narratives carrying their own moral messages.

By using the cultural ideas of memory that Circassians share with Turks (as *hatır* and *hatıra*), Part III links these linguistic expressions of historical consciousness to the acts of remembering and forgetting incorporated into everyday social life. In Chapter 6, I examine the ways memory and oblivion are discursively constructed, as well as in how remembering and forgetting are experienced in social interaction. I explore politics through the rhetoric of memory, which utilises cultural idioms that turn slave descendants into mnemonic objects to authorise a particular representation of the past.

In Chapter 7, I investigate the alcohol drinking in which Karakuyulu men indulge as a Circassian tradition, to demonstrate that different types of sociability generate different memories. I pursue the interactive process in which these men establish a legitimate relationship with their national past, which serves to produce a counter memory.

In Chapter 8, I focus on memories told about one outstanding ex-slave man in Karakuyu. To examine the process by which a novel recognition of social change is created and registered, I shall further elaborate the idea of everyday historicity in which the past can be undone and reconstituted through manipulating mnemonic objects, already developed in the previous chapters. I consider how current Karakuyulus produce an active forgetting to innovate narratives that link the past and the present; these make possible their salvation from the past, which in turn has a significant effect on life in the present.

## Part I Landscape of Uzunyayla: From Displacement to Emplacement

### Chapter 2 Displacement Discourse on Circassians

#### [1] Introduction: Two Landscapes

In Part I, I explore how Circassians pursued diverse memory politics, and how they rendered the natural environment of Uzunyayla meaningful as a cultural setting. In treating Uzunyayla as a landscape, I follow Tilly, who defines landscape as an extension of places, expanding through space, incorporating numberless landmarks on which humans have inscribed their agency. Landscape is a stage for significant human actions and as such it makes sense to people who have created it from an unmarked geography (Tilly 1994. See Ch. 1). The following two chapters aim to examine the political processes that made Uzunyayla a contested landscape among competing actors.

After the tragedy of forced deportation and consequent social dislocation, Circassians in Uzunyayla have struggled to re-locate themselves in their new natural surroundings, a harsh location for the settlement of the original exhausted refugees. The spatial inscriptions of this one-and-half-century-long endeavour to create continuity with the remembered community in their homeland rendered Uzunyayla a human landscape. Memories were made use of in many creative ways in this process of transforming the conditions of de-territorialization into re-territorialization (Appadurai 1996).

I start this chapter with some texts presented to and by pupils in a school festival in Karakuyu. I draw attention to the contested nature of Uzunyayla's landscape by juxtaposing two different representations of it: one in the school party and the other in an old Circassian ballad (*wered*) composed by the first-generation settlers. Different social actors created different landscapes out of Uzunyayla.

#### 1) The School Festival

*23 April, 1997. Day of National Sovereignty and Children. Knee-deep snow covers the ground. The schools of nine nearby villages were all closed and incorporated into the school in Karakuyu last year; over 100 pupils are now studying at the primary and junior high schools in the Middle Quarter. Seven young teachers work at the school, three of them Karakuyulus, two Circassians from other villages and the rest Turkish.*

*In Turkey, April 23rd is an official holiday, celebrating the opening of the first Grand National Assembly in Ankara in 1920 under Mustafa Kemal's leadership. Children participate in a school ceremony to commemorate one of the most important dates in the Turkish War of Independence that led to the foundation of the Republic in 1923. Here, I reproduce three related texts presented in the programme, which reflect the state's official ideology that Anatolia is the homeland of Turks.*

*The Karakuyulu headmaster opens the ceremony with a speech:*

*All of you are in debt (borç) to Atatürk for this holiday he made a gift to children. Everything must be reciprocated (karışıklı) and you enter a debt to him. As the future leaders, you are obliged to recognise the value of this day in the manner most appropriate for those who saved the homeland (vatan) at its most critical moment and raised our country (ülke) to the level of civilisation. As its present owners, you are supposed not to allow enemies to step on the soil (toprak) our ancestors (atalarımız) saved with their blood. . . . You should not forget that you are just small drops among millions of pupils celebrating this holiday all over the country.*

*Then a chorus group gives a recital including the Turkish national anthem (İstiklal Marşı) and a song entitled "If You Roam Anatolia" (Gezsen Anadolu'yu).*

*How beautiful you are, if you roam Anatolia  
You will be freed from all worries, if you roam Anatolia  
Rivers are meandering and springs take water from snow ice  
How pleasant the soils are, if you roam Anatolia*

*Spring is different there, summer and winter are different there  
Ah, it says, different, different, different  
If you roam Anatolia, if you roam Anatolia (my translation)*

*The party concludes with a play about an Anatolian village to which a new female teacher is sent to work. Villagers are excited about the coming electricity and the headman is busy preparing for it. The construction of an asphalt road is completed and life in the village becomes remarkably easy. Years later, one of the female pupils the new teacher taught returns to the village as a teacher. She says "I want to bring enlightenment to the village just as electricity brought brightness to the village". At the end of the play, all the cast reappears on stage, saying "I want to become a teacher" again and again.*

These three separate but ideologically coherent texts referred to homeland, country and soil; Anatolia; and village respectively, forming a narrative of a national landscape. The ceremony both recalled an event in the liberation war and attempted to instil in the children a sense of its gravity. The programme conveyed the nation-state's ideology, which identified the nation with a clearly bounded space controlled by a single sovereign state composed of homogeneous individuals (See Boyarin 1994: 2). This message can be easily read in the landscape constructed at the point where these three texts intersected.

The Anatolia praised in the song was an idealised landscape empty of concrete places. The lyrics evoked abstract geographical features that existed everywhere, yet nowhere. The song emphasised the distinctiveness of the seasons, which were more or less identical within the state boundaries. This homogeneity of the landscape within the state territory paralleled the idea of homogeneous citizens expressed in the headmaster's speech, which shifted attention away from pupils' individuality. In the speech, the soil was portrayed as territorialized, saved by the blood of almost mythical *male* ancestors (*ata*), personified in Atatürk (the Father Turk), and still surrounded by unspecified enemies. This landscape was incorporated into the political myth that Turkish history involved a succession of bloody wars over sovereignty.

The speech was silent about the fact that local Circassians had contributed greatly to the Turkish victory in the Independence War by sacrificing nearly a whole generation of men. The disaster of Sarkamış (January 1915) in which 90,000 soldiers, including a few thousand conscripted from Uzunyayla, froze to death, after Enver Pasha misjudged the winter weather and sent them to the northern highlands, was immortalised in a Circassian ballad,<sup>14</sup> one of the best known among the current generation. An official commemorative ceremony thus separated what should be remembered from what could be forgotten and actually led to forgetting rather than remembering, as Gills (1994) points out.

The speech encouraged children to take pride in being descendants of a nation rooted firmly in the past, and to develop a sense of indebtedness for the blood *their* ancestors shed (see also Copeaux 1996). They were expected to reciprocate through future service to their state. The state was described as a provider bringing a civilised way of life to the village. Villages were expected to internalise the idealised image of themselves as citizens who enjoyed the blessings of the paternal state, delivered through its administrative mechanisms.

This harmonious representation of the village was reminiscent of the idyllic image of modern villages outlined in the Village Law of 1924 (Szyliowicz 1966:36-38). It also epitomised the republican populism that defined Turkish society as devoid of class struggle (Hale 1981: 54, 65-66, 122). Here, modernisation and development were assumed to be a linear and even process that benefited citizens unambiguously. Advocating such an image was congruent with the state policy of developing various means of communication to incorporate villages into the nation-state (Kolars 1972; Frey 1963; 1968). The school festival showed that this programme was still very much alive in Uzunyayla.

---

<sup>14</sup> A local Avşar man, whose four sons were conscripted to fight in the First World War, also left a lament (*ağıt*) about the tragedy in Sarkamış (Işık 1963: 105).

## 2) The Ballad

The picture of Anatolia that emerged in the official narrative was of an idealised and abstract space, which lacked the real, lived experiences in particular places that composed a human-centred landscape. To this, I juxtapose a landscape of Uzunyayla evoked in an old local ballad written in the early period after settlement. As in the Middle East context reported by Shelmay (1998), songs played a significant role among Circassians, who lacked a written language, as a “medium of memory” for conveying historical knowledge.<sup>15</sup> Şora Bekmerze Noghumuka wrote the first ever monograph on Circassian history (1974, originally published in 1842 in Russian) by incorporating a number of epic songs widely known in his time.

The local ethnomusicologist Doğan Özden collected hundreds of such ballads in Uzunyayla in the 1970s. I quote from one in his vast collection.<sup>16</sup> It is the second half of a long ballad, following a first half dealing with the Circassians’ defeat by Russia:

Adyghe used to live in the world’s most beautiful place  
All the soil was taken away from our hands  
Thanks to the Russians, all our land is gone  
God damn them, they forced us to leave our land  
We got on our way to reach the place of the true religion  
People in the place where we came did not welcome us  
This is not a soil to live on  
Half the year is winter, and once winter starts, they call it “Black Winter”  
When it snows, the whole place looks like *Kanjar* Mountain [covered with permanent snow]  
Storms blow snow, leaving the doors unable to open  
Winds make such a horrifying growl, scaring even our fearless hearts  
The soil is barren, whatever we sow, it bears nothing  
What small yields it bears, field rats mow and eat up  
This soil would not be a country for us  
God damn the Russians, they are the cause  
This song, I am not singing for dancing  
This song, I am singing because we suffered

What was expressed here is a sharp sense of displacement caused by the loss of homeland and the difficulty of making a new homeland in a hostile natural environment. The landscape of Uzunyayla was illuminated by mention of the severity of “Black Winter”, the difficulty of growing agricultural products and the misery of life. Unlike the school song, which sanitised Anatolia, the ballad was comparable to the realism of Turkish peasant novels, one of whose messages is that the new idea of land acquired by labour and sweat must replace the traditional mentality that regards the soil as hard-won by blood (Stone 1973). The latter association was reproduced in the headmaster’s speech.

The song referred to the near-impossibility of making a homeland out of Uzunyayla, articulating the deep sense of dislocation. The years of past catastrophic harvest formed important components of the local chronicles even now. The song, however, also expressed memories of the struggles of the first-generation immigrants to transform this inhospitable land into a new home. Such torment resonated with the afflictions of the present generations. The evoked sense of being misplaced – being in the wrong place – was the backdrop against which the earnest human endeavours for re-emplacement were appreciated. The landscape portrayed in the song chimed with the above-mentioned idea that people must turn the land into a homeland through their sweat.

Here I looked at two landscapes represented in two different types of narrative: Anatolia in the school ceremony imposed homogeneity onto the delineated territory, while the local ballad

---

<sup>15</sup> Another example is *Rembetika* among Greek refugees from the Asia Minor who settled in Piraeus (James 2001: 237).

<sup>16</sup> Personal communication. My translation.

highlighted the difficulty of living in Uzunyayla. It is the human history in the latter that made the landscape a meaningful place.

Hirsch (1995) urges us to view landscape as a process, which develops between certain ideologies in the background and the concrete realities of everyday social life in the foreground. Landscape here emerges within struggles between those who try to impose an ideal, drawn from a specific social discourse, onto real social life, and those who resist this intervention. For the latter, it serves as a terrain for their everyday practices of accommodating to and resisting the dominant discourses and practices. Below, I shall further discuss Uzunyayla in the light of Hirsch's insight, probing how people pursued a politics bound up with these two different landscapes within two contrasting narratives. I restrict the discussion in this chapter to the claims made by various social actors who still stressed Circassians' rootlessness, which had grave consequences within local party politics.

## [2] A Contested Landscape: Imposed Displacement

First I briefly portray the process by which Circassian refugees settled in Uzunyayla, mainly by citing Habiçoğlu (1993: 167-169). Uzunyayla was one of the first places considered for their settlement. It was co-owned by Mecca and Medina Foundations<sup>17</sup> at the time of the Circassian migration, though left unoccupied till then. The settlement of Circassians started as early as 1859 and the Immigration Commission set up in 1860 decided in 1861 that the land should be given to them free.

The Avşars, a Turkish nomadic group (*aşiret*) who had for some centuries migrated annually between Uzunyayla and the Çukurova plain in Adana, had a claim to Uzunyayla as their summer camp (*yayla*) and resisted the Circassian settlement. This conflict escalated into bloody clashes, which took place on the western fringe of Uzunyayla. The Ottoman government, which had been trying to settle nomadic groups in Anatolia since the eighteenth century, supported the immigrants and repressed the Avşars through forced conscription, making them repay their debts to the government in cash and even deporting them to other areas in and beyond Anatolia. The above-mentioned folk minstrel, Dadaloğlu, is well-known for his songs about Avşars' resistance against this state policy of forced settlement that had started earlier than the Circassians' resettlement.

The Avşars eventually accepted the supremacy of the Ottoman government and settled in the Zamantı valley and the northern reaches of the Taurus Mountains, west and south of Pınarbaşı respectively. It thus became easier for the Circassians to settle in Uzunyayla; the Circassian population there had already reached more than ten thousand by the beginning of 1862. The area around Uzunyayla gained demographic importance because of the mass influx of refugees, and was thus given the status of a separate district in 1861 and named Aziziye after the Sultan Abdulaziz, who ascended the throne in the same year. Habiçoğlu mentions that "memories" (*hatıralar*) and scars remain, though no clashes have been reported since then (1993: 168, n. 4).

Circassians in Turkey are treated by both Turkish scholars and Circassian urban intellectuals as a displaced group on the way to assimilation. Early Turkish nationalists at the end of the nineteenth century described non-Turkish groups as undergoing rapid Turkification, to promote an idea of Anatolia as the legitimate homeland of Turks. Şemsettin Sami, for instance, wrote in 1881 that Circassians were being rapidly Turkified, forgetting their languages (Kushner 1977: 50-54).

It is possible to observe a similar attitude in the work of a leading historian on Turkey in our time. Karpas states that the Circassian "tribes", who lacked an overarching national identity, eagerly embraced Islam. He continues by stating that this led to their smooth integration into a new and larger form of socio-political organisation, by which he means the Turkish nation moving from Muslim-Turkish empire to the Turkish Republic (1985: 57, 75-77; 1990).

The substantial integration that did occur was, however, not a natural process. It was in fact actually enforced by the state policy of destroying the traditional social organisation and

---

<sup>17</sup> Habiçoğlu does not explain what they were.

leadership of the Circassians, as Karpat himself elucidates. Displacement (*sürgün*) was a common policy during the Ottoman regime, aimed at isolating the regional powers from the people under their command so as to centralise power in the hand of the Porte (Tekeli 1994: 204-205).<sup>18</sup> Seen as war-like barbarians by the Ottoman elite, Circassians were scattered in small groups all over the Ottoman territories. Ethnic leaders were settled in towns, separate from their own groups. Karpat writes:

If a tribe or village emigrated *en masse* and then was settled as such in a geographical, cultural, economic, and political environment very similar to the place of origin, it was possible that the old social structure, including the leadership, might survive to hinder identity change. However, the Ottoman government took steps to prevent this. It already had long experience with the settlement of tribes in the fifteenth through the eighteenth centuries, and had established a pattern designed to facilitate integration. The tribal confederations, notably the Caucasians, were divided into several groups and settled in different places (1990: 140).

The social impact of the severance might be less disturbing, and social reproduction easier, if people with common memories of the lost homeland settled in a new environment as a group. If so, the Ottoman policy toward Circassians that prioritised an imperial integration may fairly be judged as destructive. Adaptation to the Turkish-Islamic nation state was made inevitable, not through healing the wounds of worn-out refugees, but by furthering the erosion of their social organisation. Karpat portrays the process of integration as if it had proceeded harmoniously, belittling the deep pain of a people whose society was forcefully disintegrated in the interests of the state. Karpat's use of the term "tribe", by which he means a socio-political unity less developed and thus lower than a nation, for Circassians also echoes the destructive Turkification policy which the early Republican state applied to Kurdish "tribes of the East" in the cloak of a civilizing mission (see van Bruinessen 1994: 152-153).

Circassian intellectuals have recently come to see their nation as in diaspora. In her early essay, Shami, a Palestinian-Circassian anthropologist who has studied Circassians in Jordan, advocated detailed studies on separate Circassian settlements:

While the boundaries of Circassian group identity were formed by the process of displacement, its content was also informed by the process of settlement and defined in opposition to indigenous groups. It is therefore likely that the symbols of identity and exclusivity would be constructed differently in the different settlement locations (1994: 194).

In her later writings Shami shifts her interests to diasporic aspects of Circassians. She mentions that the "ethnic identity (of a deterritorialized group) has a location, and it is constructed in reference to a point of origin, however abstract or unreachable or buried in time that space may be" (1998a: 620). She goes on to argue:

To understand the new construction of Circassian identity, it is not enough to examine conceptions in one locale or even to compare across a number of locales. Rather, the socio-political relationships and cultural representations linking the multiple locales and the homeland with one another should be seen as constituting a field of transnational intersections. An emphasis on transnationalism shifts the focus from how these identities are imagined to how they are organized (ibid.: 630).

In a recent article she continues, "Throughout this long history of displacement, Circassian identity has been formed and transformed. The particularities and symbols of distinctiveness in

---

<sup>18</sup> This policy was applied to Circassians until 1923 when nearly six thousand residents in thirty villages in Western Anatolia were displaced to Eastern Anatolia (Şöenu 1923). The Law on Resettlement of 1934 manifested that Turkification was the primary aim of displacement and resettlement of non-Turkish groups (van Bruinessen 1994: 152).

each locality articulated with translocal ethnic connections and collective sensibilities” (2000: 180).

Her focus has shifted from an identity “constructed differently in different settlement locations” and “defined in opposition to indigenous groups” to “a point of origin” and further to “translocal ethnic connections” and “collective sensibilities”. This seems to clash with her earlier proposal for the study of Circassian identities created through interactions with surrounding groups in each settlement.

As for Circassians in Turkey, Shami’s awareness of “the particularities and symbols of distinctiveness in each locality” is restricted to the activities of ethnic organisations among the urban elites. Furthermore, she mentions that the ethnicity of Circassians in Turkey has taken the form of identity politics among ethnic intellectuals. She lumps all other people together in a monolithic category of those “assimilated”, concealing them behind a wholesale “collective sensitivity”. She treats them as if they have no real consciousness of themselves as Circassians in Turkey, virtually denying the vast majority of ordinary Circassians, far from urban centres, any space to express their distinctive sensitivities (Shami 1995: 83-84, 1998a: 625-626).

The Circassian urban elites in Turkey seem inclined to see the same “point of origin”, the Caucasus, as the spiritual centre of Circassians. They neglect the importance of specific localities and represent their society as only tenuously rooted in Turkey.

Two review essays (Bjedug & Taymaz 1995; Taymaz 1998) demonstrate the transition in these elites’ national consciousness as presented in the major periodicals by ethnic organisations. These essays trace the shift in how the elites imagine Circassian identity in relation to two places, Turkey and the Caucasus. According to Taymaz, the primary geographical theme throughout the 1950s-60s was the Caucasus. “The place in which [Circassian society] exists (*içinde yaşanılan mekan*)” was recognised during the 1970s-80s and the concept of “Circassians in Turkey” started to be used. This brought with it a series of fresh vocabularies including “motherland” (*anayurt*), “exile”/“displacement” (*sürgün*), “exodus/emigration for a cause” (*muhaceret*), “repatriation” (*dönüş*) and “assimilation” (*asimilasyon*).

These set notions demarcated a new framework for talking about Circassian identity. Relations with the Caucasus were re-established in the 1990s, highlighting the dichotomy between “motherland” and “outside motherland” and the concept of *diaspora* started to be used (ibid. 28-29). Though replacing *muhaceret*, this “diaspora” has inherited its implication that life outside the motherland is “forced” and “transient”. Diasporic Circassians (*xexesxer*, the plural form of *xexes*) clearly shared the sense of displacedness and misplacedness with *xexes* (“alien sojourners”) in the Circassian villages of Uzunyayla.

Taymaz points out that the elites’ continual use of these vocabularies, which feature a connotation of temporality, throughout this period from the 1950s to the 1990s, reflects their fear that Circassians are facing a danger of disappearance (ibid. 30). Following R. Cohen’s idea of diaspora (1996: 515), Taymaz himself juxtaposes the Caucasus, the homeland in which Circassians have their “origin” or “basis” (*köken*) (1998: 30), and Turkey, “the geography in which [Circassian society] exists” (ibid. 28). Despite his reflexive attempt, he appears to be repeating the elite’s insistence that the presence of Circassians in Turkey is transient, marginal and inauthentic.

Cohen (1996: 517-518) underrates the fact that groups that have undergone displacement and resettlement do not just “find themselves” in new environments as passive victims of the tragedy or as recipients of the state’s assimilation policies. Circassians in Uzunyayla did not “find themselves” confined in abstract spaces such as homeland, nation-state, diaspora or “Anatolia”. They were striving to transform their new natural and social environments into a meaningful stage where their own human agency could be exerted, as the next chapter shows.

For Bjedug & Taymaz, the elite Circassians’ re-discovery of Turkey means their realisation that Circassians are scattered among no fewer than one thousand settlements in a nation-state that does not allow them to articulate their ethnic identity (1995: 119). These authors refer to Circassians as some of the last “guests” (*misafir*) in Anatolia (ibid. 118). This idiom is frequently used in Turkey to refer to one’s presence in someone else’s territory, looking around to discover the proper behaviour expected of one. The guest is supposed to enter a reciprocal relation with the

host, exchanging obedience for protection; this is often articulated in a paired idiom of respect and love (see Chs. 6 and 7).

Despite the long-term pains people have undergone to create new homes in their localities, the urban intellectuals seem to share the ideology of Turkish nationalists in seeing their own society as misplaced. This sense of out-of-placeness is crucially different from the sense of alienation articulated in the ballad sung by the locals of Uzunyayla, which recorded their endeavours to make their new homeland.

The well-known Abaza author Özbay has published an anthology of short tales based on historical memories handed down in his own village in Uzunyayla. In the preface, another well-known Abaza writer, Hayri Ersoy, vividly expresses his understanding that Circassians remain in the wrong place. He refers to Uzunyayla as “outside [Circassians’] own natural environments”, quoting an Abaza proverb, “Even the most beautiful flower is seen as harmful in a sown field” (in Özbay 1994: 7). An ethnic magazine, *Kafdağı* (“Caucasus”), published a letter from a reader who describes a deep sense of alienation from the soil and the history experienced in Uzunyayla:

Some force is removing those people and their mother tongues, removing the custom (*xabze*) in the one-thousand-year-old, unique folk culture, and history is turning to dirt... [P]eople are helplessly being ground in the watermill of [hard] everyday life. The soil [of Uzunyayla] is nurtured by swallowing the history of these people. Every year, some elders are turning to soil with their knowledge of this unique folk culture.... A history is dying out together with [these] dying elders (Tl’ışe 1989: 21).

The reader, apparently an urban resident originating from Uzunyayla, attributes the responsibility for sustaining and reviving local knowledge to the “intellectuals who grew up with the smell of grass in the pasture of Uzunyayla”. The locals are said to be merely “thinking that they are still living as themselves”, i.e. deluding themselves that they are maintaining “authentic” Circassian culture. The urban reader ignores the fact that the locals of Uzunyayla have fostered a firmer sense of rootedness.

This common emphasis on a sense of misplacedness seems unjust, given that most members of this ethnic elite are firmly rooted in the affluent class within urban centres. Stressing the inauthenticity of the Circassians’ presence in Anatolia, they seem unable to listen to the voices of the rural Circassians who have struggled for several generations to establish their life in particular locales.

One of the most fruitful ways to adapt diaspora discussions to Circassians in Turkey may be to avoid evoking a sense of alienation from their authentic culture and homeland, and instead to consider, with Clifford, what experiences these diaspora discourses are marginalizing. Clifford draws attention to the fact that diaspora not only entails certain transnational movements that have developed as a consequence of displacement, but also involves struggles to transform local conditions into a particular community (1994: 302).

Etymologically, diaspora means “to sow seeds widely” or “to spread” (R. Cohen 1995: 5). As for its application to Circassians in Turkey, greater attention must be paid to the process of home-making in which the seeds they have planted are putting down roots in particular places. Shami’s frustrated invitation to a regionally-specified study of Circassian identity and social boundaries still remains highly relevant for an ethnographic exploration. Despite its own emphasis on the importance of place in the construction of Circassian identity, the urban elite has yet to discover Uzunyayla as a significant location.

### **[3] The Soil of History**

#### **1) The Layers of Human Agency**

So far I have shown that Turkish historians’ discussion of the Circassian mass migration and the ethnic intellectuals’ assumptions about Circassian diasporic experiences have much in common. In this section, I examine a cultural understanding concerning the connections between soil, history and human agency that manifested itself in this stress on the displacedness of Circassians.

Historian Simon Schama suggests that landscape is “built up as much from strata of memory as from layers of rocks” (1995: 7). Küchler uses the term “landscape of memory” to refer to a geography that serves as a mnemonic device, which conjures up the history of human actions inscribed onto it (1993: 85-86). Landscape may be understood as multi-layered, with each layer of history corresponding to a different stratum (see also Santos-Granero 1998).

It is possible to observe a similar idea in the 1935 programme of the CHP, which uses the Turkish history embedded in the deep layers of the soil to legitimise the national territory: “The Fatherland is the sacred country within our present political boundaries, where the Turkish nation lives with its ancient and illustrious history, and with its past glories still living in the depth of its soil” (cited in B. Lewis 1975: 39).

A series of civilisations emerged and replaced one another in Anatolia, from Hittite to Roman and Byzantine and including various non-Muslim minorities within the Ottoman Empire. They left numerous traces of their presence on the multi-layered landscape in a chronological order. This idea of human history as layered underground offers a useful insight that helps us understand the relations between landscape and remembering in Turkish contexts.

Anatolia itself inherited many place-names, such as Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Kayseri and Anatolia, from previous civilisations. The inscription of the current population’s presence in the territory often took the symbolic form of the appropriation of material cultures left by the former inhabitants, rather than sheer erasure of these records. Whereas the removal of the historical records may be understood as the production of a bare absence that compels forgetting, Turkish cases given below made symbolic use of these memory objects (*hatıra*) to publicise the message, “used to be, but not any longer” (Boyarin 1992: 3-4). This appropriation, achieved by assigning novel functions to these corporeal remains involved both remembering and forgetting.

Dramatic local cases of symbolic appropriation included: transforming a church into a mosque, a cinema or a sports club, used by a folk dance team and a boy scout group, both of whose main purpose is to raise national consciousness; demolishing a mosque to use its construction materials for a private house in an ex-Sunni village now occupied by Alevis, who do not pray in the mosque; using a Christian tombstone engraved with a cross as a stepping stone; breaking open non-Muslim graves in search of treasure; and scraping away the faces of saints on frescos on a church converted into a mosque. These operations denied, not the existence of the former civilisations, but their relevance to the present. These manipulations seemed to gain their rhetorical power through symbolic violations of these physical memories in the manner of desecration or even iconoclasm.

The multi-layered history of former populations can be compared with the multiple underground strata, each of whose layers carries the inscriptions of a particular group. The historical layers can also be perceived in the shift in the uses to which the predecessors’ memory objects are put. Symbolically usurped, these tangible traces serve as the metonymies of the take-over of the territory by the new owners.

The new claims to the territory often take exaggerated forms comparable with sacrilege. These material symbols of the layered sediment of the past recurrently remind the current occupants that their history is suppressing other histories, calling up memories which otherwise might remain forgotten. Thus evoked in the present, the past challenges the present inhabitants’ claims to the territory. People in both Kayseri and Pınarbaşı were highly conscious about the previous residence of Greeks, and more importantly of Armenians whose histories had been overwritten during the process of Turkish nation building. These former populations’ silenced histories and claims to a connection with their former territories, under the surface of which their histories remained inscribed, were evoked in unpredictable ways, though the previous inhabitants themselves may not have been the agents of such evocation.<sup>19</sup>

Political movements that strove to make the Turkish nation coextensive with the state territory enforced forgetting and silence. That which was forgotten did not lose its historical

---

<sup>19</sup> Tucker (2000) reports a case in Cappadocia, once a district belonging to Kayseri, of an evacuated village, which has been turned into an open-air museum of ancient Greek settlement for foreign tourists, the residence of Turkish populations there in the last seven hundred years left unacknowledged.

significance automatically when it became part of the remote past: it was consigned to oblivion by a public declaration that it had lost its relevance to the present. What was supposed to have been forgotten frequently reappeared on the surface. These memory objects were appropriated symbolically by trampling down, scraping off, painting over, excavating, stealing or exhibiting to ensure forgetting. Mnemonic objects could be used to facilitate remembering, but they could also be manipulated to force forgetting.

## 2) Gendering Uzunyayla

In this subsection, I examine some of the ways in which local actors, especially Avşars, gendered rival claims to Uzunyayla through metaphors linking these claims to the male-female relations they saw as natural. Claims to and transactions of land were gendered, thus generating different levels of legitimacy. The appropriation of the strata of history, for instance, appeared to become more persuasive through symbolic violations, just as the appropriation of material culture became comparable to violating women.

Memories of conflicts with Circassians appeared to be encouraging Avşars to organise themselves around the *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (Nationalist Action Party) (see Table 5). In the 1995 election, roughly 35% of voters in Avşar villages supported the party; the figure seemed much higher in the town, where the party competed for the mayoralty. The strong support for the Nationalist party was in line with the national pattern, in which the coexistence of different ethnic or sectarian groups fuelled MHP votes, especially in economically weak parts of Central Anatolia (Ağaoğluları 1987: 202-3).

This, though, was only part of the story. Alparslan Türkeş, the former leader of the MHP who died in 1997, had an Avşar ancestor exiled from Büyük Okyucu village in Pınarbaşı to Cyprus. He made it a habit to come to the town every summer in the last few years of his life. The local branch of the MHP, most of whose supporters were Avşars, held a welcoming ceremony, *Vuslat* (“Union with the Beloved”), at a park in the town. Posthumously, the park was re-named Alparslan Türkeş Park. A Turkish family, who had donated the area to the municipality, resented this, since the park was originally named after their ancestor. The *Vuslat* continued with the attendance of Devlet Bahçeli, the new leader of the party who served as one of the Deputy Prime Ministers in the coalition government (from April 1999 to November 2002).

Avşars appropriated Turkish nationalism as a medium to revive or even constitute their resentful memories, and utilised local party politics to articulate their claim to the territory. Avşars succeeded in converting their memories into a clearly audible voice. During the 1970s, when the whole of Turkey was highly politicised, Avşar MHP supporters adopted the rhyming slogan “Death to Kurds, Oppression to Circassians” (*Kürtlere ölüm, Çerkezlere zulüm*), expressing how they perceived these two groups in the same district.

### 2-1) Dede Yurdu: Gendered Transaction, Gendered Homeland

Memories of clashes passed down among Avşars were encouraging them to produce gendering stories to hierarchize the relations the two rival groups had with Uzunyayla. Sultan Abdulaziz was locally known to have patronised Circassian settlers in their conflicts with the nomadic tribe. He was born of a female slave (*cariye*) of Circassian origin. Avşars said that Circassians won his favour by offering him three girls to serve in his harem. Another historical memory told a different story:

During the early period after Circassians were sent to Central Anatolia to settle, an Avşar bey (chief; rich and influential man) fell in love with a Circassian girl. He asked her father, a Circassian bey, for the girl. The father demanded Uzunyayla in exchange for the girl. The Avşar bey accepted the proposal, and Circassians settled in Uzunyayla. The girl died young. The large plain was left for Circassians. Avşars were driven to tiny villages in the mountains. Avşars still resent the loss of Uzunyayla.

Avşars and historians seemed to share the opinion that Circassians were successful at diplomatic marriage.<sup>20</sup>

A wider framework of local gendering discourse must be taken into consideration to understand the implications of these stories. A particular gender model was recurrently employed in Turkey to present the relation between different ethnic groups as unequal. A well-known folk tale told of *Battal Gazi*, a legendary hero said to have advanced the Turkish conquest of Kayseri:

A long time ago, the whole land of Kayseri was still under the water of a huge lake. There was a Greek [sometimes Armenian] king ruling the region. He announced that his daughter would be given to whoever could take the water away and dry the land. A young Turk dived into the lake. He discovered a plug at the bottom and took it away. All the water gushed away through the hole and an enormous plain emerged. The king gave the princess to the young man, now named *Battal Gazi*. This is how Kayseri was left for Muslims. His name is still retained in the name of a quarter of the city.

In more localised stories of specific settlements, former Christian inhabitants were often mentioned as having disappeared as they mixed with Turks by marrying off girls to them. All these stories recounted how infidels vanished, leaving the land for Turks. One seed-bed for such tales might be found in the famous epic of the escape from Ergenekon of a group of male Turks, who later seized women of other groups to lay the foundations of the Turkish nation (see Çağlar 1990: 80, n. 2).

These stories illuminated a cultural notion that taking a woman involved obtaining the land of her group, while giving a woman away involved losing one's land. Seen as men's property, women and land were analogous to each other, making the capture of another group's women both metaphorical and metonymic to the take-over of its territory. The conquest of a piece of land must be initiated, accomplished or celebrated by taking women from the group who renounced the territory. These two forms of legitimate booty together formed a vibrant image of male honour won in a zero-sum game.

These cases suggested that metaphors of girls transacted in various ways, whether these transactions were reciprocated or not, were frequently invoked to negotiate and define interethnic relations. The girls were used as media to present the relations as conquest, domination, exclusion, differentiation and incorporation and also to project a convincing image of a political and moral hierarchy between different groups.

Stories of girls given away for Uzunyayla reflected Circassians' stigmatised image as female slave traders. The barter of a group's own women for land left its life-giving women commensurable to lifeless property. This transaction did not produce the positive value attached to the acquisition of women and territories together. Avşars frequently told these stories to challenge the legitimacy of Circassians' title to Avşars' "grandfathers' land" (*dede yurdu*). The stories pressed a claim that Avşars were the rightful inheritors of the feminized land owned and protected by their "male ancestors" (*dede*) and handed down through male lines until the relatively recent past of their grandfathers' generation.

Avşars' use of an uncommon term "grandfathers' land" is also significant since many local Circassians called Uzunyayla their "motherland" (*anayurt*) to highlight the feminized nature of their inheritance as well as their recent acquisition of it. They referred to the Caucasus as the "land of mythical male ancestors" (*ata yurdu*), using an expression that stressed remoteness. Here, local Circassians themselves presented themselves as remaining misplaced, in limbo between the faraway and vague homeland in the Caucasus and the new homeland to which their claim were not established completely.

---

<sup>20</sup> Kabardians established affinal relations with a Russian tzar (Ivan the Terrible) and Crimean khans by giving girls (Traho 1991).

## 2-2) Seeds of History

Avşars also used the metaphor of seed (*tohum*) to gender rival claims to Uzunyayla by calling Circassians “Russian Seeds”, referring to Circassians’ homeland as “Russia”. These images were invoked in frequent arguments over land use at the boundaries of Uzunyayla.<sup>21</sup> Avşars said, “Return to Russia! Uzunyayla is not your homeland!. There is no Abdulaziz any longer!”

Examples of nationalist struggles have been reported in which women are made to represent the national territory, used as metaphors of both maintenance and violation of national autonomy.<sup>22</sup> This association is commonly accounted for by pointing to similar qualities attributed to women and land: women’s biological and social reproductive ability and land’s productivity. From her observations in a Turkish village in Central Anatolia, Delaney (1991) points out that the man/father is imaged as a provider of “seeds” which transmit his identity to the children, the woman/mother as the soil, which provides a container in which the children are nurtured.

Some implications of Avşars’ habit of seeing the Circassians as seeds sown in Uzunyayla may be grasped in this light. The Circassians’ settlement was analogous to sowing seeds of an alien nation, which put down roots to drive away Avşars from their “grandfathers’ country”, eventually seizing the territory. Avşars did not consider Circassians to be merely inscribing their history on the surface of the land. They feared that Circassians were planting seeds of their history deep into the feminine soil previously owned and managed by Avşars’ male ancestors. These seeds would germinate, grow, flower, bear fruit and reproduce a community, handing down the territory to future generations. This historicization of Uzunyayla as Circassians’ territory also would territorialize their history, endorsing their claim to the national territory as legitimate.

The seed-soil metaphor was noticeable also in this part of Central Anatolia. According to it, men sow seeds, women help whatever men plant to grow and children receive all of their qualities patrilineally. What grows depends on what is sown and the same soil may feed different plants. Whichever group plants its seeds will nurture its national history and take the land. Avşars were expressing their enmity toward the Circassians’ acquisition of the land their ancestors had used for some hundred years. They feared that the history transplanted by these intruders would be nourished to deny their own history.

The Avşars’ reference to seeds chimed with their belief that Circassian settlement was bringing an alien genealogy to the feminized soil of Uzunyayla, breaking their own genealogical continuity. “Children of the country” (*memleket çocuğu*) were driven away, they believed, and the motherland was forced to foster the bastard child of a foreign genitor. All this made sense since the Turkish word *tohum* meant both sown seed and human sperm. Avşars interpreted Circassian settlement as “diasporic” in the original sense of the word, seeing Circassians not as refugees, immigrants or even settlers, but as colonisers.

At the same time, this masculine image of Circassians was undermined, since the seeds of history they planted were the seeds of Russians, long-standing enemies of the Turks. To grasp this point, the use of botanical metaphors (Malkki 1992) in Turkish nationalism needs to be considered. In addition to the already mentioned host-guest relationship, Turkish nationalist imagination sometimes uses tree metaphors to model the relations between Turks, the legitimate owners of the Republic, and non-Turkish ethnic groups within their territory. Tree metaphors not only incorporate different parts of society segmentarily, but also organise these parts into a hierarchy likened to an organic system.

For instance, Türkkan, one of the old guard of Turkism, speaks of the Turkish nation-state in exactly such a manner:

The trunk of the nation-state is the sovereignty of the nation.... It is the Turkish nation which founds and maintains the nation-state. Roots which nurture this tree were germinated from seeds Turks sowed. Branches, which rely on the trunk of the pomegranate tree and receive a share from the roots, are other citizens in the nation-state, that is, Muslim ethnic groups. Leaves are religious

---

<sup>21</sup> Bates reports some cases of land disputes between these two groups in the 1960s (1973: 28-29, 33).

<sup>22</sup> Recent studies include Kats (1996); Seng & Wass (1995).

minorities.<sup>23</sup> Some branches have come out of the tree itself and some are grafted like ethnic groups and religious minorities. They live like the tree's own leaves if these grafts hold.... Leaves may fall and branches may be snapped off. The roots and the trunk will continue to live, producing branches and leaves. However those branches and leaves broken off and separated, may not live easily... they fall into a hardship... and decay (1995: 75-77, my translation).

In his schema, ethnic minorities are grafted onto the trunk of the Turkish nation-state, founded on the roots of national history grown from Turkish seeds. They are expected to make a contribution to Turkish culture and allowed to benefit from the "fruits of togetherness" (ibid.). They are, however, described here as rootless, denied their own seeds, roots, trunks, flowers or fruits, marking a contrast to Avşars' fear of alien seeds. This model endorses the dominance of Turks by hierarchizing access to territory and sovereignty. These botanical metaphors naturalise the idea that a nation is fixed onto a particular space. This is a good example of the nation-state's "metaphysics of sedentarism", which territorializes culture and nation by likening them to plants rooted in the soil (Gupta & Ferguson 1997). One of the consequences of this ideology is an inclination to see displacement from a natal territory as pathological and to diagnose rootlessness as a loss of moral foundation.

Such a sedentarist ideology of the nation-state generates an epistemology that underlies a series of sociological terms popularly used as part of the everyday language in Turkey: "identity" (*kimlik*), a negative mark branded by the dominant group or by the articulate section within a group, rather than an empowering process of constituting one's agency; "mosaic" (*mozaik*), an unhistorical image visualising a map of isolated and bounded cultures and communities; "cosmopolitan" (*kozmpolitan*), an image of urban chaos in which these groups are merely juxtaposed but do not intermingle creatively; and "assimilation", a linear process in which nations severed from their natural territories are absorbed into the dominant group, unable to maintain their culture and genes.

It is possible to trace the roots of these reifying concepts, widely used in Turkey, to the divergent approaches to ethnic relations within Western social science. Banton distinguishes three major models: the "assimilation" theory of the Chicago School of American sociology, another organic model in which ethnic groups and urban immigrants, often seen as inferior, were assumed to conform to dominant socio-cultural practices (acculturation) and to be subsequently absorbed into the dominant group (assimilation); the "American Melting Pot" model, in which interacting ethnic groups were assumed to lose their distinctive character and merge into a new amalgam in the urban milieu; and the "plural society" theory, originally proposed by the British colonial administrator J. S. Furnival, an economist, which views post-colonial societies as divided into separate and competitive groups with distinctive cultures (Banton 1996: 43-44; see also Eriksen 1993: 8, 14, 18-20, 48-50).

This "plural society" model is comparable with the ahistorical "mosaic" image of Middle Eastern societies, which American anthropologist Carlton Coon systematically employed in *Caravan: the Story of the Middle East* (1951), a once widely read introduction to the anthropology of the region (see Eickelman 1998: 48-49). This static "mosaic" picture, which purported to view cultures "at rest", and the pluralist model of social integration, which shares a structural-functional approach with the first, clearly influenced the Turkish popular discourse on ethnicity, within which they coexisted with the fear of assimilation, despite the theoretical contradiction that this involved.

As Andrews states, even the acceptance of these positivist ideas may have merits in that they at least acknowledge the ethnic diversity of Turkey, something Turkish intellectuals often failed to do. Coon himself underlined the sharp contrast between the mosaic of the ethnically, religiously and regionally pluralistic Ottoman society and the modern Turkish nation state, which demands uniformity and homogeneity (1951: 5, 162. See also Mardin 1975: 15; 1977: 284; 1981: 349; 1982: 175; 1995: 286). The use of such objectivist and reifying concepts, however, often

---

<sup>23</sup> According to the peace treaty of Lausanne of 1923, Turkey recognises an official "minority" (*azınlık*) status only for its non-Muslim populations.

leads to the conflation of ethnicity and race, and ignores the subjective, processual and thus fluid nature of ethnic identity, formed and transformed by history, economy, politics, and interactions with other groups or the central state (forthcoming: 667-670). In Turkey, all these attributes – *kimlik*, *mozaik*, *kozmpolitan* and *asimilasyon* – constitute a framework in which “ethnic groups” (*etnik grublar*) and “minorities” (*azınlıklar*) are seen as social problems, often as “separatists” (*bölücü*), threatening “national unity” (*milli bütünlüğü*: “wholeness”).<sup>24</sup>

This image of discrete ethnic groups is comparable with the early Turkish nationalists’ erroneous assumption that *millets* (denominational communities) lived separately within their well-defined geographical territories and social and occupational niches, an assumption that partially accounts for the policy of large-scale ethnic exchange promoted in the process of building the Turkish nation-state.

Also, the Kemalist understanding of the Turkish “race” (*ırk*), as firmly rooted in its pre-Islamic past in Central Asia and Anatolia, was heavily influenced by early European anthropology and linguistics, which strongly promoted eugenicist ideas of human evolution and the diversification of different races or language groups. Kemalist attempts to separate Turks from their Islamic past and thus from the Ottoman legacy were exemplified by *Türk Tarih Tezi* (the “Turkish History Thesis”), which was gradually formed during the 1930s by such institutions as the Turkish History Society and the Turkish Language Society (founded by Atatürk in 1931 and 1932 respectively) and served to frame official history education until the 1970-80s (Copeaux 1998: 32-35). The positivist thinking deeply rooted in branches of Western social science persistently influenced a range of widely propagated ideas of Turkish society and its peoples.

This epistemology, which reified ethnicity, clearly affected how members of the present-day Circassian ethnic elite saw their own society in the 1990s. They portrayed Circassians in images associated with out-of-placeness (as in “guest”) or rootlessness (as in “diaspora”). They appeared to have inherited the “repatriation thesis” (*dönüş tezi*) advocated by a group of leftist Circassian writers in the 1970s: the idea that Circassians should return to the Caucasus to avoid “assimilation”, which was equated with cultural degeneration and biological extinction. Avşars, who called Circassians “Russian seeds”, shared the same understanding that a displaced nation could not retain its cultural and biological particularities. The Avşars’ de-territorialization discourse argued that Circassian settlements remained misplaced since Uzunyayla was not their authentic homeland. The idea that Circassians had not yet transformed the natural geography into their traditional territory was reinforced by the Avşars’ frequent observation that Uzunyayla was still “empty” (*boş*).

The bleak landscape of Uzunyayla, which was very sparsely populated, created the misleading impression that Circassians had made no efforts to make a better home and had produced no historical monuments. This misunderstanding invited people from outside the area to conclude that lazy Circassians were not fit owners of the land. Avşars always said, “Avşars would never have left it empty. Circassians did not plant trees because they still want to return to Russia”. They pointed to the absence of both physical and metaphorical trees with firm roots, pushing their claim to the territory yet further. They alluded to the rootlessness of Circassians, severed from their homeland, and their insufficient commitment to domesticating the new natural environment. They voiced their belief that Avşars’ banishment from their own ancestors’ land should not be permanent. Circassians, who acquired Uzunyayla in exchange for girls, were here denied legitimate ownership because of a supposed lack of sweat and labour.

Avşars had much in common with Circassian intellectuals who expressed a sense of alienation from the land, neglecting the importance of specific localities as new homes. People in Uzunyayla were denied firm roots by both groups. The view that Circassians remained in the wrong place was in sharp contrast to the official school curriculum that instilled in Turkish pupils a sense that they were descendants of a nation firmly rooted in the past, encouraging a sense of indebtedness for their homeland to unknown ancestors.

---

<sup>24</sup> See Yeğen (1996) for a more clearly “archaeological” approach to the construction of an ethnic (i.e. Kurdish) identity by the state discourse.

Local Circassians themselves hardly saw their settlement as temporary. For them, even the barren landscape of Uzunyayla had recorded hard human struggles against its inhospitable nature. It was a sign of neither their idleness nor their defeat by nature. The difficulty of growing plants there was often mentioned in Karakuyu in a story about one hundred and twenty Turkish refugees from Bulgaria sent to the village in the 1930s:

Upon coming here, they said “Circassians are lazy. They leave such a vast field empty”. They sowed watermelon and tomato seeds they had brought from Bulgaria. The plants grew very well, up to a point. A *Poyraz* (the cold wind from the north) blew in August, burning all the plants with frost. They said, “We cannot stay in a place like this”. They moved on to warmer regions in Western Turkey.

Certainly, the locals lamented, “You can sell trees after 5 years and raise two crops a year in Çukurova. Trees are still thin after 20 years and even one crop a year is not guaranteed in Uzunyayla”. They said that this was the land where their ancestors chose to raise horses, but not humans. I often heard that Uzunyayla was the only place left for Circassians or that Circassians were sent there as a punishment, despite the fact that Uzunyayla was one of the first places the Immigration Committee considered for their settlement. The locals also produced empowering narratives about succeeding despite the harsh climate: “Trees and crops grown in Uzunyayla have a better quality. They become solid as they grow slowly”; “Lambs here grow by eating wild herbs in the mountains. They produce the best meat in Turkey”.

These contrasting representations did not merely have symbolic significance for these rival groups. They were produced within political struggles over legitimate title to the territory. Such claims thus actually shaped the trajectory of their rivalry. To conclude this chapter, I would like to examine some ways in which these representations were abused by Avşars to evoke a grim reality.

#### [4] Representations in Action

Avşars fused the above-mentioned cultural understandings with local party politics to forward their traditional claims to Uzunyayla, occasionally turning these claims into a reality. Their involvement with the MHP, an ultra-nationalist party building up support in the region by distributing spoils such as jobs in the town hall and other local offices, played a crucial role. Through engagement with this party, Avşars were consolidating their influence in the region and reaping some economic benefits. They were also obtaining a voice, which helped them articulate their resentment about the loss of their vast summer camp and their forced settlement in tiny mountain villages by the Ottomans. The official nationalist ideology opened up opportunities for Avşars, who claimed to be one of the legendary Oğuz tribes from Central Asia, while generating unfavourable discourses and policies regarding ethnic minorities.

A Circassian ethnic magazine, *Merje* (“Appeal”), published a letter from the Karaçay author Tavkul, who mentions that the state project of national appropriation of Anatolia is proceeding by Turkifying the names of Circassian villages. He counts twenty-one Circassian villages all over Turkey, including two in Uzunyayla, whose names have been replaced to eradicate the term *Çerkez* (1992 Oct., p. 47). This list can be expanded to include forty-three villages altogether, including two more in Uzunyayla.<sup>25</sup>

This practice of place-naming, which covered up Circassians’ historical contributions to the state, gelled with the lament of a descendant of the first mayor of Pınarbaşı. The Abaza mayor played a peripheral role in the preparation of the Sivas Congress in 1919, of which at least the one third of participants were of Caucasian extraction (Ünal 1996: 57-61). Also, the mayor provided protection for the Çapanoğlus (Celal Bey),<sup>26</sup> fleeing from Çerkez Ethem’s force, which repressed

---

<sup>25</sup> See Andrews (1989: 385-419) for the list of over 900 Circassian villages in Turkey.

<sup>26</sup> See Çerkez Ethem’s memoir (1993: 50, originally published in 1962) for his own account of this event. See also Hiçyılmaz, who expresses scepticism about the authenticity of this memoir, published in modern

their revolt in Yozkat in 1920. His niece had married into this prestigious *derebeyi* family in Central Anatolia. Pointing to a number of posters portraying heroes of Turkish history on the walls of the town hall, the mayor's descendant deplored the fact that the republican state was pursuing a policy of glorifying the Ottoman past, compelling citizens to forget its more recent history. Circassians in Pınarbaşı claimed that their contribution in the First World War and the subsequent Turkish War of Independence had played a role in the foundation of the Republic. They resented the fact that their service was not reciprocated by due recognition from the state.

Place-names provided a field for contestation. There were numerous places in Kayseri whose names were believed to have been left by former Christian inhabitants. Georgacas mentions that erasure of place-names left by pre-Turkish civilisations leads to the disappearance of important links that connect the present to the three to four-thousand-year history of Asia Minor (1971: 101-102). By contrast, a Kayserili nationalist writer blames some Turkish scholars for attempting to find false foreign origins for some place-names (Akbaş n.d.: 18).

Places enter social discourses through place-names (Tilly 1994: 18-19). Replacing place-names in Turkey reflected the ideology of the nation-state, publicising its project of producing a homogenised space in its clearly delineated territory. This project proceeded in parallel with the project of homogenising citizens to iron out ethnic distinctiveness. The republican landscape was created through the frequent use of the same names, usually taken from heroic figures and significant dates in recent history. This recurrent landscape collapsed paradigmatically into the state's official history, reinforcing the homogenisation of both space and people.

MHP district governments appeared to be abusing this nationalist ideology. The politics of this right-wing party intersected at times with the cultural imagination in which men sowed the feminized soil with seeds of their national history. This produced locally specific trajectories that affected the competing claims to Uzunyayla unevenly. Below, I compare three cases in which the transfer of territory from one group to another was understood as a gendered transaction, and examine how local actors evaluated these cases differently. I have already presented Case 1, in which Circassian men obtained Uzunyayla by bartering girls for the land. Cases 2 and 3 contrast markedly with case 1 in terms of how the transfer of land was gendered. All three cases fit within the same gender framework, but differ in the mode of transaction, producing different values.

In Case 1, Circassians were alleged to have acquired Uzunyayla by offering their women either to Sultan Abdulaziz or to an Avşar bey. This insinuated that local Circassians continued to trade female slaves well into the 20th century. Women and land were thus effectively comparable items of male property, and were hence exchangeable. Circassian girls were, it appears, given hypergamously to notables in Kayseri in the past. The transaction in Case 1 thus invited a negative evaluation of Circassians, since they breached their group's integrity and autonomy by submitting their women to male members of another group. Here, the transaction was reciprocal and equal, with the reservation that many people, Circassian and non-Circassian, regarded equating one's own life-generating women to lifeless objects with disdain.

### ***Case 2: The Abduction of a Circassian Girl in Eski Yassıpınar***

*The dispersion of Eski Yassıpınar (Shenobe-ey) on the southern boundaries of Uzunyayla demonstrated a pattern typical of the collapse of Circassian villages. At the same time, it was a special case that ended with the abduction of a Circassian girl by a group of Alevi Kurds who had already started to settle in the village. Typical, because at the foundation of the village's disintegration lay "discord" (çekememezlik. See Ch. 4) between the Shenobe lord lineage and other families said to have served them as slaves. The Shenobe were known to have sent many gifted local Circassian boys to al Azhar in Cairo for their religious education. Many of them returned to the region as hoca (Muslim leader).<sup>27</sup> This virtuous enterprise continued until early republican days.*

---

Turkish almost fifteen years after Ethem's death (1948, in Jordan), and subsequent works by various authors based on the memoir (1993: 11-12).

<sup>27</sup> The brother of Abaza Hajji Huta's second wife (see Ch. 8) was among those *efendis* (people with a high level of Islamic education) and he served in Karakuyu.

*The Shenobe had declined economically by the 1950s, while their freed slaves grew rich and surpassed their ex-masters. The dissension between the Shenobe and their ex-slaves became aggravated. The Shenobe brought some Avşars to the village as agricultural labourers since their ex-slave families refused to work for them. The discord escalated into a bloody conflict by the 1960s. A few people were killed on both sides, including a very young boy, and the Shenobe's tractor was burned. Finally, a Shenobe man decided to disperse the village completely. He sold his properties to a group of Alevi Kurds from Sarız district. According to Circassians, 17 Kurdish men arrived on horseback with guns on their shoulders, while Kurds themselves claim they rode donkeys, since they were poor.*

*Some Circassian families had already left the village as the work-slave conflict became more bitter. The arrival of the Kurds accelerated the dispersion. The Sunni Circassians feared that Alevi Kurds ate human flesh. At the same time, some Circassian men in the village started joint businesses with the Kurds. Among them was a young man who marketed the goods his Kurdish partner smuggled from Syria. This Kurdish man abducted his partner's sister with the support of other Kurds. Even now there was disagreement whether the girl consented to this.*

*The Circassians were the most influential group in the region at the time. They launched a fierce campaign, making use of all their connections with MPs, officials, lawyers and gendarmes in and beyond the districts. The gendarmes got the girl back after a long operation; their recourse to violence left resentful memories among the Kurds. The girl was pregnant and was made to have an abortion; she remained single for a long time, and was eventually given to an old Turk much later in life. Her family left the village. All other Circassian families followed, leaving the village entirely to the Kurds. Not a single Circassian family was left in a village during my research, which had five hundred Circassian residents in the 1950s.*

*Some people said that the collapse of the village started as the result of the intra-village conflict. The scandalous abduction, however, left so great an impression that others attributed the cause of the dispersion to it. The full-scale campaign Circassians conducted retained its significance in local history as one of the last occasions in which they undertook collective action in the community's interests on their own initiative. Alongside the brideprice meeting in the same period (see Ch. 4), this incident was part of memories of the period in which local Circassians possessed a sense of agency as historical actors as well as practical influence in the region.*

In Case 2, Alevi Kurds acquired the village by obtaining a woman. From their viewpoint, the transaction was non-reciprocal, but nonetheless equal, in that taking a woman was equated with obtaining land. They monopolised two vibrant images that produced positive male values, "honour": a woman was made analogous to land, metonymically because she was seen as one of the spoils of conquering the land, and also metaphorically because life-giving women and productive land were both male sexual property. Circassians allowed Kurds to violate the sexual integrity of both their woman and their land. The alien child the girl conceived was aborted, the girl herself given to a Turk. Here, a woman's body was really a field over which male contenders compete for domination (see Olujic 1998). Circassians not only lost a woman and a village. They also lost an uninterrupted genealogy of the group, which these two "soils" would have nurtured for them. Circassians allowed Kurds to violate the land on which they had sown the seeds of their national history and enabled them to deny the relevance of that history to the territory; they thus lost legitimate claim to the land.

### ***Case 3: The Murder of Three Circassians by Avşars in Yukarı Karagöz***

*Yukarı Karagöz (Makare Hable) was a village Circassians founded in the "Bogurbaşı" (see Ch. 3) area on the edge of Uzunyayla. In the 1920s, one family of the Mekare lord lineage left the village. An agha of Alevi Kurds from Sarız purchased its properties and moved in. He moved on to a higher pasture after five years as the result of discord between him and the rest of the Makare. He sold his houses to other Alevi Kurds and initially five families settled. As the time went by, more and more Kurdish families moved into the village.*

*These Kurds were driven out of the village by some hot-blooded Circassians in the 1970s. They sold their houses to Avşars from Sarız. One of the sellers, now living in London, said "We intentionally brought the filthiest ones into the village". Aware of the recent incident in Eski*

*Yassıpınar, Circassian villagers thought Sunni Avşars were better than Alevi Kurds and allowed them to move in. Five or six Avşar families moved into each of the houses previously used by one family and the number of Avşars increased rapidly. In 1997, more than three-hundred Avşars resided in thirty houses, whereas less than two-hundred Circassians resided in fifty houses. Consequently the headmanship had passed into the hands of Avşars. However none of them owned arable land within the village and all of them earned their living outside it.*

*In the summer of 1996, friction grew between a Circassian man who came back to the village from France for a summer holiday and a group of Avşar co-villagers. The man was thinking of returning to the village for good to start farming. He sometimes flared up at one Avşar who repeatedly grazed a flock of sheep on his sown field. One night, he was coming back from Pınarbaşı with three friends by car. A group of Avşars ambushed them at the entrance of the village and fired rifles at the car indiscriminately. Three Circassian men died on the spot.*

*Reportedly, 4,000 Circassians from all over Turkey attended their funeral. A 12 km road from Pınarbaşı to the village was lined by a string of mourners' vehicles. The gendarmes in Pınarbaşı could not cope; more were called in from neighbouring districts to guard the road. The mourners protested that Avşars should leave the village.*

*Among those who came to the village to offer condolences were the governor and the military chief in Kayseri as well as four MPs from the ruling Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party) including Abdullah Gül, a minister of state.<sup>28</sup> They promised to strive to get Avşars out of the village, trying to calm Circassians down. The governor of Kayseri proposed Avşars to leave the village, only to be refused by them.*

*Three Avşars were arrested immediately and sentenced to life imprisonment. One of them, an old man, died in prison soon after. The remaining two claimed that the real killer was this old man's son, who allowed or compelled his father to go to prison in his place, thinking he would not live long anyway. During my research, the alleged killer was still living in the village freely.*

*This slaughter took place during my absence from the district where I lived during two periods. The initial fury and tension had already subsided when I returned to my research more than one year after the incident. A sense of disappointment was obvious among Circassians, who felt that they had been coerced into abandoning their protest. There was even sympathy for the murderers among Turks in Pınarbaşı, whether Avşar or not. This was well expressed in an account by a close friend of mine, a Karslı Turk MHP supporter:*

*They said that essentially the victim from France was wrong. I heard that the victim beat the Avşar man every summer when he came to the village for a holiday. The commander was drinking alcohol with that Circassian man when the Avşar went to the gendarme station. The commander did not take up his complaint. People said that the commander may have favoured Circassians then because he is married to a Circassian girl from a different region. I do not think it is true. He often drops into my shop to speak to me. He said, "I will not ruin my life for one woman".*

*Relatives of the murdered man from France rejected the rumour. They had their version of the event: the victim had never met the murderer before and everything erupted during one summer; actually he reported to the gendarmes when the same assailant fired at him a week before the incident; the MHP mayor, however, intervened to stop the gendarmes from confiscating the gun that was to be used to slaughter three men.*

*The same mayor was elected again in the next election in April 1999, two and half years after the incident. Circassians feared that Yukarı Karagöz would be seized by Avşars in the future, just like five other villages. This incident reinforced Circassians' belief that Avşars "have their eye upon" the villages in Uzunyayla.*

---

<sup>28</sup> As a result of the general election held in November 2002, Gül became Prime Minister of Turkey in the government formed by *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* (the Justice and Development Party). He is now (Dec. 2003) Minister of Foreign Affairs in the government of Tayyip Erdoğan from the same party.

Case 3 is again different. Here Avşars attempted to usurp the village by slaying men. Local Circassians understood the killing as the culmination of Avşars' campaign to gain control of Uzunyayla. *Derderu* ("We for Ourselves"), a magazine by the Caucasus Culture and Solidarity Association of Kayseri (*Kayseri Kafkas Kültür ve Dayanışma Derneği*), wrote immediately after the incident, "This incident was a development prepared in cold blood to terrorise residents, drive them away from the village and seize the village" (1996 Sept.-Oct, p. 11). Circassians believed that Avşars had attempted to create an opportunity to seize the village completely by slaughtering male Circassians, regarded as the owner-managers of the village land.

From the Avşars' viewpoint, the transaction here was neither reciprocal nor equal because men and their properties were not of equal value. Taking men and their land together generated a higher value than in the previous two cases. Seizing land by taking the lives of its proprietors was more positively evaluated than obtaining land by giving or taking a woman analogous to it.

These three cases can be compared as three different modes of transaction. The first distinction concerns whether the transaction was reciprocal (case 1) or non-reciprocal (cases 2 and 3). The second concerns whether the transacted items were equal (cases 1 and 2) or unequal (case 3). It is possible to compare this schema with a model Nancy Tapper proposed to analyse the situation in which different values are produced through different modes of transaction in the different but similar context of an Afghan society (1991: 280-284). A greater value was generated as one moves from Circassians' reciprocal and equal transaction (Case 1) to Kurds' non-reciprocal but equal one (Case 2) and further to Avşars' non-reciprocal and unequal one (Case 3), thereby constructing a hierarchy of value paid to these three protagonists.

In Case 3, the young gendarme commander at the Pınarbaşı station, husband of a Circassian woman from Western Turkey, was quoted as having said that he would not ruin his career for "one woman" (*bir karı*). This chimes with the above-mentioned schema. Here again, a man's life was worth more than a woman's and they should not be transacted for each other. Circassians were known to have been tactful in diplomatic marriage in the past, and were even alleged to have obtained Uzunyayla in this way. Ironically, this type of diplomacy did not work here. This commander was one of the first subjects many Turks in the town mentioned to me. This indicated that the fear that the commander might intervene in favour of the Circassians because of his wife created a protective atmosphere for the killers amongst non-Circassians, whatever the source of the rumour.

As for Circassians, they reinforced their self-image as "passive" (*pasif*) in relation to Avşars and to the state. Their resentment was aggravated since they did not receive due credit from the state to reciprocate their loyalty. They were betrayed by its agents whom they expected to complete the cycle of exchange. They renewed the understanding that this type of diplomacy would no longer be effective against the cruder exercise of violence, as well as in relation to the impersonal bureaucratic machine.

Another important aspect of Case 3 is that the MHP mayor of Pınarbaşı, Avşar through his mother,<sup>29</sup> was said to have intervened in the Avşars' favour. About half the Avşar residents in the village supported MHP in the 1995 election. Circassians naturally understood the incident as composed of many different interests: first, Avşars' long-term plot to take over the village; secondly, the advancement of MHP in district politics by promoting interests of only a certain section of the local population; and finally, the imposition of the state's official ideology that promoted homogenisation of its citizens and territory.

Here the state was perceived to be enforcing an assimilation policy by Turkifying the village population, not unlike the Ottomans who attempted to assimilate Circassians by disintegrating their social organisations. This served the interest of Avşars, who were pressing their traditional claim to Uzunyayla. They were increasingly organised around the MHP, which appropriated the official state ideology. Without achieving anything for the town, the same man won the 1999 mayoral election, describing himself as a "manly" (*mert*) leader in election posters. This was a part of a general election in which the MHP became the junior partner in a coalition government

---

<sup>29</sup> A rumour stated that his ancestor came to Pınarbaşı together with the Çapanoğlu defeated by Çerkez Ethem in the Yozgat Revolt in 1920.

with the leftist but nationalist *Demokratik Sol Partisi* (Democratic Left Party) of Bülent Ecevit. This indicated that Avşars' antagonistic posture in their relations with Circassians had not faltered even after the incident.

In this sub-section I have shown that the contestation of representations through gendered metaphors of seeds and soil was not simply a matter of "epiphenomena that symbolically express, functionally reinforce, or reflexively comment on preexisting social-political formations" (Brunner 1984: 3); it actually affected the course of actions through its entwinement in local party politics in which Avşars abused the sedentarist metaphysics of the modern nation-state.

I have defined landscape as a stage on which human agency was exerted and as a mnemonic device that recorded these exercises as history. This and the next chapters explore the contestation generated when different actors attempted to realise abstract ideals in the real human places of everyday social life. I have demonstrated that various actors, namely the urban ethnic elite, Avşars and the modern Turkish state, constructed the landscape of Uzunyayla from different perspectives, which sometimes were materialised as conflicts in the social arena. In the next chapter, I shall examine the ways in which local Circassians had inscribed their history on the local landscape, making Uzunyayla their new home.

I have examined the politics of boundary construction among local Circassians and other social actors, a politics that hierarchized access to the territory. In the next chapter, I shift the focus from external boundaries to internal distinctions among the Circassians, to explore the process by which various lines of social distinction were drawn, imposed, refused and redrawn among Circassians themselves. The key social boundary rested on a distinction between two historical categories: *worqs* and descendants of slaves. I demonstrate how this dichotomous understanding affected the construction of the landscape into which their national history had put down roots.

### **Chapter 3 The Reconstruction of Homeland through Memories**

This chapter gives the role of protagonists to the local Circassians described as rootless by other actors in the previous chapter. I examine the process by which they transformed Uzunyayla where they had undergone a chaotic settlement experience, into a landscape of significant human experiences in which they played an important part. I focus on their efforts to re-present their homeland in the new geography, while struggling to claim Uzunyayla as their legitimate territory. The landscape that emerged was a record of local people's endeavours to generate cultural meanings to their advantage and to sustain a sense of autonomy in the face of rival claims. In this process, they also gained opportunities to reconsider the significance of the catastrophe of emigration and settlement.

The symbolic reproduction of social boundaries may help to empower the local society, as A. P. Cohen (1982; 1985; 1987) states. This "symbolic construction of community", however, often highlights differences within society and disempowers a certain section of its people. Some boundaries within a community may be even more meaningful for its members than boundaries between the community and the outside world, since a prominent feature of society is often discontinuity (Edward 1998). Essentialism, which stresses the community and its past, is often aimed at achieving the hegemony of the dominant section *vis-à-vis* those silenced by the totalising discourses of collective interest (Brow 1990).

A landscape is brought into being at a point where geography fuses with history, itself a construction contested along the lines of social discontinuity. The landscape inevitably reflects this cleavage (Rappaport 1994: 86), emerging as a contested site where different versions of historical memories are generated in opposition to one another.

First, I examine how local Circassians were using the geography of Uzunyayla as a vehicle to form a narrative of history, claiming their autonomy and agency even in recounting their ancestors' disaster. I then looked at some ways in which they appropriated the historical memories of settlement to recreate their homeland in the nationally appropriated landscape and to enforce and also resist status differences among themselves. The first two sections of the chapter explore two different but complementary processes involved in shaping a historical narrative out of the local geography. First, Circassians constructed themselves as actors who contributed actively, though marginally, to the emergence of the historic event of their displacement and resettlement. Secondly, they imagined Uzunyayla as a stage for their social actions. Through these two processes, Circassians made sense of their everyday life in Uzunyayla as historically significant.

#### **[1] From Victims of History to Actors of History**

##### ***1) Migration***

Academic studies of the Circassians' mass migration and settlement in the 19th century usually explain this historical cataclysm in terms of external factors that Circassians themselves could not command. McCarthy, for instance, locates the forced migration in the context of the Russian policy of expelling Muslims and the Ottoman policy of reinforcing the Muslim population in Anatolia (1983; 1995). Karpat points out that the Empire pushed policy to strengthen agricultural production in Anatolia, where the male work force decreased considerably during the successive wars of the 18th and 19th centuries (1985: 69; 1993: 77-78). He mentions that Circassian settlements were also utilised as buffer zones between sedentary and nomadic populations, and that the people of those settlement were later employed for the construction of the Anatolian railway. Toledano maintains that the influx of Circassians was accepted particularly as a means to reinforce the Muslim military forces (1998, see Ch. 3).

Circassians are usually portrayed either as prey or as pawns tossed about between Russian and Ottoman politics; they are not portrayed as protagonists in their history, or as producers of history commanding their own fate. These views of Circassians as victims were not necessarily shared by the local Circassians themselves, who often saw themselves as significant actors, even in the currently unfavourable socio-political environment in the region.

The shift in the ethnic elite's focus, from exile to diaspora, has not eliminated its basic understanding that life outside the Caucasus is forced and temporary. Even today, official Turkish

nationalism has led a substantial number of citizens to believe that it is unsuitable to call Circassians “*Çerkez*”, thus marking their ethnic distinctiveness. This atmosphere is clearly registered in the frequent use of “Caucasus Turks” (*Kafkas Türk*) and “immigrants from the Caucasus” (*Kafkas Göçmen*) in a number of publications (Subaşı 1995: 231; Güleç n.d.: 138; İzbirak 1945: 288), including the district guidebook of Pınarbaşı (Temel 1973: 21), which align Circassians with Turkish refugees from various parts of the Balkans. One illuminating case is the historical cartoon *Çerkez Etem*, published serially in the major newspaper *Sabah* in 1993, in which the author had the hero describe the *Çerkez* as a “tribe” (*oymak*) of Caucasus Turks in a gathering in which Atatürk was present (Yalez 1997: 124). Official discourse still identifies Circassians with out-of-placeness; yet they are unable to articulate their distinctiveness.

By contrast, the concept of exile that connotes Muslim migrants who fled from political and especially religious persecution had fallen out of favour among ethnic intellectuals. People in Uzunyayla still interpreted their ancestors’ emigration from the homeland as an escape from the threat of conversion to Christianity. Their enduring use of the words *hicret* (*fugitive*) and *muhaceret*, however, was not best understood as stressing the temporality of life in the new settlement. Some locals certainly said that their *dede* (grandfathers) died dreaming of going back to the Caucasus, but the nostalgia incarnated in *dede* here should be interpreted as part of a narrative device employed to highlight the contrast with the current generations firmly rooted in the locality. An unspecified *dede* was used here almost as a synonym of *ata* (ancestors) to stress remoteness and anonymity.

More importantly, the locals interpreted the exodus as *hicret* to mark the event as a voluntary action. They stressed the religious aspect of the tragic separation from homeland to place themselves in the position of self-determining actors. They redefined the exodus, not as a forced result of atrocity, but as a historical event that they at least partially initiated. The displacement was reinterpreted as not necessarily an experience of disempowerment, as they said: “Coming to Istanbul was just like becoming a half hajji, because the caliphate was in Turkey then”.

Their ancestors’ autonomous role in this mass migration was asserted in the narratives, in which a temporal sequence was re-arranged into a coherent human experience. Given that the locals equated their ancestors’ reaching Turkey with becoming “half hajjis”, the fact that more people from Uzunyayla went to Mecca than to the Caucasus, easily accessible now, was even more significant. Their trip may be understood as the completion of the haj pilgrimage on which their ancestors had set off.<sup>30</sup> The locals fused their ancestors’ hopeful immigration to Turkey and their own long-awaited pilgrimage to the Kaaba into a single historical experience over generations.

Understanding their ancestors’ migration as a religious act, they imagined long-term experiences as an epic journey that had started in the Caucasus, passing through Uzunyayla and eventually reaching Mecca. This narrative transformed a series of events into a history by providing an ordered and consistent message. As hajjis, the current generation completed the journey their ancestors had set out on as *muhacir*, concluding the tale of a devout journey.

Cultural roots were not sought only at the point of origin in this epic story, but in three key locations: the Caucasus in the past, Uzunyayla in the present and Mecca in the future. If the coexistence of three geographical and temporal focuses does not seem to have created the diasporic sense of displacement and in-betweenness that is reported about Turkish people in other situations (e.g. see Mandel 1990; Erman 1998), it may be because these multiple centres were incorporated into a long-term history of mass movement in which Circassians themselves were protagonists (See also Yamba 1992).

They made stories that transformed a political agreement between tsarist Russians and the Ottoman Porte into a religious expedition realised of their own accord and argued that their ancestors held the capacity to create their own history. The current generations also exercised

---

<sup>30</sup> Actually, many Kabardians applied to the Russian governor for permission to visit Mecca and headed for Turkey, after the completion of the Russian military campaign (Duman 1994). One such document records a collective application in 1869 submitted by hundreds of Kabardians including two brothers of the Adygeuna with their families and slaves (ibid. 171, 214), who later settled in the Upper Quarter of Karakuyu.

their own creativity to turn experiences over generations into an orderly history. These two types of agency reinforced each other in the narrative related by the present generations to reclaim the status of social actors for themselves.

## **2) Journey and Settlement**

The locals reasserted their own initiative in their accounts about the choice of Uzunyayla as a place for settlement. They mentioned that Circassian settlement was used to force Avşars to settle, but they also told a different story. One of the elders in Karakuyu related the following account, showing me some Arabic inscriptions on the back cover of an old Qur'an:

It reads "Travel around. You can settle anywhere you like. Nobody can drive you away," with the signature of Sultan Aziz Khan himself. Aziz acceded to the throne in 1861 and Circassians were accepted in the same year. It is 137 years since Circassians came here. Arriving in Istanbul, they sent a group of four mounted men to Anatolia on a mission to find a favourable place to settle . . . Avşars are said to have been living in Uzunyayla at that time, but this area was empty. Grass grew up to human height around a well after which the village was named "Black Well". My real grandfather cut a way through the grass with a dagger and scooped the first water with his hand. The first lineage to settle in Uzunyayla was ours. We are the foundation stone not only for Karakuyu but also for the whole of Uzunyayla.

All the locals knew the story that Çukurova, in Adana, now the most fertile agricultural region in Turkey, was merely an uninhabitable marsh when it was initially offered for settlement. Many Circassians died of malaria there and others ran away to the highlands. Uzunyayla, green and with plentiful water, was reminiscent of the Caucasus and was chosen as the final site for home making. Circassians selected Uzunyayla for grazing the horses they had brought with them, numbered by one elder at 60,000. The current generations asserted that the settlement in Uzunyayla was their ancestors' own choice, thus opposing the idea that they were victims of history used as pawns in state politics.

Local Circassians described their ancestors as heroes of history when speaking of driving Avşars out of Uzunyayla. A story had been handed down that three mounted Circassian men terrified the Avşars, who fled from their summer camp,<sup>31</sup> contrary to academic accounts, which claim that the Ottoman forces coerced Avşars to settle. They still boasted that the repelled Avşars presented a petition in which they expressed their fear about these alien invaders: "What they eat is maize. What they wear is leather. Their eyes are blue, faces yellow. Enough, our Sultan. Banish them and let them go back!" (*Yedikleri darı. Giydikleri deri. Gözü gö. Benzi sarı. El-aman, Padişahım, sür gitsin geri*). Their principal self-image was as conquerors who overwhelmed the local inhabitants.

They repudiated the legitimacy of the Avşars' claim to Uzunyayla by asserting that it was they who elevated Uzunyayla to the level of an orderly human settlement, and they repeatedly portrayed Avşars as sub-human savages. From their viewpoint, human history in Uzunyayla started with the advent of Circassians, though Avşars may have utilised it as a summer camp. It was the Circassians' ancestors who brought "civilisation" (*medeniyet*) from the Caucasus and established order in a true human colony. The reversion of Uzunyayla to the barbarous Avşars meant its return to the wild state of nature.

Circassians continually stressed the remoteness of Avşars from humanity, underlining their "ignorance" (*cahiliyet*) and "savageness" (*vahset*), to re-situate the contest for the territory into a universal human struggle against nature. The competition for land was staged also at a symbolic level by the use of a nature/culture dichotomy. Circassians legitimised their claim by turning the contest for control over a physical space into a humanity-level struggle fought on the temporal axis around which the story of human evolution unfolded itself.

---

<sup>31</sup> See Şaşmaz (1997) for the 1879 report by a British consul in Kayseri, Captain Cooper, about the disquiet Circassian immigrants created in the town. Captain Cooper was one of the consuls sent to Anatolia by the British Foreign Office to observe the conditions of Armenians (ibid. 329).

<sup>32</sup> *Gö* is an old, local dialect form of *gök* (sky-blue).

Here, Circassians were pursuing a “politics of dimensionality” (Boyarin 1994) through the use of temporising metaphors. They evoked a Dark Age, often entailing a nature-versus-culture contrast (Rosebury & O’Brien 1991), not upon their own past, but upon the present state of the rival group,<sup>33</sup> rather like the image of the Age of Ignorance before the advent of Islam, while they themselves by contrast came to the land of the Caliph to unite with the House of Islam.

### **3) Reunion**

Local Circassians avoided falling victim by telling a heroic epic of their ancestors’ mass emigration from their homeland, settlement in Uzunyayla and expulsion of Avşars. By contrast, they had scarcely handed down any hard facts regarding the process of migration. Shami mentions that oral histories among Circassians in Jordan remain silent about “the means and costs of resettlement”, while stories of voyage and dispersal abound (1998a: 201). In Uzunyayla, almost no stories of travel by water were told, leaving it impossible to reconstruct the actual routes of migration.

This was unsurprising, given that an entire male generation was lost in successive wars waged by Turkey, resulting in the replacement of a huge store of orally transmitted knowledge by a new set of memories. Given the relative heterogeneity of the present composition of villages, it also made sense that even memories handed down in and about the same village did not form a coherent picture of collective movement.

Fragments of oral history in Uzunyayla spoke, however vaguely, about a land journey and reunion, not voyage and dispersal. Together, people composed a narrative of meeting, gathering and reuniting from all four corners of Anatolia and beyond to lay a foundation for the present villages; for instance, Karakuyulus said their ancestors reached the village *via* Istanbul in the west, Çukurova in the south, Kars and Malatya in the east, and Tokat and Sivas in the north. One family claimed an ancestry traceable to the Mamluk dynasty (1382-1517) of Circassians in Egypt, naming one of their young men after Berkuk, the founder of the dynasty.

I quote an account by an elder, the son of an imam who had served in Karakuyu for forty-five years for such occasions as Friday prayers and religious wedding ceremonies. This is the only account that vividly described families as having travelled together to found Karakuyu:

I can tell you only what I heard from my father. The foundation of the village was in 1853, earlier than the mass migration [of 1864]. Methiye was founded in the same year. That of Altikesek was even 18 years earlier. My grandfather was born in Istanbul and had three brothers. After living there for four years, his group migrated to Ihsaniye district of Tokat and moved on to Karakuyu two years later. The group who came to Karakuyu was part of a larger group who migrated from Istanbul to Tokat. 70-80 households settled in Karakuyu from there. The villages grew larger, adding 5 more families two months later and then another 4 families three months later. I heard that the village had approximately 400 households at its peak. There were 1200 people here if the average size of a family was 3, and 1600 people if it was 4. From this, seven villages were created.

According to another Karakuyulu man, now resident in Ankara, his lineage was one of those that later joined that initial group:

Our lineage was from the same village in the Caucasus, but we travelled by land and we were reunited with the rest of the village in Karakuyu later. We had a slave family while in the Caucasus. We took only the mother and the daughter with us since the father was old and sick. Six families of our lineage first settled in Ardahan, near Kars. We sold the slave girl there. Her mother set fire to our houses and barns in fury. So three families migrated again to Niksar in

---

<sup>33</sup> Ironically, both Russians and Ottomans understood Circassians as exactly such an uncivilised tribe far from humanity. See Sahni (1997), for Russian Orientalism as an ideology justifying their invasion of the Caucasus.

Tokat. My great-great-grandfather made three sons there. His family moved on to Karakuyu, leaving two families in Tokat. One of the sons married a girl from a family in Karakuyu.

An elder of a prominent *worq* lineage from a nearby village talked about the journey of his lineage as follows:

Our lineage moved from Istanbul to Tokat, where they made a large farm. With the princely family, the Gazi, we came to Yağlıpınar in Pınarbaşı, also known as *Jerisit-ey* among Circassians. We settled just below the present settlement of the village, separate from that group. One man of our lineage died, leaving a cemetery there. The princely family decided to return to Tokat. Our ancestors came to Karakuyu, then moved on to Kılbalık to join with some relatives. Those families who stayed in *Jerisit-ey* were later incorporated into the village, forming a separate quarter named after the prince as *Gazi Hable*. Our slave family was left there, staying in the village to the present.

These two accounts may appear to describe the dispersal of families, leaving some parts here and there. These were, however, fragments of a fuller narrative that told how these families came to the respective villages, uniting with relatives, neighbours and co-villagers and creating new relations through marriage. The following account was related by an elderly man from a prestigious family known to have produced a general (*paşa*) in the late Ottoman period. It describes the journey of his lineage in the original sense of diaspora as sowing seeds widely, not merely scattering, the result of which was several villages named after his lineage in and beyond Uzunyayla:

Our lineage first settled in Yıldızeli district of Sivas. One section moved on to Kangar district from there and made another village. My grandfather came to Pınarbaşı and made another village. One of our slaves moved to Yahyal district of Kayseri and one of the two quarters of the village is named after our lineage. Another man of the lineage moved to Sarız and founded a village there. Then he moved on to Syria.

Though an accurate reconstruction of the actual process of migration and formation of villages in Uzunyayla is far beyond the scope of my thesis, what these accounts illustrated was that the Great Exodus was not seen by the local Circassians as an emigration from the homeland, so much as an immigration to the place where they were now, founding current villages, naming them, renewing or creating relations.

Apparently, the presence of slaves, placed in and beyond Uzunyayla, served as an effective mnemonic device for memories of settlement. Slaves were not only left ubiquitously as traces of the movement of given lineages to, from and in Uzunyayla, but were also utilised to imagine this process, most details of which were long forgotten. The next account, by an Abaza elder, elucidated this point:

I do not know by which route our ancestors reached Uzunyayla. However, I am guessing that our lineage had come from Istanbul since one of our slaves ran away there. The slave must have known something about Istanbul. Otherwise, he would not have headed for Istanbul.

Amid these stories, slaves emerged as objects brought, left, sold, bought and sent on missions at their masters' will. Circassians mentioned numerous cases of slave movements in Uzunyayla through trade, as runaways or as gifts. Their ubiquity, created in the process of migration and settlement, made them easily available landmarks of Circassian history, contributing to the construction of Uzunyayla as a meaningful landscape.

## [2] Uzunyayla as the Caucasus

Here, I investigate how local Circassians constructed Uzunyayla for them to inscribe their history on it, appropriating it as their national territory. I examine more ways of ordering temporal experiences into a story to explore further the intersection of time and space. The geographical

conditions of Uzunyayla appeared to help the locals turn the temporal sequence into an orderly narrative of history and to make sense of their experiences in time. This history then allowed the landscape of Uzunyayla to emerge as a homeland transported from the Caucasus.

Uzunyayla is a high plateau located at around 1600 meters above sea level, surrounded by mountains that rise 200 to 600 meters above the plateau. The area was believed to have retained a high degree of isolation due to its remoteness from a major city (Kayseri, 150 km to the west) and the weakness of the district town as a socio-economic centre. The influence of labour migration to urban areas was not felt until the 1970s. A customs officer in Istanbul with a hotel business in Nalchik accounted for the insulation of Uzunyayla, after returning to the snow-covered Karakuyu in February for his nephew's wedding:

We observe our customs (*âdet*) as best we can. In accordance with what we own, we can hold a dance party in a barn where animals are usually kept. Nonetheless, it is Uzunyayla that has maintained Circassian customs in their best form in the world. The languages are no longer spoken and the customs have been forgotten in Düzce and Adapazarı in Western Turkey. As for the wedding party, that of Uzunyayla is closest to the original form, even closer than the current weddings in the Caucasus. However, these customs are preserved as a product of its harsh nature, isolated at 1900 meters above sea level. The state could not reach here. It is not that they did not attempt to. Turkish immigrants from Bulgaria were settled here, but they could not bear the weather and ran away.

Many Circassians both within and outside Uzunyayla saw the region as the place where their traditions were maintained in the closest form to the original. At the same time, many urbanites interpreted its closedness as a sign of its backwardness. Spatial isolation was turned into temporal insulation in either case. People commonly presented the local Circassians as tied to the former period, but evaluated them differently, depending on whether one interpreted the crucial changes in social values and relationships positively or negatively. They were seen by some as champions of Circassian national traditions, and by others as the most conservative group, who still pursued historical status differences meticulously.

Some locals interpreted Uzunyayla as an actual reproduction of the Caucasus in general or the Kabarda plain in particular. This view itself was not a natural consequence of the displacement and resettlement, but was only made possible by the historical contingency in which Circassians were allowed to occupy one of the largest uninhabited plains in Central Anatolia in the early period after the mass migration, so as to create a cluster of separate ethnic colonies composed of more than 70 villages. A member of the administrative staff of the newly opened Pınarbaşı branch of the Caucasus Association expressed such a view as follows:

I have a copy of a map of Nalchik before the exodus. According to the map, the way Circassians founded villages in Uzunyayla is exactly the same as the locations of the villages back in Nalchik. The layout of villages in the Caucasus was reproduced here. The sole exception is Kılıçmehmet, or *Kılıçbi Hable*, which was supposed to settle at the edge but actually settled in the centre.

It is possible to interpret the stress on the spatial isolation of Uzunyayla as an expression of localism, overstated by people facing difficulty in sustaining structural boundaries. The intensified sense of cultural pride became most explicit in a common saying, "There is nobody other than Circassians here". This distorted the fact that the great majority of Circassian villages had some Turkish permanent residents as well; it was an attitude reflected even in one work published by the Caucasus Association. Regarding questionnaires completed by 160 households heads in 7 villages in Uzunyayla, Eser reports that all these locals stated that, "All those living in the village are Circassians". This included Karakuyu, which had 3 families of *Bulgar Göçmen* (1996: 134). This exaggeration made it possible to compare Uzunyayla to the homeland in the Caucasus; culturally, as the place where their traditional customs were best preserved; physically, as a geographical reproduction of Nalchik; and demographically, as an area occupied exclusively by Circassians.

Clearly demarcated, Uzunyayla emerged as Circassian national territory, making it feasible to view the plateau as soil in which Circassians' own history could take root. Just as one may cut off unnecessary parts of a photograph to create a more compelling image, local Circassians construed Uzunyayla as a culturally as well as demographically distinctive and autonomous area, though Circassians were scattered all over the Middle East and settled diffusely in several hundred villages even within Turkey. They could thus imagine their experiences as unique and peculiar to the area, yet also as constituting the mainstream history of Circassians continuing from the homeland in the Caucasus. They refused to see their history as diasporic and thus marginal.

Circassians made their delineation of Uzunyayla, which facilitated both the national appropriation of its landscape and the territorialization of the national history, yet more coherent by perceiving its space as graded along a temporal axis. Uzunyayla has been treated so far in the most general sense as a wide area extending around Pınarbaşı district, where a cluster of Circassian settlements was founded. Locals themselves, however, understood this space as divided into four separate, distinctive areas (Map 3).

Uzunyayla proper is a plain almost co-extensive with Örenşehir sub-district in the north-east of Pınarbaşı, where villages featured vast but unirrigated lands used for growing cereals and pasturing livestock; “*Boğurbaşı*”<sup>34</sup> was the name given to the cluster of smaller villages in the Central (*Merkez*) sub-district around the town, which people in Uzunyayla proper also called “Potato Villages”, because smaller areas of irrigated land were used to grow fruit and vegetables; Sörümşek Valley was the site of a group of villages in Kaynar sub-district, stretching along the southern skirt of Hunzur Mountain (2641m), where vegetables were grown. Uzunyayla proper contained mostly Kabardian villages, while Sörümşek Valley had both Hatukoy and Abzekh villages and *Boğurbaşı* included both Kabardian and Abaza villages. Also, there was a small ethnic enclave of several Abaza villages among Kabardians at the north edge of Uzunyayla on the boundary between Pınarbaşı and Şarkışla.

Kabardians in Uzunyayla proper, among whom it had become shameful to have women work outside, saw people in *Boğurbaşı* as “degenerate” (*decenere*) since woman here enjoyed working in the garden. Hatukoys in Sörümşek Valley were a frequent target of ethnic jokes among Kabardians, who saw them as even more “assimilated” (*asimile*). Hatukoys were thought to have been almost entirely Turkified, especially because marriage with Turks, often taking the form of elopement, was more frequent among them. By contrast, Kabardians saw Abazas in the ethnic enclave as backward, excessively conservative about the distinctions of traditional class status, saying, “Abaza still do not allow slaves to sit in their guest room” or “They do not let slaves pass to the better (*yukarı*: upper) seats”.

From the viewpoint of Kabardians in Uzunyayla proper, these four subdivisions constituted a continuum – descending from the Abaza enclave through themselves and then those in *Boğurbaşı* to Hatukoys in Sörümşek Valley – in which a spatial movement was seen to be almost congruous with a temporal sequence. As one moved from Uzunyayla toward Kayseri, the degree of acculturation allegedly became greater. The Abazas, in an isolated colony, were thought to be extremely obstinate, to the extent that they could not keep up with the times.

Kabardians in Uzunyayla proper were neither as backward as Abazas, nor distanced from Circassian customs like people in *Boğurbaşı* and Sörümşek Valley. They were seen as the most suitable guardians of Circassian traditions in this schema, and Uzunyayla proper was elevated as a sanctuary-like area where these traditions were best maintained. The visual representation of space around Uzunyayla contributed to reinforce the idea that assimilation was a linear process.

All the five Circassian villages that had passed into the hands of other groups were located at the fringes of Uzunyayla (Map 3). This left Circassians conscious of threatened boundaries, fortifying the idea that Uzunyayla was a national territory proper to Circassians. This raised consciousness about vulnerable boundaries further reinforced the graded image of the ethnic landscape of the region, highlighting a distinction between Uzunyayla proper which was the

---

<sup>34</sup> *Boğurbaşı* was assumed to be Circassians' “crude” version of Pınarbaşı. The clean/crude (*temiz/kaba*) dichotomy reproduced the dichotomy between elite Turkish (*Osmanlıca*) and rural folk Turkish in the Ottoman period.

innermost part reserved exclusively for Circassians, and villages at the edge threatened by Avşars' eyes.

The graded character of Uzunyayla's landscape emerged at the point at which territorialised history intersected with historicised territory. Many locals were in direct contact with Kayseri, owing to the economic marginality of the district town. The Kayseri-Malatya highway, completed in the 1950s, helped to align the four sub-regions into one string and to construct the boundaries that divided "us" and "them", not into a clear dichotomy, but along a gradual continuum. Even this schema was made possible by an exercise of human agency that wove multiple and contradictory experiences in time into a single coherent narrative of history.

I have demonstrated some creative uses of memories (Gupta & Ferguson 1997: 4), in which Circassians constructed a setting for their actions, first by imagining themselves as actors in their own fate and then by comparing Uzunyayla to the homeland in the Caucasus. The agents who produced history and the stage where their agency was exercised were thus established. Interactions between the space the humans had constructed and the significance this space had for human actors can be seen here. Everyday interactions and memory politics among the local Circassians unfolded in this human space.

### [3] The Uzunyayla of Circassian Warlords

In this section, I explore issues related to contested Circassian names of villages used alongside official Turkish names. I examine competing oral accounts to illuminate qualities of Circassian history that have taken root deep in the soil of Uzunyayla. As an example of how Circassians creatively used memories to reconstruct their homeland within the context of displacement, I would also like to consider the connections between the two types of landscape Kūchler (1993) distinguishes: "landscape of memory", an iconography of the history of human actions in the past (see Ch. 2); and "landscape as memory", a process in which people evoke memories of past events as they fuse geography and history, continually transforming historical accounts and thus incorporating changes into history.

#### *1) Landscape of Memory: Village Names*

First, I examine one of the ways in which local Circassians filled the bounded landscape of Uzunyayla with specific locales in which significant social action could take place. Landscape functions as a mnemonic device that records historical events; place-names are one of the media of this recording. According to Tilly, "Place names are of such vital significance because they act so as to transform the sheerly physical and geographical into something that is historically and socially experienced. The bestowing of names creates shared existential space out of a blank environment" (1994: 18).

Soon after settlement, Circassian migrants named specific places in the natural environment and made their new homeland meaningful and familiar. Many Turkish place names in the district seemed to date back to the time before the Circassians' settlement, including Karakuyu ("Black Well"), alluded in Dadaloğlu's ballads (see n. 10 above). These names stressed topological characteristics that attracted human attention. Republican place names, in contrast, were often taken from contributors to the foundation of the Turkish nation-state and their frequent recurrence homogenised its territory, collapsing the space into one and the same historical theme. Old Turkish names and new republican names told of two different types of relation between humans and space.

The Circassian habit of fusing places with the particular individuals who had made these sites meaningful was in a sharp contrast to these two modes. Most landmarks in Uzunyayla were named after individual persons who had special relations with them, and convey information about their lives. Instances in Karakuyu include; a mountain, summer pastures and barns named after their wealthy owners; a path along which flocks of sheep were taken to an agha's pasture; and sites where some unfortunate co-villagers were killed in a lineage feud or by bandits.

This mode of naming resonated with the practice of naming Circassian villages after the most prominent lineage in the village. A lineage that gave its name to the village was called the "lord" (*bey*, *ağa*) or the "founder" (*kurucu*) of the village. Some highly prestigious lineages were called

the “prince” (*pshu*) of the village, or even “the prince of princes” (*beylerbeyi/pshumiyipshu*) in the unique case of the Hatukoshoko, said to have ruled a wider region encompassing many villages. This princely family produced a man known as the “last bey” of Uzunyayla (see Ch. 8).

Almost all the villages in Uzunyayla had Circassian names alongside their official Turkish names. It was normal for a Circassian village to have a Circassian unofficial name, and the anomaly of some villages, the Circassian names of which were unknown, could be accounted for in this light. These were often described as “villages without a lord”, usually meaning villages without nobles or villages of commoners, but also interpreted as villages of slaves.

This custom of naming villages after a strong lineage itself promoted a particular understanding of history. It told a story embroidered with images that the local themselves understood as “feudal” (*feodal*): there was fierce competition among warlords who built power around their own lineages, some of which managed to distinguish themselves; they founded villages by gathering relatives, friends, clients, peasants, farm labourers and slaves around themselves; these “lords” had a strong influence over those people as the leaders or even as the owners of the villages and the rule of some especially outstanding warlords extended beyond a village to a wider area.

Villages in Uzunyayla were usually assumed to be reproductions of the villages of the same name in the pre-migration Caucasus. The use of these village names recalled a narrative that Circassians left the Caucasus and settled in Uzunyayla in many separate groups formed around powerful “lord” lineages, transporting their homeland there.

Basso suggests that “place names... represent the narratives themselves, summarising them... and condensing into compact form their essential moral truths” (1988: 121). This applied well to the village names in Uzunyayla. The juxtaposition of Turkish and Circassian names indicated that place names did not exist outside discourse; different sets of place names communicated competing messages, bringing about contested landscapes from the same extension of space.

The Turkish nation-state erased the ethnic traces with which Circassian settlers endowed place-names in Anatolia, and left their toil unacknowledged. The locals, however, still used Circassian place-names and also Circassianized Turkish place-names by pronouncing them “crudely” (*kaba*). A university student from Karakuyu said, “I need to say ‘Kwarakway’. If I say ‘Karakuyu’, people would think I am putting on airs”.<sup>35</sup> The use of “crude” forms may be understood as both adaptation and resistance to the dominant language (see Grillo 1989), imposed as part of the state’s policy of homogenising its territory and population and assimilating ethnic minorities.

What counted in everyday practice was not the proper nouns that carried the state nationalist ideology, but how people actually operated and manipulate them (de Certeau 1988: 103). Circassians were “getting by” in their everyday life by using whatever resources they had to hand to recreate meanings that favourably defined their social situation. In doing so, they strove to maintain boundaries with the outside society and to sustain a sense of autonomy in relation to the official narrative of the modern state. The use of these Circassian place-names as local knowledge played an important role in relations between their own society and the outside, symbolically keeping the penetration of external influences at bay to maintain their community as imaginable.

Circassians continued to call Pınarbaşı Aziziye, a name that alluded to their ancestors, accepted into Uzunyayla during the reign of Sultan Abdulaziz, a patron of Circassians. The name Aziziye was abolished in 1926 when the district was transferred from Sivas to Kayseri, probably a component of republican policies aiming to eliminate the Ottoman legacy. As already mentioned, Avşars told Circassians “There is no Aziz any longer” in disputes over land use. The continuing use of Aziziye seventy years after its abolition thus gained further significance. As long as Pınarbaşı was Aziziye, Uzunyayla remained a stage where Circassians produced their history. The reign of Aziz represented an age of autonomy when Circassian “chevaliers” (*şovalye*) roamed on horseback, driving away Avşars with *kama* daggers, and denying the state agents access to their villages.

---

<sup>35</sup> Further examples included “*Varanşahar*” for Öreşehir (formerly, Viranşehir) and “*Boğurbaşı*”.

The use of Circassian names here corresponds to K chler’s landscape of memory on which human intentions were recorded. Just as the Circassian place-names linked outstanding individuals to specific places, villages named after their “lords” told a story about village leadership. Local Circassians continued to use these Circassian names to sustain a sense of autonomy, which upheld Uzunyayla as a stage where history remained theirs.

Landscape is one of the media of memory around which everyday historical consciousness is formed. The landscape of Uzunyayla served to record Circassians’ agency as historical actors, allowing them to generate favourable meanings. Under adverse circumstances, in which they were still regarded as a rootless people on the way to assimilation, they imagined themselves as groups led by warlords, struggling against one another for domination in the area, just like when they lived in the Caucasus; this generated empowering experiences in their new homeland (see also Leonard 1997).

The reconstruction of community was attempted here through historical memories epitomised in place-names. A. P. Cohen (1982) mentions that the experience of belonging to a particular community involves two levels: the construction of boundaries dividing one’s own group from the outside society, and the multiple and sometimes contested meanings its members attach to these boundaries. The bounded landscape of Uzunyayla, which facilitated the imagining of a homeland continuing from the Caucasus, fulfils Cohen’s first point. How memories work at the second level of belonging to a community is examined next.

## **2) Landscape as Memory: Naming Villages**

Despite the general acceptance of the idea that each of the villages had a Circassian name, these names, far from already-fixed labels constituting landscape as a static background of everyday activity, were still contested. Competitive social acts of *naming*, therefore, will be explored further, rather than *place-names*, which imply an already-settled history.

Weiner suggests that “place names are not inert, lexical labels for places; place names have their origin in discourse, and it is within discourse . . . that places are named” (1991: 44-45). He continues: “The manner in which human action and purposive appropriation inscribes itself upon the earth is an iconography of human intentions. Its mirror image is speech itself, which in the act of naming, memorialises these intentions, makes of them a history-in-dialogue” (ibid. 50).

Circassian village names surely demonstrated that place-names incorporated a particular social discourse. There were, however, always competing discourses; the struggles pursued to give specific names to villages cannot be treated in terms of a singular discourse. The naming of a village was a yet-to-be-completed process in which contesting claims to legitimate names, relying on different social discourses, jostled for prevalence. Examining the contestation of names helps us understand the relation between different discourses supported by different resources.

Almost all the villages in Uzunyayla had Circassian names, almost all of them related to a particular lineage, and almost all of them contested in one way or another. Morphologically, these village names could be roughly divided into two categories: first, those supplementing a lineage name with the suffix *ey* meaning “belonging (to someone)”, as in Kundet-*ey* and Shenobe-*ey*; and secondly, those which ended with a word meaning “quarter” (*hable*), as in Makare *Hable* or Kılıçbi *Hable*, or “village” (*kwaje* in Kabardian, *kut* in Abaza or *k y* in Turkish) in a few rare cases, as in Lo *Kwaje/Kut*.

It is not possible to provide an accurate statistical breakdown of the two major types, since the great majority of village names were contested and some villages had more than one name. Roughly, two thirds of the 41 Kabardian villages finished with *ey*, the rest with *hable*. In a few cases where two villages shared the same lord lineage, the adjectives “old” (*je*) or “little” (*tsuk*) were usually added further to distinguish them, as in Hotukoshoko-*ey-je* and Hatukoshoko-*ey-tsuk*, though even this was contested.

One of the issues that attracted the special attention of the locals was how to interpret the difference between *ey* villages and *hable* villages. Many people said that *ey* villages were founded *by* a princely lord and *hable* villages were founded *around* a *worq* lineage. Others, however, said that *ey* villages were larger than *hable* villages. This idea was especially articulated in the speculation that a *hable* village was in origin no more than a “quarter” of an *ey* village, as in the above-mentioned case of Gazi *Hable* in Jerisit-*ey*, and was separated from it at some point in

history. All these interpretations acknowledged the higher prestige of *ey* villages through factors such as nobility, size or genealogy.

According to a young headman of a Kabardian village, the proper interpretation was as follows:

The *ey* village was a village of a prince, while the *hable* village was a village of just a *worq*. *Ey* means that the whole village was a property belonging to a powerful lord. The prince exercised absolute authority in the *ey* village, while there were several, equally strong lineages beside the lord in the *hable* village. In my village, the lord lineage could not influence my lineage and my mother's lineage. The lord could give orders to the whole village in the *ey* village, while the elders held an *unafe* meeting to make a collective decision in the *hable* village. Only the prince could entertain guests in the *ey* village, while there are several families who could take guests in the *hable* village without offending the lord. The prince never worked himself and they exploited the labour of all the villagers, while the *worq* lord worked alongside the rest of the village. This explains why the lords of most *ey* villages have declined and disappeared, while the lords in most *hable* villages could remain on their own feet until now.

The headman appropriated the prevailing theory of prince's *ey* village and *worq*'s *hable* village to refute the often-claimed greater prestige of the former over the latter. He was a headman of a *hable* village and was not from the lord lineage. He was positioning himself here *vis-à-vis* the local Circassian community and its history and providing a particular interpretation from that standpoint. People positioned themselves to draw significant boundaries, depending on what criterion of status was at stake. While place-names constituted a landscape of memory, the process of naming continued to incorporate new human intentions into the landscape, even *ex post facto*, helping the landscape to transform itself.

It may also be possible to classify the villages according to the degree to which their Circassian names were accepted: first, those whose names were almost unquestioned and widely used; secondly, those in which a shift from the name of one lord lineage to another was known; thirdly, those in which there was an overt contestation over which lineage names must be considered legitimate; fourthly, those whose names had dropped out of use; and finally, those where Circassian names were not known, at least outside the village.

It is crucial, however, to recognise that almost all these village names, including those at the two opposing ends of the continuum in the level of acceptance, were contested to varying degrees and in different manners. The names of the villages in the first group were most frequently mentioned in the whole region, but were still unable to win acceptance from the lord lineages' close neighbours in the same village. The villages in the last category had no known name, which still stimulated speculation about how this happened. All these ambiguities inherent in village names were utilised to impose a hierarchy among families in the village from various viewpoints, adopted to claim the honour of giving one's lineage name to a village. At the same time, they could be utilised equally as a means of resisting imposed differences in the rank and of challenging the dominance of the "lords". More significantly, these competitions frequently generated reinterpretations of the one hundred and fifty year history of settlement and later developments, as demonstrated in the case given below.

### **3) A Contested Village Name**

*Amongst many village names contested amid different accounts, one of the most illuminating cases was presented in Yukarı Karagöz, a village in Boğurbaşı already mentioned in Ch. 2. The village came into being by merging three different groups that had settled separately along a scenic stream. This union was realised by joining the two upstream groups to the one below, whose initial settlement became the location of the current village. Yukarı Karagöz was a hable village (Makare Hable) named after the leading lineage in the downstream group and the name was one of the most commonly used, except perhaps inside the village.*

*A man from one of the lineages that moved downstream said, "The Makare are staying in the lower part of the village. Still they say 'We are living in the Upper Quarter', or 'We go down to*

the Lower Quarter’’. The speaker’s old uncle added a story about how the village was thus named:

*Our lineage first settled above the river around the site where there is a trout farm now. Since our cemetery is left there, we may have lived there quite a while. The Makare most likely came earlier and settled below the river. One day both sides said, “Your settlement is small and our settlement is also small. Let’s get together and make a village”. Both of the families insisted that the other should come over to their settlement. So they held a horse race to decide on which site the village would be formed. The Makare won the race. We came down and Makare Hable came into existence*

*There was no such lineage as the Makare in the Caucasus. They acquired the name after they came here. The Makare were serving a prince family as slaves. One day in winter, their master family was bringing a bride home and the wedding procession got stuck in the snow. The Makare were among the group. Since they did not have a horse of their own, they fetched a rented horse and saved the bride from the snow. Their master freed the Makare from slavery as a reward and they became the Makare. Makare means a manger of horses. The master gave them some slaves.*

*The speakers’ family carried a name known, not for its nobility, but for its ubiquity, living in many villages without actually recognising blood relations among each other. It was more a commonly used family name than a lineage name (unagots’e, or *sülale ismi*),<sup>36</sup> shared by those descended from the same ancestor. It was often said that runaway slaves felt it easy to assume the name during the disarray of migration since it was so common. The different groups called one another slaves, sometimes even within the same village. The particular group in this village, however, distinguished itself as one of the most affluent families in the area in the pre-1950 period. The association of this family with wealth, based on breeding military horses, had some resonance in the story they told about the birth of Makare Hable.*

**A man from the other lineage that came down to merge into the present village recounted the foundation story as follows:**

*If I add my own interpretation to what I heard from my uncle who died recently at the age of 105, we were most influential amongst all the lineages in the village. All the land on the south bank of the stream was once our lineage’s land, starting from a mountain pasture named after our ancestor down to the upper end of the present settlement.*

*Given that, the village also should have been named after our lineage. We had a number of girls and many relatives through them, though we did not have much manpower. I guess it explains the reason our ancestors came down to the village.*

*I do not know how our lineage came to live together with the Makare. The Makare first settled in an upper part of the village but were pressed by us to move down. They were not strong enough in either wealth or nobility to give the name to the village. They were living in the lowest part of the village just at the entrance. Visitors coming from below started to call the village by their name. I heard that they were slaves of a prince family in a nearby village, the Beslen.*

*All the Makare had left the district. An elderly man whose grandfather had settled with his mother’s lineage, the Makare, was often seen as their local representative and he responded to these stories told by other families in the village:*

*The Makare might not have been worqs in the fullest sense. They might have been l’akol’ash, one rank below worq. But they had a slave. The Hamurze was the prince of a region in the Caucasus. The Makare came from there, but they were not their slaves.*

---

<sup>36</sup> Interestingly, Circassians seemed not to use the term “linage/clan name” (*l’ako ts’e*) in their own language, while its Turkish equivalent (*sülale ismi*) was frequently mentioned. Kabardians commonly used *unagots’e* (“name of an extended family”) in place of “lineage name”.

*There was no such thing as a horse race. It is only an “empty talk” (laf).<sup>37</sup> Slaves invent these stories and displease nobles. These two families came from Makare Hable in the Caucasus. The nobles captured people from somewhere and enslaved them. Slaves were not allowed to enter an unafe meeting where influential persons discussed. They do not have any intelligence.*

*They were freed after the Republic and started to emerge (ortaya çıkmak). Talking hot air like a horse race, they are trying to elevate themselves to a higher class. But there is no foundation for such a story. Things are not that simple. They became rich after the emergence of the Demokrat Partisi and they are trying to lower their ex-masters. They do not do anything else. They do not have any thoughts.*

*But a lineage would not “decay” (azmaz) and would not smell. Slaves are “corrupting good manners very badly” (çok azıyor). To be a noble personality that can fulfil obligations as such is more important than material wealth. Everybody can become rich, but not an aristocrat. The milk of slaves is rotten and they will reveal themselves sooner or later.*

Reconstruction of homeland in Uzunyayla was pursued on at least three levels; first, the consolidation of the boundaries of the territory; secondly, the reproduction of separate villages; and thirdly, space arrangement within houses (see Ch. 6). According to the Russian ethnographer Bgazhnokov (1983), Circassians are very sensitive to the hierarchy of values attached to a series of dichotomous categories dividing space into high/low, centre/periphery, right/left and front/back. He mentions that the lord of a village never gave up the most prestigious site in the settlement to other families.

In settling in Uzunyayla, there seemed to have been some disputes over where different families should settle in the village. Stories were told in some villages about competition for a location above a spring around which the village was formed. At the same time, these spatial classifications did not necessarily refer to physical layout; they were socially created and deployed rhetorically to empower one party over others.

Different stories about the Circassian name of Yukarı Karagöz seemed to have arisen partially as a reaction against the Makare’s attempts to distort the objective arrangement of space to press their claim to the respectful treatment due to the “lord” of the village. Although the village was named after them, the Makare did not overpower other families in real terms. They themselves settled in the lower part of the village, without being able to make other families settle below them. They announced their residential quarter to be the “upper” section of the village to enforce acceptance of their higher standing, even opposing its actual spatial order. They turned the space upside down to create a social landscape corresponding to their version of history, which conferred the title of “lord” on them. The other two lineages, on the other hand, recreated their respective stories from the actual physical alignment.

Manipulation of space played an important role here in creating a particular representation of the past. Members of these two families seemed to found their narratives on the observable fact that the Makare had taken up residence in the lower end, contrary to the idea that a lord would not give up the most prestigious site of a village.

They challenged the Makare’s lordship as well as the appropriateness of the village name taken from them. This allowed them to imagine new stories which explained why the village took the Makare’s name: either the Makare lineage gave its name to the village as the winner of a race in which at least one of these two lineages also participated as *equal* contenders, whose name would have been taken for the village, had they won; or the name was taken merely for the convenience of travellers, regardless of the degree of strength or nobility, some of the criteria according to which the village might have been named after other lineages.

To oppose the claims pressed by these families, the elder usually known as a Makare called them “slaves”, whether or not this was founded on historical fact. He referred to a prince family (the Hamırza), locally known to be closely related to the one (the Beslen) mentioned by a different speaker above. These two families, which settled together in the same village in Uzunyayla, were said to have descended from two prince brothers who migrated together. His

---

<sup>37</sup> See Ch. 7 for the discussion of *laf*.

reference suggested that the speaker was well aware of the fact that the Makare were often said to have been freed from slavery by a prince after the settlement in Uzunyayla.

His reaction, nonetheless, registered a concession he felt obliged to make. He presented the Makare as *l'akolh'ash*, which he placed between *worqs* and commoners. He revised the Makare's claim to noble status, even cancelling out the recognition of nobility usually granted to "lord" lineages. Historically, this category denoted the top ranking nobles<sup>38</sup> between prince and *worqs*, but the speaker used it to create a medium rank between *worqs* and commoners, still retaining its connotation of intermediary.

What emerged from this contestation over the village name was not a landscape of memory that simply recorded and communicated the encoded memories of already-settled history. It was a landscape as memory, evoked and transformed in the middle of the contestation, thereby making it possible for the history of settlement to take in changes. As part and parcel of struggles for prestige pursued in symbolic arenas, the contestation over village names among co-villagers called up different versions of history about Circassians' settlement in Uzunyayla. These new stories allowed people to re-construct that historical process with some modifications.

This landscape as memory still served as a linkage with the past. This continuity was not merely *reflected* in the use of Circassian village names that connected the present to the homeland in the Caucasus: the contestation in naming villages itself represented a continuity with the wartime Caucasus, when changes of village names occurred frequently as settlements continually dispersed and re-merged with a new composition (see Duman 1987). Many new leaderships seemed to have emerged only to be replaced by others in both the nineteenth-century Caucasus and the early period after Circassian settlement in Anatolia, as the Ottomans implemented their policy of destroying Circassian traditional social organisations. This sort of continuity evoked the homeland in its totality and allowed the current generations to re-present – "make present anew" (de Coppet 1992: 65) – a homeland where Circassians were still struggling against one another for supremacy. This landscape as memory recreated a historical consciousness that re-articulated the present to the past in everyday social relations.

#### [4] Conclusion: Emplacement as Memory Process

Circassian names of villages had two aspects: first, as a landscape of memory, which enabled the inhabitants to recognise themselves as actors producing history in that landscape; secondly, as a landscape as memory, in which new meanings and historical understandings were produced. The latter process enabled a competition for status and was affected by it. This dual nature seemed to correspond to that discussed by A. P. Cohen regarding the symbolic reconstruction of community.

The use of Circassian village names itself constructed boundaries between Circassians and non-Circassians. At the same time, these names, contested by definition, reflected the diverse meanings given to those boundaries from within. Circassian village names certainly produced boundaries as a feature of local knowledge. A significant number of non-Circassians in the district, however, were familiar with some frequently used names, especially among those with some working experiences in Circassian villages as shepherds or cowherds. The significance of the contested nature of these names, by contrast, could make sense only for Circassians: the competing histories produced in the contestation for prestige were localised in a real sense.

The homeland reclaimed in Uzunyayla was characterised by a landscape that could not be mapped out without privileging particular families and thus victimising others. The process of Circassian settlement here was yet to be completed. The Kayseri and Pınarbaşı branches of the Caucasus Association prepared a pamphlet for the first Uzunyayla Festival held in July 1998. The booklet included a map of Uzunyayla with Circassian names of the villages. During the festival, I

---

<sup>38</sup> The first part of the word (*l'ako*) denotes "clan", the second part (*l'a*) "man". As for the third part (*sh*), the above-mentioned Jaimoukha draws attention to the possibility that it has derived from the term *kosh* ("brother of man") (personal communication).

witnessed some locals complaining to members of the club about the Circassian names of their village printed there, challenging the authenticity of the name, resisting the mapped landscape.

Early historical events that helped consolidate Circassian place-names were invoked repeatedly, altering the historical narratives and messages carried by these names. Landscape appeared to play a vital role in this process. As Weiner mentions, places named in social discourses produced history in dialogue. As a new history was told, the village names were reformed, imposed, challenged, replaced and forgotten, changing the landscape of Uzunyayla continually. Local Circassians refused to pin down the landscape on a map: in transforming the landscape, they gave some feedback to the historical story that originally evoked the landscape. They thus kept history from being written down.

Küchler mentions that a landscape as a process cannot be separated from the politics of memories (1993: 104). This point helps to elucidate the politics involved in the reconstruction of homeland by local Circassians. The image of homeland they had fostered was one stratified by different class categories. In this construction, different people were unevenly empowered in their relation to the landscape of memory and they strove to bring about different landscapes to their own advantage (see Bender 1993: 17).

As we have just seen, references were made to slaves not only in order to retrace or imagine the route of migration but also to rewrite the foundation story of a specific settlement. If the landscape of Uzunyayla was part of the mnemonics of Circassian history, it is easily understood that slaves, themselves treated as mnemonic objects ubiquitously located throughout that landscape, played important roles in the process of remembering. Tilly argues that control over the production of landscape is essential to sustain power relations (1994: 26). *Worqs* interlaced slaves into the landscape to reinforce their arguments; power was thus truly incorporated into the construction of landscape.

A narrative landscape in Uzunyayla reflected inequality in commanding discursive memories, through which one party attempted to maintain its dominance over other parties symbolically. *Worqs* constructed landscape by placing slaves in particular locations when inscribing their national history onto geography, and then claimed a right to monopolise the natural space. In the process by which nobles appropriated the landscape, slaves emerged as passive objects, denied the status of autonomous social actors with their own historical agency.

This dominant version of landscape in Uzunyayla was, however, usually supported only by traditional status, the symbolic capital of often impoverished nobles, and was rarely endorsed by actual socio-economic power.<sup>39</sup> *Worqs*' attempts at supremacy seemed restricted to articulate discourse. Slave descendants were not mere memory objects in their own real lives, even if slaves placed in the landscape played important roles in cultural mnemonics. Slave descendants resisted the *worqs*' discursive attempts as shown in the following chapters.

The contestation over village names in Uzunyayla reflected a struggle for hegemony between competing social discourses that constructed landscapes in different ways. As seen in the above case, people made opposing arguments about village names from different perspectives, which sometimes reflected the nature of the material or symbolic resources over which the speakers had control: nobility, wealth or social ties. Village names were not sunk into a set background for social actions, but drawn into an unstable and contested foreground of everyday human relations. Tilly's above-quoted argument, that place-names construct a shared existential space, may be valid. Even place names were, however, contested for Circassians in Uzunyayla and a shared landscape was at most imposed and resisted.

In Part I, I have examined the struggles pursued by Circassians to reconstruct their homeland in a new natural environment after displacement. Alongside the homogenising modern state and the Avşars who had their eye on their historical homeland, the urban Circassian elite continued to see themselves as rootless, laying stress on the Great Exodus in 1864 as the prime marker in their national history. In opposition to this, local Uzunyayla Circassians underscored their rootedness.

---

<sup>39</sup> See Thomas (1993: 21-25) for the landscape depicted in modern Western perspective paintings. This way of representation, supported by a rising bourgeoisie, privileges the viewer outside the picture, while assigning only a passive role to the objects inside the frame.

They re-presented their homeland in Uzunyayla through their memory narratives, vigorously creating historical continuity with the pre-1864 past, thus denying their displacement.

Lovell states that experiences of dislocation may not necessarily lead to social dis-orientation since new memories of placement and belonging may counterbalance memories of displacement (1998: 5). She also suggests that:

a sense of belonging and identity are created and maintained around actual or fictitious, memorised... space. Identity can crystallise around a sense of belonging predicated on hierarchically defined rights of access to territory, which then serve to stratify social groups according to perceived origin (ibid. 6).

The importance of memories about settlement, and of the stratified image of community, both apply to Circassians in Uzunyayla.

If a certain essentialism was prominent in local social discourses, this was partially to counteract the sedentarist metaphysics of Turkish nationalism, which constructed Circassians as a still rootless group. Local Circassians transformed Uzunyayla into a meaningful landscape by imagining it as the reproduction of homeland. Their entrenchment in the bounded space had been accompanied by essentialist discourses that rigidified inherited statuses and overstated hierarchical relations between social categories inside the community. Perceived origins thus continued to stratify different groups in the Circassian society of Uzunyayla, though Lovell herself adds, "Alternatively, the memory of belonging may enhance a sense of unstratified, egalitarian commensality" (ibid.) (see Ch. 7).

It is often pointed out that people who have undergone a separation from their homeland tend to idealise their lost way of life through an image of community that distils memories of amicable social relations (Bahloul 1996; Bohalin 1998; Dhupelia 2000). Circassian efforts to heal the trauma of displacement and to recover their lost community may be compared to a social movement that Jun calls "re-possession" (1999: 325-326). In Uzunyayla, the process of re-possession covered two domains: first, physical emplacement onto the new territory; secondly, the creation of a symbolic homeland. What was at stake in the first aspect was establishing the legitimacy of Uzunyayla as the Circassians' proper territory. In the second aspect, efforts to represent the lost homeland in the new territory had resulted in idealising the society, represented not as suffused with egalitarianism, but as stratified into status groups. Memory narratives in Uzunyayla clearly articulated "the means and costs of resettlement", under-communicated in oral history among Circassians in a different context.

Even this condition may be positively evaluated, as proof of the resilience of Circassian society, which was not completely worn out even after the chaos of exodus and thus had no need to be sanitised as an idyllic community. The landscape in Uzunyayla was saturated with contestation, and was continually transforming itself. And this contested landscape was not a mere static context but a stage inserted into a struggle over history, memory and status, which is the main subject of the following chapters.

## Part II Historical Memories and Social Forgetting

### Chapter 4 Remembering “Bridewealth Issues”

#### [1] Introduction

This chapter examines orally expressed memories about a series of bridewealth meetings held in Uzunyayla in the 1960s and introduces some of the themes discussed in the following chapters. In line with the understanding of social memory as a framework in which different memories are generated and linked, I compare competing re-interpretations of the past produced in different modes by people who saw themselves as belonging to different social categories. I point to a dominant schema of history presented by the elite of the local ethnic community and demonstrate that the significance given to a thirty-odd-year-old event was still contested. Also I shed light on everyday historicity in which an active process of retaining, abolishing, creating and accepting customs helped produce a compound historical consciousness, in which the local Circassians' experiences over time were negotiated.

Bridewealth (*başlık*<sup>40</sup>) in Turkey<sup>41</sup> has been discussed in both sociological works in urban settings (Timur 1981: 69-70; Kazgan 1981: 144-145) and anthropological studies on semi-tribal societies in peripheral areas (Aswad 1971: 72 ff; Bates 1974: 275; Yalçın 1991: 242ff.). The former show that the amount of payment increases in accordance with the labour expected of women transferred in marriage. The latter see bridewealth as part of a family's marriage strategies for establishing alliances and obtaining resources, and argue that the amount of bridewealth is positively correlated with the importance of the social relations the marriage is expected to create. A more semantically oriented study links the amount to different degrees of transferability of the bride's personal honour (*namus*) (Meeker 1976: 414-416).<sup>42</sup> According to other anthropologists, bridewealth has no significance beyond sharing the wedding expenses in farming villages (Delaney 1991: 104; Stirling & Incirlioğlu 1996: 70-71).

Many observers of Turkey and other parts of the Middle East have reported the large bridewealth demanded for Circassian girls (e.g. see Magnarella 1998: 57-68). Certainly, bridewealth once played a significant role in creating relations of equality and inequality among different sets of local Circassians. The transaction of bridewealth was not typical of Uzunyayla in the 1990s. The amount of payment was far from being the focus of people's attention. At the same time, local Circassians continued to carefully pursue a match that united two people of similar social standing when choosing marriage partners; this was one of the main factors explaining their reputation among the urban elite as backward.

My aim here is not to discuss bridewealth as a vehicle for creating new social relations, though the ways Circassians have used marriage to re-construct their society amid displacement experiences is an important subject. I rather examine the contested memory of a series of meetings held in the 1960s to standardise the amount of bridewealth, by focusing on oral narratives recounted by various sets of people with different relations to these meetings. This chapter aims to explore verbal memories as a medium for articulating historical consciousness, a consciousness that took the form of contestation over the significance of the social transformations local Circassians had been undergoing over time.

As a starting point for relating the question of bridewealth to a particular form of historical consciousness, I refer to a remark made by Schiffauer, based on his observations in a Turkish village on the Black Sea coast. He attributes the competitive escalation of bridewealth, in which co-villagers' preceding transaction turns into a custom (*örf* and *âdet*) or a precedent, to an egalitarian mentality among peasants who fear loss of status. He further distinguishes this

---

<sup>40</sup> It is interesting to note that local Circassians often used this Turkish term (lit. “head money”) to refer to the fee that slaves paid to buy back freedom in the past. This usage reflected the fact that historically the regaining of freedom by slaves was described as “head purchasing” (*shha shahuj*), and the money paid for it the “head purchasing fee” (*shha shahuj psh'a*), i.e. “head money” (*başlık parası*).

<sup>41</sup> See Magnarella (1998: 57-68) for an overview of the shift of bridewealth's social implications in Turkey.

<sup>42</sup> See also Tapper and Tapper (1992/93) for two different understandings of woman's honour (*namus* and *urz*).

precautionary attitude of peasants towards the future from a carefully designed future (1993: 74-78). Bridewealth increased rapidly in Uzunyayla in the 1960s. However, perceiving themselves as divided into different status groups, many locals saw the bridewealth competition as a manifestation of a new social consciousness, founded on a striking contrast to past conditions.

I examine the competing memories of these bridewealth meetings recounted by two separate sets of people: on the one hand, members of *worq* families who saw the intensification of competition as a grave social problem and organised a meeting aimed at controlling the transaction; and on the other hand, people seen by this elite group as belonging to lower classes such as slaves, peasants or villagers. I portray the local Circassians as social actors endowed with agency to different degrees through different social discourses and resources at hand, competing over legitimate ways of articulating the past with the present.

## [2] *Wase* and Bridewealth Meeting

From his research in two Turkish villages in Kayseri not far from Pınarbaşı, Stirling reports that bridewealth increased above the inflation rate after 1945 (1965: 186). *Yeni Kafkas* (“*New Caucasus*”), a magazine published by an ethnic organisation, reports the same trend among rural Circassians during the same period, lamenting how difficult it made getting married (1957 1/3: 17-18; 1958 2/10: 10). The magazine mentions that this bridewealth competition does not resemble the previous custom practised until around 1950. The rise in bridewealth significantly affected Circassians in Uzunyayla. A recent issue of *Alaşara* (“*Light*”) magazine mentions that the bridewealth, which was one of the most significant problems for Circassians in the past, still remained a “problem” in Uzunyayla up to the present (1996 11: 32-34).

However, in the 1960s a group of local Circassians attempted to stop this transformation of bridewealth, unlike Schiffauer’s peasants, who allowed neighbours’ transactions to create a precedent. They tried to re-establish what they considered the authentic tradition and thereby the proper order of their society. As *Yamçı* (“*Felt Cape*”) magazine mentions, though famous for bridewealth among Circassians across the country, Uzunyayla also became a stage for heated debates and frequent “intervention” (*girişme*) concerning bridewealth (1975 1: 9-18).

The local people’s contrasting reflections on this controversy and on intervention are the subject of this chapter. The Circassian word for bridewealth, *wase*, denoted both market price and value. Its use appeared to be compatible with Circassian understandings of marriage: a separate word for “to marry” did not exist. “To fetch”/“to bring (over here)” (*kashan*), and “to take (over there)” (*shan*) or “to go with” (*dak’an*) were used, depending on which party one belonged to. According to Uzunyaylalı elders interviewed in *Yamçı* in the mid-1970s, bridewealth started in the Caucasus with a horse given to the bride’s maternal uncle. In Uzunyayla, it incorporated the former *kobjeut* payment of two oxen given to the slaves of the bride’s family, to be finally formalised as “two oxen, two horses” (*vit’ shut*).

During the 1950s, the mechanisation of local agriculture and the motorization of the Turkish army, which until then had relied on Uzunyayla for a supply of military horses, devalued these livestock. Bridewealth was turned into a cash payment, which stimulated an escalation, making marriage very difficult. A regional-scale meeting was held in Yahyabey village in the summer of 1965 to rein in the increase in bridewealth, thereby making marriage easier. A decision was made to reduce the amount from fifteen thousand to three thousand Turkish lira (TL).

This meeting was covered in a major national newspaper, which reported that the plan was welcomed by the locals:

At last, no young man would be left without a wife owing to lack of money. No girls would dry, wither and become too old because a bridewealth payment cannot be made.... Thanks to mature, capable elders (*yaşlı başlı, er kişileri*) and local aghas and beys (*ağaları beyleri*), Uzunyayla can encounter happiness.... Parties and gatherings continued until morning after the decision. A couple got married in one of the villages every day for the last two months. Gun shots echoed until morning in the star-filled, cold sky of Uzunyayla (*Milliyet* 19 July 1965, my translation).

As the newspaper reports, this meeting was meticulously prepared by people who recognised themselves as nobles and thus “notables” (*ileri gelenler*) in local Circassian society. The nucleus of this group consisted of relatively young people, including officials, merchants, bank clerks, teachers and university students. They did a great deal of groundwork for the meeting, preparing a text of the collective decision to be taken, and left the control of the meeting to some “influential elders” (*tamada*). Hundreds of notables were invited to the meeting as representatives of all villages. The gathering took the form of a traditional *unafe* meeting where the leading nobles discussed issues and made decisions in the interests of the whole local community.

One of the main organisers, in his 70s, is interviewed in *Alaşara*. He recalls that the meeting was held in the belief that the problems “arising from traditions (*gelenekler*) that drive our life into a more difficult state... can be solved” by “propagating a new set of traditions which eliminate these negative traditions”. It is apparent from the list of decisions<sup>43</sup> that the meeting was aimed not merely at lowering bridewealth but also at consciously re-establishing certain wedding customs in order to restore the traditional social order maintained partially through marriage practice.

According to a district guidebook on Pınarbaşı, local Circassians resumed making bridewealth transactions as they saw fit four years after the original meeting (Temel 1973: 102). Another meeting was organised a few years later by a different group and held in Karakuyu under the command of the same influential elders, leading to similar decisions.

Virtually nobody showed interest in the amount of bridewealth during my research in 1997-99. Its competitive elements had disappeared. Payment was still often made either as a means of sharing the expenditure of badly-off brides’ families or as a formality of Islamic *mehr-i muaccer*<sup>44</sup> transferred at the engagement ceremony. It had no connotations beyond that. Circassians in the 1990s had clearly experienced a shift in the social meaning of bridewealth, just as people in the 1950-60s perceived a significant change in the competitive transaction of bridewealth.

Current interpretations of the bridewealth issue in the past period and reappraisals of the meeting’s effects were diverse. This may be explained in part as a reflection of the shift in the nature, meaning and significance of bridewealth over the last 35 years. This change may be characterised as a diversification of ideologies for interpreting the transaction: a greater variety of social discourses had become available now, attributing different moral meanings to the payment.

The present discrepancy in attitudes towards bridewealth and the result of the meeting also seemed to chime with where and how one was positioned in Circassian society, in the light of different statuses and varying economic conditions. As the newspaper article mentioned, the people who arranged and commanded the meeting were those who saw themselves as *aghas* and *bey*s of the local community. The prominent role that these individuals played, however, seemed to have upset some people, leaving a positive evaluation not universally acceptable. This dissent seemed to reflect a more general continuing contestation over how to interpret longer-term social changes in local Circassian society. The nature of these contested understandings may be grasped by comparing accounts given by people who had different relations with the meeting.

Therefore, I examine differences in oral accounts given by members of the youth group who organised the meeting in Yahyabey in 1965; and by those belonging to various categories of people to whom this elite denied both agency as social actors and the authority to produce significant social knowledge. I interviewed the organisers of the Yahyabey meeting; Yahyabey residents who hosted the meeting; the organisers of the Karakuyu meeting; and *Karakuyulus* who served as hosts. I concentrate mostly on memories presented by the first and the last groups in order to elucidate the divergent ways in which different sets of people produced historical knowledge. In the contested memories of a specific social event, I shall locate some basic components underpinning local discourses on history, which is the subject of the next chapter.

---

<sup>43</sup> *Alaşara* reprints the whole text of the decision with seven items circulated among participants, which I can only summarise here: 1) standardisation of bridewealth at three thousand TL; 2) standardisation of the payment to the imam who performs *nikah* at fifty TL; 3) abolition of tips to the youths of bride’s village; 4) eradication of alcoholic drinks given at wedding party; 5) abolition of *wuki* dance; 6) abolition of payment to the village headman; 7) proposal not to allow Circassian girls to marry out (1996 11, pp. 33-34).

<sup>44</sup> Payment of money made to the bride as a guarantee in case of divorce or the husband’s death.

### [3] Memories of the Bridewealth Meetings

#### 1) The Yahyabey Meeting

I started my research on the first meeting with the article in *Alaşara*, interviewing both the people whose names are mentioned as its organisers, and the members of the “inspection committee” formed in order to ensure that the decisions were observed. I met over ten people who prepared the meeting, including those now living in Ankara and Istanbul, though the elders who led the meeting had long since passed away.

Virtually all my interviewees had been youngish members of the well-known *worq* families, including several from “lord” lineages. Because of their keen awareness, they were still notably articulate in recounting their actions then. There were some minor disagreements as to the greatest amounts of bridewealth or who married whom in well-known cases. However, there was total agreement on the basic framework of “issues”, also mentioned in such terms as “question” and “problem” (*dava, mesele, sorun, problem*), the reasons they believed it necessary to intervene, and the course and outcome of the meeting.

This understanding was also shared by those who, though they did not play a central role in the meeting, belonged to the same generation of prestigious *worq* families. Those who had a common position as members of a reputed status group in local society shared the same viewpoint, from which they wove memory fragments into particular social narratives. Their stories had a high degree of consistency, despite differences in their present economic conditions, occupations, places of residence, educational levels, styles of life and ages. Rather than being divided by class consciousness, they inhabited the same “plot-space” (Hastrup 1992: 4-9) in the world, constructed through their own narratives about the history of the community. *Worq* organisers’ accounts can, therefore, be supplemented with those of other *worqs* as a reconstruction of the bridewealth meeting shared by those with a common elite consciousness.

Their memories had two central themes: first, they shared the common understanding that the bridewealth competition was a transitory phenomenon, which emerged in the specific social and economic conditions of the mid-century, and was thus inappropriate in the light of Circassian traditions; secondly, their hostility towards the transaction of large amounts of bridewealth obviously arose from their feelings of shame at the stories that Circassians sold slave girls until recently.<sup>45</sup> They did not interpret the competition within the kind of ahistorical framework imbued with egalitarian mentality that Schiffauer attributes to peasants in isolated communities. They tried to make sense of the tendency by locating it within the historical transformation that their society was undergoing.

The nobles recognised the trend as peculiar to the period of “crisis” (*bunalım*), in which changes in the economic structure affected traditional social relations. Local economic conditions changed drastically during the 1950s-60s when bridewealth transactions became commercialised. They expressed the idea that the degree to which one could adjust to a new mode of economic activity depended on one’s class status, rather than one’s personal aptitude.

In their memory, before the 1950s Uzunyayla was one of the richest regions in Turkey, enjoying affluence as the provider of half the horses required by the military. Horses were a status symbol among Circassians. Only noble families were allowed to brand a lineage emblem (*damga*) onto their horses. Uzunyayla had 2,800 branded mares in 1928 (Güleç n.d.: 138).<sup>46</sup> Members of families that once owned horses agreed that the sale of one horse covered half a year’s household expenses. It was also a time when the sheep trade was immensely profitable.

In the pre-1950s period, bridewealth became standardised at “two oxen, two horses, clothes money (*vit’ shut’ shigenopha*) of 3000 lira” in cash payment. *Worqs* said that this payment was

---

<sup>45</sup> G. Lewis referred to this meeting in a book on the modern history of Turkey. He mentions that it was held because the increased bridewealth left parents unable to find husbands for their daughters (1974: 235), rather than find wives for their sons. The stereotyped image of Circassians as wife-givers seems to be reproduced here, though he does not mention Circassians.

<sup>46</sup> An official report in 1938 numbered 1679 brood-mares (*Ziraat Vekâlati Naşriyatı*: 3). See Kosswig (1974) for *damgas* collected in Uzunyayla.

required only within noble circles. Masters usually arranged their slaves' marriages, providing one or two oxen. Often nothing was given.

According to one of the organisers,

All the villages in Uzunyayla had a herd of horses and thirty flocks of sheep.<sup>47</sup> A hundred and fifty to two hundred flocks of sheep could be pastured in the mountains. The slopes of the Şirvan Mountain behind the town looked totally white with sheep. This could meet the needs of Turkey. In the 1950s, Kayseri's need for flour, cheese, butter, meat and other foods were supplied from *Aziziye* and those of Nevşehir and Ürgüp as well. ... *Vit' shut' shigenopha of 3000 lira* was a huge amount of money at that time. If you had that much, you were called *Hajji ağa* in Kayseri. The land at the centre of Kayseri cost you only 50 TL per square metre.

Another organiser explained what a huge amount 3,000 TL was:

I sold 120 young sheep (*kusur*) in 1954. A sheep was 25 lira and they made 3,000 lira altogether. With this money, you could have purchased 30 decars in the busiest street in Kayseri. How many trillion lira does it cost now? And half the households in every Circassian village had 120 sheep, while some like us had even more than 1,000 sheep. If you had bought a 30-decare plot and built an apartment building, you could be the owner of 100 apartments now.

The organisers recognised that Uzunyayla was suddenly impoverished and fell into a dark age as the purchase of horses by the military came to an end in the late 1950s. They all agreed that whereas the *worq* families, which had had their heyday with horse trading, declined, people from ex-slave families became wealthy after freedom. Changes in the organisation of labour enabled members of the former underclass to accumulate wealth through their own toil. The noble families, who had once lived off the surplus of slave labour, were unaccustomed to working for themselves. They could not get used to exhausting work in the fields, the barn or the pasture and declined materially. A new disparity emerged between hereditary status and actual socio-economic standing.

The organisers agreed that this reversal of economic standing between nobles and ex-slaves spurred the mutation of bridewealth, which became a cash payment during the same period, into a competition. The custom of bridewealth, previously confined to the higher status families, was now emulated by the descendants of slaves. The organisers said that some ex-slave families who had overtaken their ex-masters economically, started to ask for *worq* girls, who would never have been given to them previously. Some impoverished *worq* families started giving their daughters to anybody, irrespective of status, as long as a good bridewealth was offered. Consequently, bridewealth turned into a competition at both ends of the transaction. The following comment by one *worq* clearly displayed the we/they dichotomy used to construct "the other" (*öteki*):

People on *the other side* were freed and given a right to speak only after Atatürk. Before that, *they* just served their masters and had fewer rights than livestock beside the door. *They* kept alive a feeling of oppression. *The other side* was more numerous and wealthy than *worqs* many of whom had been impoverished . . . Slaves wanted to repress *the other side*. With the power of money, *they* started to take girls from lineages who rank much higher than them. Those youths who formed the first core of the meeting all came from notable families. *They* [i.e. slaves] opposed the decision of the meeting for the sake of opposing.

It has become customary for Circassian urban intellectuals to cite the first monograph on Circassian history by Noghumuka, mentioned above, and state that Kabardians had the most

---

<sup>47</sup> Locals often mentioned the size of a herd as five hundred head, though herds were much smaller in reality.

elaborate social structure composed of more than ten different classes (Güsar 1969; Kanbolat 1989).<sup>48</sup> This class system is often referred to as “feudal” (*feodal*) (İnalçık 1960: 22; İzzet 1976).

There was, however, a vigorous dispute in Uzunyayla over how the status categories should be defined and which family belonged to which group. A *worq* man of local origin, now serving as a judge in Ankara, remarked: “There are two types of families. One includes those that *worqs* see as slaves. The other includes those that slaves see as *worqs*”. This reflected reality to the extent that current Circassian ideas of noble and slave status seemed to have little to do with people’s real, historically factual origins. Forcing particular families or individuals into specific categories played an important part in everyday language exchange among the locals. My project deals with the contested nature of these statuses, and avoids imposing clearly defined titles on particular families. *Worqs* and slaves in this thesis must be understood as “*worqs*” and “slaves” at all times.

The only locally significant distinction in Uzunyayla was between *worqs* and slaves. Contrary to the idea of class or “estate”, implying inequality and asymmetry, *worqs* described these two categories as “teams” (*takım*), as in “the *worq* team” (*worq takımı*) and “the slave team” (*köle takımı*), indicating that these groups were opposed on more or less equal terms. This habit discloses *worqs*’ dichotomous assumption that *worqs* and slaves were rival contenders in a historical class struggle, both sides sharing a common goal as well as the same types of resources to fall back on. This was the prime engine of national history for *worqs*. Naturally, describing a family as non-*worq*, i.e. as “freeman”, “peasant” or “villager”, was accepted as designating it as slave, occasionally annoying its members. For *worqs*, those who were “self-sustaining” (*kendi halinde*) or who “cooked meals with their own oil” (*kendi yağ ile pişirmek*), both designating those who did not possess a slave or two on whose labour they could rely, were no better than slaves.

I frequently heard from *worqs* that differences in traditional status must continue to be taken into account in choosing marriage partners. This claim was sanctioned by the impersonalised authority of a common Turkish saying, “Let one go to one’s own like” (*Denk, dengine gitsin*) and also, though much less frequently, by a Kabardian proverb, “Those who do not joke with each other will not dance together. Those who do not resemble each other will not marry”.

Yet, the status of a given lineage was often no more than a claim, made through guesswork, based on a shallow history of the marriages arranged by the particular family since migration. This included many cases of elopement and abduction, often recounted with resentment. Thus, family status was inevitably contested, subject to public bargaining as well as to covert objections. Status retained its significance as something over which people agreed to disagree. Social standing as inferred from a limited number of marriages had little to do with clearly defined titles, but was part of a “chunked knowledge” (Bloch 1998: 16), a body of practical memories rapidly processed and selectively employed on appropriate occasions.

According to the organisers, matchmaking in the pre-1950s period had been maintained as a stable system, unaltered since Caucasus days; it had become a resource for *worq* families, allowing them to claim celebrity status. With a clear idea of their position, people exchanged girls within a circle of their own status. Bridewealth was not a “price” (*wase*) for the girl but a symbol of the “value” (*wase*) the groom’s family attached to the bride’s family, serving as an expression of mutually acknowledged equality between the two parties. It entailed no element of competition or trade, which began only once slave descendants started to pay a huge amount of money to obtain a *worq* girl.

At the same time, the wife-taking party amassed the greater honour, as expressed in another frequently quoted Circassian proverb, “Take from below. Give to above”, usually given to me in Turkish, as “*Aşağıdan al. Yukarıya ver*”.<sup>49</sup> The organisers claimed that the newly rich ex-slave families tried to make *worq* families accept their equal, or even superior, standing by marrying *worq* girls who ranked much above them, as if purchasing them for money. The rare cases in

---

<sup>48</sup> Jaimoukha even compares the different categories of Kabardian nobility to various titles given to the English peerage system, partially relying on the same source (2001: 156ff).

<sup>49</sup> Its fuller version is “Look at one rank below and take. Look at one rank above and give”.

which ex-slave families obtained a girl from their own ex-masters were mentioned as the supreme examples of “revenge” (*revans*) by slaves, clearly registering their considerable social achievement.

The sudden bankruptcy of Uzunyayla also caused many Circassian girls to be given away outside their society in exchange for an attractive bridewealth. The ethnic elite claimed that the population of local Circassians decreased because of out-marriage, interpreting this as leading to “assimilation”, understood as demographic diminution or genetic extinction. The large bridewealth Circassians demanded from non-Circassians was locally well known, a prominent case being the daughter of a village lord family given to the son of a Kurdish agha in south Turkey towards 1930. This event, arranged by the girl’s maternal uncle from a notable *worq* family in Karakuyu, an official of the sub-district of Örenşehir, was immortalised in a ballad, well known locally, allegedly sung by the girl. A Karakuyulu elder said that the girl’s family received one and half flocks of sheep, which means seven to eight hundred head. He also states that the girl’s uncle received the half of the bridewealth, which served as the foundation of the Karakuyulu noble family’s heyday that continued into the early 1970s.

People often recalled that, at the time, marrying a wealthy Turkish man meant salvation for girls from poverty-stricken Circassian families. Many of these girls were married off to wealthy but often aged Turks as second wives or fellow-wives (*kuma*) in polygamous marriages. Many people remembered the days when rich Turks visited Uzunyayla not only from Kayseri but also other parts of central Anatolia with a roll of banknotes and gold jewellery, hoping to find a Circassian bride.<sup>50</sup> A *worq* elder stated that the number of local Circassian girls given to Turks for money could not be less than two or three thousand. A middle-aged Karakuyulu woman told me that dancing parties used to be held to entertain these would-be husbands so that they could choose their favourite girls.

Circassian girls’ popularity derived from their well-established reputation for beauty, manners and discipline, based in part on the historical fact that many female slaves in Ottoman harems were Circassians. For local Circassians, this history remained a painful memory. In Karakuyu, the last *saraylı*, a slave woman who returned to the region from her service at a harem in Istanbul, died around the time of the bridewealth meetings. Several male elders born of *saraylı* women were still living in the village during my research. It is easy to imagine that memories of the female slave trade were much more poignant at the time of the meetings and formed the historical backdrop of the decision to discourage marrying girls out. The meeting also prohibited the *wuki* dance, in which unrelated young men and girls danced hand in hand in pairs. *Wuki* had become a natural target for the curious eyes of Turks, as well as for criticism by devout Circassians.

The organisers expected the standardisation of bridewealth to obstruct both giving away poor *worq* girls to prosperous slave men and giving out destitute Circassian girls to rich Turks in the manner of a commercial transaction. The difficulty of ensuring a proper marriage, the increased frequency of elopement and the anticipated decrease in population were not the only conditions that made the young notables anxious about the escalation of bridewealth. The greatest concern for them was to restore the status endogamy they claimed had broken down as a result of economic and social change, and to re-establish a Circassian society with well-defined social statuses. *Worqs* identified this proper order with the *Adyghaga* assumed to have existed in the pre-1950s era.

Those who recognised themselves as *aghas* and *beys* of local Circassian society did not strive simply to facilitate marriage. They saw the increase in bridewealth from an elite viewpoint as undermining their own social standing, and attempted to restore the social order that legitimated their respectable status. A *worq* man said: “The meeting was held immediately, once some *worq* families started to give girls to rich slaves for an attractive bridewealth. It prohibited the transaction of large amounts of money. No *worq* girls were given to slaves after that.” This interpretation was repeated by the organisers, who recounted that most of the participants in the Yahyabey meeting were *worqs*: people who might oppose the decision were not invited. In *worqs*’

---

<sup>50</sup> One such case from Nevşehir is reported in Roper (1974: 30).

eyes, the meeting was prepared in the format of the traditional *unafe* meeting. The aghas and beys were treated as the representative of their villages.

A great number of wedding parties followed the meeting, clearing the backlog of unmarried men and women. The organisers insisted that the Yahyabey meeting was a success and that its decisions were followed for some years. The eventual increase in payments was attributed to the failure of the subsequent meeting arranged by the newly founded Caucasus Association of Uzunyayla based in Kayseri, which was held in Karakuyu a few years later. According to these elite organisers, “slaves who feel it inconvenient even to say ‘I am a Circassian’”, and who were not invited to the first meeting, arranged the second meeting in order to “get their own name mentioned by society” (*topluma kendi ismini söyletmek*).

It is not difficult to imagine that many people were dissatisfied with the outcome of the first meeting, given that only people of privileged status took part in the discussions and made decisions in their own interests. This was clearly seen in a heated argument between a *worq* organiser and an elderly man of note, sometimes said to be of slave origin. This wealthy merchant was also active in local party politics, serving as a member of the municipal assembly’s executive committee (*encüman*).

I met him in a small bus ticket office in the town of Pınarbaşı and showed him the *Alaşara* article. Having looked at the faces of the young organisers in pictures taken during the preparation of the meeting and read their names, he made a wholesale denial of the meeting’s success, stating that it could never have been effective because those young men had no right to make a collective decision; because even the more mature organisers were too poor to be influential; and because the highly reputed elder who presided over the meeting had once stated that payments over the fixed amount should be transacted under the table. He insisted that it was he who had abolished both bridewealth and *wuki*. He said that he did not receive bridewealth when two of his nieces married prior to the meeting, since it was not a livestock sale, and that he did not allow the “improper” *wuki* dance at his sister’s marriage in 1953.

Just then, one of the main organisers came into the office; the wealthy man turned on him, repeating his arguments. The organiser replied:

A worthless poor slave girl married for three thousand TL and a wealthy noble girl married for three thousand TL after the meeting. *Denk, dengine gitsin*. The same amount of money must be received. Marriage between an ex-slave man and a *worq* girl with a huge amount of bridewealth must be avoided. Everybody can “find his balance” (*ayarını bulmak*) by this rule. Everybody can “adjust” (*ayarlamak*) himself and his spouse. A slave cannot ask for a *worq* girl. A *worq* girl cannot be given to a slave man. From then on, everybody asked for an appropriate (*layık*) person and bridewealth became equally three thousand TL for both *worqs* and slaves. That is justice.

His overt insistence on the *worq*/slave dichotomy and his explicit elitism were unacceptable to the non-*worq* notable who had mentioned on another occasion that he accepted notable persons (*ilerigelen kişi*), but not notable lineages (*ilerigelen sülale*). An exchange of fiery words started between them in front of a small audience.

Later, one Circassian bystander explained the quarrel as *benlik davası*,<sup>51</sup> an “ego problem” or more literally an “‘I’-ness dispute”, a phenomenon in which someone insisted on monopolising credit for all great feats, saying “I (*Ben*) did it”. It seemed to lie at the foundation of the grave problem of *çekememezlik* (envy/jealous, intolerance, discord), widely recognised and deeply deplored among local Circassians. *Çekememezlik* was perceived as a mentality preventing people from appreciating other people’s deeds positively and thus from achieving national unity. People considered social attitudes such as status competition among nobles and discord between nobles and slave descendants to be a residue of “feudal” consciousness. They regarded *çekememezlik* as the reason why Circassians could not gain power in many important aspects of social life in the

---

<sup>51</sup> In Turkish, *benlik* is distinguished from *bencilik*, a more usual translation of “egoism” or “selfishness”, which entails a strongly negative judgement.

region, such as party politics and club membership, and why they failed to produce strong leadership while Avşars were consolidating their influence.

Local Circassians said that *çekememezlik* was not a competitive spirit that could be turned into a foundation of mutual betterment. They explained *çekememezlik* as a negative habit of mind, an inclination to frustrate others with the thought that “I do not care if I do not have it. But don’t let him have it, either”. This dog-in-the-manger state of mind appeared comparable with the disposition to see all resources as limited goods, once seen as a common trait among poor peasants in closed village communities (see Foster 1965). Local Circassians, however, understood it in a historical context, in which persistent status consciousness over-stressed hereditary inequality and obstructed a shift to an open and meritocratic social formation appropriate to the modern world.

It was thus surprising that a group of young local Circassians united thirty-five years ago and took concerted action in the interests of the whole ethnic community in the region, though they viewed the situation from an elite, thus restricted perspective. Many organisers recalled that Circassians had been the most influential group in Pınarbaşı then. A *worq* man said,

Circassians were not split as badly as now though they were divided by their affiliation with different political parties. *Worqs* in the town could achieve unity since slaves still stayed in villages. Circassians became fragmented and lost political influence after slaves moved to town and started to oppose *worqs*.

Regardless of whether this argument was valid, it was difficult to imagine several hundred local Circassians gathering in one place at the present time, holding a discussion and making decisions for the sake of their community. The meeting then was held at approximately the same time as the locals took determined collective action to get back a Circassian girl abducted by a group of Alevi Kurds (see Ch. 2). This appeared to have been the last period when local Circassians could make a claim to autonomy by demonstrating local initiative without recourse to the more formal organisation of ethnic clubs.<sup>52</sup> Being members of leading *worq* families, the young organisers were encouraged by their self-recognition as actors inherently endowed with authority and potency. They obviously perceived themselves as agents of history, able to intervene and affect the course of events in the local ethnic community.

## 2) The Karakuyu Meeting

*Worq* organisers’ narratives may further be analysed by comparison with alternative memories of the meeting recounted by people they did not accept as equally potent actors. Here, I focus on the reconstructions of the meetings by Karakuyulus: these compare most strikingly with the elite memories. First, it is illuminating to look briefly at accounts given by two other categories of people. *Yahyabeylis* were generally favourable towards the meeting. This approval probably reflects the village’s reputation as the one named after “the prince of princes”, as Old *Hatukoshoko-ey*. Its residents enjoyed the fame of living in the “prince village” (*pshu kwaje*), where they alleged regional-scale *unafe* meetings were traditionally held.

The Karakuyu meeting was organised by a newly opened Circassian club in Kayseri a few years after the Yahyabey meeting, but without consulting the original organisers. The president of the club differed from the *worq* organisers in that he was of an ex-slave family. He was equally articulate, as a retired teacher who also served as a chief inspector working for the Ministry of Education. He, however, repeated the official and sanitised story as related in the newspaper and ethnic magazine mentioned above, without referring to the noble/slave opposition.

My approach, to compare memories of two different meetings, may invite a question. I stress that Karakuyulus did not perceive these meetings as separate enterprises, but as a series of

---

<sup>52</sup> The above-mentioned Uzunyayla Festival in 1998 was a great success, attracting an unexpected twenty thousand Circassians from all over Turkey. However, it was completely different in nature from social movements in the 1960s. The idea of the festival originated with the main branch of the Caucasus Association in Ankara. It was planned by the Kayseri branch, with work provided by the Pınarbaşı branch, leaving most locals, especially residents in Uzunyayla, as mere spectators.

interventions on their customs. The fact that the same prominent *worq* elder presided at both meetings gives an appearance of continuity, though these meetings were arranged by two rival groups. Karakuyulus perceived that the *aghas* and *beys* who claimed to speak in the name of the local community disapproved of bridewealth as a deplorable and shameful problem affecting the whole community, and imposed their decision to lower and fix the amount at a level they felt appropriate. Karakuyulus recounted their own memories to me as reactions against this discourse of the community.

Nobody who played a central role in either meeting came from Karakuyu. Karakuyu had been called a “slave village”, since more than half of its current households were descended from freed slaves. For members of notable families, Karakuyulus were not fully social beings, and were unable to judge a historical situation in the light of local community interests, or to act confidently and thus have their words listened to.

In terms of economic conditions at the time of the meeting, the slave descendants in Karakuyu included both those who saw themselves as *aghas* of the village and those who were only recently recovering from a poverty-stricken state of near-slavery. This characteristic composition seemed to give the Karakuyulus’ oral accounts some specific qualities even though not all the accounts discussed below were presented by slave descendants.

Accounts in Karakuyu were temporally shallow and spatially narrow, relating only memories of the village at best, and not history on a regional scale. These memories were restricted to what people saw and overheard in the meeting. Even those who got married during the 1950s-60s could not remember accurately how much was transacted or how many of which animals were given as bridewealth in their own marriages. Bridewealth competition was not a pressing concern for them.

Broadly, two different attitudes to the meeting were apparent, according to whether those involved identified themselves with the wife-giving party that received money, or with the wife-takers who paid money. Some remembered that a father of a poor *xexes* family with five daughters grumbled in the crowd, “Why do they interfere in my bridewealth? I am poor. If I do not receive bridewealth, how can I marry my daughters? How can I prepare their trousseaux?” Other Karakuyulus mentioned that another Karakuyulu jeered at the main speaker, who they alleged to have some unmarried middle-aged daughters, saying, “How much are you going to receive for your daughters?” One Karakuyulu recalled, “What he said proved true. In a few years the speaker became the first man who went against the decision”.

Many of those who identified themselves with the party receiving bridewealth to prepare their daughters’ marriage were economically weak, including those who still transacted animals even after cash payment had become normal practice. They did not see the payment as commerce, but as a contribution to sharing the rising expenses of wedding. Others asserted that not receiving bridewealth at all contravened Islamic *mehr-i muaccel*, and explained the choice of marriage partner as *kismet*, one’s “destiny” written by Allah, but not in terms of “balance” (*denk*) in social standing.

In contrast, a man from a wealthy family, which had paid a huge bridewealth when he eloped with a *worq* girl a year before the first meeting (see Figure 3, Family 5), said:

Ten thousand TL was paid for my marriage. It became the record around this area. Twelve thousand TL was paid when my nephew married a few years later. This became a new custom. As the proverb says, “Stretch your legs according to your duvet” (*Yorgana göre ayağını uzat*), you ought to do things according to your capacity. Our family was rich. My father and my eldest brother never hesitated to use money. They thought, “Let not others say they gave up a girl for money”. Now my son is getting married. I will pay whatever the bride’s family asks.

One organiser of the Yahyabey meeting mentioned the marriage of this narrator’s nephew as one of the cases in which newly rich slaves had paid a large bridewealth. The nephew, who married four months after the Karakuyu meeting, had his own memory of the meeting:

Votes were cast to decide at which amount bridewealth would be set, three thousand TL or seven thousand TL. A friend of mine from [the lord lineage of] a nearby village asked me to join

him to vote for three thousand TL. His family did not have a good economic condition at that time. He was still single. I supported seven thousand TL instead.

This suggests that his family could afford to pay more than a prestigious but worse-off lord family. These two men who chose to recount their memories of the meeting as wife-takers were members of a family that became wealthy despite their rumoured ex-slave origin. The family claimed to have been the agha of the village until the mid-1960s, when five brothers equally shared the patrimony. Their attitude towards bridewealth appeared to be reproducing a situation that the meeting organisers saw as a social disturbance, but from the opposite standpoint.

These two different parties in Karakuyu agreed that the meeting failed to bear fruit. However their memories were divergent, varying from “They voted to set free the amount of bridewealth” and “Bridewealth was turned into cash after this meeting”, to “The meeting decided to abolish bridewealth completely, making people swear that they would not receive bridewealth. It ended up increasing it”. These village memories were presented as fragmented episodes and did not form a single narrative shaped from a specific vantage point. What these accounts shared was that Karakuyulus produced them in reaction to the way the meeting was held, to negate the decision’s practical effect and thus the organisers’ social influence. A poor elder said,

The leading persons of the region spoke very well, but they spoke in vain. The rich men of the time had a discussion among themselves. They made a decision in the name of the community. Their talk was good, but it is not a law. Now that parents cannot make their children listen to their own words, who is going to listen to them?

People in the “slave village” perceived that the *worqs* saw the rise of bridewealth as a threat to their higher status and were trying to enforce a decision to freeze it under the guise of community welfare. Without mentioning the *worq/slave* dichotomy, they opposed organisers’ covert intention to maintain the logic of *denk dengine gitsin*: *worqs* should marry *worqs* and slaves should marry slaves, each within their own respective status group, keeping the social boundaries clearly defined. The *worqs* supported this ideology of status endogamy by a body of practical knowledge accumulated through marriage arrangements over several generations and employed it to claim or denounce the particular social standing of given families.

An intimate association between bridewealth and status in Karakuyulu minds is clearly noticeable in the following episode, which I sometimes heard recounted in the village. It was normal practice in the case of agreed elopements that the girl’s family demanded a civil marriage before they sat at the table to negotiate the bridewealth, lest the girl should be deserted. Many Karakuyulus remembered that the presiding notable, in order to discourage young people from elopement, said, “You should not have a *nikah* performed in case your child eloped with somebody you do not want to make your relatives”. A Karakuyulu man from an ex-slave family then turned on him, saying, “Are you going to let an unmarried young couple go around as if they were married?” A man of slave origin recalled, “Everybody said ‘Bravo!’ to him. Elopement is a Circassian custom. If the girl’s father does not want to make me her groom, I will run away with her”.

Among Circassians, elopement was a popular alternative to the formal procedure of marriage, frequently practised by young couples for various reasons: to avoid a high bridewealth or time-consuming formalities or having to wait their own turn after the marriages of elder siblings. Actual calculations of these diverse factors by the young couples or often even by their well-informed families were seldom made public. Others usually interpreted this as meaning that these young couples perceived the imbalance in their families’ social standing and understood their marriage would not be allowed. Elopements were often explained as a sign of unequal status between the two families, especially when a family’s genealogy was presented. These cases were used to invent a novel story, which differentiated the social standing of the two lineages in a post-factual manner.

Many Karakuyulus interpreted the elder’s proposal as remonstrating against marriage with someone you did not see as your equal. In the context of this meeting, this could easily be seen as telling *worqs* not to give their daughters to slave descendants for bridewealth. The *worq*

organisers of the Yahyabey meeting, none of whom was present in the Karakuyu meeting, denied the truthfulness of this episode. They said that it was not possible for the elder to have said that since he was keenly aware of the antagonism between *worqs* and slaves. What was significant here is the fact that Karakuyulus, who observed the meeting as non-participants in the crowd, still sensed such an implication in the meeting led by *worqs*.

A Karakuyulu man whose marriage was also delayed until his late forties said:

There was no bridewealth competition. Three thousand TL was nothing for some people. Others could not make such an amount by selling all their belongings. Everyone got married according to his economic condition. Marriage was not difficult. Bridewealth was not important. It is not firmly founded. Everybody received what he received. There was no standard.

To hear such comments in Karakuyu made me realise the need to reconsider the whole “bridewealth issue” and to ask whose “problem” it actually was.

### 3) *Worq* Memories and Slave Memories

Now it is possible to compare the memories of the bridewealth meetings narrated by *worqs* with those of the people these *worqs* saw as slaves. *Worqs*' memories displayed a high level of consistency despite differences in life situation now or then or in relation to the meeting. They unanimously argued that bridewealth transactions acquired a commercial nature along with economic changes that resulted in the decline of the once-ruling class and the upward mobility of the previously exploited class.

Anthropologists point out that oral accounts of historical memories diverge according to the narrators' status or wealth (Collard 1989), or in line with social discourses available for self-identification (Tonkin 1992: 9). These *worq* youths recognised themselves as social agents who produced history and attempted to exercise their capacity to influence the society. They identified the history of local Circassian society with that of the class to which they belonged.<sup>53</sup> Connerton states that oral history is a genre of narrative particular to the members of the elite who perceive their own capacity to intervene in major social institutions in their own interests. They can integrate their own life history with the history of the society they rule, and interweave memory fragments into a coherent and meaningful narrative of social history (1989: 19).

These *worqs* relied on a dichotomous schema of declining *worqs* and empowered slaves and saw symptoms of the latter's “revenge” or “rebellion” (*isyan*) in the increase of bridewealth. They turned memories of their intervention into a consistent narrative of human endeavour to reverse this immanent trend. The meeting was recollected as part of their own elite autobiography. Their shared, articulate accounts demonstrated that these *worqs* believed that the *worq*/slave dichotomy was the legitimate framework to generate social significance and thus to make history take place. They also had no doubt that I, as their respectful listener, would carefully attend to their accounts.

The consistency clearly discernible in their reconstruction of the event supports the idea that their accounts had the quality of a “collective memory”, shared by a particular status group. They had a common perspective towards local Circassian society and its history. This viewpoint entailed not only a specific positioning among the narrators, but also an implication of common resources on which they relied to authorise their argument. Resources were unevenly distributed among speakers of different categories, legitimating alternative versions of history to different degrees. Monopolising a prestigious status as a time-honoured symbolic resource, *worqs* did not accept slave descendants as social actors or as narrators of rightful knowledge. *Worqs* refused to see them as equal competitors in producing historical knowledge.

It is often argued that the production of socio-historical knowledge takes a segmentary form corresponding to social boundaries at multiple incorporating levels, in Middle-Eastern societies (Meeker 1976, 1979; Davis 1987, 1992, 1994; Dresch 1986, 1993; Shryock 1996) as well as in nation-states in general (Herzfeld 1992; A. P. Cohen 1993). In Uzunyayla, such symmetry could

---

<sup>53</sup> Similar arguments have been made about sheikhs (Gilsenan 1990a) and sayids (vom Bruck 1998) in different Arab societies. See also Armstrong (2000) and Lass (1994) for similar cases in Western contexts.

be located only among *worqs* who, though eagerly contesting minor details, still accepted a basic framework of narrative plot. Through restricting participation in the debates, *worqs* made a claim to “joint property ownership” (Sant-Cassia 1999: 254-255) of significant knowledge, which allowed them to monopolise a national history and prestige. What integrated them into a substantial “community of memories” (Burke 1989: 107) was participation in contestation over status and history.

*Worqs* claimed that there was an asymmetry between *worqs* and slave descendants in knowledge production. The latter’s accounts appeared to lack consistency compared with those of the elite narrators. Karakuyulus seemed to be divided by economic conditions and social achievements, both now and then, unable to imagine a status group to which to commit themselves. This was in contrast to the *worqs*’ assumption that slave descendants constituted a “team” with common motivations and interests that opposed their own. Slave descendants had no shared vantage point and no common resources. Many Karakuyulus associated the current increase in bridewealth solely with inflation. They stated, “It’s not in my hands (*Elimde değil*)”, expressing a sense of the impossibility of affecting the course of history. It was improbable that they recognised themselves as social actors capable of moulding the course of events.

Karakuyulus’ memories shared a quality with those of the wealthy merchant in the town who started a quarrel with one of the organisers. Both were conjured up as a reaction against the dominant framework *worqs* relied upon to produce history. Nonetheless, every time people wove this “discourse of negation” (Portelli 1990: 155), they had to do so from scratch, without relying on a ready-made story line; it remained a collection of individuated memories of fragmented episodes. Karakuyulus proved unable to endow their individual memories with the kind of coherent collective quality that could have generated a social consciousness peculiar to a particular group within society. The slave descendants’ memories lacked the qualities that enabled *worqs* to participate in animated debates to claim superior status over others.

Karakuyulus avoided recounting stories with a direct reference to the *worq*/slave dichotomy that would disempower them, and they were unable to present an alternative framework for interpreting the course of events. For those people who had doubts about their own origins, the imposed model could not serve as a convincing social context within which to locate their individual life histories. The lack of such a context prevented them from constructing an identity endowed with agency.

The chief organiser of the Karakuyu meeting started his account by admitting, “I am not of a *worq* family”, but could not utter the sentence, “I am from a slave family”. This indirectness both prevented him from developing a more positive identification, which might have generated a well-defined viewpoint, and hindered the achievement of the subjective coherence necessary to create effective arguments to offset *worqs*’ monolithic narratives. He could neither bring up the theme of the decline of status endogamy, which the *worq* organisers saw as a crucial problem, nor challenge this elite attitude. Without an argument, his memory was not a *memoir*, related by a socially significant figure: it remained the formalised account of a person whose social awareness was at best partial.

People of lower status remained incapable of achieving a well-defined position save indirectly as non-*worqs*, within a dominant social discourse that did not provide them with an enabling identity to embrace. They were unable to constitute a unitary voice. They expressed themselves with the aid of the various resources and discourses they had at hand. Their voices remained heterogeneous and could not be easily woven together into a single story. They did not own a history to narrate. They lacked a guiding story in which they could identify themselves as protagonists.

*Worqs* refused to acknowledge the authority of slave descendants’ knowledge about the bridewealth “problem”, saying, “They cannot understand the situation of the period” or “They cannot tell it”. The fragmented nature of Karakuyulus’ episodic memories appeared to confirm this claim. In the Kabardian language, one and the same term, *sh’an*, was used to mean both knowing and doing. This attitude, which equated knowledge with demonstration, was also observable in Circassians’ use of Turkish. They regarded “to know a custom” (*âdet bilmek*) as almost interchangeable with acting properly according to it (*âdet yerine getirmek*: “to put the custom in its proper place”), constructing an authoritative discourse around Circassian custom.

The Turkish term *bilmek* also had a much wider implication than the storage of knowledge. It denoted the mind's active workings, which put divergent elements into a story; this process included imagining, realising, understanding and interpreting. It also implied actions and behaviours arising from these workings of the mind.

*Worqs* often said, "Slaves do not know (*bilmez*) history", and, "Even if they know, they cannot tell (*anlatamaz*)". To be treated as a knowledgeable person, one did not require a great capacity for retaining "static memories" (*hafıza*) of already-settled historical facts. One was expected rather to demonstrate the ability to "understand" (*anlamak*) a situation thematically and to produce persuasive stories in accordance with a cultural framework, within which meanings could be generated. In "narrating" (*anlatmak*) these stories, one needed to "make others understand" (*anlatmak*), i.e. persuade them to accept that one's argument carried the authority to silence opposing voices.<sup>54</sup> The aorist tense, or "broad time" (*geniş zaman*) in Turkish, usually identifies a doer (G. Lewis 1985: 117). The negative "broad time" was employed in *bilmez* and *anlatamaz* to stress the timeless nature of slave descendants' inability to become doers; they were dismissed as ignorant and were thus unable to silence *worqs*.

Knowledge here was evaluated in terms of whether it was "powerful" (*kuvvetli*) and the extent of this "powerfulness". The knowledge drew its "power" (*kuvvet*) from articulation, founded upon various conditions necessary to achieve narrative coherence: simplification, customisation, generalisation and conceptualisation. The historical knowledge of slave descendants was denied legitimacy, since it did not rely on the specific framework that turned a flow of time into a meaningful sequence of events, that is, the narrative of history.

Ardener's (1975) idea of a muted category, which concerns the difficulty women experience in articulating their voice within a male-centred, dominant structure of communication, can be usefully applied to Circassian slave descendants, who were denied authority in the production of local knowledge.<sup>55</sup> In this respect, ex-slaves can be likened to socially defined women, denied the status of fully social persons (see Ch. 6), a privilege that only "real men" enjoyed. Social memory, as a framework in which *worqs*' memories and ex-slaves' memories were linked, is further explored in the following chapters.

#### [4] Conclusion

To conclude the chapter, I locate my interpretations of the different modes of producing memories of bridewealth meetings within a wider discussion about the use of customs in the production of compound historicity. Schiffauer attributed the tendency for prior bridewealth transaction to set a new standard to the negative quality of status honour among peasants, who fear its loss (see also Pitt-Rivers 1965: 36). In contrast, as mentioned above, one organiser recalled that they held the meeting to replace certain burdensome customs with a new set. The fact that these elite Circassians tried to establish a novel tradition could be understood as an active and conscious effort to produce a future in the form of a new social formation. They looked at custom as a primary means of generating and innovating a particular narrative that connected the past and the present. They transformed the nature of customs from unreflected *doxa* to objects that they could manipulate consciously.

A new community usually claims legitimacy by emphasising either continuity or discontinuity with the past (Rosebury & O'Brien 1991: 12). Forty mentions that destruction or elimination of a material object leads to the forgetting of the memory associated with it, just as its preservation facilitates retention of the memory (1999: 3-4). Customs in general have undergone objectification after a conscious invention and abolition of traditions in the modern age. Various Circassian groups manipulated tradition to create continuity with or a break from the past and to project a particular image of the future. At the bridewealth meeting, decisions were made to retain certain customs while eradicating others. It may be understood as an attempt to promote a new

---

<sup>54</sup> See Caton (1987) for a segmentary model as a framework for persuasion.

<sup>55</sup> See Frey (1968), Abadan-Unat (1993) and Altınay (1999) for some other ways in which "muted categories" were produced in Turkey.

image of the future by breaking the connection with certain aspects of the past imbued with particular negative memories. Custom here was an important category around which people negotiated historical consciousness.

The organisers' endeavour to hamper the giving of *worq* girls to slave descendants and Circassian girls to Turks in exchange for a large bridewealth was partly aimed at breaking with a stigmatised past of female slave trading. They also clearly sought the restoration of continuity with a sublime past by re-establishing the appropriate status endogamy. For wealthy ex-slaves, taking *worq* girls meant a break with the very past that the *worqs* were trying to restore. For some poor slave descendants, exchanging bridewealth at all was a sign of a break with the past. Renaming bridewealth as *mehr-i muaccel* was an attempt to create a new bridge to the Islamic past, insulated from their national past associated with slavery, in which their girls were sold by their masters. Held in the form of *unafe*, the meeting itself symbolised continuity with a past when *worqs* represented the Circassian community. The underclass created a break with that past by opposing the decisions.

The tendency to provide a large trousseau (*çeyiz* and *bohça*)<sup>56</sup> and an expensive gift of gold jewellery (*tak*) was rapidly spreading in Uzunyayla while some Circassian customs were being eradicated. *Worq* organisers did not treat these components of modern Turkish weddings as immanent social problems. These new customs did not constitute a "problem" for discussion in the meeting, though they were the major factor making people's life difficult by raising bridewealth, as many Karakuyulus agreed. One of the main organisers of the Yahyabey Meeting explained the evasion, saying, "We intentionally did not make these issues the subject of discussion. We thought there should not be an ethnic 'distinction' (*ayrımçılık*)". The elite members of the minority group seemed to have perceived their capacity to intervene in aspects of culture originating in their own community, but this capacity did not extend to keeping the wider society's influence under their command. The negotiation over the connection with the past also attempted to shape the future of the local Circassian community in the Turkish nation-state.

Circassians' use of the term *wase*, denoting both price and value, helped create a sense of continuity in the face of the transformation in the meaning and scale of bridewealth, as well as changes in the relations a marriage creates between two families. Further, ambiguities in interpreting certain precepts about the appropriate marriage arrangements also helped maintain continuity with the past. People very frequently stated "Take from below. Give to above". They explained this, by saying, "Take a bride from one rank below and make her work hard. Give your daughter to one rank above and allow her to live comfortably (*rahat*)"; "One should take one's wife from below and not let her say to her husband 'My family is superior'"; or, "You should scrutinise the groom's family when you are marrying your daughter off. You need to give your daughter to a good family since she will be left alone amongst strangers".

The opponents of this idea, mostly from prominent *worq* families, held to another maxim; "Let one go to one's like" (*Denk dengine gitsin*). These notable *worqs* justified this by saying, "One should be more careful when one takes a bride. You need to take a bride from a good family, because the mother brings up your children. You cannot take a bride from below. Those who do not resemble each other cannot marry, since they have a different upbringing".

No matter how people defended their opinion of these guidelines, all these explanations were founded upon a particular understanding of gender relationships entailing paternal care of the daughter and an expectation that the bride would maintain harmony with the family she marries into. This gender model was also apparent in the casual discussion Circassian men often had of the idea they expressed in a commonly mentioned phrase, "Circassian girl (*kız*) and Turkish bride (*gelin*)". Circassian men compared two sets of women ("unmarried girl" and "married woman") always in terms of the "comfort" (*rahat*) these two categories of women enjoyed – loved by their natal families or in-laws, socialising freely, and free from excessive household chores – in Circassian and Turkish societies respectively. People sometimes said the expression the other way

---

<sup>56</sup> *Çeyiz*, or *cehiz*, usually consisted of a set of furniture, electrical appliances and other household goods the bride brought to the newly weds' house with her. *Bohça* (literally a wrapping cloth) denoted the gift individually given to the groom's family members and relatives, usually clothes.

round, as “Turkish girl and Circassian bride”, but they did so without reconsidering the woman’s position within the family.

Many Circassian men continued to assume that their women should be loyal to the male-dominated order in both their families. The continuity with the past, thus created by assigning the unchanging conforming and passive role to the woman, seemed to be facilitating a smooth transition in the discourses concerning the choice of the right spouse. Unlike conservative *worq* notables, most Karakuyulus had sifted the idioms used to legitimate a proper marriage arrangement, from “balance” (*denk*) in ascribed “feodal” class statuses to “fate” (*kismet*). They highlighted this Islamic understanding of marriage as predestined, and concealed the equivalence people now sought in socio-economic status (and probably also sought in the period well before the bridewealth meetings). Despite this transition in the narrative on the suitability of marriage, from a “feudalist” version manifested in *denk*, to the religious one embodied in *kismet*, the compliant and submissive role expected of daughters and wives in the protective family circle did not seem to have changed fundamentally.

This may be especially true in Uzunyayla proper, where men did not let their women work in the fields, dismissing women seen working outdoors as “shameful” (*ayıp*), and thus depriving them of opportunities to participate in valued economic activities.<sup>57</sup> Local Circassian women, especially after marriage, were often confined to the private space of their household, retreating from public spaces. The fact that not a small section of local Circassians had shifted the ideologies by which they presented marriage arrangements within certain social narratives, did not entail a radical transformation of the basic tenets of gender relations within local Circassian society. This stability in certain aspects of family relationships seemed to be allowing people in the most affluent village in Uzunyayla, under the guise of the concept of predestined marriage partners, to promote the transition in the desired balance, from the symbolic balance of historical class status to a more realistic balance in terms of socio-economic capacity.

These continuities and discontinuities, produced in various ways, were creating highly intricate and contradictory dichotomies of *now* and *then*, as well as *us* and *them*, drawing and redrawing the lines of social boundaries.<sup>58</sup> The everyday historicity of Circassians, or the mode of establishing relations between the past and the present and forwarding them to the future in a particularly story, here took verbal and non-verbal forms of contestation and negotiation through maintaining, introducing, discarding and reinterpreting now-objectified customs.

The divergent courses of history, selectively assembled from disposable images according to one’s agenda, may not converge into the linear progress assumed by modernity. Local Circassians often said, “What is appropriate/proper is a custom”, or “A custom is what everybody accepts/does”, attributing the maxim to Kazaonokho Jebago, a Kabardian 18th century legal reformer, who systematised Circassian customary law as *Jebago Kanunu* (“the Law of Jebago”).<sup>59</sup> It was human intentions that made customs appropriate. Given that the locals were actively creating such continuities and discontinuities, they did not seem to be mystified by customs; they could imagine alternative styles of life and different pictures of history.

Reflecting upon wedding ceremonies in Turkey, Nancy Tapper once wrote: “[since] the construction and meaning of [wedding] rituals have been subject to very little political pressure or scrutiny ... changes in such rituals reflect accurately changes which have taken or are taking place in other areas of social life” (1985: 307). This was equally true of changes in Circassian wedding arrangements in Turkey. The intervention in bridewealth, however, suggests the need to problematize “changes which have taken or are taking place in other areas of social life” and to specify the agents of the transformations of life rituals more carefully than her own ethnographic material allows. Argyrou appears to be on stronger ground: drawing on his research on wedding ceremonies in Greek Cyprus, he argues:

---

<sup>57</sup> See Ch. 5 for the effect of the land distribution, which did not give land to women, on the reproduction of culture that does not regard them as producers, thus facilitating the maintenance of cultural continuity.

<sup>58</sup> Collard uses the term “dual dichotomy” to refer to a sense of distance in both temporal and spatial terms incorporated into the process of identity construction (1989: 99-100).

<sup>59</sup> See Askerbi (1970) for other sayings left by Kazanoko Jebago.

What is no longer practised is significant. Through absence, it is possible to reconstruct what has happened over this period, what struggles have been fought, who the protagonists and what the stakes were. What currently exists is equally significant. Through presence, one can explore the current state of the Greek Cypriot society and culture, its present visions and divisions, the tensions and contradictions embedded in the new order of things, the dilemma that it is currently facing (1996: 79).

In the next chapter, I further explore the framework within which people produced culturally significant history, and emphasise how human agency and intentionality produced such a history. I analyse the unique features of orally recounted historical memories in Karakuyu within the wider context of the social history of Uzunyayla. I also reconsider in that light the difficulties I experienced in doing research in the village.

## Chapter 5 The Politics of Forgetting and Remembering

In the last chapter, I examined memories of a specific event marking one of the watersheds in local history. The analysis showed that the *worq*/slave dichotomy served as a framework for interpreting events as socially significant and that *worqs* relied on it to present a coherent memory narrative. On the other hand, oral accounts presented by Karakuyulus from various backgrounds and in different life situations seemed fragmented along socio-economic lines, unable to achieve the same sharedness.

This chapter compares the clearly articulated memories of the self-proclaimed agents of history to the inarticulate memories of muted people in Karakuyu, to explore further how social memory served as a framework for generating and linking different memories. I examine specific characteristics of different representations of the past, comparing these two sets of oral accounts about historical experiences that occurred over a longer time span. This investigation of two sets of verbal memories sheds light on the politics of the communicative practice that produced both knowledge and silence.

### [1] Social Amnesia in Karakuyu

#### 1) The Loss of Social Knowledge, or the Art of Forgetting?

I start by sharing some obstacles I met during my research in Karakuyu. I examine the difficulties I had in getting people to talk, in line with my research aims, as “social amnesia” (Burke 1989). I then juxtapose these barely articulated memories to the elite’s eloquently expressed memories and reveal the different ways in which these two sets of historical memories were constructed. The focus is on how the barely articulated memories served as an alternative version of local history, but I also cast light on the forgetting involved in both types.

From my previous contact with mostly educated elite members of Circassian organisations in urban centres, I started my fieldwork in Uzunyayla with the assumption that Circassian, especially Kabardian, society featured a rigid hierarchy in which people were divided into four clearly defined, separate status groups: princes, nobles, free villagers and former slaves. I also presumed that the catastrophic Great Exodus was still vividly remembered as the most dramatic historic event.

I settled in Karakuyu on the recommendation of members of the newly opened Pınarbaşı branch of the Caucasus Organisation, who highlighted its accessibility to both the district town and the remoter villages in Uzunyayla. It was also the most populous Circassian village in the region. Prior to research, despite the passage of one and half centuries, I expected the graphic details of the migration to be easily available as hard facts, including the routes taken by each family and the human losses.

What surprised me once I began research started was that very little was known about the tragic experience despite its enormous human significance. People seemed uninterested in learning and talking about the disaster. Stories of migration were very much standardised: the great majority of Karakuyulus told me that their ancestors left their homeland, escaping the repression of Islam by communist Russia. The first settlement in Karakuyu dates back to the late 1850s. The lives of three generations were compressed in people’s accounts, linking the mass movement to the communist revolution in 1917. Karakuyulus equated 19th-century Tsarist Russia, which caused their ancestors to leave their homeland by threatening to convert forcefully them to Christianity, with the 20th-century communist regime, which they equally considered a repressor of faith.

Their strong commitment to an Islamist understanding of history, which identified their ancestors’ journey as *hicret*, suggested that they were using a universalist history to fill the real memory gap caused by loss of knowledge. With a clear affiliation to particular political parties (MHP and CHP respectively), local Aşağı and Alevi Kurds relied on Turkish nationalism and secular socialism as social theories around which their memories were woven. Circassians’ commitment to Islamist history chimes with the popular view of the Turkish War of Independence, still seen by many citizens as a war against infidels. Apparently, the Republic’s official story, which uses Sunni Islam as a means of achieving social cohesion, was giving shape to human experiences. Public memories of the nation state, constructed partially through the *Türk-*

*Islam Sentezi* in the formal history education,<sup>60</sup> were affecting the personal memories of members of this minority group.

While urban intellectuals discussed the Great Exodus in 1864 as “a formative moment” (Lincoln 1989) in the development of Circassian national memories, Karakuyulus did not highlight the event. Instead, they eagerly talked about World War I and the Land Distribution of the 1950s. These two more recent events appeared to have informed people’s historical consciousness more than the Great Exodus, which was unsurprising given their greater impact on present social relations in the village.

Peters mentions that historical knowledge orally handed down to the present rarely dates back beyond the fifth ascending generation (1990: 99). Memories in Karakuyu were much shallower, drawing what Peters calls “the area of ambiguity” to a more recent past. Many elders did not know much about their own grandfathers. Many thousands of local Circassian men were killed in World War I and the Turkish War of Independence. Elders agreed that Karakuyu suffered the greatest casualties: only three men returned alive out of a hundred conscripted. It seemed natural that this near-total annihilation of one male generation led to a considerable loss of orally handed-down knowledge and resulted in the creation of a new set.

The fathers of many present elders were left fatherless after the war. Some elders themselves were brought up by their mother’s relatives, since their mothers could not maintain an independent household without male help, losing house, land, livestock and barns to a money-lender in the village or to even shepherds hired from outside. This period of hardship and dispersion, summed up as *Büyük Seferberlik* (“the Great Mobilisation”), stretched back well beyond the Turkish War of Independence (1921-22), to incorporate the First World War (1914-1918) and even the Yemeni War in 1904. One of the well-known *worq* lineages in Karakuyu, the Altıdokos, produced a pasha of gendarmes (1860-1904) during this period. Elders’ memories of which battle he was killed in fluctuated between these three wars.

Some Karakuyulus attributed their shallow and narrow memories to a traditional avoidance among family members and relatives, especially strictly observed between father and son. The lack of verbal communication in the family prevented them from learning about history, especially after sociability in the guest room, a cultural institution for handing down historical tales, declined. Elders also refrained from talking about personal matters from a cultural sense of “impropriety” (*yemuk*) and “shamefulness” (*ayıp*). This formality (*resmiyet*), brought to the fore in Circassian culture, was explained as a sign of respect for *me*. It may partially account for the fact that people were more comfortable talking about other people or villages in an indirect manner.

It was also obvious that people did not want to talk about their own past poverty, from which many of them had not yet recovered completely, or publicly to allude to their own lower social standing. People sometimes chose to place the disgrace of past poverty onto other families, making a passing reference to them as having been in sheer destitution just a few decades ago, or as being of slave origin. Telling stories about their own similarly humiliating past was scrupulously avoided. In Karakuyu, people tried to obliterate traces of that humbling past by various narrative devices and manipulative uses of memory, which may be referred to as “arts of forgetting” (Forty 1999). As described above, this included compression of long periods, projection of hardship onto others, repression of past poverty and voluntary censorship to avoid emotionally painful topics.

---

<sup>60</sup> In parallel with the weakening of orthodox Kemalism after Mustafa Kemal’s death (1938), *Türk Tarih Tezi* (see Ch. 2) was gradually replaced by *Türk-Islam Sentezi* (the “Turk-Islam Synthesis”), a historiography that sees the Turkish nation as the guardian of Islamic religion, and thus interweaves the two threads of the history (Turkish national history and Islamic history) of the period after Turks accepted Islam in different parts of Asia, including 9-11th century Anatolia (Copeaux 1998: 56). Apart from the well-documented shift in formal history education, these two styles of Turkish nationalism, that is, racism and Islamism, continue to complement each other in popular discourse.

## 2) Absent Lords

Difference in traditional status was rarely stated explicitly in Karakuyu, compared with often-mentioned disparities in wealth. Certainly, my questions sometimes pressed speakers to present themselves as “*worqs*” during the course of my interview. This, however, seldom led to a detailed account of the history of their own lineage or the village.

The lord lineage of the village had been the Kundet, a princely family of the second degree (*l'akol'ash*), who had ruled an area in present-day Nalchik named *Kundet-ey* after the lineage. Karakuyu was founded as the first campsite of the refugees. The refugees who first settled in Karakuyu formed six more villages from here, to reproduce *Kundet-ey* in Uzunyayla around Karakuyu. This lord lineage was almost forgotten, leaving little impact on recent village history. Karakuyulu elders remembered a slightly retarded man from a branch of this princely lineage that had moved on to settle in a near-by village. He stayed in Karakuyu in the 1930-40s, serving a wealthy ex-slave family as a horse-cart driver. He died unmarried. Most had never seen any other members of the princely family.

A middle-aged man from an ex-slave family once exclaimed, “This village is not *Kundet-ey*. This is Karakuyu”. He rejected this reminder of the past, in which his ancestors were known to have come from another *Kundet-ey* village to Karakuyu as companions of their master’s daughter, who married into the village. The young bride died of tuberculosis after a few years: her slaves gradually broke the bond with her husbands’ family, to form a separate descent group, acquiring its own family name.

People talked comfortably about the tyranny and demise of famed princes in other villages with whom they had no direct contact. In contrast, it took some time for people to mention the title of *worq*, considered to have constituted a significant part of the nobility and possessors of real power as administrators. According to the widow of a Karakuyulu *worq*, in her late 40s, living outside the village, Karakuyu was once regarded as a “*worq* village” (*worq kwaje*), with a number of native *worq* families augmented by many *xexes worqs* who joined them as their in-laws. Almost all of them had left the village since then, bringing about a situation in which Karakuyu was ridiculed as a “slave village”. Given this former fame, the silence of the present residents regarding the *worq* title seemed to have important implications.

Recollections of two *worq* lineages, which had once achieved prominence in their respective quarters of the village, were very different. The name of the Adygeuna from the Upper Quarter was often mentioned. A branch of the lineage had produced highly successful brothers, sons of Musa (b. 1884-1934), who became an administrator (*nahiye müdürü*) of Örenşehir sub-district including Karakuyu, after serving in an Armenian camp in Eastern Turkey. One was Cevat (1907-58), a general manager of Sümer Bank, then promoted to top-ranking bureaucrat in the prime minister’s office. The second was Suvat (1920-71), a lawyer at the Highway Bureau in Kayseri, who brought the first tractor to Karakuyu in 1950 and employed farmhands (*azap*) from all but a few well-off families in the same quarter. In the 1961 elections, he stood as candidate for the *Yeni Türkiye Partisi* (New Turkey Party), whose leader (Ekrem Alican) was a Circassian, though he was not elected.

Even young Karakuyulus, who never saw any of them, referred to the Adygeunas as the last family to keep slaves “at the door (*kapi*)”. The Adygeuna were, however, never blessed with sons. A poor branch of the lineage, which left the village in the late 1970s, had the only male successor of the whole lineage, unemployed and unmarried in his thirties. Many people in and beyond Karakuyu said that the Adygeuna were finished.

The Jenak of the Lower Quarter claimed that the quarter was once called *Jenak Hable* after their lineage. Their name was barely mentioned in the village. After spending a decade in Germany as a labourer (1964-74), the oldest man of the family (b. 1922) built a luxurious, two-story house in the village, which poor neighbours called the “White House”. He was still spending the summer months in the village. More than ten households from four families rumoured to have descended from the Jenak’s freed slaves were still living in the same quarter. In contrast, the Adygeuna’s slaves did not survive to see the family’s heyday, when they used a number of farmhands sometimes described to me as their “slaves”.

Many of the families seen as having derived from the Jenaks’ ex-slaves were now wealthy and influential in the village. They included those who fed the poor man of the princely Kundet as

their cart driver in the 1930-40s, and families who made two record bridewealth payments in the 1960s. A man from one of these families already served as a *muhtar* (village headman) of Karakuyu during World War II, following two periods served by a woman owing to the shortage of men after the Independence War. At the same time, two elderly unmarried brothers from another ex-slave family of the Jenak were still earning their living by working as agricultural labourers. In less busy seasons for farmers, one of them was also working for a hotel in the district town, which was once managed by a Jenak, under whom he started working there in the 1970s. The village census, in which the oldest record dates to 1903,<sup>61</sup> did not show that any of these families had really been slaves. It seemed that their ancestors, if bound at all, encountered freedom even earlier.

Though the old Jenak man made it an annual habit to spend the summer in Karakuyu, nobody in the village visited him in the White House or even talked about him. He was not regarded as a fellow villager. He himself stayed away from public gatherings in the village, spending most of his time at coffee houses in the town with his *worq* friends. An elderly woman in the same quarter had heard from her mother-in-law, of a now extinct Karakuyulu *worq* family, that the Jenak aided over twenty-five destitute neighbours during the *Seferberlik*. They owned a three-stoned water-mill and provided the poor with bread made from flour ground by it. She added that their benevolent deeds were totally forgotten.

Even members of families not normally associated with a slave past at first hesitated to mention to me the title of *worq*. After a while, many people started to claim their own family's *worq* status, bringing about a classical situation in which "Nowadays everybody says 'We are *worq*'."

Nevertheless, the criteria they relied on varied in accordance with their own convenience: from the ownership of wealth or horses and having possessed a slave or two, to being of "free" (*hür*) status, equated with having a "root" (*kök/asıl*). They often tried to show the family's strength by subsuming their own poverty-stricken branch within a wealthier section of the same lineage. Also, the Turkish titles (*ağa, bey* and *asılzade*), frequently used in place of *worq*, added a further ambiguity to defining what nobility really meant in the Circassian context, as well as identifying who were really nobles. The status, which people sought by investing varied social capital, seemed to change its definition continually, leaving the boundaries fuzzy and contested (also see Dominguez 1986: 263-265).

Unlike nobility in Western feudalism, understood as a hereditary rank with a clearly defined, endowed title, Karakuyulus presented nobility (*asalet*) as having "roots" (*asıl*). By this botanical metaphor, reminiscent of those used in Turkish nationalist discourse (see Ch. 2), they meant not having been enslaved at some stage of their genealogy through kidnapping or purchase and hence cut off from the social webs into which one was born. They described slaves as "those who have no roots" (*asıl olmayanlar*) or "rootless people" (*asılsız olanlar*). As for family crests used for branding horses in the past and seen as the most convincing proof of nobility, some Karakuyulu said that, although most families had their own in the past, these emblems were now forgotten or lost as people had ceased keeping horses.

In Karakuyu, not being of slave origin was almost equated with being "noble". Among famed *worq* families in other villages, not being born to specific famed noble families was nothing other than being "slaves". These prominent nobles saw most Karakuyulu families claiming *worq* status as "slaves" or at best as equally despicable humble commoners. Better-known *worqs* who had already left Karakuyu shared the same view. Few of the families still left in Karakuyu could evade slander alluding to their slave origin or their having mixed with slaves through marriage.

---

<sup>61</sup> The Public Record Office in the town of Pınarbaşı was burned down around the time of the foundation of the Republic. Local oral history gave two contesting accounts of the incident: according to one, Armenians who survived the genocide by the Young Turks burned the records to hide their non-Muslim identity; according to another, Muslim residents of the town who took over the possessions left by the massacred Armenians eliminated the records that registered the original proprietors. The oldest population records of Karakuyu were entered in the census book kept in this office in 1903, though the book currently kept in Karakuyu was a later copy of this original.

A *worq* man in a different village said of the lineage of a Karakuyulu elder who claimed “noble” origin:

The family was exactly a slave of the Kundet. A man from the family visited the Caucasus, but could not find any traces of their lineage. They have never seen a prince in their whole life, and *worqs* have not passed through their door, either. They do not know Circassian history or customs. Even if they do, they cannot tell.

Many elders of noted *worq* families in the region agreed that I was unfortunate to have chosen Karakuyu as the primary site for my research, where there was nobody who knew or could tell history. They often interpreted my research on local history as a study of the true “origin” or “descent” (*köken*) of each family. They tried to monopolise this history, equated with “roots” (*kök*), and denied it to most Karakuyulus.

Though many people in Karakuyu treated me generously as their “guest”, they were not necessarily helpful towards my research. Some of them saw me as a Japanese secret agent or merely a collector of gossip (*dedikodu*). Some people made light of my research, while others were scared of it, sometimes publicly calling me “microbe” (*mikrop*). A few men simply refused to be interviewed.

At an early stage of my research, many people told me that when the old Jenak man arrived in summer, he would tell me “everything” (*her şey*). A young man from the Jenak’s ex-slave family described him as “a man just like history”. I was waiting for this living history to come to the village, feeling frustrated about the difficulty of getting people to share what they knew about village history.

When the old man finally appeared after the initial six months, he was suffering from “forgetfulness” (*unutkanlık*), which he alleged to have been aggravated by age. Actually, the “man just like history” did not know much about the village as he had spent most of his time outside it. He had a primary education in Pınarbaşı and Kayseri, and then worked as a lower official in Sivas and Istanbul. He was elected as a member of the provincial assembly of Kayseri, serving in the executive committee of the assembly, before moving to Germany for a decade (1964-1974).

He had published a book in 1989, entitled “From Caucasus Mountains to Uzunyayla” (Canak 1989). It was a memoir about the flamboyant sociability of moneyed local families after the *Seferberlik*, including the Jenak, the Adygeuna and other *worq* families with whom they had close relations. He explained to me his motivation for the book, saying that he wanted to pass on to future generations the Circassian life style and mentality, which he observed were disappearing at that time. Connerton sees a memoir as a product of elite consciousness, which allows one to identify one’s own life history with the history of one’s nation (1989: 19-20). This crystallisation of the man’s elite consciousness alienated, not the mass in the village, but ironically the author himself from that mass. Even before he came to the village, I had heard that this publication provoked hostile reactions from some people in the village.

Seeing him regularly, I understood that there were many things he was not willing to tell me not only because of his forgetfulness but also because of the memory of these unexpected attacks. He seemed especially careful not to say much about those families that, though rumoured to have served his lineage in the past, have long taken over leading positions in the village. He said that the section in which he named some local “*worq*” families as commoners who were later allowed to marry *worqs* was most “aggressively” (*şiddetli*) criticised. It was obvious that he was still living in fear. He was silenced.

Given this, the Karakuyulus’ comment, “He will tell you everything”, seems to have carried the connotation that he spoke about things he should not. This interpretation was affirmed by the fact that others warned me, “Do not listen to him. He talks nonsense”. The above-mentioned old woman in the same quarter said: “He could not write the true history from fear. He said to me that he is already too old. *The other side* want the true story forgotten for good. I want it to be written. You came too late. Nonetheless, you may still be able to write something”. His book was obviously unbearably elitist for some people, insufficiently so for others.

### 3) History as the Past

Most people in Karakuyu were uncomfortable about the subject of status hierarchy. Though common, elopement was a highly sensitive topic. I learned of at least forty cases of elopement in Karakuyu, involving fifty-six Karakuyulus. This included sixteen cases of marriage within the village, mostly within the same quarter. This alternative procedure of marriage almost always evoked the interpretation that the young couple ran away because they understood that their marriage would not be accepted owing to the difference in social standing between the two families. Cases of elopement were often deployed rhetorically to reinforce the local theory about class distinction (see Ch. 4).

Karakuyulus often responded to my questions by saying “Do not get mixed up with history”, “History is closed”, “There’s no history left” (*Tarih kalmadı*), “It has become history”, “Do not stir up the past”, or “Do not go into depth”, in order to stop the conversation from dwelling on certain subjects. In contrast to *worqs* outside Karakuyu who equated History<sup>62</sup> with the noble blood of lineages, “history” in Karakuyu is a category identified with “time-passed” or a “bygone”: it should not be stirred up and brought to light. People made such a conceptualisation of history possible by moulding past events and social conditions into a temporal category of *geçmiş*, “time which has passed without retaining its relevance to the present”, or “over and done with” in a more common English expression. This past was removed from the horizon of the present and relegated to a time different in quality from the present, almost like the time in the Caucasus.

However this attitude, which treated discussions of “history” as “inappropriate” or “shameful”, betrayed the fact that what Karakuyulus claimed to have passed were still casting a long shadow over the present. Avoiding such discussions actually seemed to help save the past from “double oblivion” (Casey 1992), a state in which people even forget that they have forgotten something. Rather, this silence was an effect of “cultural censorship” (Sherif 2000) aimed at adapting oneself to a difficult condition in order to avoid emotional pain. These conscious efforts to “make do” seemed to enable the effects of the past to linger in the present.

In Karakuyu, history (*tarih*) was not a primary category through which people were willing to establish continuity with the past. Karakuyulus were constantly mentioning the set phrase “Respect for the senior, love for the junior” (*Büyüklere saygı, küçüklere sevgi*), which chimed with the official ideology, partially taught through formal education.<sup>63</sup> Karakuyulus explained that this principle of respect-love reciprocity lay at the foundation of “Circassianness” (*Adygagha/Çerkezlik*), by which they meant the traditional order of their society. *Adygagha* may be understood as a social order maintained by observing “Circassian manners” (*Adyghe xabze/Çerkez usul*), i.e. the authentic way in which things should be done among Circassians. The above-quoted maxim epitomised the Circassian code of conduct. Borrowed from Turkish but even more cherished by Circassians,<sup>64</sup> the paired idiom of respect and love seemed to elevate mostly

---

<sup>62</sup> I hereafter use History for *worqs*’ representation and “history” for Karakuyulus’ representation, to highlight the dual nature of history among local Circassians.

<sup>63</sup> Here, I quote the full text of the Students’ Oath of Allegiance (*Öğrenci Andı*), which Turkish children (from the 1st to 8th forms) daily recite in school (see Kaplan 1999: 354).

*Türküüm, doğruyüm, çalışkanım. İlkem, küçüklerimi korumak, büyüklerimi saymak, yurdum, milletimi özümden çok sevmektir. Ülküm yükselmek, ileri gitmektir. Ey Büyük Atatürk! Açtığın yolda, gösterdiği hedefe durmadan yürüyeceğime and içerim. Varlığım, Türk varlığına armağan olsun. Ne Mutlu “Türküüm” diyene!* (I am a Turk, I am honest, and I am hard working. My principle is “Protect my juniors, respect my seniors, and love my country and nation from the heart”. My ideal is “Ascend and progress”. O Great Atatürk, I take an oath to walk ahead ceaselessly along the way you opened and to the target you demonstrated. Let my existence be a gift to the existence of Turks. How happy one is who says, “I am a Turk”! (my translation))

See also Szyliowicz (1966: 103) on the respect-love ideology taught in school textbooks. See Ch. 7 of the present thesis for an exploration of the Turkish expression “to drink an oath” (*and/ant içmek*), translated as “to take an oath” in the following text.

<sup>64</sup> It was surprising for me that no one in Karakuyu found Kabardian words denoting respect and love, which they so frequently used in Turkish. Some people outside the village mentioned *sh’ih* and *lhaghunugha* respectively. While *sh’ih* seemed to overlap with respect, *lhaghunugha* (from the verb

unreflected practices to an abstract level where they became subject to consideration, possession and manipulation.

This stress on time-honoured etiquette enabled Karakuyulus to gain access to *Adygagha* as an idealised past in which age was the primary criterion of social differentiation. Elders always lamented that this precept was no longer obeyed as strictly as “in our time” when they waited on their father and guests, standing at the door of the guest room for hours and hours without speaking a word. An old man observed, “I was young when the young were not respected at all. I am old when the old are not respected at all”.

This sanitised image of the past, however, was itself a reconstruction created through a selective stress on customs, as in the bridewealth debates. Condemning the current youth of the village, these Karakuyulu elders never addressed the question of whether they had showed so much respect to their seniors because they were young people from lowly families, and whether they could not receive as much respect now equally because of their modest origins.

It was very difficult to make people talk about history in Karakuyu. Soon I became obsessed with a question, “How does a society forget?” rather than “How does a society remember?” I could not work out how to deal with these complexities until the end of my fieldwork. A state of oblivion, silence and a more active engagement with forgetting formed a large part of historical memories in Karakuyu. People had literally forgotten parts of their history. They had also devised divergent techniques to avoid bringing certain memories to their own as well as others’ minds in public. As a consequence of the unresolved tension between the willed forgetting and the forced telling, Karakuyulus expressed a sense of belonging to a historical community in an indirect and twisted manner. Repressed memories of the repressed people (Bozan & Thiesse 1986) in this slave village remained as individuated fragments, hardly a manifestation of collective consciousness shared by a group.

My own presuppositions and my way of doing research seem to have resulted in repressing Karakuyulus’ voices further, doubling their silence. My interest in reconstructing the history of the re-formation and transformation of a diasporic community, my treatment of knowledge almost as hard facts out there waiting to be written down, as well as my choice of certain persons as primary informants, inevitably reinforced the mutedness of Karakuyulus already constructed in the elite mode of communication.

In the post-fieldwork stage, I felt a strong moral obligation to re-evaluate subtle expressions of historical consciousness whose significance I failed fully to recognise during fieldwork. I struggled with my field notes, both written and remembered (Ottenberg 1990: 144 -147), to rediscover what people implied without articulating overtly. I tried to locate, within a greater narrative, what fragments of Karakuyulus’ historical experiences I could manage to record and then to present them as their voice carrying a significance of its own.

In the next section, I examine the History more clearly articulated by the cultural elite from leading *worq* families. Then, in the following section, I compare this History and Karakuyulus’ social amnesia, elucidating the different representations of the past in more detail. I examine the relationship between the two and show how *worqs*’ History was made a dominant social memory in Uzunyayla, helping silence the muted group.

## [2] *Worqs*’ Memories

### 1) The *Worq/Slave* Dichotomy

How was history constructed and represented by the *worq* elite? It was not until I had started to meet nobles in the town as well as in thirty-odd villages in the latter half of my research that I fully realised the dual and asymmetrical nature of history among local Circassians. I also noticed some specific characteristics of historical memories in Karakuyu.

The eloquence of those who regarded themselves as “masters of speech” or “possessors of words” (*söz sahibi*) was diametrically opposed to the silence prevailing in Karakuyu. They called

---

*lhaghun*, “to see”) meant “warm affection”, quite different from the Western ideas of love, whether romantic, erotic, parental or fraternal. Local Circassians sometimes explained *lhaghunugha* as equivalent to Turkish *hoş görme*: “to see something/someone as pleasant or agreeable”. *Sh'ih* and *lhaghunugha* do not form a paired idiom in Kabardian.

themselves those who could speak “comfortably” (*rahat*), distinguishing themselves from slave descendants not endowed with “a right of speech” (*söz hakkı*). They stressed the truthfulness and authenticity of the stories that only they could tell. For them, real History consisted of what *Karakuyulus* could not tell me. Masters of slaves and speech also owned History as their common property.

*Worqs* understood History in terms of the *worq*/slave dichotomy. Clearly noticeable in their accounts of the bridewealth meeting, narrators brought up the theme of the decline of *worqs* and the rise of slaves recurrently, at any period in the local chronology they regarded as a critical turning point, helping them structure their historical narratives. The defeat of Circassians by Russians in the nineteenth-century Caucasus was put down to betrayal by slaves with an expectation of liberation by the Russians, which precluded the achievement of national unity. The Communist Revolution in Russia, which they said caused their ancestors’ migration, was portrayed as a slave rebellion. Slaves themselves were sometimes referred to as “proletarians” (*proleter*) or even as Bolsheviks. The period during and after the *Seferberlik*, when manpower was in short supply, was described as a time in which “The arena (*meydan*) was left to slaves”.

Some *worqs* even said that the Republic of Turkey was founded with the aim of achieving equality by freeing slaves. A number of people misunderstood the motto of the *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti* (Committee of Union and Progress, CUP) that led the Young Turk revolution in 1908, “Liberty, Justice, Equality and Fraternity”, as the principle of the Turkish Republic founded fifteen years later. The sudden end of the military horse trade in the late 1950s plunged *worq* families into decline, while freed slaves accumulated wealth by working hard just like “oxen”, “ants” or “bees”, resulting in the rise of competitive bridewealth. Equally, it was landless slaves who profited from Land Reform throughout the 1950s. Labour migration to Germany, which started in the 1960s in the region, gave another opportunity to “poor slaves who did not own anything in the hand” to become rich. *Worqs* who relied upon what resources they had in the village, often no more than one pair of oxen, went bankrupt. Even in Germany and urban centres in Turkey, *worqs* who were not used to hard labour found it hard to succeed, while slave descendants outstripped them economically.

A teacher from a *worq* family even attributed enthusiasm for education, for which Circassians were reputed nation-wide, to the struggle of slave descendants to raise their social standing. Many *worqs* understood the increased interest in and commitment to Islam among the locals, including the growing popularity of sending children to imam-preacher schools, as well as the increasing numbers of hajjis, as a reflection of slaves’ intention to gain the social prestige denied to them by traditional views of status. Especially relatively young members of *worq* families with socialist inclinations habitually blamed ex-slaves for the growing influence throughout the region of political parties relying upon Islamic discourses, the *Refah Partisi* (Welfare Party) and their successors the *Fazilet Partisi*. *Worqs* viewed the formation of this new “religious class” with suspicion.

In short, people from ex-slave families were considered to be “agitators” (*karıştırıcı*) or “rebels” (*isyancı*) against the social order. *Worqs* from villages taken over by non-Circassian groups attributed their loss to “the dog-in-the-manger state of mind” (*çekememezlik*) that had arisen within the village as better-off slave descendants stopped listening to their ex-master’s words. Almost all the *worqs* perceived their superiority in terms of humanity, looking down on wealthy slave descendants as “*nouveaux riches*” (*yeni/sonradan zengin olan*) or even as a different “nation” (*millet*).

As Hastrup states, such a cultural framework of causality employed to bring about social significance had consequences for the course of events in the present (1992a: 4-9). *Worqs* deplored the fact that Circassians, divided among different political parties, were not able to unite under one umbrella, like Avşars and Alevi Kurds, who seemed to have successfully affiliated with the nationalist MHP and secularist CHP respectively. They attributed this fragmentation to the negative legacy of past “feudal” relations.

This perception affected local party politics. A military officer, born to a local Kabardian slave family, became a brigadier-general in the 1940s and then a DP MP in 1950. Some *Karakuyulus* told me that a group of local *worqs*, including those within the village, conducted a campaign to collect *worqs*’ signatures for a petition attacking the suitability of a freed slave for

these offices. A similar slander was repeated in the 1990s under the *Doğru Yol Partisi* (True Path Party) government of Tansu Çiller. Her maternal grandmother was a *saraylı* woman originally from one of the Kabardian villages in Uzunyayla, and some of her relatives are still left in the village. A *worq* man from the same village, an active member of the opposition *Anavatan Partisi* (Motherland Party), sent letters to Ankara denigrating the prime minister by calling her the granddaughter of a slave.

In one local village, *worqs* were still trying to block slave descendants from holding the office of headman. The village's physical composition reflected a past event in which freed slaves created a separate quarter. The former slaves also built their own mosque in the new quarter so that they would no longer be told by *worq* co-villagers to pray behind them. The *worq* headman elected in 1994 showed me the late-Ottoman village population records, which clearly identified slaves as *gulam* and *cariye*. The census of this village, which once had over one hundred households, records two *bey*s, three *ağas*, five *efendis* and two *mollas* (mullahs).<sup>65</sup> Seven families are mentioned as *zade* (noble). It also mentions thirty-six *gulam* families and one woman is referred to as *cariye*. The book registered slaves as part of their master's family by the use of the "annexation" (*izafet*) suffix, rather than as his possession. The headman said, "We cannot give this book into the hands of slaves. They will erase this proof". Referring to the election of 1994, young members of *worq* families explained to me:

Everybody knew that the candidate from a slave family was much more capable and suitable for the job of *muhtar*. But *worqs* did not want to visit a slave family's house and bow their heads for the *muhtar*'s signature. So they put up a helpless *worq* candidate in the election and made him a *muhtar*. He cannot bring any benefit to the village. The slave *muhtar* would have worked all the harder because he is from a slave family.

These *worq* youths were never visited by youths from ex-slave families. They said to me, "You can talk about anything here because they will never come". Having examined the population book before, one of them said:

We were surprised to find so many unheard-of families. These families must have left the village because of the discord between *worqs* and slaves. Elders in the village do not want to talk about it anymore, not because the antagonism no longer exists, but because its effects are still felt so badly. People are fed up with it.

The *worqs* saw the book as a common heritage, handed down as shared property among their own circle. They used it as a portable monument to History on private commemorative occasions such as the evening gatherings of young members of *worq* families I attended, in which they tried enthusiastically to learn the history of the village, exchanging what each had heard from the elders of their own lineage with each other. One said, "When slavery was abolished, slaves in the village went outdoors in joy and exclaimed with excitement, 'Freedom! Freedom!'" Another continued, "Yeah, some of them ran away and headed for Sivas. The leading persons of the time chased on horseback. They captured the deserters just before they reached the town of Sivas, and whipped them back to the village. It was a cold winter day. The masters threw these runaway slaves into the half-frozen river within the village, and left them to die". Another concluded, "Slavery continued in this village even after its abolition". These *worq* youths used the village census book, which clearly marked the master-slave relations in the past, to convince themselves of the truthfulness of these stories the preceding generations related to them.

---

<sup>65</sup> According to Bayerle (1997), officially, *bey* was the title used for military officers, of whom those at the highest four ranks were addressed as *pasha*. *Efendi* was the title given to officers with *medrese* education, while illiterate officers were addressed as *ağa*. It is likely that the Ottoman government gave these military titles to Circassian nobles with an expectation that they would help in mobilising the local Circassians for war. *Efendi* also meant "master" of slaves. All these informal "titles" (*lakap*) and official "status" (*ünvan*) were legally abolished in 1934.

This village was locally well known for its support of leftist parties; it even produced a deputy chairman of the pro-Kurdish *Halkın Demokrasi Partisi* (People's Democratic Party) in the 1990s. This leftist inclination was atypical in Uzunyayla, where people generally showed their support for political parties that exploit religious discourses: the villagers lamented, "It is difficult for the men of this village to get married. Nobody wants to give his daughter to them, saying 'They are leftist'". *Worq* villagers told me that not a few people from ex-slave families supported the ultra right-wing MHP, just to oppose *worqs*. As Sirman (1990) observed of a village in Western Turkey, the dominant representation of society obviously has repercussions on the way a village is administratively represented by its headman in its relation with the state, and this representation generates everyday social realities.

## 2) Manipulating Time

Anthropologists have often pointed to the political nature of people's efforts to construct time telescopically within their representation of history (Peters 1990, Karakasidou 1997). Circassians frequently claimed descent from the Hittites, the ancient civilisation that flourished in Anatolia in the second millennium BC, leaving a dam in Karakuyu. The compression of four thousand years drew its local importance as a return journey to the homeland within the context of a struggle against Avşars over the right to the land of Uzunyayla. An elderly Karakuyulu man recounted his story:

One day, I attended an informal gathering where many locals were present. One Avşar said, "You Circassians came from Russia and took our grandfathers' land". I "tossed a hot air" (*laf attum*<sup>66</sup>), "No, that isn't true. Circassians are descendants of the Hittites, and they returned to their ancestors' land. You know the famous ruins of *Hattuşaş*, the ancient capital of the Hittite Empire. In the Circassian language, *ha* is 'dog', *t'u* is 'two', and *shha* is 'head'. Certainly, two sphinx statues are guarding the gate of *Hattuşaş*. The Hittites called themselves Hat. Hatukoy still call themselves Hat. Hatukoy means 'son of Hat' in Circassian. We are the descendants of the Hittites." The Avşar was speechless. All the others were amused. They said, "*Çerkez* brought up the Hittites and silenced the Avşar".

Also, the above-mentioned compression of almost 70 years between the 1850-60s and the Communist Revolution in 1917 was striking in narratives of *hicra* from the Caucasus to Ottoman territory, helping to positively reinterpret their ancestors' displacement from their homeland.

What seemed a more significant manipulation of temporality was a collapse of many different experiences over a long span of time into a single repeated story by the use of one and the same schema to generate historical meaning. In *worqs*' accounts, certain themes were always brought up to evoke a break between the time before and the time after. These two phases thus punctuated were presented as characterised by different kinds of social relationships, namely, a stable class system *worqs* called "feudal", followed by its disintegration. *Worqs* described the first phase as a golden age in which traditional master-slave relations were strictly preserved. The second phase was a dark age in which this hierarchy was reversed, leaving social standing as entirely a matter of wealth. Respect for hereditary status declined, as people of lower origin claimed equality or even a higher standing through their own socio-economic achievements.

The rupture marking the end of the past and the beginning of the present was not fixed at one specific point, but freely slid along the temporal axis between all the points *worqs* recognised as a watershed for calamitous social changes. Various historical events were collapsed on top of one another, forming one and the same story of the success of slaves and the fall of *worqs*. Local elites deployed this dichotomy as a primary framework for turning seemingly insignificant incidents into socially meaningful events; it thus served as a format for the production of History.

*Worqs*' confidence that they occupied the same stratum as the national elite helped them exert agency in weaving the threads of complex, ever-changing daily life into a consistent narrative of History. This allowed them to identify themselves with the fate of their society. The demise of the

---

<sup>66</sup> See Ch. 7 for a discussion of *laf*.

golden age was a recurrent motif in their autobiographical narratives on that History. What this recurring History demonstrated was the *worqs*' political agenda of maintaining their prominence over slave descendants, far from the ahistorical cyclicity sometimes attributed to non-Westerners' or peasants' "primitive mind" as unable to grasp history as a lineally unfolding story.

They stressed three events as formative of present conditions: the *Seferberlik*, the foundation of the Turkish Republic, and the end of the horse trade in the late 1950s. The past in the Caucasus and the period before these punctuating points in Anatolia were presented as continuous in terms of prevailing social relations, forming an idealised era compressed as the time of *Adygagha*. *Worqs* explained *Adygagha* as "a social order consisting of four different classes", or "the world where people knew both equality and inequality". Karakuyulus qualified *Adygagha* as the reciprocation of respect and love between the old and the young.<sup>67</sup> The *worqs*' also founded their *Adygagha* on senior/junior relationships framed in the same paired idiom of respect and love, but put a greater emphasis on the respect *worqs* expected from slaves as a superior status group. *Adyghe xabze* here concerned the established codes of conduct between nobles and slaves.

The episode *worqs* particularly highlighted as constitutive of the present social situation was the legal emancipation of slaves, which they merged with the foundation of the Turkish Republic, with some rhetorical effects. Actually, the Ottoman government did not completely abolish slavery, nor was any law concerning the abolition of slavery enacted during the Republican era (Erdem 1996: xix).<sup>68</sup> Nonetheless, the transition from the Ottoman regime whose religious law legalised slaves, supplied largely by Circassians, to the Republicans whose early principles included the adoption of family names by all citizens,<sup>69</sup> the abolition of personal titles (both in 1934) and the denial of class conflict, was understood as having entailed the legal abolition of slavery. Some *worqs* even claimed that the Republic was founded in order to free slaves.

The past was rhetorically fragmented at these three points: each of the breaking points marked the remote past as different in nature from a more recent past that merges into the present. The end of the golden age of intact *Adygagha* slid from the chaos after the *Seferberlik* through the foundation of Turkish Republic to the end of the horse trade that left *worqs* in bankruptcy. By collapsing all these events into one and the same schema, the elite narrative transformed the remote past into an idealised time, unbroken since the mythical times in the Caucasus.

---

<sup>67</sup> See Ertem (2000: 300-301) for an ethnicity-centred redefinition of "Circassianness" (*Çerkezlik*) in the context of social activities of an urban Circassian organisation.

<sup>68</sup> According to Erdem, the restriction on slavery in the Ottoman Empire started in the mid-19th century. The same treatment of Circassian domestic slaves proceeded gradually: the importation of slaves from the Caucasus was banned in the mid-1850s, followed by a period of domestic trade after the Circassian mass migration to Anatolia. The trade was entirely banned in 1909 at the onset of the second constitutional period.

<sup>69</sup> A local Abzekh man recounted the impact of the Family Name Law of 1928 on the self-consciousness of freed slaves and its wider social implications: "I was an itinerary merchant in 1964-65, visiting villages in Uzunyayla. I met a girl from a Kabardian village when I participated in a wedding party in Karakuyu. When I visited her village, I saw her father threshing with an ox. I gave him a greeting and said, 'I once met your daughter in a dance party'. Unexpectedly, he said, 'Our family name is Z....' He was still feeling a tremendous pleasure even many decades after the enactment of the Family Name Law. In the past, slaves had been registered as part of their masters' households in the population census. With the Family Name Law, everybody received a family name. Nobles, who already had lineage names, created similar-sounding Turkish family names. Those who did not have lineage names benefited from the completely new family names.

The man's children could not share their father's joy. They have an 'inferiority complex'. Most [former] slaves are now wealthier than their ex-masters. But it was not until just two, three years ago that they learned that economic power can win a greater respect than noble pedigree. The man's son is now a successful merchant. He took a bride for his son from his ex-master's family just a few years ago. Before that, he was not greeted by *worqs* in the street, however wealthy he had become. The Family Law undermined the authority of Circassian nobles, and imposed central government authority".

### 3) Slave as Category

I restrict myself here to examining narrative devices for manipulating temporality that turned slaves into a category separated from the actual flow of time, leaving an extended discussion of slave-as-object to the next chapter. In the static time of *Adygagha*, slaves were monolithically portrayed as having owned nothing, unable to open their mouths in the presence of the master, or having worked only to fill their stomachs on a day-to-day basis. This period was presented as an age in which slaves were seen as nothing more than their master's "property" (*mal*). For slaves, this was a dark age in which masters' abuses were tolerated. Many elders in Pınarbaşı still talked about a famous case where a tyrannous master nailed a slave's ear to the post of a barn to punish his misbehaviour. They said "I was [fortunate to have been] born early enough to witness it" (*yetişmek*: "live to see"), stressing a sense that the age was far distant.

As landmarks in the reconstructed landscape of the Caucasus in *Uzunyayla*, *worqs* denied slave descendants a life in the actual world and objectified them as a timeless category in their narrative space. This different quality of slaves, fabricated through the manipulation of time, was also made to appear natural by deployment of biological metaphors. Slaves were described as having inherited a "decayed" (*bozuk*) essence through paternal "stock" (*maya*: fermenting agent) or maternal milk. An essentialist metaphor of the caste (*kast*) system, which rigidly equated birth, occupation, status and moral hierarchy, was also sometimes employed to naturalise slaves' subordination. The exclusion of slave descendants from the choice of marriage partner among *worqs* was another important means to restrict who could share History as an inherited resource and who enjoyed the right authentically to represent the society.

Above all, even 90 years after the demise of slavery, *worqs* still referred to descendants of freed slaves as "slaves" without distinguishing their present status from their origins. Especially when slave descendants were still living in the same village as their ex-master's family, the members of the latter frequently referred to the former as "still present" (*hala hazırda*), using the word *hazır* conveying a connotation that slaves were still "ready" to serve, or "prepared" to show respect.

Here, the political use of an Islamic discourse that legitimates slavery played a prominent role. *Worqs* stretched time by deploying Islam to immortalise slaves' sub-human status, while Karakuyulus compressed time with an image of *hicra* to attach a positive meaning to their ancestors' migration. Re-interpretation of Circassian slavery in the light of Islam enabled *worqs* to say that slaves remained slaves until their masters manumitted (*azat etmek*) them through a religious ceremony, even after they were administratively freed through legislation by a secular state.<sup>70</sup>

An Arab imam of a Kabardian village, from Eastern Turkey, who still preached that "slaves" should be obedient to their masters in the 1960s, was well remembered. Even at present, the *müftü* (district director of religious affairs) and some Circassian imams said that Islam does not allow slaves to marry, to become a hajji or to kill a sheep as a sacrifice (*kurban*) without their masters' consent. These civil servants in charge of the official religious discourse of the state could comment on the Circassians' practice of slavery, only with regard to whether Circassian slaves were originally infidels captured in holy wars. People often posed questions concerning slave descendants going on a haj pilgrimage without a formal manumission. They also told stories about runaway slaves (*kul kaçkın*) who returned for their master's permission to marry, having been urged to do so by the imam of the village in which they were hiding.

Circassian slaves left the Caucasus for Ottoman territory already as Muslims. The fact that trading them did not conform to the *shari'a*, which prohibits enslavement of Muslims, or to the official prohibition of the slave trade in the late Ottoman period, did not help define slave status unambiguously among Circassians. *Worqs* still said, "Slaves should be freed 'at long last' (*artık*), 'now that' (*simdi*) they have accepted Islam". *Worqs* were stretching time by talking as if Circassian slaves' conversion to Islam were a recent event, effectively generating an impression that the process of their liberation had just started and was slowly progressing.

---

<sup>70</sup> Also see Shepherd (1980: 96-97), for a similar case of the ambiguous status of ex-slaves.

Furthermore, an image of slave descendants still suffering in poverty complemented this suspended encounter with freedom: “They have been rescued from a state of slavery ‘only recently’ (*yeni yeni*: newly)”; or “They are pulling themselves together ‘slowly slowly’ (*yavaş yavaş*) owing to the Land Distribution”. These idioms of stretched time were used to give an eternal quality to slave status and slaves’ distress. This dovetailed with the treatment of slaves as a category existing outside time and thus with the production of an idealised image of society founded upon a collapsed time.

The construction of this narrative time and space marked slaves as different from *worqs*, who inhabited the ever-changing present. *Worqs* portrayed slaves as the other; *worqs* shared with them most social spaces but not a temporal space, in contrast to “contemporaries”, as Rosen (1984: 141) refers to people with whom one shares a temporal space but not a social space. Fabian’s (1983) argument about anthropologists’ production of otherness by denying the locals the same temporality as themselves can be perfectly applied to *worqs*’ politics of transforming slaves into a category.

Bloch (1989) draws our attention to the politics of the presence of the past in the present realised through verbal accounts and ritual enactments. The past was not just present in the present in Uzunyayla: *worqs* actively brought it into the present as part of their attempt to maintain their prominence over slaves. Treating slaves as a timeless entity made it possible to further depict the past as homogeneous and static in the image of a golden age.

The spatial isolation of Uzunyayla enabled locals to imagine Circassian warlords struggling against each other for supremacy. The spatial distance in this idealised landscape was, however, transformed into a temporal insulation, from which an ontological difference was generated between *worqs* and slaves. *Worqs*, who claimed legitimate authority to represent their society, enclosed slaves into a static past, while allowing themselves a fluidity of life in this world.

Slaves were live mnemonic objects, which enabled *worqs* to gain unimpeded access to the image of an idealised social formation. The dominant representation homogenised and objectified slaves, who served as a metonym in the imagery of a “feudal society” in the de-temporalised past. Though freed from exploitative abuses, Circassian slaves were given a role as the eternal victim in *worqs*’ representations of Circassian “feudalism”, just like peasants who could not “breathe or stir” in the nationalist historiography of the Ottoman period (Berktaş 1992), or villagers compared to Hittite statues in an early Anatolian novel (Dino 1986: 268).

#### 4) *Worqs*’ History as Narrative

In Karakuyu, the villagers identified “history” as time-passed, which had lost its relevance to the present; they avoided referring at length to that past. History in *worqs*’ representation was classified as a golden age, equally outside of time, different from the present in dimensionality.

Popular newspapers in Turkey often wrote, “We Wrote History!” (*Tarih Yazdik!*), highlighting the importance of events which looked insignificant to outside observers, such as a Turkish team’s victory in a European Cup football match and other everyday happenings. This seemed to reflect an everyday historicity in which history was continually produced, then renewed, replaced and forgotten.

The future-oriented nature of “tradition” in Turkish was expressed in an often-used phrase “to bring something into a traditional state” (*geleneksal hala getirmek*) denoting one’s ambition to establish something newly introduced as a “tradition” in the future. Just as English “tradition” originally meant “that which has been handed down”, its Turkish counterpart (*gelenek*) means “that which has come down to the present”. Both stress a law-like force in patterned practices or established habits, derived from a continuity with the past. Despite this, people’s actual use of the word in Turkish revealed a sense of the agency of human actors.

Turkish citizens, enjoying a gradual betterment of living conditions and keeping their eye on full participation in the EU, seemed to be manifesting trust in the future with an opportunistic attitude that overwrote history again and again on an everyday basis. Turks kept on re-inscribing such history in line with their envisaged future; it was different from the “history” repressed as the past by Karakuyulus, who made forgetting prevail, and also from the nostalgic History *worqs* elevated as the idealised *Adygagha*.

The official historiography of the state requires a linear sequence of events, such as that expressed in the grand narratives of progress, modernisation and development. White (1981) argues that the tendency to construct history as a fable with a particular moral message emerged as a project of modern nation-states. The principle of equality amongst citizens seems to be one of the major factors affecting the way the official story-line of a modern state is woven. Atatürk's principle of populism was first taken into the CHP's party programme (1931) and then adopted into the Republic's constitution as one of its official ideologies (the "Six Arrows"<sup>71</sup>) in 1937. Apart from aggrandisement of Atatürk's strong leadership, the state's official understanding of Turkish society as devoid of class conflicts seemed to have a strong influence on the narrative of Turkish historiography.

Strong status consciousness seemed to be contributing to a different construction of historical memories among the Circassian elite who imagined their own historical community as rigidly stratified. Valeri (1990) suggests that a representation of history acquires persuasive power by having either a consequentiality or a theme, or a combination of both. Consequentiality resembles White's linear narrative. The Circassian elite in Uzunyayla claimed the truthfulness of its History by repeating one and the same format. This thematic recurrence did not exclude linearity. The former was a framework within which people wove a diachronical story by aligning several temporal points in accordance with the main theme, which made History take place.

Appadurai states that, as people compete over contrasting versions of history, those narratives that have the capacity to incorporate several versions within them are more likely to become authoritative (1981: 203). In History, the recurrence of a syntagmatic cause and effect seemed to produce a paradigmatic truth (Lincoln 1989: 24) to authorise the rhetoric. According to Eickelman, historical events in the past exist like separate islands in people's perception (1977: 43). Certainly, some events were emphasized in Circassian historical memories. However, *worqs*' main concern was with which events to select and how to link them to produce History. The politics of the representation of history cannot be effectively examined by adopting the idea of isolated islands.

The narratives of the Circassian elite, nonetheless, could never achieve effective closure. White argues that a historical narrative needs a coherent plot in order for its moral message to be conveyed forcefully (1981: 20). *Worqs* frequently interrupted their stories abruptly with laments, "That's passed, too (*O da geçti*)" or "That's finished, too (*O da bitti*)". This revealed their realisation that this static construction of *Adygagha* had no significant effects upon the present, as if to reverse the effect of Karakuyulus' repression, which inevitably brought back the past which Karakuyulus denied. *Worqs* were deeply aware that a return to the idealised past was just an unreal fantasy even within narrative constructions whose production they monopolised. This awareness made these stories paradoxical, that is, stories people tell about something that may not even have existed as they hoped (Lavie 1990: 318).

*Worqs* were certainly capable of moulding history into a particular patterned form, appropriating it as their own stories. The society with which *worqs* identified themselves, however, was a society of an ethnic minority in a nation-state of Turks that had repressed overt expressions of ethnic distinctiveness. *Worqs* inevitably revealed their perception that their local society had lost autonomy. Lacking the support of the state's official narrative, the ethnic elite seemed to have invested enormous energy into aggrandisement of the past. This "getting by" resulted in the exaggerated maintenance of symbolic boundaries behind which they entrenched themselves, often in the nostalgic image of aristocratic sociability. This essentialist exaltation came at the cost of stressing internal differences, which divided, rather than united, their society.

Perceiving weakening structural boundaries, *worqs* idealised their own society as inherently hierarchized, which apparently led them to equate the decline of the noble class with the diminution of autonomy of the whole community. They did not perceive the general improvement in living standards as a positive change within their ethnic community as a whole, though

---

<sup>71</sup> These six principles of Kemalism consist of Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Statism, Secularism, Revolutionary/Reformism. The debates regarding how some of these fundamentals ought to be interpreted and implemented still continued in Turkey.

previously destitute strata were certainly experiencing empowerment in parallel with the social transformation of the Turkish hinterlands.

In this sense, the official history of the ever-progressing Turkish Republic seemed unable to share a narrative with Circassian elites, who told of their own society's succumbing to that nation-state. The linear and cumulative history of the republic also remained unable to incorporate Circassians' local narratives of discontinuity into its greater narrative. Nonetheless, the local Circassians were not mere passive receivers of the state's history but were engaged in rewriting it actively into a localised history of a specific group with its own culture and history.

Long-repressed unofficial memories are currently infiltrating the mainstream narratives of new official histories in many ex-socialist states (Watson ed., 1994). In parallel with this, the Turkish Republic, which has a long tradition of monopolising official history, is now showing a greater tolerance of heretical histories. This has resulted in the current boom in "non-official history" (*gayri-resmi tarih*), flourishingly constituted and articulated anew, which includes a surge of revisionist literature on the history of multi-ethnic, multi-religious Ottoman Anatolia, facilitated by revitalisation of memory (Canefe 2001) in which people's historical experiences have been conveyed, without being told publicly. These non-official histories are competing for public recognition and demanding the revision of official history, which has imposed homogeneity and forgetting of diversity in locality, class, gender and religious or ethnic affiliation.

The Circassian urban elite has evidently taken advantage of this relaxation, calling for an official acknowledgement of the Circassians' great contributions to Turkey. A major example is Muhittin Ünal's (1996) book, demanding due recognition of the contribution to the foundation of the Republic made by the politicians, military officers and bureaucrats of Caucasus origin. As president of the Caucasus Association, Ünal also requested the then president of Turkey, Süleyman Demirel, to remove descriptions of Çerkez Ethem as a "traitor" (*hain*) from school textbooks. Ethem was described as a "traitor" by the Grand National Assembly led by Mustafa Kemal, despite his great contribution to the Turkish War of Independence, suppressing revolts in both the Marmara and Central Anatolia regions (1919-1920) in which Circassians were heavily involved. The petition was accepted.<sup>72</sup>

Local *worqs* also attached distinctive meanings to the Republic's history, appropriating it as a history of their local ethnic community. Swedenborg points out that people's historical consciousness, repressed by official history, may be expressed in symbolic form (1991: 165-9). Others have pointed out that people in the north Caucasus who did not hand down a written history tended to discuss history in the realms of myth and imagination (Krag & Funch 1994: 10). This seemed true of Circassians in Uzunyayla. They seemed to have constituted and articulated their historical consciousness through symbolic means, often inwardly and romantically. Typical forms of this were mythical connections with an ancient civilisation like the Hittites, the Greeks or some Biblical stories,<sup>73</sup> and selective customs. *Worqs*' use of master-slave imagery to represent their society as "feudal", highlighted as a domain peculiar to their national culture, may be counted as another example.

### [3] Re-examining Forgetting in Karakuyu

The articulacy I observed among *worq* elders was in sharp contrast with the difficulties I experienced while collecting accounts about history in Karakuyu. In this section, I compare this inarticulate historical consciousness implied in fragmented accounts of "history", with the

---

<sup>72</sup> Recent works, aimed to redress the accounts of Çerkez Ethem's Incident in the official history (*resmi tarih*), though for different ends, include Bozgeyik 1995; Kutay 1990; Şener 1994.

<sup>73</sup> A Kabardian doctor in the district town explained his belief that the first human being spoke Kabardian: "The Bible says that Allah gave Adam a language. It is not that Allah taught him the words to describe all the things in the world, but that Allah gave him the mental capacity to distinguish things and name them. In Kabardian, we call human 'ts'uh'. It literally signifies the 'knower' (*ts'uhn* = to know). The idea that the human is the 'knower' matches the Biblical story. In Kabardian, *ada* denotes 'father' and *adam* signifies 'of father'. The language spoken by the first human must have been Kabardian."

dominant and more coherent History, to further elucidate the nature and implications of social forgetfulness in Karakuyu.

### **1) The Great *Seferberlik*: the End of the Past**

*Worqs* highlighted three major turning points in their History: the foundation of the Republic, the *Seferberlik* and the 1950s. The first of these was hardly ever identified with emancipation of slaves in Karakuyu, while the latter two were also stressed as significant turning points. Many Karakuyulus saw the rise of slaves as having started even earlier than the *Seferberlik* in the narrow sense (World War I) and as having been consolidated by it. This period of turmoil marked the end of an era, in which the richest men of the earlier period, whose names were immortalised in place-names within the village, lost their wealth, and a blood feud between two Karakuyulu families was terminated.

Karakuyulu elders said that, whereas a hundred men were killed in the war, some slaves somehow escaped conscription since customarily their births were not registered, and this laid the foundations of their later fortunes. They also had different explanations for the foundation of former slaves' fortune: they stated that shepherds were not drafted because of their role in securing the provision of foodstuffs and that the whole village was left with a few slave shepherds; or they claimed that since those married to widowed women or their daughters, who needed protection, were exempted from the draft, poor slave men, who often could not afford to marry a virgin girl with proper wedding formalities, were not drafted. Some people, apparently discursively fusing Islamic teaching with historical fact, likened the situation to that in the Caucasus, where Circassians did not send slaves to war. Many people believed that the death of a whole generation of men in the war, including many members of slave-owning families, led to the rise of the slaves left in the village.

Karakuyulus' references to slaves rarely led to an extended narrative, though they recognised that the *Seferberlik* left the social arena to slaves. Many of these speakers were brought up in poverty in the post-war period as sons of fatherless children, unless they were fortunate slaves. Many of them had not fully recovered from the hardships they previously experienced while working as agricultural labourers beside people they saw as slaves, sometimes even under their supervision.

They seemed to lack a positive self-image and the motivation to assert *worq* status. They were at best "non-slaves", an indirect identity, but not *worqs*, an identity that requires a more determined identification and a continuous public commitment to leadership. Even when the course of our conversation compelled Karakuyulus to present themselves as "*worqs*" to avoid humiliation, they did not demonstrate a strong identification with the noble group, which might have helped to locate them in a well-defined position in society, from which they could have woven a coherent narrative. On the contrary, they showed hesitation and discomfort.

According to elders from well-known *worq* families in the region, close friendships developed naturally among approximately one hundred "*worq*" men who survived the war, and these formed the core of high society in the prime time of Uzunyayla. The above-mentioned book by an old man of the Jenak mainly concerned this sociability of the local notables, whose regular members included two prominent figures from two rival quarters of Karakuyu: his father (1883-1945), an albino man who was almost blind, and the officer of Örenşehir sub-district from the Adygeuna (1884-1934), who escaped conscription with the help of his Turkish in-laws in Pınarbaşı: an adjutant-major and a doctor.

The old man gave away a free copy of the book to each household in the village. The villagers had an extremely low opinion of it. Most Karakuyulus could not identify with his memoir since their fathers or grandfathers never enjoyed membership of this ostentatious polite society exclusive to wealthy notables, though perhaps not necessarily time-honoured nobles. The old man's nostalgia for a vanishing life-style and mentality did not appeal them. The fact that he had published his memories in a book oriented towards an imagined ethnic reading public indicated his isolation from the immediate community; he lacked an audience in the village willing to listen to a spoken account.

Despite the often-mentioned association of the *Seferberlik* with the ascendance of ex-slaves, the above-mentioned late Ottoman village book did not show any of the Karakuyulu *nouveau*

*riche* slaves as really being of a slave origin, implying an earlier encounter with freedom. According to Toledano, exploitation of Circassian slaves intensified in the post-migration chaos and exhaustion and even non-slaves were traded. He also mentions great social turmoil, caused by armed conflict between masters and slaves. This caused the Ottoman government to take a piecemeal approach to advancing the emancipation of Circassian slaves, though within the restrictions imposed by the *shari'a*. The Refugee Commission provided slaves with land, which they could use as payment for emancipation (*mukatebe*). This policy was applied in Sivas province (1998: 87), to which Uzunyayla then belonged. The liberation of the ancestors of better-off ex-slave families seemed to date back even further than the *Seferberlik* and the foundation of the Republic, regardless of whether they paid “head money” (*başlık parası/shha shahuj psh'a*) to buy freedom or were voluntarily manumitted by their pious masters.

## 2) Land Distribution: the Beginning of the Present

The *Seferberlik* was highlighted as the end of an era in Karakuyu. What was stressed even more was the starting point of the present, identified with the distribution of land to landless farmers throughout the 1950s. This coincided with the termination of military horse provision. The latter event was barely acknowledged in Karakuyu, despite the fact that Karakuyu was one of seven villages in Uzunyayla to which breeding horses were sent for mating with stallion from the depot in Sivas. Nobody admitted that their ancestors did not own any horses in the past, though this by no means meant that their ancestors were engaged in horse trading.

The Land Distribution Commission was founded according to the 1945 Law on the Distribution of Land to Farmers. It distributed 3 million hectares of tillable land nation-wide to 400,000 farming families (Keyder 1983a). Scholars agree that the land reform and agricultural reform that started in the same period improved life in the Anatolian hinterlands (Meyer 1959: 77; Aktan 1966: 323-4; Parvin & Hiç 1984: 221; Arıcanlı 1986: 46; Keyder 1993). 3,209 households in 41 villages benefited in Pınarbaşı. The standard amount of land distributed to adult males varied from village to village at between 21 and 300 *dönüms*<sup>74</sup> (Köy İşleri Bakanlığı 1968: 78). This meant that those who benefited most were landless Circassians in the much larger villages in little-populated Uzunyayla. The commission gave *de jure* legitimisation to the *de facto* use of land and distributed state pasture lands (*mera*) to all adult males. The result was that all men in a village now possessed the standard amount,<sup>75</sup> unless they had inherited more.

Among Circassian villages, the commission came first to Karakuyu, in 1951. As one of the largest villages, the standard land grant was set at 225 *dönüms*, one of the highest even in Uzunyayla. At least 77 Karakuyulu men benefited, according to my incomplete research. As far as the 66 men about whom I have detailed information are concerned, they received a total of 12,295 *dönüms* of land (Table 6.1), accounting for more than half of all the cultivated land in Karakuyu, quoted as roughly 20,000 *dönüms*.

According to a 1974 report (cited in Taymaz 1996: 174), 337 *dönüms* was necessary for a household to make a living from the land in unirrigated areas in Uzunyayla. The fact that all adult males, married or unmarried, were regarded as having separate households and were made owners of 225 *dönüms* of tillable land, means that each extended family with more than one adult male member received a significant amount of land.

---

<sup>74</sup> Locally, 1 *dönüm* was equal to 1,000 m<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>75</sup> No women were made landowners by this distribution, regardless of their age, marital status, and economic conditions. This state policy reinforced Circassian customary practice that frequently discouraged women from inheriting and owning real estates. This reproduction of economic inequality between sexes may partially account for the preservation of women's compliant role in their both natal and marital families. In turn, this cultural continuity, reproduced partially by the state intervention, seems to have enabled the affluent section of society to seek a balance in wealth in arranging marriage, despite the change of the idiom employed to justify the suitability of marriage choice, from the balance (*denk*) in family status to fate (*kismet*) (see Ch. 4). See also Sirman (1996: 119-120) and Hann (1993: 135-136) on the importance of viewing gender relations as a production of a specific history, rather than as a static, traditional culture that has been simply handed down.

This partially accounted for Karakuyu's reputation as "the richest village" or "the village least affected by labour migration". During my fieldwork, Karakuyu had only twenty tractors for seventy households; the rate of tractor-owning families was much higher in certain much smaller villages.<sup>76</sup> Fifty households survived without owning a tractor. These fifty families still managed to remain in the village, generating Karakuyu's reputation as "the most populous village". Certainly, the effects of labour migration, caused partially by "structural adjustment" introduced in the 1980s (Boratav 1990) and partially by some pull factors of urban life, were strongly felt. Most of these tractor-less households received remittances sent by young family members working outside the village. They also rented out the land consolidated in their hands by absent relatives, either for a fixed price (*icar*)<sup>77</sup> or for half the crop (*ortak*). A smaller number of people, around four from ex-slave families, operated others' tractors in exchange for the free use of the tractors on their own fields. Some young men of *Bulgar Göçmen* families herded livestock alongside hired shepherds and cowherds from nearby Turkish and Kurdish villages.

Karakuyulus were proud of the village's fertile, black soil, which allowed them to cultivate wheat and reap greater profits than the calcareous soil in other parts of Uzunyayla where only barley and rye for livestock could be grown. Karakuyu was seen as the most affluent village, engaged in lucrative wheat production on a large scale, alongside the sheep breeding also widely practised in the great majority of other villages.<sup>78</sup> In the light of this, it is understandable that the land distribution in the 1950s was even more clearly marked in the villagers' memory than the *Seferberlik*. For Karakuyulus, the beginning of the present was more significant than the end of the past. The villagers' memories, in which the objective and the subjective intersected, reflected this historical contingency and its lingering effects.

The evaluation of the land distribution by Karakuyulus differed, partially depending on whether or not they received a share and how big it was. Interestingly, it also diverged according to status. People avoided overtly expressing appreciation for the distribution for fear that this be taken as a sign of their own destitution in the past.

I frequently heard people complain that they had suffered as a result of the distribution. "*Worqs*" in Karakuyu, i.e. mostly "non-slaves", mentioned that landless slave men benefited most from the distribution, among whom some stood out as current leading figures of the village. On the other hand, these "*worq*" speakers, as they already owned some land, could not obtain extra land or received the least productive plots. They remembered well that the new land the slave descendants received showed excellent productivity, which their own land had lost after a century of usage. Nonetheless, even when they referred to certain beneficiaries as slaves, they said, "Don't stir up history", or "Don't go too deep", to stop me from scrutinising the subject further.

Disapproval was unhesitatingly expressed about the fact that *xexeses* benefited greatly, receiving land within the village boundaries. Karakuyu's ample land and rich soil had attracted many people from other villages to settle there, working as agricultural labourers for wealthier families in the village. Many of these *xexeses* were mentioned as poverty-stricken, freed or runaway slaves. They either turned to their maternal relatives or married into the households of widowed slave women before 1950, creating a foundation for Karakuyu's current reputation as a slave village.

Most families remaining in Karakuyu to the present were actually destitute before 1950, while the better-off sections of two distinguished *worq* lineages in Karakuyu, the Adygeuna and the Jenak, had left the village or considerably weakened their connection with it by the early 1970s. Few families in the village escaped being referred to as of slave origin at some stage of my research, despite their own claims to *worq* status. They were slighted by prominent *worqs* as people "unworthy of mention", belonging to unimportant classes of ordinary villagers or unbound farmers, no different from slaves.

---

<sup>76</sup> For example, a neighbouring *Kundet-ey* village with considerably less arable land had twenty tractors for thirty households, greatly sacrificing efficiency of mechanisation.

<sup>77</sup> A local standard was two oil "tins" (*teneke*) of wheat (32kg) per 1 *dönüm*.

<sup>78</sup> During my research, sheep breeding was rapidly being abandoned in Karakuyu because of the fall in prices. The number of sheep flocks in the village fell from 11 to 9 in one year. Wealthy farmers were switching to more lucrative calf breeding.

The land commission treated all adult males in the village equally, without discriminating between the genuine *Karakuyulus*, their in-laws and agricultural labours hired for that particular year. Thirty of 66 beneficiaries were *xexeses*, receiving 49.8% of the distributed land (Table 6. 2). These 30 *xexeses* included 9 *worqs*, 18 men who had counted on the help of their ex-slave relatives in Karakuyu and 3 Turks. The fact that 47 people, composed of such *xexeses* and Karakuyulu slave descendants, received three quarters of the total distributed land, accounts for the resentment among Karakuyulu *worqs*, who regard none of them as legitimate recipients.

Most vociferous in making these complaints were people from ex-slave families said to have made a fortune before the 1950s. They were not only the most voluble in claiming to have lost out through land distribution, they also grumbled that strangers had become “Karakuyulus” or “locals” (*yerli*) by obtaining land within the village boundaries.

The village headman during the distribution was one of the brothers (b. 1916) of the rich ex-slave family that made the record bridewealth payments in the 1960s, first for his youngest brother and then for his nephew. His father (b. 1880) escaped the draft during the *Seferberlik* by marrying a widow and stayed in Karakuyu and the neighbouring villages as a shepherd. The family was known for having worked hard over three generations, which made them wealthy. The headman protested strongly to the commission’s delegates against the land distribution. He even petitioned in Ankara against giving land to “those who had nothing to do with the village”, as his son put it. His relatives complained that the commission punished him for this objection by giving only barren land to male members of his family.

So-called *nouveau riche* slaves did not talk at length about how their ancestors became wealthy. This silence helped them shift the crucial turning point of history away from the period around the *Seferberlik* to the 1950s. Their stress on the beginning of the present over the end of the past opened up a narrative space, a gap of several decades; they inserted their voices into this gap, then removed the gap from the horizon of the present and incorporated it into the remote “area of ambiguity”, distinguishing themselves from *xexeses* as well as those Karakuyulus still in need.

Celebrated *worqs* designated the pre-*Seferberlik* era as a period of stable social structure to accentuate the contrast between wealthy *worqs* and poor slaves. Karakuyulu non-slaves assigned the same period to the equally static “time-passed”, devoid of relevance to the present. Karakuyulu *nouveau riche* slaves stressed land distribution in 1950s, to shift the primary social distinction away from that of *worqs* and slaves to that of rich and poor, and even further to that between Karakuyulus and *xexeses*. They slid the starting point of the present from *Seferberlik* to land distribution and concealed the context of their economic and social ascendance within a forgotten past.

In shifting relevant social boundaries, Karakuyulu slave descendants nonetheless appeared to be appropriating the *worqs*’ framework for generating significant History, adapting themselves to that version and conceding its dominance. Their silence concerning the pre-*Seferberlik* period paralleled Karakuyulu *worqs*’ avoidance of examining “history” closely, which would have exposed their past poverty. Those from ex-slave families facilitated a mythification of the “feudal” past by neither re-examining nor overtly challenging the legitimacy of that dominant representation. They consented to it in silence.

This accommodation allowed them to open up a narrow narrative space in which they could present themselves as “wealthiest” (*agha* or *bey*) or “influential” (*ilerigelen*), no matter what their origins. They also claimed to be among the first groups to settle in Karakuyu. They stressed that they were firmly “rooted” (*yerli*: lit. “of the place/ground”) in the village, as if to compensate for the sense of rootlessness (*köksüzlük/asılsızlık*) *worqs* imposed on them as severed from their natal environment (see Ch. 6), reproducing the same image in their relation with *xexeses* (“alien settlers”) who later came to the village.

Keyder argues that this land distribution was the result of class struggle (1993: 80-83). A rich slave descendant told me a story that a *xexes worq* used his connections with Circassian bureaucrats in Ankara to bring the commission first to Karakuyu. This *worq* family had founded a new village on land purchased at the edge of *Bogurbaşı* before the *Seferberlik*. Partly because of the infertility of the land and partly because of the discord that developed between them and others they had brought to the village as agricultural labourers, they sold off the whole village to a

group of Alevi Kurds and settled in Karakuyu in 1949, counting on many *worq* relatives for social and moral, if not economic, support. Six male members received a total of 1,500 *dönüms* in the village (see Figure 2-1).

The speaker continued, “They had an intention to sell off the land to Kurds again. They wanted to bring them to Karakuyu. They had a plan to disperse the village, just as they had done before”, demonstrating how the locals still looked at *xexeses* with suspicion. According to this *worq* man’s son in Istanbul, his family left the village in 1955 because the distribution escalated the discord between them and their in-laws and maternal relatives, almost to the point of spilling blood. They left fearing they would be shot. The seriousness of this *yerli/xexes* antagonism was never mentioned within the village, in which the present residents stressed harmony and quietness (*sakinlik*).

A Karakuyulu *worq* man also told me that an ex-slave family deliberately brought three in-law families to the village in anticipation of the distribution.<sup>79</sup> Six males from these three *xexes* slave families received 1,275 *dönüms*. The Karakuyulu family itself received a further 895 *dönüms* for six male members (see Figure 2-2, Family 3). Together, the land given to them accounts for almost one fifth of all the distribution. Land reform was talked about as early as the 1930s within Ankara political circles, and the law was passed in 1945. Statistics show that Karakuyu’s population increased during the five-year period between 1950 and 1955 by almost 40 percent, from 447 to 621, of which the male population totalled 394 (55.4%). This cannot be accounted for without taking some purposeful inflation into consideration.

An old man from a non-slave family complained that other villagers insisted on a false border while the commission was recording the traditional land usage of the family, and the land registered as his family’s became considerably smaller. Some other people grumbled that their families’ land was confiscated and used for distribution. These resentful memories indicated that the have-nots in Karakuyu struggled to enhance their lot *vis-à-vis* the haves during that period.

### 3) Raising One’s Voice: Which Dichotomy?

Both Karakuyulu non-slaves and the *nouveaux riches* understood that land distribution was aimed at rescuing the destitute section of the village. The former attempted to endow the event with significance by borrowing the *worq*/slave dichotomy from the elite *worqs*’ discourse. Not a few of them, however, were among the needy who received the land and they were unwilling to talk about it at length. They were aware that those who worked on others’ land were nothing other than slaves for better-off *worqs*. These Karakuyulu “*worqs*” could not persuasively impose the borrowed rich/poor dichotomy onto the *worq*/slave framework, compromising the clearness of their arguments.

The *nouveau riche* slave descendants shifted the framework for presenting the struggle between the rich and poor from this *worq*/slave dichotomy to that centred on *yerli/xexes*. This view was clearly noticeable, obviously obtaining an endorsement also from “*worqs*” who had been hard up at that time. The land distribution offered a visible stage for a struggle between the rich and poor within the village as an administrative unit that set the size of distributed land. On a wider, regional scale, the better-off slave descendants in Karakuyu highlighted the locals’ resistance against the state policy of entitling the new settlers to a considerable amount of the most productive soil in Uzunyayla, and presented this class struggle in a cloak of maintenance of village boundaries.

These social categories of *worq*, slave, *yerli* and *xexes*, did not reflect actual economic conditions. Karakuyulu speakers, both “*worqs*” and slave descendants, voiced their resentment by identifying themselves with different categories that they claimed to be rightful beneficiaries. While appearing to maintain various social boundaries, their arguments shifted the frame of reference within which the significance of the event was claimed. This alternation served ideologically to under-communicate, if not to conceal, the real conflict of interests between the

---

<sup>79</sup> A man in his mid twenties from the Karakuyulu former slave family heard, from the preceding generations, that their ancestors had brought these *xexes* families as their slaves.

landholders and the landless at both the intra-village and the inter-village<sup>80</sup> levels, projecting a distorted image of society to the former's advantage.

In the elite's representation, the period between the *Seferberlik* and the Land Distribution was an age in which certain slaves rose to acquire prominence and voice. Stories well-off slave descendants themselves recounted, however, revealed that they had acquired a clear voice *vis-à-vis* those still in need, regardless of whether they were co-villagers or *xexeses*, leaving much of the structure of the better-off *worqs*' historical narrative intact. Noted *worqs* had established a schema that assumed a timeless past in order to voice their claim of precedence over slaves. Rich slave descendants seemed to have appropriated that framework to form their own voice in relation to socially weaker segments, without overtly resisting the basic narrative, thus accepting *worqs*' narratives as a dominant discourse.

Empowerment in Karakuyu was not the mere acquisition of voice. It was certainly supported by a re-distribution of resources (see Cheater 1999) and accompanied by the silencing of other sets of people. Local Circassians generally accepted that one's economic power greatly contributed to authorising one's voice and consolidating one's influence. A rich *worq* man in a different village mentioned, "In Karakuyu, *worqs* spoke in the past. Rich slaves are speaking nowadays".

A voice in Uzunyayla did not have a universally accepted authority, but was constituted by turning people of a weaker category into its object to be talked about unhesitatingly. Rich people from ex-slave families attempted to distinguish themselves from poor others by freezing a history into an inaccessible past, just as *worqs* did in their relation with slaves. This may be understood as wealthy slave descendants' partial appropriation of the *worqs*' story, which also necessitated their accommodation to it. Such incorporation into a dominant narrative structure obviously produced selective realms of silence in their own narratives on particular subjects, including their family background and the processes by which they became better off. Silence was produced not only through repression, which kept ex-slaves quiet, but also through incorporation, which actually made them speak, producing some gaps and blanks. The latter helped them voice their feeling about certain sections of people, whom they victimised in their narratives.

In contrast to the articulacy displayed by elite *worqs*, silence and forgetting in Karakuyu seemed to have been caused largely by the fact that the vast majority of the villagers hesitated to fully utilise the *worq/slave* dichotomy, which served as the driving force of History in *worqs*' narratives. In particular, Karakuyulus avoided the theme of the fall of *worqs* and the rise of slaves, so strikingly noticeable in History. The cultural elite dismissed the voice of *nouveau riche* ex-slaves, since the latter did not share this paradigm that produced historical significance.

As mentioned in the last chapter, Circassian historical knowledge did not designate long-term memories about past events, but involved a capacity for creating meaningfulness by interpreting events according to a culturally authorised framework. Dominant knowledge here concerned a paradigmatic truth. Mutedness was a difficulty that a certain group of people experienced in both constituting a voice and making it heard within the dominant structure of communication, which featured its own plot and idioms as well as an uneven distribution of the right to speak. Silence emerged partially from accommodation to the dominant discourses. Silence in Karakuyu, nonetheless, had its own story to tell as an important part of communication practice.

#### **4) The Time of the Community**

Many people in Karakuyu still seemed to retain a self-image as socially weak, formed by memories of poverty they themselves or their recent ancestors suffered; to lack a strong motivation to see and present themselves as belonging to the leading group. Their reluctance to make use of the *worq/slave* framework appeared to hamper their acquisition of a clearly articulated voice.

How did these members of the silent majority in Karakuyu represent their lives in the village of the past? The better-off in the village described them as having been so poor that they had to

---

<sup>80</sup> See Hann (1985; 1990b) on the importance of viewing a region as a whole, rather than a single, separate village, as an economic unit where inequality is produced and experienced.

fill their stomachs by asking these affluent families for wheat bran or the brine used to preserve cheese. By applying the narrative tools for stretching time mentioned above (e.g. *yavaş yavaş*, *yeni yeni*, *artık*, *simdi*), the socially weak were kept in a timeless past, as if their destitution were eternal, without any clear beginning and ending.

All that the poor elder could say was, “Everybody was poor in the past”, “Nobody could marry in the proper way” or “All the people shared the hardships”. The frequent use of generic terms (e.g. “every”, “all”, “nobody”) emphasised some egalitarian, communal aspects despite poverty. It conveyed a moral message different from that evoked by the use of dichotomies, which described society as divided along certain lines. The stress on memories of shared difficulties seemed to be aimed at portraying Circassians in Uzunyayla and particularly in Karakuyu as having lived as a community. The elderly members of the worse-off families in Karakuyu reconstructed the past as “the time of the community” (Zonabend 1984: 9. See also Behar 1986; Mitchell 1998) when people, though poor, helped each other on equal terms. This formed part of their “getting by” to create positive meanings that enabled them to operate everyday life.

This was not the high society of aristocrats or warlords, but a community of peasants, in which everybody owned something no matter how small it was: a horse, a pair of oxen, ten or twenty *dönüms* of arable land, five or ten sheep, plus their own manpower. This understated the fact that these resources were never enough to sustain life without serving somebody else as farmhands or slaves.

Those old people who knew the poverty of the past presented *Adygagha* selectively as a moral world founded on *Adyghe xabze*, by which they meant reciprocal exchanges of respect for the elderly and love for the young. They described themselves as having lived in a world with its own morality different from the *worqs*’ world of *Adygagha*, which was established on well-defined status differences and unevenly distributed resources. By inhabiting this community, poor Karakuyulu elders tried to sustain their honour not only as self-sufficient peasants but also as Circassians. They put forward their claims to social values as elderly members of society.

Imagining a historical society where the poor can breathe a little more comfortably was, however, made possible by highlighting shared past experiences of poverty and hunger and disastrous harvests caused by summer frost. This was a time when people collected undigested pieces of grain from the dung or the stomach of domestic animals and poultry, or ate pieces of leather shaved off home-made boots. With this self-image, selective forgetting and strategic silence were naturally a favourable goal.

A past in which everybody was poor not only played down the boundaries within the village, but also tacitly acknowledged an improvement in living standards in the present through the then/now dichotomy. Narratives of empowerment were, however, rarely articulated in a straightforward manner, often distorted as the salvation of other families. Rather, Karakuyulu elders manipulated the now-objectified custom of respect-love exchange as a primary means to claim legitimate relations with Circassian national past. They selectively voiced resentment at the break from the communal past, deploring the fact that the younger generations did not show respect to their seniors as when they were young.

Karakuyulu elders frequently described “our time” as an age in which “We used to take (*götürürdük*) all the girls in the village to wedding parties. We used to take out (*çıkarırdık*) girls from the window without their fathers’ permission”, or “We used to go (*giderdik*) to see guest girls at their relatives’ home and sit (*otururduk*) with them until morning”. They repetitively employed “broad time” in the past tense to present themselves as acting subjects, especially, as principal carriers of national traditions, whether *jegu* (a dance party) or *warsher* (a chat with guest girls). They opposed this lost age to the present in which “lack of trust” (*güvensizlik*) prevails in the village. I heard from many fathers that they could not send their daughters to wedding parties in the village unless they knew the groom’s father very well.

Many elders of famous *worq* families in Uzunyayla remembered that they did not participate in the wedding parties of ex-slave families in the past and their girls were never sent to such parties. A Karakuyulu man in his late forties from a noted *xexes worq* family, now living in Germany, saw the same situation in Karakuyu in his youth. Wedding parties in the past do not seem to have been a social space shared across status boundaries. The absence of girls from

wealthy *worq* families in wedding dance parties was still observable in and outside Karakuyu even during my research.

Given this, just like the forgotten family crests which “all the families once owned”, the use of “all the girls” should be understood as a rhetorical device employed to quell the narrative of social disparity and to evoke the former village society within a utopian fantasy where no inequality or discord existed and status differences did not count for much either. Ironically, everybody seemed aware that such an inclusive and convivial society probably had never existed at any time. The communal fantasy, expressed in the feeble voice of once-poor Karakuyulus, seemed unconvincing even to the speakers themselves. Naturally, the elites and the rich turned a deaf ear to it. Legitimate knowledge in Uzunyayla not only required an ability to produce the past in a highly formalised manner, but also the endorsement of a culturally approved authority to confirm that it carried historical truth, and to silence the voice of dissidents. In the production of knowledge, the causative aspect of persuasion was as crucial as achieving a narrative closure.

To conclude, Karakuyulus shifted the significant turning point of history towards a more recent time, away from the *Seferberlik* and the foundation of the Republic to the Land Distribution. They employed the now/then dichotomy to represent the social relations of the past as a caring and peaceful community, and the us/them dichotomy to push a new category (*xexes*), opposing the common interests of that village community. In this way, they tried to move the meaningful social boundaries away from the *worq*/slave dichotomy and to create a “history” with its own message.

So entrenched in their own History, the nobles lacked the capacity to hear Karakuyulus’ voices. They were unable to acknowledge the significant narrative of Karakuyulus’ historical consciousness, revealed in fragmented oral accounts of events and in the gaps within these stories. The “history” which Karakuyulus told themselves was left unacknowledged within the dominant structure of communication. Karakuyulus were left muted: silence and forgetting appeared to prevail, bringing about a situation that initially struck me as collective amnesia. These silences and forgettings, however, were telling a more significant narrative than could be conveyed by the image of amnesia.

I participated in maintaining the domination of *worqs*’ representations by conducting my research in Karakuyu with presumptions about Circassians that I gradually internalised while listening to the elites’ clearly articulated voices. As Sider & Gavin correctly argue, the silence of the subordinate was embedded in the formation of a culture in which a dominating section lacked either the capacity to listen or the practice of listening to their voices (1997: 14).

#### **[4] Some Perspectives on Future Investigation of the *Worqs*’ Memories**

In the last section I compared historical narratives presented by muted Karakuyulus with those given by the local nobles and analysed the nature of social forgetting prevalent in Karakuyu as an alternative mode of communication. Dislocating the *worqs*’ History by conjuring a “more objective”, “truer” version of the provincial history based on historical records and academic findings is beyond my scope. I limit myself here to briefly proposing some points that may be further investigated with a view to demystifying the elite representation that empowers the *worqs* at the cost of others.

First, the ahistorical model of society presented in the *worqs*’ idea of *Adygagha* may be re-examined. An idea of transformation may well be incorporated in a better understanding of the social formation in Uzunyayla. The rise and fall of Circassian notables may be re-examined historically in the light of “the cycle of wealth” which Stirling presented to understand the growth and decline of wealthy families in Turkish villages in the same Kayseri province (1965: 133-147). Interestingly, families of prominent figures who made names for themselves by their ostentatious sociability in the post-*Seferberlik* era (e.g. the Adygeuna) seemed not to match the legendary families, such as princely lord lineages (e.g. the Kundet), known to have been wealthy and influential during the earlier period. When and how was the wealth accumulated which facilitated the replacement of local notables and sustained their flamboyant social life?

Keyder’s historical model, which portrays Anatolian agricultural sectors in a cyclical alternation between sharecropping and self-sustaining peasantry (1983a; 1983b; 1986; 1993),

seems to be more useful than presuming a rigid ranking system in the past. In an essay on his natal village near Karakuyu, a Kabardian sociologist of a reputed *worq* family mentions that the organisation of labour in his village before 1950 was characterised by the “feudal mode of production” (Duman 1996: 144). The means of production (land and livestock) were monopolised by three “noble lineage(s)” (*bey soyu*) (ibid.), which he also calls “feudal lineages” (*feodal sülaleler*) (ibid. 145 n). His ahistorical description of pre-1950 Uzunyayla as “feudal” appears enmeshed with the dominant representation based on the *worq*/slave dichotomy,<sup>81</sup> whose well-known, earnest advocators included many members of his own lineage. At the same time, one male past member of the lineage was said to have had his orphaned cousin registered as his own slave in the village census. Such manipulations seemed to have been necessary to achieve a coherence in social history produced within a specific frame.

The increase in agricultural production, which threatened local horse breeding by turning pastures into crop fields, is reported as early as in the 1930s (Ziraat Vekâleti Neşriyatı 1938). This development may be linked with the historical situation of Anatolian agriculture in general before 1950, where the number of sharecroppers rose considerably, leading to an increase in agricultural production. The Great Depression in 1930 and World War II in the 1940s had caused a decline in prices in international markets (Akçetin 2000; Pamuk 1988) and this had to be compensated for by investing more labour to increase production. Despite locals’ stress on the isolated location of Uzunyayla, the incorporation of the regional economy into the state’s agricultural policies and the international division of labour may have proceeded earlier than locals understood.

This leads to my second point: the ethnic elite’s representation of history and society reproduced the simplified image of European feudalism as a stable hierarchy that clearly divided the ruling warriors and the agricultural producers. The elite model considered peasants, sharecroppers and farm labourers to have been nothing other than slaves. This model cannot incorporate an actor-centred approach, which takes account of the agency of these producers at the bottom. Members of the Circassian underclass were depicted as passive entities, bereft of the initiative to make strategic decisions in line with changing circumstances.

Contrary to the *worqs*’ portrayal of slaves as powerless victims, violent conflicts between slaves and their masters were reported since the early years after settlement in Anatolia, especially in Sivas province, to which Uzunyayla belonged until 1926. The governor of Sivas looked for help from the Porte in the face of strident slave demands for freedom in 1878 (Toledano 1998: 101-103). A local notable sent a letter to a Circassian organisation (*Çerkes İttihad ve Teaviin Cemiyeti*) in Istanbul, in 1907. He reported the armed clashes between the *worqs* and slaves, who had made a public decision to fight for freedom, and called for governmental intervention as the *only* solution (Dumanıç 1999). Also, a local story related that a male member of one princely lineage was killed while chasing a runaway slave during the same period. Far from their stereotyped image as the prey of history, subject to their masters’ arbitrariness, slaves in Uzunyayla seemed to have been active since early times as social actors in producing local history, a history about which History did not tell a great deal.

Berktaş (1992) argues that the nationalist historiography of the Ottoman socio-economic system provided no space in which peasants could act on their own initiatives. The same held true of the *worqs*’ official historiography of their local community. Slaves and agricultural labourers were thought of as submissive victims. They were part of a mnemonics that actually produced forgetting and concealment by over-simplifying complex social processes and transforming them into a History with its own gaps and silences. A contemporary Circassian author calls his historical novel on slaves’ struggle for freedom in eighteenth-century Caucasus “Adyghe history”

---

<sup>81</sup> See also Taymaz (1996) for the socio-economic transformation of Circassian villages in Pınarbaşı. Taymaz juxtaposes the former “feudal lords” (*feodal beyler*) and the large-scale landowners within the category of “landlord” (*toprak beyi*), opposed to “villagers” (i.e. small-scale landowners and landless villagers) (ibid. 178-179). However, just like Duman, he fails to problematize adequately the idea of “feudal relations” (*feodal ilişkiler*), an idea which Circassian intellectuals use too readily in describing the past social relations of their society. Thus, he states the transformation of local economy, including the fall of “landlords” and the rise of “villagers”, has led to a socio-cultural “confusion” (*karmaşık*) (ibid. 179), rather than improvement of social conditions.

(Mesbase 1994). The “Circassian history of Uzunyayla” is yet to be told. It still remains hidden, waiting to be articulated.

## [5] Conclusion

Following the previous chapter in which I compared memories about a single event, in this chapter I have examined different ways in which social experiences over a longer span of time were woven into narratives, and probed the politics underlying such constructions. Throughout Part II, I attempted partially to respond to Neyzi’s proposal to explore oral history as the means of bridging the gap between the Republic’s official history and ordinary people’s local experiences (1999: 3-4). My analysis showed that the locals themselves were making active efforts to link the public discourse and the experiences of their own community.

Circassians in Uzunyayla had their own debates, equivalent to some academic debates on the society and history of Turkish rural areas: they had their own debate on feudalism and a related one on *çiflik*, which were concerned with how far their society in the past could be represented as having a feudal structure; they debated agrarian questions in search of the foundation of a relevant social division; they enthusiastically engaged in debate over divergent paths of rural transformation and asked themselves how their particular social organisation was affecting the local experiences of modernisation and development.

One striking difference in the nature of the debates within the two separate circles was that all the arguments among Circassians were utilised by the ethnic elite to sustain in symbolic forms their dominance over the once-exploited class. A static image of timeless “feudalism”, simplified as a society divided into status classes, played an essential role in this ideological use of memory. Contestation over such historical representations was an important part of the power struggles and symbolic struggles within local society.

Secondly, the significance of this debated local history had not yet been settled, as seen in the competition over village names, which inevitably led to the production of alternative narratives of settlement. One of the reasons why the stratified nature of Circassian society in the past continued to stimulate people’s imagination may be that the imagery of slavery provided a base for discussion of Turkish experiences of modernity, including persistent social inequalities in the present: “Slaves in the past were no different from labourers in the present. All these unionists are like slaves in the past. The present condition is even worse, since labourers cannot even fill their stomachs.”

References to slavery enabled the locals’ cultural imagination to locate their history within the wider context of world history through various images borrowed from ideas of basic human rights, nominal equality of citizens, the Islamic understanding of slavery as well as historical trans-Atlantic slavery practices. The locals encountered the last through “Roots”, the very first programme they watched on television, which was introduced to the region after the military coup in 1980. “Kunta Kinte”, the name of a young Gambian boy brought to the United States as a slave, became a nickname for slave descendants, imposing a new image of a much more systematised, rigorous exploitation.

Circassian slavery revealed ambiguities and paradoxes within these contradictory ideologies, practices and realities. It served as a metaphor with which the locals could discuss such issues as the development of a capitalist economy and the political situation of the Republic, and especially the contradiction between the principle of social equality that the modern state proclaimed, and the reality of inequality, which people evaluated in divergent ways. This social criticism, in which the local memories of particular oppression and the present experiences of large-scale exploitation at the national or global level merged with each other, formed what Lipsitz calls counter-memory (1990: 213-214).<sup>82</sup>

---

<sup>82</sup> Lipsitz contrasts his counter-memory, as a fully developed alternative narrative that purports to redress the dominant and totalising narrative of history, to Foucault’s concept of counter-memory – specific to a particular event, singular, fragmentary and unauthored – which does not reify a totalising narrative of history (Foucault 1977: 139, 144, 150).

History in Uzunyayla was yet to be settled, despite local understandings of history as the past irrelevant to the present, or the equally static golden age. The unfinished past remained felt as a burden, producing contested memories open for reinterpretation. Social memories in Uzunyayla retained their vitality by being sustained as an on-going debate that would never be completed.

It was not unambiguous master-slave relations that had continued up to the present day, it appears, but rather competition over status, about which ample records from the first years of re-settlement in the region existed. In Circassian society in Uzunyayla, various social boundaries were drawn and redrawn in spite of, but appropriating, the dichotomous social view which the *worqs* were trying to impose as authentic history. People were engaged in differentiating themselves from each other. The construction of the other was not complete. Land distribution, intended to make farmers equal, had resulted in a new source of social inequality, which served as a constant subject of local debate.

### Part III Everyday Practice of Social Memories

#### Chapter 6 Everyday Production of Memories and Forgetting

##### [1] Introduction

Part III links memory as a discursive reflection of history, examined in the previous chapters, to the actual process of remembering and forgetting incorporated in everyday life (see Middleton & Edwards eds. 1990; Algazi 1997). This chapter further explores the *worqs*' memory politics, which transformed slave descendants into memory objects that evoked History. These ubiquitous, embodied memories helped lend authority to the *worqs*' particular renderings.

With this in mind, I shift the focus from *hafıza*, a static aspect of memory as the storage of knowledge concerning the already settled past,<sup>83</sup> to *hatır*, an aspect of self implicated in an active process of remembering.<sup>84</sup> Tourmarkin mentions that displacement and settlement serve for Circassians as an instrument of "collective memory" (1996: 116). Circassian authors use its Turkish equivalent, "*kolektif hafıza*", in the same context (Bjedug & Taymaz 1995: 120; Taymaz 1998: 30). I argue that the active nature of Circassian social memories cannot be fully conveyed by the static *hafıza*. *Hatır* and *hatıra*, which point to interactive practices of remembering that incorporate a notion of self as social being, seem more appropriate.

In origin, *hatır* is an Arabic noun identifying the agent of an action designated by its root, ر - ط - خ (kh-T-r), denoting "to swing" (as *خطر khaTara*), "to come to one's mind" (as *خطر khuTuur*) and thus "to be weighty", "significant" or even "dangerous" (*خطورة khaTura*). In Turkish, *hatır* is used to form a number of idiomatic phrases where it can be variously translated as mind/thought, heart/feelings, memory and influence. With this series of related senses, *hatır* may be seen as connoting an idea of self incorporated into memory politics, though it remains a virtually unreflected concept among Turkish speaking people themselves, unlike Western ideas of self.

Two of its common idioms, *hatırında tutmak* (to keep in one's heart) and *hatırında kalmak* (to remain in one's heart), refer to the human capacity for retaining episodic memory. *Hatırına gelmek* (to come to mind) illustrates the human being as a receptor susceptible to external influence, whereas *hatırına getirmek* (to bring to mind) acknowledges human's more active role in retrieving fragmented personal impressions to mould them into a well-structured story. *Hatırı sayılır kişi* (a person whose feelings/thoughts are respected) connotes the social influence of such a person's *hatır*, and is used as a synonym of *ileri gelen kişi* (a leading person).

These uses indicate that *hatır* bridges heart and mind and links them to a social aspect of the everyday politics of remembering, in which the body also plays an important part, as the

---

<sup>83</sup> Its Arabic root verb (حفظ *hafıza*) denotes "to preserve", "to protect", and thus "to retain in one's memory" or "know/learn by heart". As such, *hafıza* is linked to such notions as "conservative" (*muhafazakâr*) and "hafiz, who has learned the Qur'an by heart" (*hafız*), commonly used in Turkish.

<sup>84</sup> Also, the two different types of knowledge connoted by both Kabardian *sh'an* and Turkish *bilmek* (see Ch. 4) may be seen as corresponding to these two different aspects of memory.

following sections make clear. For instance, the presence of *hatır* in the causative form (*hatırlatmak*: to remind) of the verb *hatırlamak* (to remember) seems to imply the doer's intention to exert his agency by reminding the recipient of his actions of something that person has forgotten, and thus to register certain effects upon the latter's *hatır*; this memory process, which involves both remembering and forgetting, may offer a useful clue to understanding a politics of interactive knowledge production.

*Hatır* indicates an affinity between memory and aspects of self. This suggests that memory may also be linked to personhood – the person as social being – to elucidate the rhetoric of memory employed to make slaves embody History. The contrast between *worqs*' articulacy and slaves' mutedness seems to be linked to the cultural understanding of efficacy unequally conferred on different categories of person. La Fontaine (1985) argues that the recognised unevenness in authority and agency among different members of society is deeply implicated in their relative achievement of the status of socially significant person.<sup>85</sup> This appears to apply precisely to Circassians.

Taylor (1985) argues that the model of an autonomous person, deeply conscious of his own position within a society that he himself represents, is peculiar to the modern West. He compares it with models of personhood constructed through language exchanges in public space, much more common in non-Western societies. Circassian *worqs* resembled the Western elite in that they empowered themselves through self-recognition as social actors and producers of history within their own representation of the social order. In this sense, they were autonomous in constructing their own selves.

In this chapter, I demonstrate that different sets of local Circassians achieved coherence in their person to varying degrees; such coherence was the effect of the transaction of meanings realised in exchanges of substances, words and actions in public space. I argue that this uneven accomplishment was linked to ratification and denial of authority, which allowed a particular person's historical knowledge to pass as socially true. I show how the social practice of memory, which worked through the control of these flows of symbols, helped to validate *worqs*' schematic representation of History as an authoritative version.

## [2] Slaves as Lesser Persons

### 1) Personhood

Patterson's insights on the slave as non-person are a useful starting point to explore the relation between personhood and authoritative knowledge. He argues that slaves may be seen as socially dead since they are separated from their natal social relations and remain incapable of being fully incorporated into a new social network. Slaves, unable to have social relations except through their ties with their masters, lack the recognition granted to autonomous persons. He concludes that slaves are non-persons (1982: 48).

Erdem, a Turkish historian writing on Ottoman slavery, translates non-person as *gayri şahıs* (1998: 175). *Şahıs* (شخص *shakhS*) is an Arabic term meaning "person". Just like the English "person" or "personality", it often denotes a person with social influence. Its abstract form *şahsiyet* may therefore be equated with La Fontaine's personhood. The first Turkish sociologist Ziya Gökalp, who was also the theoretician of the Young Turks, argued that the ideal in Turkish society involves transforming an "individual" (*birey*) into a "personality" (*şahsiyet*) (Heyd 1950: 53). His idea of *şahsiyet* here, reflecting his Durkheimian training, is a person merged with the interests of society. I restrict my use of *şahsiyet* to denoting an interactively constructed person with a hint of social influence incorporated within the sense of personal integrity.

In Turkish, *şahsiyet* is thought of as something to be "constituted" as shown in the phrase *şahsiyet oluşturmak*. Etymologically, *oluşturmak*<sup>86</sup> refers to a reciprocal interaction in which separate elements are brought together, thus bringing a new whole into being. Here, a state of being and a process of becoming, both denoted by its root verb *olmak*, are understood as

---

<sup>85</sup> See Eickelman (1991) for an early application of the idea to a Middle Eastern context.

<sup>86</sup> The verb *oluşturmak* is composed of three elements; *olmak*, a verb denoting both a state of "being" and a process of "becoming"; *uş*, an affix indicating that an action is done in a reciprocal or co-operative manner; and *tur*, a causative suffix.

alternating phases of a continuity. *Şahsiyet* is closely linked to like notions such as “personality” (*kişilik*) and “identity” (*kimlik*), both of which are also said to belong to the type of personal qualities that people “constitute” in interaction with others.

All these concepts share another similarity: they imply agency, potency, power, influence, authority, efficacy and other qualities summed up as “self-confidence” (*kendine güven*), which also need to be “constituted”. As the following sections demonstrate, these concepts, related to a certain state of social person, are interwoven with other idioms, such as *hatır*, respect and *rahatlık* (comfort/repose: a state of being at ease). Together, they form a semantic field in which a high value is attached to self with an implication of integrity and coherence. This idea of *şahsiyet* is not far from a post-modernist idea of identity that, constituted in discourse, enables one to exert social agency (Sarup 1996; Hall 1996).

At the same time, a series of verbs (*bozmak*, *kırmak*, *yıkmak*, *parçalamak*, *yitirmek*) sharing the basic meaning of “breaking into pieces”, frequently take as their objects a set of nouns related to rudimentary elements of a person (*akıl*: “mind”; *gönül/kalp*: “heart”; *yürek*: “heart”/“stomach”) brought together in the “inner self” (*iç*: “inside”/“core”) and various states (*gurur/kibir*: “pride”; *keyif/moral*: “high spirits”; *umut*: “hope”). All these phrases denote destructive experiences. Expressions that refer to experiences with far-reaching repercussions for the individual, encompassing all the above-mentioned implications of shattering particular facets of one’s self, include “to have one’s inner self broken (by an ache)” (*içi parçalanmak*) or “to ruin one’s own personality” (*kişiliğini yitirmek*), the result of the latter being a “broken personality” (*bozuk kişilik*). Also, *hatır*, a notion that integrates mind, emotion and body into a coherent self, is often mentioned as the object of “breaking” (*hatırını kırmak*). This experience of having one’s self crushed is often put simply as “I am broken” (*kırıldım*), endorsing the idea that *hatır* is a comprehensive notion almost equivalent to self.

The Turkish language appears to reflect a cultural understanding that the process by which coherence in personhood is achieved may be reversed, forcefully breaking apart its constituting elements. Person is implicated in the continuum between two poles of a process in which people are engaged during everyday encounters with others. Graphic images of achieving a coherent whole from multiple constituents, and fracturing that integrated self back into fragments, are incessantly produced, ephemerally conjuring up the imagery of a coherent person associated with social efficacy.

In this interactive model, in which personhood can be considered in terms of either more or less, slavehood need not be treated as a permanent state of being a non-person, but can rather be thought of as incorporated into a process in which different sets of people are hierarchized in everyday life. It has been pointed out that slaves, as non-persons, are often denied the possession of knowledge.<sup>87</sup> How then was the mutedness of Circassian slave descendants implicated within this relative model of personhood? In the next section, I analyse *worqs*’ manipulation of this interactive understanding of person, which conceptualised slaves as unable to achieve a highly coherent and thus socially valued personhood. I elucidate the process of objectification<sup>88</sup> through which *worqs* first materialised slaves as tangible entities and then transformed them into abstract objects within the dominant historical knowledge.

## **2) Metaphors of Slavehood: the Incomplete Personhood of Slaves**

Patterson draws attention to “idioms of power”, the particular images through which power relations are presented to people and understood by them in a given society in which slavery exists. Such representations of power have an ideological function of transforming slaves into non-persons and legitimating the exploitative relations between masters and slaves. Patterson alerts us to two types of images of power; firstly, materialising metaphors by which slaves are presented as property; and secondly, socialising metaphors that humanise power by casting a familiar kinship model over large scale exploitation (1982: 18-19). These two idioms for

---

<sup>87</sup> See Diawara (1989: 116) for a Malian case of slaves’ mutedness.

<sup>88</sup> Dominguez (1989) uses the idea of objectification to refer to a process by which one emerges as an acting subject in defining one’s object, thus bringing about status difference between the active self and the passive other.

domination were interlocked in *worqs*' oral accounts of *worq*-slave relations, reinforcing the image of slaves as non-persons.

### 2-1) "Property": Materialising Metaphor

Account 1: Those who were manumitted used to be sold off just like livestock (*mal*) at the gate (*kapi*). Since slaves were your own property (*mal*), some masters used their slave women without formal marriage (*nikâh*). My maternal uncle lost his wife. He had a widowed slave woman at his door (*kapi*). He entered relations with this woman. Before she gave birth to a child, he had a *nikâh* performed and treated this child as his own son. Later, this son eloped with a Karakuyulu slave girl.

(An elderly *worq* man, from an Abaza village)

*Worqs* presented slaves as property no different from livestock. *Mal*, which denotes property or possessions in general, was used here to refer to movable, transferable and alienable commodities in contrast to immobile estate (*mülk*).<sup>89</sup> The traditional form of subsistence economy in Uzunyayla largely depended on dairy products. *Mal* was the word most commonly used for livestock (*canlı mal*: "live property"), especially sheep.

The sheep was a symbol of passivity. This image was clearly reflected in *worqs*' equation of slaves with livestock. I often heard people say that masters had absolute rights over their living property. Cases of past tyrannous treatment of slaves by their owners were known in many villages including Karakuyu. Slaves were said to have done whatever they were told, or to have shuddered with fear in the presence of *worqs*. They were also described as having been "unable to open their mouths", reproducing the image of slaves' silence.

Slaves were often sold off or given to others on the whim of their masters, their families dispersed. After the Circassians' forced migration and the prohibition of slave imports in the Ottoman Empire, Anatolia became the sole source of *cariyes* for the Sultan's palace. Exploitation of slaves seems to have intensified among Circassians who settled in Uzunyayla, the severest of natural environments. Many impoverished *worqs* had to sell their slave girls. Uzunyayla became one of the main sources of *cariyes*.

Patterson points to two different modes of representing slaves' social death, in line with the principal mode of enslavement (1982: 38-44). *Worqs* used both modes to explain the slaves' lack of personhood. Patterson finds the primary instance of the "intrusive" mode within Islam, which sanctions enslavement of non-Muslim war captives. The local nobles most often said that their slaves originated from either infidels captured in war or non-Circassians kidnapped in raids. In the "extrusive" mode, enslavement is the effect of removal of rights and duties as full members of a society as the result of impoverishment or crime. *Worqs* also said that the ancestors of slave families fell to that sub-human status as a punishment for immoral deeds of *zina* including incest and infidelity. No matter which mode was utilised to legitimise hierarchy, this became a basis for justifying exclusion of slaves from a social circle, as in the case of marriage.

One interesting interpretation was that Circassian slaves originated from foundlings. Some ex-slave families were said to have descended from abandoned children, "found and brought up at the gate" (*kapi*) by *worqs*, made to "work at the door" (*kapi*) for them as slaves. The reason the children were not wanted, people often imagined, was because they were the product of illicit relations between *worqs* and slaves, whose status difference impelled people to believe that they were unmatched and thus marriage between them was undesirable. Islam permits masters to have sexual relations with their slave women outside marriage. Deploying the verb *kullanmak*, which denotes the handling of a simple instrument, local elders told me that masters "used" their female slaves in the past. Islam requires masters to free and marry the slave women who bear their

---

<sup>89</sup> *Mal* derives from the Arabic verb مول (*mawala*: to make someone rich) and designates movable property (money, taxes, goods, livestock) in contrast to *mülk*, which is immoveable property (lands and buildings). *Mülk* derives from ملك (*malaka*), which denotes "to possess/own".

children. Many people, however, imagined that children thus born were often unwanted and that many of those abandoned infants were the illegitimate children of *worq* men and slave women.

Within this historical imagination, a double standard was often applied to *worqs* and slaves in matters of sexual ethics. *Worqs* saw that both economically and demographically slave descendants overtook their own class, many of whom declined or died out. They said that slave descendants were still slaves to sensual pleasure and thus procreated excessively, whereas *worqs* could control their own sexual impulses. Slaves' servitude to other persons was justified by describing them as slaves to their own physical desire. In the Qur'anic tradition, which lacks the notion of original sin, sexuality represents the freedom humans enjoy, and consequently control over one's own sexuality is left to individual responsibility (Bouhdiba 1998: 58-59). The *worqs'* view that slaves renounced their autonomy by giving up resisting their carnal desire was highly congruent with this Islamic understanding.

Slave women's supposed sexual availability horrified most people. *Worqs* were not blamed for lack of self-control, since these stories were told to underline the absolute power owners exercised over their own "property". What violated slave women's sexual integrity was not their *worq* masters as individuals, but impersonal History, in which slaves could only be objectified victims. These slave women, forced to accept their masters' will, metonymically symbolised the passive, effeminate position of the slave class in relation to *worqs* (see also Ch. 2, for the use of gender metaphor in producing a hierarchy). It was imagined that children so fathered were often abandoned, as their *worq* genitors did not acknowledge their paternity.

Such children were said to have been named according to the annual crop yield (e.g. "Rich Harvest", "Blessing") or the lowly tasks assigned to them (e.g. "Shepherd", "Grass Cutter", "Reaper"). They were also called descendants (*kho*: son) of various animals. Along with other cases, in which some patronymics were used, local Circassians still used these "nicknames" (*lakap*), as new and inauthentic names of their descent groups. They served as a mnemonic device (*hatura*) imbued with the stories that their ancestors were born from slave women violated by their masters. Abandoned children bridged the two modes of slaves' social death: severance from natal social ties caused by immoral deeds; and re-integration into a host community as lesser persons. This provided a strong image, which the elite members of Circassian society used to legitimate hierarchical relations between *worqs* and their slaves.

The idiom of honour, much discussed in various contexts of Mediterranean societies, is part of a more general idea of "collective selfhood" where "we" is experienced as a potent metaphor of oneself (Herzfeld 1992: 67). Turkish societies are often said to be characterised by this principle (Stirling 1965: 230-233; Meeker 1976; Unsal 1995:53-59; Şimşek 1998; Magnarella 1998: 212-213). According to it, a man's female relatives under his protection are an integral part of his person. Violation of these women's "sexual honour" (*namus*) is considered an infringement of a man's own person. In *worqs'* eyes, slave men, who could not prevent their female relatives from being sold or made to serve their masters, lost their own honour.

Davis points out that honour is an idiom that serves to produce social stratification and to legitimise material difference, by facilitating an inconsistent application of moral norms to different categories of people (1977: 98). Circassians did not seem to use "honour" (*şeref* or *namus*) as a vital social idiom to create a hierarchy amongst males, based on their control over the sexuality of their female family members.<sup>90</sup> Nonetheless, a moral double standard, which anthropologists have pointed out in the use of honour idiom in different contexts, was certainly observable in the claimed status differences between *worqs* and slaves, which reinforced the tendency to evaluate persons in more-or-less terms.

The recognition of deficiency in personhood may be expressed through the honour idiom in many Mediterranean societies. *Worqs*, however, elaborated the transformation of slaves into non-, or lesser persons through the paired idiom of respect and love. This socialising idiom supplemented the conceptual manipulation through the metaphor of property and helped to deny slaves the achievement of a highly integrated personhood. Thus it presented exploitative relations in familiar terms, humanising power.

---

<sup>90</sup> Circassians do not have their own word for *namus*, and therefore use this Turkish word of Greek origin.

## 2-2) Respect and Love: Humanising Slaves' Subordination

Account 2: Masters provided their slaves with a house and arranged marriages for them. Therefore intimacy (*samimiyet*) grew and respect and love could exist between them. Otherwise it would not have been possible to keep slaves at the door by tyranny.

(An elderly *worq* man, from a Kabardian village)

Account 3: Abazas do not love slaves. Here in Karakuyu, we love slaves.

(An elderly Karakuyulu man, from a “*worq*” family)

Account 4: Both my grandfather and father made efforts to keep harmony in the village and made themselves accepted by Circassians. My father is loved by Circassians. I can enter any Circassian wedding party.

(A Kurdish man in his thirties, born and bred in a Kabardian village)

The metaphor of property supported the *worqs*' claim of deficiency in slaves' personhood. The idea that slaves were inferior to *worqs* in the level at which one could achieve personal autonomy was further elaborated by the idiom of “respect” (*saygi*) and “love” (*sevgi*), which helped to construct slaves as lesser persons. The usage of this paired idiom characterised master-slave relations as humane, nonetheless furthering the objectification of slaves at a conceptual level.

In Turkey, social relations are generally interpreted as a model of exchange between actors. The model has an ideological effect of presenting inequality between the partners in a mitigated form, since an exchange often provides an image of “reciprocal intimacy” (*samimiyet*). Whether between individuals or groups, social relations are evaluated in terms of the presence or absence<sup>91</sup> of “take and give” (*alış veriş*), as well as the quality of the exchange. *Hak* is a term of Arabic origin, referring to both “rights” and “duties”. *Hak* was cherished by local Circassians, who usually explained it as “that which falls on one's head” with a stress on its naturalness. Circassians frequently used *hak* as an object of verbs denoting transaction, especially “to take”/“to receive” (*almak*) or “to give” (*vermek*). They were very keen on claiming their rights and accomplishing their duties according to their position in a social network, actually using these claims to negotiate their positions.

Ziya Gökalp, the first Turkish sociologist, argued that the image of legitimate power in Turkish society is not “coercive force” or “rule” (*sulta*) which enforces subordination by fear, but “authority” (*velayeti*) as guardian (1966). Complementing Gökalp, Parla mentions that the Turkish idea of social justice is based upon the notion that those entrusted with power provide protection and care to the socially weak, completing a reciprocal cycle to promote social solidarity and public benefit (1985: 94). Gökalp likened such authority of the ruler to the relation between a father and his family (1966: 28), where affection and control are bound up with each other as an ideology of reciprocity that compels the junior member to accept the senior member's authority, as a Turkish social psychologist suggests (Kağıtçıbaşı 1970). The humanising metaphor of family and kinship is often used in Turkey as a model for social organisation; it serves as an ideology that legitimates an unequal distribution of power.

Anthropologists of small-scale communities in Turkey appear to have characteristically located “love” in egalitarian aspects of social life such as co-operation, solidarity and closeness, which are opposed to hierarchy, authority, competition and struggle (Meeker 1976; Casson & Özertug 1976; Delaney 1993). In contrast, those writing on exploitative relations between aghas

---

<sup>91</sup> In Karakuyu, there were some people known to be in a *küs* relation, which villagers explained as a state in which people did not talk (*konusmak*) to each other. *Küs*, well documented by Stirling (1965: 248-251), may be understood to signify the absence of “gives and takes”.

and peasants (Kudat 1971), labour organisation in an urban setting (Duben 1976; 1982; White 1994), or patronage-clientelism in party politics (Güneş-Ayata 1994) have demonstrated that these social relations are organised on the basis of reciprocal exchange of service for protection. Here, in line with the latter approach, I understand respect and love as forming a paired idiom that people in Turkey – including Circassians in Uzunyayla – use to legitimise authority on the basis of the reciprocal relationship into which the senior and junior partners enter, exchanging obedience and support. Love is an essential part of the cultural understanding of power in Turkey, contrary to the image of romantic love in Western societies, as well as in different contexts in the Middle East, in which love is feared as a feeling subversive to the existing social hierarchy (Pehrson 1966: 62-67; Abu-Lughod 1986: 143-150, 211; 1990a: 35; see also Mernissi 1975: 56-79). In Turkish contexts, the relation established through love could sometimes be exploitative.

The relation between “senior” (*büyük*) and “junior” (*küçük*) is usually expressed by this paired idiom. Formulated as “respect for the senior, love for the junior” (*büyüğe saygı, küçüğe sevgi*), this set idiom gives a specific moral character to relations understood as an intimate reciprocity between the socially unequal. These terms have the following connotations, words which in fact sometimes replaced them during my research: for respect: *hizmet* (service), *hürmet/izzet* (respect), *itibar* (esteem) and *itaat* (obedience), and for love: *şefkat* (concern), *ihdimam* (care), *himaye* (protection) and *ikram* (hospitality). The *büyük* and the *küçük* implicated in the exchange often refer to the older and the younger members of a family. However, literally meaning simply “big” and “small”, these words help to incorporate the social major and the social minor in diverse senses into this model of reciprocity. They facilitate the inter-dependence of various realms of hierarchy, which include the relationship between *worq*s and slaves.

The respect-love idiom is an official ideology, which is learned partially through formal education (see Ch. 5), but is also firmly rooted in the minds of people in Turkey as a moral code for a society, which, according to Mardin, has traditionally used the emphasis on solidarity (1966: 381-382) and the “low tolerance of deviance” to strengthen community-based control (ibid. 387). At the same time, this idiom is often employed to legitimise social inequalities.

Circassians particularly emphasised respect. This suggested readiness for obedience held in the heart and made known through the body. Respect was used with “to feel” (*duymak*) and explained as a sense of “shame” (*utanma/haya*) or “inferiority” (*aşağılama hissesi*), which the junior was expected to feel in the presence of the senior. It was also used with “to show” (*göstermek*) and “to do” (*yapmak*), to designate demonstration of that readiness for submission through bodily action by the junior who recognised the other’s authority and power. Circassian manners were largely a matter of subtle but elaborated formalities that communicated in silence the value one gave to others.

Interestingly, the notions of respect and love remained unelaborated in Kabardian. The borrowed Turkish words seemed to have helped Circassians to discover the distinctiveness of their culture,<sup>92</sup> despite their often-expressed regret over assimilation. The Turkish idiom enabled Circassians to view their society in abstract terms,<sup>93</sup> facilitating a shift in the way in which their society was organised (see Parkin 1976. Also see Amara 1999; Gill 1999). The same was also true of many other Turkish idioms. By contrast, Circassian words that Circassians often incorporated into Turkish referred to either personal titles or statuses: e.g. *pshu*, *worq*, *unaut*, *kajer*, *tamada*, *kashan* (a fiancé/fiancée), *xegebz* (a girl) and *tachin* (an assistant at a dance party); or concern particular conventions: e.g. *xabze*, *unafe*, *wase*, *chanta*, *nusasha* (a wedding procession), *jegu* (a dance party), and *warsher* (a chat with guest girls).

This division of labour further affirmed the idea that the use of Turkish words had a positive aspect of allowing local Circassians to consider and articulate their cultural specificity. People frequently mentioned the words “customs” (*âdet*) and “etiquette”/“manners” (*xabze/usul*), usually with a view either to distinguishing Circassians from Turks, or evoking the law-like force of approved practices handed down from the past. In this sense, custom and etiquette largely

<sup>92</sup> Such self-rediscovery through engagement with a different culture appears to be a common experience among social scientists who study other societies. See for instance de Certeau (1988: 51) on Bourdieu’s *Outline of a Theory of Practice*.

<sup>93</sup> See Dirven (1994) for a similar case of English metaphors borrowed into Afrikaans.

overlapped with tradition, for which Kabardian did not seem to have a separate word, apart from *xabze*.

*Worqs* often characterised the past slave-master relationship in this respect-love idiom. Account 2 expresses the recognition that an exchange of respect and love summed up as “intimacy” or “affection” (*samimiyet*) could develop since the masters provided a house for their slaves and arranged their marriages, paying the bridewealth. *Worqs* frequently expressed the opinion that slave descendants had to still show respect to members of *worq* families.

The use of the *mal* metaphor promoted a conceptual manipulation that transformed slaves into tangible objects owned by masters, which enabled *worqs* to describe slave descendants as vulnerable to their masters’ arbitrary violence. How did the use of the respect-love idiom help to reinforce such a subordinate status, beyond merely borrowing a kinship model? How did the claimed difference in achieved personhood provide a basis for slaves’ junior status?

These questions will be treated here, first from the standpoint of the receivers of love. In Turkey, people who recognised their own dependence on aid from influential persons, usually said “The patron loves me very much”, often adding “I will do anything for him”. Generally, the more total their dependence became, the less willingly clients said that they respected their patron. This may have something to do with the fact that showing respect had the connotation of one’s subordination to another person, often demonstrated by submissive bodily gestures made out of a sense of powerlessness, such as kissing the superior’s hand or bowing one’s head.<sup>94</sup> The indirectness the junior partner manifested in such expressions as “The patron loves me,” indicated that the weaker party was presenting his own identity by incorporating the other person’s loving gaze in the construction of his own self. He turned himself into the other of the other who cared for him. He became an object in relation to the acting subject.

This indirectness was also prominent in the use of love in the relationship between individuals and a collectivity, as well as between different collectivities. The passive usage of love in Account 4 helps to clarify the implication of relations between an active lover and the recipient of his love. This account was presented by a man in his mid thirties, grandson of an Alevi Kurd who had settled a long time ago with his sons in a local Kabardian village as farm labourers. He told how his father and grandfather played down their Alevi identity in order to be accepted in a Sunni Circassian village. They prayed in the mosque more often than the locals and became hajjis. The family was “loved” by Circassian fellow villagers as the result of these efforts.

The inferior will be given love by the superior by “keeping harmony” (*uyum sağlamak*) with the social order defined by the latter. He will be incorporated into a network of exchange of *hak* (“rights and duties”) in that circle. Respect may be understood to mean that a person who passively offers himself as a beloved partner entrusts his superior with an authority to define the order of society. He shows loyalty to that order including his identity and position in it. The often-manifested Circassian self-image in relation to the Turkish nation-state, summed up in the phrase “more royalist than the king himself” (*kuraldan kuralcu*), clearly revealed that Circassians felt pressured to “maintain harmony” with the state order. Naturally, Circassians often said they were “loved” by Turks.

Account 3 was presented by an elderly man from a Karakuyulu *worq* family, who still had one household descended from his great grandfather’s slave living behind his house. This layout served as a reminder of the time when masters provided their slaves with a house within the same premises. His affirmative remark, “We love slaves”, expressed his determination to establish himself as subject. Portraying himself alongside other *worqs* as loving subjects in “we”, he stated his conviction that they were entitled to define slaves through their love. Slaves had to reciprocate

---

<sup>94</sup> In Turkish, “to kiss the hand” (*elini öpmek*) is a common expression used to “to show gratitude”, while “to kiss the foot” (*ayağını öpmek*) is often used to denote a submissive posture taken “to implore”. Also, “to bow the head” (*baş eğlemek*) is a synonym of “to submit”, whereas “to raise the head” (*baş kaldırmak*) means “to oppose” or “to revolt”, and “to hold up one’s head” (*kafa tutmak*) signifies “to be defiant/obstinate”. These phrases indicate the importance of one’s head as a symbol of one’s autonomy, an idea reflected in the notion that “head money” (*başlık*) means both bridewealth and the payment made by Circassian slaves to their masters to regain freedom (*shha shahuj psh’a*).

*worqs*' love with respect. The concise sentence, "We love slaves", manifested his recognition of *worqs*' authority as well as responsibility for creating an order.

By contrast, the weaker party's recognition of a relation between the loving other and the beloved self revealed his acceptance of a condition, in which the other defined who he was. This was a renunciation of self-determination and autonomy, presented as objectification of one's own self in relations with the superior other. This self-objectification denied the socially weak the chance to claim the status of active subject who defined his own self and could force specific names on others. Those who showed respect were defined heteronomously, not by their own acts, but through the love with which the other reciprocated their respect. Even those who said affirmatively "I will do anything for the patron [who loves me]" were not free agents.

In the *worqs*' willingness to use the paired idiom to describe their relationship with slaves lay their intention to represent slaves as lacking in autonomy: namely, as the social minor or the lesser person. The respect-love idiom produced slaves as self-alienated humans who saw themselves from the viewpoint of the other. In this section, I have treated respect and love as a set idiom of power, which made master-slave relationships understandable and legitimate by imposing a more familiar authority model likened to kinship. The incessantly mentioned respect-love idiom produced and demonstrated a differentiation among people in an exchange model, according to the level at which one could achieve personal integrity.

Ethnographies on diverse parts of Anatolia point out that family members dependent on a father-husband's material provision and spiritual love do not have a separate identity independent of that of the man who represents their household (Sirman 1990; Meeker 1996). The respect-love idiom helps to acknowledge the different degrees to which one can accomplish an autonomous self, as implied in family relations founded on loyalty and protection. The same exchange model was used by Circassian *worqs* to describe slaves as the receivers of their love, lacking self-containedness as a fully realised person. This idiom generated opposing images of passivity and heteronomy, transforming the lack of autonomy indicated in one's need to go under the umbrella of somebody's care into a recognition of the incompleteness of one's person.

If Patterson's idea of the non-person, which refers to slaves in an actual state of servitude, is too extreme to describe the descendants of Circassian slaves freed almost a century ago, the respect-love idiom may be said to represent them as lesser persons. This nuance is well reflected in Islamic as well as Turkish terminologies where the words that originally meant "young boy" (*gulam*), "young girl" (*cariye*) and "child" (*uřak*) came to be used for slaves or servants. This popular idiom served to produce the same image within the everyday process of "crafting selves" (Kondo 1990), in which local Circassians forced each other into unequal categories so as to make sense of power relations. *Worqs* asserted positive identities for themselves by moulding slave descendants into an inferior category: the ones who receive love.

### ***2-3) The Objectification of Slaves and the Production of Historical Knowledge***

Account 5: Those who are not of noble birth (*asil*) cannot be trusted. Just as five fingers of a hand are not the same, people's behaviour cannot be the same. Nobles are very careful about where to sit, what to say and how to behave in society so as not to make mistakes. Those who are not would not keep harmony with community. They would say the wrong things or make lots of mistakes in the light of custom. Since slaves do not know manners (*usul*) and customs (*âdet*), they make their birth known. Those who are not of noble birth were just like livestock at the gate (*kapı*). They did not have a "right of speech" (*söz hakkı*) and did not know how to speak. They were not allowed to speak in the *unafê* meeting.

(An elderly *worq* man from a *Kundet-ey* village)

The materialising metaphor of property helped *worqs* to imagine slaves as tangible objects. The socialising idiom of respect and love further helped *worqs* to describe them as heteronomous entities who lacked autonomy in defining themselves. What effects did these idioms of power have on the production of historical knowledge?

One of the effects of treating slaves as objects was that it enabled *worqs* to regard history as their personal property, collectively inherited over generations. This allowed the *worqs* to

manipulate history as a symbolic resource. Account 5 above, given by a *worq* elder leads to Account 9 below. The speaker's lineage produced one of the wealthiest men in the whole region during the period around the *Seferberlik*. He was notorious for his tyrannical attitude towards his slaves.

In Account 9, the speaker talked about a family descended from a slave who had ran away from this dictatorial man, calling them "those who left *our* door". Historically, Circassian slaves belonged to a person, not to a lineage, as reflected in the registration in the census book. The runaway slave's master was this man's great-uncle, elder brother of his grandfather. The speaker, a poverty-stricken man, here subsumed himself under a wealthier and more influential segment of the lineage by treating the slave as "our" common property, just as the "*worq*" speaker in Account 3 used the collective "we" to present *worqs* and slaves as separate groups. This manipulation of historical facts helped him to evade restraints in making a caustic remark about slaves' personality.

A group of people who saw slaves as "their" shared property were not confined within a single lineage. Even those *worqs* whose ancestors never owned slaves seemed to feel at ease in treating slaves as "theirs", talking freely about flaws in slaves' disposition. They also expected slave descendants to show respect to them as *worqs*. This treatment of slaves as *worqs*' common assets made it easier for *worqs* to achieve a coherent narrative of History, relying on a framework of *worq*-slave opposition in which they could portray slaves' misery and revenge. *Worqs* could develop a sense that they were entitled to treat history as a possession belonging to their collective "us", comfortably manipulating details as just illustrated. *Worqs* transformed history into their shared heritage – History – through a claim to shared ownership of slaves as common property.

*Worqs* naturally tried to confine this ownership of History within their circle. They attempted to control the boundary around those allowed to produce authentic knowledge in order to control the way history was represented. To understand this process, one must probe how *worqs* constructed a social arena for memory politics, a politics pursued to value knowledge unequally. All the accounts quoted above referred to bounded spaces or activities in these public spaces, through expressions such as slave women "at the door", livestock "at the gate", a wedding "party" one was allowed to "enter" or an *unafe* "meeting" where slaves did not have the right to speak. In the next section, I illustrate the kinds of power field that *worqs*' narratives constructed with these spatialising motifs. This became the arena for memory politics incorporated in everyday social practices, where remembering was actually done and forgetting was actively produced.

### [3] "*Kimlerdensin?*": Everyday Politics of Remembering and Forgetting

#### 1) *Sofra and Kapı: Politics of Space*

Account 6: *Unaut* were slaves who served at the door (*kapı*). Those from slave families in the village are children of people who grew up serving at the door. Those who were brought up at the door, those who could not separate from the door owing to poverty and those who ate, drank and served at the door did not have either manners or knowledge. They just did whatever their masters told them to do.

(One of the *worq* organisers of the Yahyabey Meeting in Ch. 4)

Account 7: The X...s and the Y...s in our village do not have lineage names brought from the Caucasus. Traces of master-slave relations still remain. Those from slave families prefer not to mix with others. They try to hide the past, but everybody understands.

(A Karakuyulu man in his thirties, from a well-off family)

Account 8: There is a difference between slaves and *worqs* in humanity. The Turkish proverb, "Nobility won't decay, honey won't smell. If it smells it's butter, the essence of which is yoghurt" (*Asıl azmaz, bal kokmaz. Kokarsa yağdır, mayası yoğurttur*), is right. There is difference in humanity, which is respect and service (*hürmet*). You would understand even somebody you do not know. They reveal themselves from the manner they speak, sit and behave. They behave disrespectfully and rudely, thinking they were oppressed in the past and they have freedom (*hürriyet*) now.

(A middle-aged *worq* man, from a Kabardian village)

In this section, I shall focus on how *worqs* structured public spaces and more importantly how they utilised this spatialised social order. Public spaces here were a stage in which everyday memory practices took place, giving authority to a particular historical representation. Different spaces may be associated with different activities through which people's social life gets organised differently, as many studies in the Middle East have demonstrated (Gerholm 1977; Gilsenan 1990a; Meneley 1996; Slymovics 1998; Weir 1985). Restrictions on who can act and speak fully on that valued stage are one of the means for controlling knowledge production.

The young Kurdish man in Account 4 mentioned that his father was "loved" by Circassians. He added that he could enter any Circassian wedding party. As elucidated above, love indicated protection and support given in exchange for compliance shown to the order established by the superior other. That this order tended to be represented as a structured space, that is, as a stage for a particular activity, was indicated by this young man's reference to dance parties in barns at which his admittance was tolerated, though not necessarily welcomed.

Looking again in this light at the accounts presented above, it is noticeable that slaves were closely associated with *kapi* (door, gate). In *worqs'* accounts, slaves "were born", "grew up", "fed", "served", "worked" and "died" at the door. Even runaway slaves were forcefully "brought back" to the door, sometimes with the help of gendarmes. Common expressions involving "staying" (*kalmak*) or "remaining" (*durmak*) at the door indicated a lack of mobility, summing up slave lives. Following Berg & Kearns, I shall look at the politics of space construction in two phases: first, *spatialising* politics which situated this door/gate within a public space likened to a social order; and then, *spatialised* politics, which used this particular representation to control meanings that defined the experiences one went through in that space (1996: 11).

Local Circassians represented Uzunyayla as their bounded territory, stressing close relations within their own community. They regarded a set of formalities associated with the reception of guests as the foundation of Circassian culture. This explained why they used the gathering in the guest room (*misafir odası*; or simply, *oda*) as a primary model for interpreting social relations. In particular, the aristocratic social life of better-off notables at the zenith of regional prosperity was still legendary. This extravagant social life was thought to have been peculiar to the wealthier *worq* class, who were dependent on the exploitation of slave labour. Therefore, such sociability was still often identified with "*worq* society" (*worq toplumu*). A meaningful social involvement was one that took place at "*worqs'* dining-table" (*worq sofrası*). Slaves tied to the door were not recognised as organic constituents of that society.

The table/door dichotomy constituted the room, making it possible for the social order to be presented as a bounded space. The *unafe* meeting, in which influential *worqs* gathered to discuss and resolve serious social issues, was the most highly valued, formal occasion in Circassians' social life. Naturally, those who organised the bridewealth meeting claimed that it had been an *unafe*, presenting themselves as the official representatives of the local community.

Nowadays, the *unafe* had been reduced to a commensal gathering held the day before a wedding. The heads of all households in the village were invited to the meeting to select a leader (*tamada*) and his assistant (*koz*) in the wedding procession (*nusasha*) to fetch the bride. The *unafe* was still regarded as one of the most formal occasions. In the guest room, the most highly valued (*en büyük*) person was led to the best seat (*chanta*; *baş köşe*: "head corner") and others followed, giving the right-hand side, referred to as "upper" (*yukarı*) seats, to their seniors.

Those elder *worqs* known as knowledgeable persons always said that they acquired the knowledge in their youth while serving guests at the door of their fathers' guest rooms. As already mentioned, Turkish *bilmek* and Kabardian *sh'an* shared the same dual character of knowledge. First, there was a body of articulated knowledge about history and society, which augmented its cogency by relying on some particular themes. Secondly, there was a practical, bodily knowledge necessary for proper behaviour. The acquisition of this social sense led to an ability to "act comfortably" (*rahat hareket etmek*) or to "be at ease" (*rahat etmek*) in gatherings. *Rahat* indicated a state of repose in which the heart, mind and body lay in a well-balanced unity; that is, enjoying a sense of being oneself. *Rahat etmek* was premised on an experience of harmony between mind and body, achieving a state of equilibrium in which a peaceful state of mind both reflected and

was produced through a relaxed bodily posture. Further, *rahat hareket etmek* implied a self-confidence with which one could be active in the community, feeling a real sense of being oneself.

Circassians frequently used *hürmet* in reference to services performed for guests or father in the *oda*. It denoted a respectful attitude demonstrated through courteous treatment, a concept like deference, linking veneration (*saygı*) and service (*hizmet*). *Worqs* claimed a hospitable reception to have been a form of sociability exclusive to them. While showing *hürmet*, *worq* children could “constitute personhood” (*şahsiyet oluşturmak*) through acquiring knowledge in these two different senses. As already explained, *oluşturmak* signified bringing something new into being by putting separate elements together. This *şahsiyet* was often equated with “self-confidence” and linked to a sense of “being at ease”. A socially significant person here denoted one with self-confidence who could act comfortably. Constituted through social interactions with others, this personhood incorporated a recognition of one’s agency as a socially constituted actor.

Kağıtçıbaşı mentions that mutual dependence and family or group loyalty are necessary conditions for the healthy and moral development of an individual (1971: 60-62). It was possible to see a similar relational model of person in the process of self-development among Circassian *worq* youths. At first sight, the hierarchy produced through the reciprocal idiom of love and respect appeared to subordinate personal autonomy to group loyalty. However, as far as the *worq* offspring were concerned, the idiom helped them to mediate the opposition and incorporate it into a process of personal growth in which the tension was ultimately resolved.

In order to have a well-developed personality and self-confidence, people needed to attend a number of social occasions (*ortam*), just like knowledgeable elders who spent their youth serving in their fathers’ guest room. “Getting about” (*gezmek*), which helped to train people, was a highly valued activity, as epitomised in an often-heard saying “*Bilen gezendir* (A person who knows is a person who gets around)”. People who had established a great number of social contacts by attending dancing parties as youths, and later *unafes* as senior members of society, were highly respected as “men of society” (*toplumun adamı*). These “men of society” were also mentioned as having “mixed with society”, “entered and come out of society” or “sat and got up in society”. They were regarded as able to behave “appropriately” (*uygun*) and act “comfortably” (*rahat*) in society. The high esteem in which they were held was expressed by calling them “people to whom a seat (*yer*) is given at a *worq* dining-table”, “who can sit in a *worq* guest room” or “who have a place (*yer*) in *worq* society”.

Those who preferred to avoid social contacts were called people who “stay on the edge (*kenar*) of society”, who “are occupied with their own affairs” (*kendi halinde olmak*) or who “struggle with their own work” (*kendi işi ile uğrasmak*). Their social worth was low, though they were not necessarily people from ex-slave families. Slave descendants were, however, particularly liable to such a negative appraisal. Unable to move from the *kapı* to which they were tied, they were not reckoned as fully participating in the activities at *sofra* or *oda* associated with *worq* society. They were considered unable to fully constitute a personhood endowed with self-confidence and a social capacity.

Slaves disclosed their inability to achieve a high degree of coherence in their personhood, as their lack of knowledge, in two senses. First, it meant their lack of historical knowledge. Secondly, slaves were described as lacking a practical ability to behave according to the established code of behaviour and to act with comfort and self-confidence. *Worqs* said that slaves, sensing a mal-coordination between inner and outer self, tended to act inappropriately and reveal “discomfort” (*rahatsızlık*). This revealed sense of self-alienation was seen as evidence of the defunct nature of their personhood. Slave descendants betrayed their birth status through their bodily movements. Thus, they became mnemonic objects that “reminded” (*hatırlatmak*) all others present of History.

Bernard Lewis has argued that the image of power in Islam is not based on a vertical distinction between high and low, but on a horizontal one between in and out or centre and periphery (1988: 12-13). In the Ottoman dynasty, the position of power was designated by architectural metaphors (Lewis 1990: 20). *Kapı* (“gate”) signified access to power, just as the word was used for many official posts and places of employment, including the Ottoman central government called the Sublime Porte. *Kapıkulu* (“slave of the gate”) as servants at these *kapıs*,

especially Ottoman palace servants, were referred to, had a connotation of power and authority rather than contempt or disdain (Kunt 1998: 162).

Circassians visualised society through the metaphor of a guest room. They referred to the position of power as a dining-table. The door symbolised marginality. But there was an ambiguity here. For *worqs*, the process of personal development was understood as a transition from the door to the table. The door, which one went through to take one's seat at the table, truly symbolised "inward" mobility here. Nonetheless, Circassians' frequent employment of up/down or high/low imagery, as seen in upper/lower (*yukarı/aşağı*) seats or superior/lowly (*üstün/düşük*) families, suggested that they did not exclusively use the centre/periphery or in/out images to project power relationships in a spatial metaphor.

In contrast, a personal development equivalent to that of young *worqs* was not acknowledged in cases where the door metaphor was used to refer to the peripheral position of slaves. Slaves' immobility was not only spatial but also social. For slaves, a door signified a threshold they could not cross symbolically, thus not an access to power, but an exclusion from it. This metaphorical use of the door shared a connotation with other phrases of rejection frequently used by Circassians, "to drive someone away from the door" (*kapıdan çevirmek/kovmak*) and "not to take someone inside the door" (*kapı içine girdirmemek/almamak*). What is important here is not this ambiguity itself, but the way *worqs* utilised this image to achieve their goal.

Considering the habitual use of door metaphors, it may appear puzzling that Circassians did not use *kapıkulu* (lit. "slave of the gate/door") to refer to their slaves. In Islam, which means submission to God, "slave" is used universally for mankind with an honorific implication as servants of God (Lindholm 1996: 225), or those who submit themselves only to the commands given by God. Like *mamluk* (mameluke)<sup>95</sup> in Arabic, *kul* in Turkish has a connotation of power and dominance (Lewis 1988: 65). But Circassians did not refer to their slaves with this religiously suffused term; *worqs* called them *köle*.

The Kabardian language further divided *köle* into *pskul'e* and *unaut*, which respectively meant "those attached to a master" (from "lord" + "man") and "domestic slaves serving at the master's house/room" (from "house"/"room" + "to stand at the entrance of something"). According to one of the early monographs on Circassians, *pskul'es* were of Circassian origin and almost their masters' partners with their own personal assets: *unauts*, on the other hand, were descended from war hostages of different ethnic origin and were not allowed to have separate households (Baj 1995: 109-110, originally completed in 1921). Circassians in Uzunyayla did not have a concept of serfs inseparable from particular pieces of land, though some authors distinguish slaves and serfs among Circassians (Luzbetak 1951: 50-60; Özbay 1994: 43), occasionally identifying them with *unaut* and *pskul'e* (Kanbolat & Taymaz 1990: 41).

Also, *worqs*' frequent use of the term *kajer*,<sup>96</sup> which along with *kul kaçkın* originally meant "fugitive" or "runaway slave" in Turkish, manifested their claim that these slave descendants were not yet freed legitimately. The term denied a fully developed personhood to slaves, along with other names that objectified slaves as masters' property and bind them to the door. The use of *kajer* promoted the image that slave descendants remained severed from their proper community. This idea was reflected also in the use of another common term, "manumitted" (*azat*), a category indicating a state in social limbo in which slaves were freed generations ago, but had still not fully attained personhood and citizenship. *Worqs* preferred to use these terms that stressed slaves' sub-human status, avoiding *kul* and *kapıkulu*, which implied power, authority and honour as well as the equality of the believers.

The official village population book did not distinguish *pskul'e* and *unaut*, just as the difference between slave and serf, or domestic slaves and agricultural slaves, was not marked in

---

<sup>95</sup> Deriving from ملك (*malaka*: to possess/own), *mamluk* literally means "owned", sharing the basic meaning with *mülk* (immoveable property), in contrast to *mal* (moveable property). Historically, *mamluk* (pl. *mamluk*) was used particularly to designate "white" slaves (Turks and Circassians). Circassian *worqs* frequently used *mal* for slaves, male or female, underlining their transferability and thus rootlessness.

<sup>96</sup> The term *kajer* appears to have some links with the Qajars, a Turkic tribe that, under the leadership of Aqa Muhammad Khan, unified Iran in 1779 and founded the Qajar dynasty (1785-1925), though locals were unaware of this neighbouring country's history.

Turkish. It registered all male slaves as *gulam*, which originally meant “young boy”. The nuance of slaves’ sub-human status was retained in the use of this word, with an implication of not having fully developed and matured as a person. The master/slave (*effendi/gulam*) relation may be compared with the more comprehensive master/servant (*adam/uşak*) relations explored by Emiroğlu (1989: 13). The latter set also carries a connotation that the master, or the patron in relation to his client in the modern context, monopolises the honourable status of *adam* in both senses of “mankind” and “a real man”, diminishing his lesser partner to the status of a sub-human.

Here, I lay the ground for the discussion of the social practice of memory in the next section. According to this model, the *worqs*’ dining-table, standing for their guest room, in turn standing for their society, was a public space *par excellence* where valued knowledge was produced, learned and handed down. Allocating the *kapı* to slaves controlled the boundary, metaphorically restricting those who could enter that space. The emphasis on community value and the high opinion given to “men of society” compelled the locals to participate in the social life of the community, regardless of their birth status. However, in the dense web of social relations they were pressed to enter, the position given to slaves was fixed, not at the table, but at the door, where they could not have their speech attended to, nor their knowledge highly valued.

In this way, the image that “Slaves at the door could not open their mouth in *worqs*’ presence” was produced. The silence of slaves partially signified the cultural deafness of *worqs* who could not pay heed to slaves’ words. In *worqs*’ representation, what counted for everything in this gathering was their noble blood. This was a space where only specific types of symbolic capital were valued, invested and then reproduced. The social order, represented as a hierarchically structured space, often horizontally, helped to allocate different social positions, like table and door, to people of different status. The next section examines the spatialised politics where this spatializing politics met with the politics of memory in certain public spaces.

## 2) “Kimlerdensin?": *the Production of Forgetting and the Embodiment of History*

Account 9: All the aristocrats had menials (*hizmetçi*) who looked after their work before Atatürk gave freedom to all. Everybody started to say “We are free” after Atatürk. It became impossible to say “You are slaves” after people lost the right to say something to others. The Y... in X... village are actually those who separated from *our* door (*bizim kapıdan gitme*). They cannot mention that new name in *our* presence. It is not even a long time since they left *our* door. I several times said to their face, “You are not the Y.... You are a son of *our* slave Omer”.

(the narrator of Account 5 above)

In this section, I focus on *hatır* implicated in the everyday practice of memory in the *toplum* (and its metaphorical spaces: *oda, sofrası, unafesi*) defined as the most highly valued public space in *worq* historical discourse. Focusing on the idea of *hatır* has the merit of elucidating the workings of human intention, social influence and the great value that *worqs* placed on personal integrity within memory politics, a politics they pursued in order to monopolise the right to represent their society in both symbolic and practical senses. *Hatır* is almost co-extensive with an aspect of self, incorporated into the political process, through which people constitute, articulate, impose and deny particular memories and also define and produce the specific form of forgetting; *hatır* indicates authority, power, efficacy and agency, unevenly distributed among different actors involved in this memory politics. Though it may be possible to translate *hatır* as “memory”, i.e. the mental faculty of memorising and remembering, my aim here is to focus on the interpersonal politics implicated in the *social*, not *mental*, process of remembering: it is thus better to avoid restricting *hatır* to the workings of the human mind.

Derived from the same root verb, *hatıra*, “a memory” opposed to “memory”, denotes both a vehicle for remembering and a fragment of a memory narrative recalled with the help of that mnemonic object. According to *worqs*, slaves could not foster a sense that they achieved personhood with the high degree of integrity necessary to recognise their own agency and capacity as social actors. Slaves who could not hide their *rahatsızlık* “reminded” (*hatırlatmak*) all

those present of their lower status. Slaves served as a *hatıra* (“memory object”) that metonymically conjured up the narrative of History in its wholeness.

I introduce a controversial personality in Karakuyu to shed light on the process by which remembering was actually done, including the production of forgetting and the practice of reminding. Huta (pseudonym) was an ex-slave Abaza said to have “served seven *kapis*” or “changed his *kapis* seven times” before freedom. He then settled in the Upper Quarter of Karakuyu as a *xexes*. Everybody in the village knew the story of how Huta became a wealthy man, blessed with diligence and ability as well as a number of sons. He was regarded as one of the most prominent figures in Karakuyu throughout the 1940-50s. He was still much talked about nearly half a century after his death as a freed slave who became far better off than his ex-masters. Here, I shall present *hatıras* – in the sense of fragments comprising a greater memory narrative, which emerges in Chapter 8 – of only two episodes of his story told by *worqs* outside Karakuyu and demonstrate some cases of memory politics. I leave the greater part of his story to Ch. 8.

*Hatıra 1*: Influential persons of the region were invited to an *unafe* meeting to solve a case of elopement caused by status difference between the young couple. Huta was sitting in the gathering, at the lowest end of the room beside the door. He had once served the girl’s family as a slave. Huta interrupted while those leading persons were discussing how they could arbitrate between the two parties. He said, “If you leave the matter to me, I can settle the issue”. A man from an Abaza princely family, which Huta also had served in the past, answered him, “I understand that you have self-confidence. But you also need to take into consideration the value given to you by society”. Huta drew his chair back to the door and never opened his mouth again.

(An elderly *worq* man, from an Abaza village)

*Hatıra 2*: A Karakuyulu girl was getting married to a young man in our (Abaza) village. A group of Karakuyulus were sent to the groom’s village for bridewealth. Huta was the leader of the group. He was ushered to the best seat in the guest room. Then, an old man from a leading *worq* family of the village came in. Huta had once been a slave of his maternal relatives. The man found Huta sitting on the best seat. He said furiously, “You have become a rich man, but you still need to know who you are. You must understand where you should sit”. The man drove Huta out of the room with his long walking stick. Realising that the group of Karakuyulus were left bewildered, the man said, “Forgive my crudeness. However, it is the custom. I just wanted Huta to know his place”. He let Huta back into the room and made him sit beside the door on his left.

(a composite memory of elderly *worq* men from the Abaza village)

I already mentioned that respect may be understood as acknowledging another person’s superiority by adhering to the order he has created. Respect may be further interpreted as behaving properly according to the place (*yer*) allotted to one within a space, given that a social order tends to be represented as a spatialised hierarchy. *Worqs* saw *Adygagha* as a social order composed of four different classes. Respect here involved a demonstration that one “knows oneself” (*kendini bilmek*) by “fulfilling” (*yerine getirmek*: to bring to its proper place) his *hak*, or a series of rights and duties which “fell upon one’s head” naturally, in accordance to one’s position within the social arrangement that *worqs* claimed to have existed intact until the recent past. Here, *worqs* rhetorically deployed the time-honoured authority of custom and etiquette to impose a particular model of social order in which they could claim a privileged position over those of marginal status.

An act seen as unsuitable given one’s position was regarded as a lack of social sense, and described as “disrespect” (*saygısızlık*). Circassians censured behaviour out of step with the established code of conduct as “impropriety” or “shame”. The double standard applied to the morality of *worqs* and slaves also meant less tolerance of slaves’ “unsuitable” behaviour. *Worqs* monopolised the ability to form an audible voice of ridicule by linking misconduct to status, though *worqs* often said that slaves were quick-eyed in spotting *worqs*’ failures.

*Worqs* frequently pointed out slaves’ “disrespectful” behaviour. Rich slaves were said to attempt at every available opportunity to use their economic power to “crush” (*ezmek*) *worqs* because of their own “sense of being crushed” (*eziklik*), just as in the discussion over the rise of

brideprice. *Worqs* saw such a sense of oppression as a hereditary quality of slaves. *Ezilmişlik* (lit. “a sense of having been crushed in the unknown generation”),<sup>97</sup> or a memory of torments handed down through “rotten” parental essences, still hindered the present generations from constituting a fully-developed personhood. This idea was used to support *worqs*’ claim that there was an inherent difference in humanity between themselves and slaves.

In *Hatura 1*, Huta offered to take on the bridewealth for which a Karakuyulu family was asked by one of Huta’s ex-masters’ family. Huta was reprimanded by a man from another family he had served as a slave for an act inappropriate for an ex-slave, however wealthy he had become. In *Hatura 2*, Huta sat in the best seat as the leader of a Karakuyulu delegation visiting an Abaza family. He was driven away from the seat by a *worq* elder who saw the seat as unsuitable for an ex-slave.

In both cases, it was perceived as improper for an ex-slave not to behave as modestly as he should, even after having acquired legal freedom and considerable wealth. *Worqs* often pointed out that slave descendants carelessly took the best seat before a suitable place was shown to them. *Worqs* often mentioned that “A place [and a duty associated with it] is given, but not taken” (*Yer/görev verilir, alınmaz*), to stress a contrast with boastful rich slaves, said to take a good seat out of lack of social experience. They interpreted this misbehaviour of slave descendants as “not knowing oneself” (*kendini bilmemek*), equal to “forgetting oneself” (*kendini unutmak*). Slaves’ pathological self-oblivion, which *worqs* considered to be inherent in them, was in fact produced in light of the way *toplum* and its metaphorical spaces were represented as the public space.

*Worqs* often told me that they admonished slaves for improper conduct by asking “*Kimlerdensin?*” (lit. From whom are you?). Usually, “*Kimlerdensin?*” was a question asking one’s lineage names. All lineages had affinal ties with many other lineages in the local community, owing to many generations of intermarriage between exogamous groups. When local Circassians came across a stranger, they always asked his lineage name. Asking somebody’s lineage name to warn him about inappropriate behaviour relied on an idea of collective selfhood: a person’s unsuitable act would bring shame on the name of his whole lineage. This rhetoric of staining one’s lineage’s name often had a practical effect of restraining the person from impropriety, since the locals actually knew somebody from most lineages.

Slaves, who lacked lineages, could not even answer the question without humiliation. *Worqs* mentioned that slaves preferred to stay away from broader community life, lest somebody should ask their lineage names. When *worqs* asked the question of a slave they consider disrespectful, it was to remind him that he did not have even a lineage that could share disgrace with him, much less honour. They intended to make him suffer *rahatsızlık*, an experience of disintegration of mind, heart and body held together in his *hatır*. “*Kimlerdensin?*” – almost “Who the hell do you think you are?” here – directed to a slave who “had forgotten himself” was an attempt to make the slave remember his lowly status, to censure his behaviour. A slave who forgot his place and acted in an out-of-place manner needed to be reminded that far from being the main protagonist on the central stage he was bound to the *kapı* on the fringe of *toplum*. This control over the slave body, the posture or movement of which recalled a variety of emotions and thoughts, was one of the important principle by which *worqs*’ symbolic domination was assumed to work (see Bourdieu 1988: 110-111).

I was present on an occasion when a Karakuyulu university student became badly disconcerted by the question “*Kimlerdensin?*”, casually mentioned by a Kurdish elder who had stayed in Karakuyu as a shepherd. The young man replied, mentioning the name of the master lineage his ancestors had served, “We are the T..., too. But our lineage (*sülale*) is lost”. Knowing what it meant, the Kurdish man dropped the subject. I cannot be sure if *worqs* really uttered the question to slave descendants in public, but the latter seemed to have been experiencing humiliation frequently in less dramatic cases.

---

<sup>97</sup> The suffix *miş* used here indicates that the action took place at an unspecified point in the past. Thus, *ezilmişlik* can be understood as a memory of oppression handed down from the past, but unknown generation. Sharing the same suffix, *geçmiş* (time-passed) connotes the same unspecifiedness.

In account 9 above, a man whose family had assumed a new collective name,<sup>98</sup> under-communicating their slave past, was made to recall his lowly birth by a member of their ex-master's lineage. The *worq* elder interpreted it as improper for descendants of a runaway slave to take on a name as a separate descent group, thus concealing their having been bound to his lineage. *Worqs* thus silenced slave descendants in public space, and continued to create humiliating memories for them. They then would bring up these memories in later contexts, remind the slave descendants of the initial humiliation, and thus humiliate them again. In so doing, *worqs* appeared to be actively producing and reproducing ex-slaves who could not mention the newly assumed name in the presence of members of their ex-master's lineage.

Huta was understood in these two episodes as having forgotten his inborn inherited status. He was then literally brought back to the door by *worqs* who rebuked him for his impudent conduct. In a *worq oda*, the door was a marginalised position to which an *unaut*, "a slave who stands beside the master's house/room", remained bound. Huta was prevented from shouldering a bridewealth payment and settling the elopement. *Worqs* refused to allow a slave, seen as even deprived of historical knowledge, to play a role as an eminent social actor in a social event to be remembered in the future. *Worqs* transformed Huta's attempt to carve out a moment in which he could act as a producer of history into a Historical event in which they themselves were the protagonists, suppressing the nouveau riche slave's "uprising". Huta was remembered in that episode as having withdrawn to the *kapı*, never to open his mouth again. This enforced silence suggested that Huta was reminded that he would not be entrusted with a community-level task, even after he had economically overtaken most of his ex-masters, including these two at the meeting.

People used the term *hatır* in a series of expressions designating "to remember", "to recall" and "to remind", often to signal the presence of a certain inequality among actors. Used in reference to the social practice of memory, *hatır* implied some exercise of power by those in the advantaged position, such as *worqs* among local Circassians; the effect of this power was registered on the individual person, who became the object of *worq* actions of remembering and reminding. In line with the word's implication of unevenly distributed agency, *hatırını saymak* denoted "to show respect to somebody's heart and mind," which played important roles in the mental faculty and the social process of remembering. *Hatırı sayılır kişi* designated an influential person whose thoughts, feelings and memories were respected. Locals, including both Turkish and Circassians, often paraphrased this as "a respected and loved person" (*sayılan sevilen kişi*) and "a person whose words pass" (*sözü geçerli kişi*): an important person who could have his "self" (*hatır*) respected was a person who monopolised both respect and love and whose memory accounts were carefully attended to.

All these expressions suggest that people paid respect to the "memory" (*hatır*) of an influential person. This certainly affected the value people attributed the "memories" (*hatıra*) that the person accounted orally. "To know" meant to understand an event within a particular framework and also to make others accept it in the same way. Local *worqs* claimed the authority of their knowledge in their efforts to make History pass as *the* history. In contrast, the reason slaves' knowledge was discounted is that they were seen as deprived of *hatır* or an integrated self to be respected. Slaves were to be silenced, or to be reminded of the memories they were trying to quell and forget, by those whose *hatır* was recognised as more fully integrated.

An action causing somebody to recall something he had repressed, and the passiveness with which one received this action as its object, were located at opposite ends of the social practice of remembering. This usage of *hatır* certainly retained a connotation of efficacy present in its Arabic origin: "what comes to one's mind" or "what strikes one" is "what carries significance". Slaves who did not conform to the expectations of their status were understood as having forgotten

---

<sup>98</sup> The slave family actually took the lineage name of a Karakuyulu *worq* man who married the widowed wife of their master. They claim to be descended from an illegitimate son of this man, born of a woman of the slave family he now owned through his wife. The Karakuyulu man, who received a huge amount of wealth left by his wife's late husband, was later killed by the wealthy man's relatives. The site where he was murdered became the cemetery of the Lower Quarter, and was named after him.

themselves. They were reminded of a memory they strived to obliterate. Slaves were located at the extreme end of passivity, pressed to accept a definition imposed by *worqs*.

Such a heteronomous quality was of the same kind as that produced through the reciprocal idiom of respect and love, though more explicitly manifested here. The loving senior claimed an authoritative status as a subject to name the beloved others; in contrast, the beloved junior compromised his autonomy, accepting definition as the object of the loving other. Images of slaves' flawed personhood were more actively produced and imposed by *worqs* in the everyday practice of *hatırlatmak*.

In particular, evoking a slave's lower origin by saying "Kimlerdensin?" was equated with an act of "breaking the slave's self into pieces" (*hatırını kırmak*), which could equally be taken as "ruining his heart/mind" and "crushing his memory". Along with a series of similar expressions such as "to break someone's heart" (*gönül yıkmak*) or "to destroy someone's morale" (*moral bozmak*), *hatırını kırmak* pointed to a model of the partible person that could be broken apart and reduced into parts, marking an effect caused by an exercise of external power.<sup>99</sup> In turn, this partibility reflected a cultural understanding that an integrated person came into being from divergent components in equally power-laden social interactions.

I have already suggested that a state in which a person was perceived to have achieved coherence of a high degree served as an image of power that differentiated values attached to different categories of people. The idea of the partible person explains why this worked in this way. The alternating images of integration and disintegration of different elements which were brought together to constitute the wholeness of one's person, together presented one of the primary models that visualised an unequal distribution of power in face-to-face relations. *Hatırını kırmak* indicated the exercise of efficacy by those in the dominating position, which shattered the unity implied in the idea of fully achieved personhood, thus keeping certain people in a subordinate position.

Uneven achievement of personhood as an indicator of social hierarchy is implied also in the already-cited observation from different parts of Anatolia that women and children do not have identities independent of the husband-father. Delaney suggests that only an adult male can achieve a self-containing body and a self-motivated identity; women's and children's identities are not uniform, their bodily boundaries being fluid, permeable and prone to influence from the outside (1991: 37-38, 65, 67, 82; see also Marcus 1992: Ch. 5). This image of the partible person is not alien to the contemporary Caucasus. Chesnov, a Russian ethnographer, points out a similarity between Circassians and Papua New Guineans in perceiving the person as affected and altered as an effect of interactions with others. Here again, the woman's body is imagined to be more liable to external influences, while men tend to stress their own autonomy as person (1993: 26-27). In the memory politics of Uzunyayla, *worqs* unsettled slaves' *hatır* and actively produced differences between *worqs* and slaves, comparable to those between men and women as well as between adults and children in other contexts.

Slaves who had their memories broken were again made to experience *rahatsızlık*, in which different components of their selves could not remain bound together in equilibrium. This was a state where one was not oneself, where one could not achieve a coherent personhood and thus could not compose an enabling identity as a social agent with self-confidence. Here, *hatırlatmak* – to make slaves remember – was synonymous with *hatırını kırmak* – to crush slaves' memory and then replace it with *worqs*' truer memory. Slaves who had "forgotten themselves" would have their own memories and the particular self-images based on these memories, shattered by *worqs*. They were brought back to their marginal place, allocated within the spatial representation of society that *worqs* had created. They were forced to accept the memories imposed by *worqs* as their appropriate identity.

Slaves were denied autonomy in defining themselves and made to embody a sense of self-alienation. This visual image of a parted person was diametrically opposed to the idea of enablement incorporated in the model of constituted identity endowed with a sense of agency. The

---

<sup>99</sup> See Cornwall & Lindisfarne (1994: 40-44) for a discussion of efficacy in the production of the partible person.

devastating experience of not being oneself turned into an embodied memory registered in one's person (*hatırıda kalmak*), to be carried into future contexts in which the imbalance was recalled as *ezilmişlik*.<sup>100</sup>

*Worqs* not only denied slaves' knowledge, but actively pictured their memories: slaves did not talk about History in the family; slave parents did not tell their children about their origin; they taught false stories about *worq* families, e.g. they referred to their masters as having been their slaves; young members of a slave family first realised their lower origin when somebody said their name in a quarrel; they feared the question "*Kimlerdensin?*" and hesitated to mix with others; and they oppressed *worqs* on the basis of the memory of past oppression over generations. *Worq* representations of slave memories superseded slaves' own memories, left unasked for and unspoken. Such a meta-memory turned slaves into objects without a past other than that narrated by *worqs*. This was another strategic manipulation that transformed history into *worqs*' personal possession as History.

Pierre Nora (1989), a French historian, argues that in modern states innocent and spontaneous memories have been replaced by a political project of official history. He uses the idea of "sites of memory" to refer to monumental places where memories, which can no longer exist independently of the state's public history, converge and are compressed. He likens them to a seashell left on the beach after the tide has withdrawn. Historical memories in Uzunyayla were a construction that could not be separated from *worqs*' political project to maintain their domination, at least in a symbolic domain.

Slaves accepted the gaze of the dominant other, transforming their own bodies into "sites of memory" on which the other's memories would be inscribed. They were materialised as mnemonic objects that would evoke the image of History characterised by the oppressive treatment of slaves. The act of humiliating slave descendants by reminding them of their lowly origins re-enacted the arbitrary violence directed towards their ancestors generations ago. Slave descendants who relived the memories of the far-away past embodied History in its totality, which is, for Bourdieu, "a whole cosmology, an ethic, a metaphysics, a political philosophy" instilled into their bodies (1977: 94). The bodies of slaves who experienced *rahatsızlık* may be likened to a seashell left on the beach, an entity suspended in a social as well as conceptual limbo: slaves were set free from bondage generations ago, but slave descendants have not yet been fully liberated and incorporated into the community.

Citing G. H. Mead's model of symbolic interaction, Caton distinguishes two different aspects in self: he opposes "I", a spontaneous and creative agent with its own initiative, to "me" who acts conventionally, anticipating what other people expect him to do. In Caton's words, "The 'me' has a memory; it remembers how one acted previously in a situation, the attitudes and responses this action elicited in others, and the expectations these others have of the action being repeated in the situation" (1985: 147). This "me" quality of the self as an object of the other person's action was highlighted in Circassian elites' discourse on slaves' memory. This passive and self-alienated quality was further supplemented by pushing a specific memory about which slave descendants were continually reminded. This undermined "I"-ness in the self of slaves, allowing it to exist only as "me".

The *worqs*' discourse of memory (*hatır/hatıra*) suggested that, in order to impose an unevenness of efficacy, they relied on imagery in which those in a marginal position were ultimately to be broken apart. To achieve the dominance of this discourse, *worqs* controlled the interactive practice of remembering and forgetting in their guest rooms and confined knowledge production within their own circle. As controllers of symbolic meanings, *worqs* forced slave descendants into the category of objects to be shattered, allowing themselves to have a positive experience of crafting their selves as actors endowed with power.

Less dramatic cases than these two episodes involving Huta still abounded even during my research in Karakuyu. I saw an elder mentioned as a mean and stingy *nouveau riche* slave sit in one of the better (*yukarı*: upper) seats in a *unafe* at a wedding party. Then he immediately started counting the bank notes (approx. \$1,700) he had just received from the newly harvested wheat,

---

<sup>100</sup> See Lattas ed. (1996) for the politics of memory production at commensal occasions.

showing them to everybody in the room. At another wedding party, one old man, this time a slave descendant still in poverty, insisted on staying in the hall without entering a room for a feast. Eventually, family members and relatives of the groom, who were serving at the party, persuaded him to join the others in the room. The other guests in the room, who were considerably younger than him, offered him one of the best seats, since he was their senior. He still refused to take a seat at the table and sat at the lowest (*aşağı*) seat beside the door, embarrassing all others.

Such scenarios seemed to be quite common, as *worqs* were unanimous in saying that slaves revealed their lower birth status in social gatherings (Accounts 5, 7, 8). These two Karakuyulu elders embodied an irony of history: even after almost one century had passed since the demise of slavery, descendants of freed slaves still hesitated to mix in society, unless they were backed by material wealth that compensated for their former status. The *rahatsızlık* they enacted differently at both ends of *oda* discloses the contradiction between nominal equality and persisting status consciousness. It reminded many present of the history of the recent past in which there was slavery in their society.

When I was visiting elders of well-known *worq* families in other villages, I sometimes saw some other men keeping silent throughout my conversation with the elders. Similarly, knowledgeable *worqs* who were answering my questions often did not ask others sitting at the same dining table about what they knew. Later, I was told that these men were neighbours from ex-slave families. They appeared to have an existence of a different quality, though present at the site of knowledge production. They were invisible in *worq* eyes and inaudible to *worq* ears.<sup>101</sup> Their talk would not register on *worqs*' memories, nor in my notebook. A *kapı* was created symbolically, keeping slave descendants on the margin, far from the centre in which power and authority were located, though we all shared the same table. In this way, the boundaries of knowledge production were guarded and the image of passive slaves was reproduced in everyday interactions.

There is no doubt that my research helped to reproduce the silence of slaves, through my interest in reconstructing local history as well as by my selection of informants. At the same time, the unease shown by the two Karakuyulu elders, and the silence of other slave descendants, indicate that they were all well aware of the prevalent social discourses illustrated above.

The meta-memory concerning slave memories linked various fields including the constitution of personhood, the perception of slaves as lesser persons, the construction of public space, reciprocal respect and love, and ideas of authority and agency. The discourse on memory informed the everyday stage where remembering was actually done, producing slaves' forgetting and silence. The image of power present in integrity and in personality with self-confidence was used to hinder slaves from becoming producers of knowledge, especially those types of knowledge that could form subversive narratives that effectively oppose History. Slaves' attempts to participate in a dialogue, to contribute to the production of a more inclusive social memory, were interpreted by *worqs* as "forgetting oneself" and they were reminded of their "truer" past.

The *toplum* and *oda* structured within memory politics served as a "landscape of memory" (Kirmayer 1996), an idea that brings relative accessibility of different kinds of memories into perspective, composed of a set of spatial dichotomies including high/low, centre/periphery, right/left and near/far. Account 7 was actually given by a man of about thirty from a wealthy ex-slave family in Karakuyu, who reproduced what *worqs* frequently said about his own family. This supports my conclusion here that the memories of slaves, independent of *worqs*' memories, were difficult to access. The practice of memory in everyday life obviously contributed to *worqs*' monologic and monopolistic production of History, reproducing slaves as a muted category.

---

<sup>101</sup> Foucault's argument that the gaze limits what one can see (Butchart 1998: 17) well applies to the *worq* gaze.

## Chapter 7 Drinking Alcohol as Re-membering the Past

### [1] Introduction

This chapter analyses alcohol drinking in the Middle Quarter of Karakuyu. This open space emerged as a new arena for men's competition, replacing the guest room as the most highly valued public space in the village. In the previous chapter I focused on the achievement of socially significant personhood and argued that the imagery of coherence in one's person functioned as a symbolic means to authorise *worqs*' representations of history and society. *Worqs* produced autonomous or circular knowledge; they gained power by presenting themselves as the authorised narrators of History within a model of society they themselves provided. *Worqs* were struggling to keep legitimate narratives under their control since that social order was being produced primarily through discourse. They excelled in the effective deployment of discourse, seeing themselves as the representatives of the local ethnic community. They ruled exchanges of words and regulated the production of meanings in public spaces, aiming to define experiences in such settings in terms of *worqs*' domination and slaves' subordination.

Slave descendants' attempts to subvert *worqs*' dominant meanings showed up in non-discursive practices of everyday life. People experienced different connections with the past as they undertook various activities, while specific types of sociability generated specific memories (Zonabend 1984: 203), which were then remembered in future contexts.

Known as a slave village, Karakuyu, the most affluent village in Uzunyayla, was distinguished by another feature: its well-off male residents were known among local Circassians as heavy drinkers. Karakuyulu families competed with each other in the scale of wedding parties, assessed partially according to the number of *rakı* (a strong liquor) bottles grooms' families gave away to their guests. Male members of the village regarded alcohol drinking as an important component of their national tradition, brought from the pre-Islamic Caucasus and enjoyed by many notable men in the village's more recent past, though such men were frequently subject to jokes about blunders made under the influence of alcohol.

This chapter focuses on male Karakuyulu practices of alcohol consumption as a form of interaction that structured and organised daily social life (see Douglas ed. 1987) and that offset *worqs*' version of History, which relied on a particular understanding of society. I explore the ways in which Karakuyulu men "got by" in everyday life by usurping meanings from *worqs*' discourse through embodied practices. In so doing, they quelled that discourse of inequality that treated them homogeneously as "those without anything to tell". They turned the village into a social space where people with various backgrounds could live together more convivially.

The guest rooms of leading *worq* families in two separate quarters were central to social life in the past. The idea that a hospitable reception had been a privilege only a handful of wealthy families were allowed to enjoy, was linked to stories of tall tree trunks placed upside down in front of the guest houses of these better-off families, as a sign of the availability of their guest room for travellers passing the village on horseback. *Unafe* meetings before wedding parties remained strictly within the quarter boundaries. Social life within separate quarters, including the "guest room culture" closely associated with family status and hospitality, reflected stratified social relations. *Unafes*, to which all household heads were now invited because of depopulation, remained important as one of the official occasions punctuating the community life of the village.

The most significant stage for the performance of everyday life had, however, shifted to the open space that had newly emerged on the boundary between the Upper and Lower Quarters. It was a point at which local enterprises encountered state agendas concerned with incorporating the periphery into the modern state. The Middle Quarter symbolised a "domestication of the state" (Hann 1990), similar to that occurring in Sunni Turkish villages in different parts of Central Anatolia, where such domestication had emerged around a clearly defined centre (Shankland 1994).

Approximately one hundred pupils from around ten nearby villages got on and off a bus there every day. Lorries to and from the chromium mine and the cattle market of nearby districts stopped here for petrol. In summer, the busiest season for farmers, tractors from neighbouring

villages queued at a welding workshop and some dozen combine harvesters gathered there as their final destination after three-month tours in Central and South Anatolia.

Karakuyulus boasted of living in the largest, richest and most populous village in Uzunyayla, calling it “little Paris”. People from the surrounding villages carefully watched what was going on in Karakuyu, as a common saying, *Karakuyu seyri* (“excursion to/looking at Karakuyu”) indicated. Decisions made in the village, such as payment for the harvesters, often became new standards for the whole region. The Middle Quarter was certainly emerging as a new social centre of Uzunyayla.

Two grocer’s shops, facing each other in the heart of the quarter, had different clienteles, drawn from the respective owner’s quarter. The teahouses (*çay ocağı*) annexed to the shops were frequented by men, who got along well with each other, to drink tea and alcohol as well as to play cards. These two teahouses attracted different categories of people.

One was run by a popular, youngish entrepreneur of a reputable *worq* family, which had produced a pasha in the pre-*Seferberlik* period, though his own orphaned father lived in destitution. He returned to the village with welding skills from Kayseri. His customers were small-scale, property-owning, commodity-producing, independent farmers, aged between thirty five and fifty years old. They were seen as “leading persons” (*ileri gelenler*) of the village, representing a new social ideal as heads of self-sustaining households.

The other shop was owned by a man of slave origin. He opened the shop with the help of a successful merchant of slave origin in Pınarbaşı, an uncle of his wife, who had eloped with him. Several men who were not engaged in agriculture for their living, like lorry drivers, gathered there. One regular member was the wealthiest<sup>102</sup> man in the village, who owned the petrol station to which this shop-cum-teahouse was adjacent. Without the need to busy themselves in the field, they indulged themselves in drinking alcohol every day, often in broad daylight. Other villagers saw them as socially incompetent and morally degraded drunkards, though well-off. The grocer called his company “poor strangers” (*gariban*: “social outcasts”)<sup>103</sup> to normal society of the village, stressing a sense of out-of-placeness deriving from their non-conformity to the current ideal of small-scale farmers.

Alongside “the leading farmers” and “outcasts”, a third group consisted of “the poor fellows” (*fakir fukara* or *fakir zavalhı*) who could not afford to participate in the sociability at these teahouses. They called the first two groups “the rich” (*zengin*). “The rich” said that these “poor fellows” remained in the village because their poverty prevented them from migrating to the town, also stressing their out-of-placeness. The poor were excluded from the category of the “villager” (*köylü*), given its current norm of self-sufficiency.

The practice of alcohol consumption in these two teahouses had given rise to comradeship across the boundaries of traditional statuses, ages and residential quarters. This had led to the emergence of these new social categories. No descendants of *xexes* ex-slaves, however, became wealthy enough to be incorporated among the group of “the leading farmers”, while wealthier *xexes worqs* had already left the village. The *yerli/xexes* dichotomy still remained discernible in the absence of *xexeses* mixing with the first group.

The Middle Quarter was called “centre” (*orta*) or “arena” (*meydan*).<sup>104</sup> Activities there were characterised by social relationships based on new principles. It was an open space where people interacted independently of their natal status difference (see also Gilsenan 1990a: 173-180). At the same time, the difference between the customers of the two teahouses was sometimes explained in senior-junior terms. Relations among members gathering at the same teahouse were also explained in the respect-love idiom. The teahouses maintained a legitimacy as significant arenas on the grounds of a continuity with the guest rooms, not completely separated from the latter as opposing public spaces.

---

<sup>102</sup> One of the regular members of the first teahouse, who named this man (one of Abaza Huta’s grandson) as the wealthiest, also argued that ten other men in the village were equally well off.

<sup>103</sup> From the Arabic root غرب (*gharaba*), denoting “to go away”. Linked to such ideas as “strange”, “destitute” (*garip*) and “foreign land” (*gurbet*), *gariban* means “someone in a foreign land”, “Gastarbeiter” or even “homeless”.

<sup>104</sup> Literally, *meydan* means a place where alcohol (*mey*) is found in Persian.

Below I focus on a set of manifold actions distinguishing social gatherings for alcohol consumption and elucidate the sociality that underlay male interactions in Karakuyu. I follow Weiss in understanding sociality as “the qualities and values generative of a wide range of sociocultural forms and practices” (1999: 405-406). I demonstrate how Karakuyulu men appropriated *worqs*’ discursive social order into actual social practices and dislocated the dominant meanings of the elite discourse, to produce empowering meanings for themselves. *Worqs*’ claim to a legitimate connection with the past of the local ethnic community was sustained by their control over knowledge production through articulated narratives. Observing non-verbal, embodied practices on this commensal occasion may help identify an alternative connection with the Circassian national past established by people muted within the dominant discourse of history.

## [2] Sociability in *Worqs*’ Guest Rooms

### 1) Eating, Drinking and Feeding

I shall first examine a pair of idiomatic actions, “eating” (*yemek*) and “drinking” (*içmek*), associated with commensality in *worqs*’ guest rooms. This examination of a sociability highly valued in the elite discourse helps to elucidate the nature of interactions in the teahouses. Commensal acts of eating and drinking gave a materialised, substantiated form to a hierarchy acknowledged through the respect-love exchange. Preparation, reception, consumption and rejection of food were used as metaphors of the master-servant relationships in the Ottoman administration (Peirce 1993: 175). Hospitality still remained a main idiom of inequality, created through extending protection and receiving provision.

This asymmetrical relation was often made known through the use of the causative forms of eating (*yedirmek*: to feed) and drinking (*içirmek*: to make someone drink). The use of *yedirmek* was reserved especially for occasions when a hierarchy between the feeder and the fed needed to be stressed, as when criticising someone for having forgotten the indebtedness generated by shared consumption of foods and reminding him of a duty to repay the spiritual debt.

Known for their legendary hospitality, Circassians had developed a set of formalities between the host (*bustum*) and the guest (*xasa*). The latter was ushered into the former’s guest room through “our door” (*kapımız*), mentioned as “always open”. Circassians usually used some references to tea to express, evaluate and negotiate the interpersonal relationship in the guest room. Always personalised, tea helped to define the order by reaffirming who was drinking whose tea. The relation between the two parties was asymmetrical in that the host made the guest drink “our tea” (*çayımız*), turning the latter into an object of his action through which he himself emerged as a subject. The guest allowed himself to be defined by being fed by the host. This indirectness revealed a concession the junior partner acknowledges in the level of autonomy he achieved.

The host’s tea, mentioned as “your tea” (*çayınız*) by the guest, was evaluated in terms of whether it was “beautiful” (*güzel*), rather than simply “tasty” (*tatlı*) or “delicious” (*lezzetli*). This evaluation comprised judgements on the host’s attitude to social relations, often summarised as his *sohbet* (friendly conversation<sup>105</sup>) again praised as *güzel*. Tea was a social beverage, which helped to transform a multi-sensory experience into multi-stranded social relations.

Commensal tea drinking was closely associated with “sweet chat” (*şirin sohbet*) embellished with “tasty words” (*tatlı dil*). A hierarchy was acknowledged through the idiom of a respect-love exchange between the senior and the junior. Sharing the same beverage substantiated this hierarchy as a unity of “intimacy” (*samimiyet*) and “affection”/“love” (*muhabbet*: closeness through affection, especially, affectionate exchanges of signs of approval, linguistic or otherwise). Commensal occasions helped to incorporate a sense of moral indebtedness into a cordial relationship between the two parties. This recognition of indebtedness was later evoked as a feeling of shame, which the junior was expected to embody in the presence of the senior. The

---

<sup>105</sup> Locals explained *sohbet* as an “exchange of thoughts”. In Sufi traditions of Anatolia, *sohbet* also denotes a “spiritual exchange through conversation”, one of the means through which the disciple achieves “total identification with the Master” in the one-to-one relation (Mardin 1993: 211).

multi-sensory experience of *sohbet*, *muhabbet* and *samimiyet* at tea drinking was understood as reflecting an intimate unity between the host and the guest, making it possible to imagine the relation between the unequal partners exchanging submission and protection, not as a forceful rule, but as a humane solidarity.

Richard Tapper points out that “to drink” in Turkish signifies an intake of various types of flowing substances, not only liquids but also gases and spoken words, into the body. He gives the example of “to drink words”, which may be translated from Turkish *ant/and içmek* (to take an oath; see Students’ Oath of Allegiance, quoted in n. 62 above) or *söz içmek* (to make a promise) (1994: 216). I take a step further to argue that the cultural imagination that visualises the acts of taking an oath and making a promise as “drinking words” recognised a human efficacy that pins down elusive words by forcing them into a specific meaning. “To drink” implies an exercise of potency to transform a fluid into a more tangible object, making it easier to handle and manipulate.

The fact that “to drink” was often used in a causative form as in “to make someone drink words” (*söz içirmek*) implied that the floating substance was not be the only object solidified through this act. The subordinate partner who was passively made to take in the well-defined memory object had his fluid existence tied to that focal point and received a clearly bounded identity. Whether tea or words, a set interaction of causative *icirmek* and passive *iç(iril)mek* differentiated the agent and the subject of drinking through the indirectness involved in the action.

The imbalance of capacity recognised between these two partners was further illustrated by the use of various verbs signifying “taking in” an object through the mouth to refer to getting driven into a difficult situation: e.g. “eating” (*ayval/huyar/bok/kazık yemek*) and “swallowing” (*hap yutmak*).<sup>106</sup> What must be recognised in these common expressions is a clear hierarchization between the active partner and the passive partner, facilitated by fooling, deceiving, outwitting, embarrassing, perplexing, frustrating and imposing unfavourable terms. This nuance is well conveyed also by “taking in” in English, though the person who “takes in” the other is the active one (the deceiver), and the deceived is “taken in” here.

The active partner’s capacity to create adverse effects on the passive partner was registered in the bodily transformations the latter underwent. The lesser partner temporarily ceased to be fluid as a configuration of perpetually changing social relations, and a well-defined identity as a recipient was imposed on him. The execution of the former’s greater efficacy was visualised here in a series of images of forced intake of an alien object through the latter’s bodily boundaries, as in eating and drinking, which summoned the complementary identities of the superior and the inferior.

One’s possession of greater power was often claimed through images of attacking the lesser partner’s bodily orifices, not only mouth (*ağız*) but also anus (*göt*) and vagina (*am*). Images of inequality were often presented by the use of metaphors of assaults on one of these points of access. Men frequently used idioms such as “to shit in someone’s mouth” (*ağızına sıçmak*), “to fuck someone’s ass” (*götünü sikmek*) or “to put something in someone’s vagina” (*amına koymak*). By demonstrating their manful assertiveness, they opened up a moment in which they could stand in a dominating position over others.

The scope of these expressions can be stretched to produce the same gendered image involving the relationship between a person and a collectivity, or between collectivities, including domains related to state politics and the market economy, e.g. between Turks and an ethnic minority: “Put ‘a Turkish soldier’ into PKK’s vagina” (*Mehmetçik*,<sup>107</sup> *PKK’nin amına koy*), a slogan chanted in a nationalist demonstration (Yelda 1998: 132); between Turkish illegal labour migrants and a host country: “Let me fuck England’s ass from the back” (*İngilterenin götünü arkadan sikeyim*); and the city of Kayseri and Karkuyulu away” (*Şehire gidince, hemen adama kıyırığını vereceksin*).

---

<sup>106</sup> Respectively, “to eat a quince/cucumber” (to get into difficulties); “to eat a stake/pale” (to get impaled; to get ripped off); “to eat shit” (to make a blunder); and “to swallow a pill” (to be done for). Note the phallic images of cucumber and pale.

<sup>107</sup> *Mehmetçik* is the Turkish equivalent to “Tommy Atkins”, an old English term for an English soldier.

These examples demonstrated that an intake of an object beyond the youths, “Once you move to the city, you will give your tail to a ‘real man’ right boundaries dividing self and society was an important image used to mark an uneven distribution of power between different actors. Recognition of a greater potency was manifested as a capacity for making the subordinate partner ingest an alien object. As its effect, the latter would be provided with a coherent self. The image of penetration and infringement of bodily boundaries deprived him of fluidity, giving him coherence as an object.

Paradoxically, a series of ideas such as submission to the powerful, a renunciation of autonomy and a failure to achieve self-containedness were also presented in images of break-up of closure (the crumbling of a state of being clearly bounded and thus firmly closed), by which the integrity the recipient had just received was dismantled. In verbal duels, Turkish youths often generated images of destroying their rivals’ bodily orifices by forcing objects into them (see Dundes et al. 1970). “To break into pieces” (*parçalamak/paramparça etmek*) was a term that men commonly used to refer to their male efficacy registered on the person of the female partner in a sexual act. This image was also reflected in another popular idiom “to crack a walnut” (*ceviz kırmak*) signifying “breaking a girl’s virginity” (*kızlık bozmak*).

*Gulam*, used to refer to male slaves in the late Ottoman censuses, has a connotation of a passive partner in a homosexual relationship (Lindholm 1996: 224-227; Schmitt 1992: 12; Murray & Roscoe 1997: 303), indicating an affinity between women and effeminated slaves. Murray & Roscoe mention that the image of sexual intercourse between two males among Muslims in the Middle East involves inequality between the penetrator and the penetrated upon whom the former’s act is conducted (1997: 10). They also note that the fact that the sodomiser is referred to as *ghulampara* (a combination of *ghulam* and a Persian verb meaning “to tear apart”) indicates that the penetration of a penis into an anus is imagined as shattering the personhood of the passive male partner, metonymically signified by that bodily orifice. *Ghulampara* turns into *kullampara* in Turkish (ibid.).

A similar imagination about the relation between body and imbalance of power is reported from the present-day Caucasus where men describe their male potency realised in sexual acts with phrases like “spreading apart”, “breaking” and “splitting in half” a woman, and women perceive their body as “altered” (Chesnov 1993: 26-27). Turks and Circassians seem to have similar imagery about how the effects of power are marked. Both interpret power through a pair of oppositional images in which thrusting strange objects into the subordinate’s bodily openings either impose coherence on their personhood or destroys an integrity presumed to be the core of their identity.

This dual imagery was also conjured up through the use of the question, “*Kimlerdensin?*” by which *worqş* destroyed those memories of slaves that constituted their self-image (*hatırını kırmak*) and imposed a different identity imbued with an elite representation of the past (*hatırlatmak*). Whereas the reciprocation of love and respect differentiated the level of achieved coherence in one’s person at an abstract level, the same asymmetry was more actively produced in commensality through the acts of “drinking” and “eating”.

The locals in Uzunyayla gave a special value to social life in the guest room, where the primary social beverage was tea. This was especially true of *worq* elites who had elaborated a high culture founded on host-guest formalities. A hierarchy of efficacy and autonomy was created between the host and the guest under the guise of cordial commensality. The host provided hospitality and services, whereas the guest was made to take the host’s protection into his body symbolised in the tea and food the host served. To make someone drink tea clearly brought forth an image of a process in which one caused others to fall into a receptive position. A memory of having compromised one’s autonomy and having had one’s integrity dismantled turned into a sense of indebtedness registered on the guest’s body.

This hierarchy between the feeder and the fed clearly suffused Circassians’ understanding of the master-slave relationship. The present members of former slave-owning families summarised the relationship between themselves and the descendants of their ex-slaves in some food idioms, saying “They ate with us/at our home” (*Bizde yediler*) or “They ate at our door” (*Bizim kapıda yediler*). They interchangeably used some expressions, “He ate bread with us”, “He grew up at our home” and “He grew up at our gate”. The idiom of eating used to signify a slave’s service to

the masters' family also helped to keep the slave bound to the "door" of the master's house. *Worq* masters demanded that their slaves nurture a sense of indebtedness while eating meals they provided as a token of love. This spiritual indebtedness had been passed down, as memories of inferiority and marginality, to the current members of ex-slave families. The slave descendants were reminded of who they were by the question "*Kimlerdensin?*" and re-experienced their ancestors' humiliation.

I have demonstrated at length that commensality produced a hierarchy between the actor and his passive object by generating an image of indirectness in which the latter's self was defined through the former's action. The metaphors of *yedirmek* and *içirmek* were also used to qualify the relationship between the master and the slave. The metaphor of commensality formed part of set idioms employed to legitimise the slaves' subjugated position, founded upon their passivity, alongside two other practices associated with *worqs'* guest room: the love-respect exchange and the memory practice of "*Kimlerdensin?*"

## 2) *Respect and Love: Honour and Shame*

It is possible here to compare the respect-love idiom with the honour-shame idiom more systematically. Boudhiba mentions that love in Islamic understanding illustrates the relationship between the superior and the inferior, not in opposition, but in a welded oneness (1998: 139). A similar understanding could be clearly seen in Circassians' use of love (as *muhabbet*) by which they referred to the hierarchy between the host and the guest as incorporated in an intimate and affectionate relationship.

Love is regarded as the primary principle of Sufism that pursues a mystical unity with God (Nicolson 1914: 107). This mystic tradition equates love with believers' self-renunciation. The Sufis strive to remove their "I"-ness that prevents immersing in God's body and returning to the state of the pristine oneness (Schimmel 1995: 135). The believers are not seen as the agent of their love, because only God is the loving agent (ibid. 146). Celalettin Rumi, the thirteenth-century Persian mystic poet who founded the Mevlevi order in Konya, wrote that the believers' love is only an effect of God's love (Nicolson 1914: 113).<sup>108</sup>

It is possible to draw a parallel between this Sufi understanding of love and G. H. Mead's idea of two different aspects of self: the autonomous "I" as an acting subject and the passive "me" which serves as an object for the other person's action. Yunus Emre, the Turkish poet from the late thirteenth to the early fourteenth centuries, drew the mystic understanding of love and referred to "the loving gaze" of the Supreme Lord (Faiz 1991: 4). Here, he repeats the imagery in which the subordinate person becomes an object who defines himself through the eye of the loving superior. Emre transformed this mystical abstraction into human terms, translating love-as-unity into a social ideal of respect and care between father and son, teacher and student or master and disciple (Başgöz 1973: 102-4). This became the foundation for the tradition of Anatolian poems.

After Emre, Anatolian minstrels (*âşik*: lit. the "lover") used love for "passionate and erotic love" (*aşk*) between man and woman. The "lovers" often likened the loved woman to the Sultan, describing themselves as her slave (ibid. 108). A well-known Kayserili *âşik*, a dedicated supporter of the MHP, explained to me his service (*hizmet*) to Alpaslan Türkeş, the *Başbuğ* ("Commander-in-chief") of the party, by analogy with the *aşk* ("devotion") that Turkish minstrels traditionally expressed towards God, rulers (*padişa*) and leaders (*başbuğ*) in their songs. Similarly, the Pınarbaşı branch of the MHP used a term with a connotation of totality into which parts were integrated (*Vuslat*<sup>109</sup>: "Union with the Beloved") to the ceremony they held to welcome Alpaslan Türkeş to his "homeland" (see Ch. 2). Passionate love that longed for oneness with the loved, whether a transcendental being, a prophet, a secular ruler or a woman, implied the subordination of the loving one to the beloved.

---

<sup>108</sup> It is possible to understand that a client who said, "The patron loves me. I will do anything for him" is not the acting subject of his devotional acts, in the same schema.

<sup>109</sup> *Vuslat* is originally an Arabic term (وصلة *wuSla*: junction, connection, contact) deriving from the root verb وصل (*waSala*: to connect, unite).

Mardin (1984) points to a characteristic dichotomy within Turkish Islam between, on the one hand, the pietism of puritanical orthodoxy, often a means of state/social control, and, on the other hand, liberating *communitas*, founded on mysticism, spontaneity and esoteric speculation (1984: 119, 121). He observes that, in addition to the mystic tradition of Alevis, Anatolian Muslims have avoided a restricting and cheerless pietism by promoting the cult of the person of Muhammad, in which “love, affection and a feeling of hope replaced control and discipline”. He further states that this relationship between the believer and the Prophet can be likened, borrowing from Victor Turner, to that between “I and Thou” (Mardin *ibid.* 120), who “confront one another” as “concrete, historical, idiosyncratic individuals” (Turner, cited in Mardin *ibid.* 118). Mardin’s “I-thou” construction here may be justifiable since he aims to probe the search for lost community apparent in the cultural history of modern Turkey (*ibid.* 115). The above study of love has, however, suggested that it is more rewarding to locate a “you (subject)-me (object)” construction in the dyadic relationship constituted within the image of affection; this elucidates the interpersonal politics implicated in the discourse of community.

This understanding of *aşk* (love as “longing”/“desire”) largely overlapped with the idea of the “respect” (*saygı*) the lesser partner demonstrated to his superior in secular contexts. Protection, care, mercy and blessings given in return for “respect” or “devotional love” (*aşk*) were also referred to as “love” (*sevgi*) in modern settings. There was a reciprocity between the two types of love, *aşk* and *sevgi*.

The hierarchy created through that exchange was regarded as an ideal model of social order and harmony. That idealised image of affectionate and intimate unity and solidarity (love as *muhabbet*) may be ultimately likened to the perfect oneness with God the devoted believers strive to achieve. The oppositional and reciprocal relation between *saygı* and *sevgi* could be compared with the relation between *aşk* and *muhabbet*, though *muhabbet* denoted, not an object of exchange, but the totality which emerged from and encompassed all the transactions of various items, including the other two types of love (*aşk* and *sevgi*). This idea of *muhabbet* as a totality including *sevgi* and *aşk/saygı* can be compared to what Holbrook calls the “paradigm of love” of Anatolian Sufism: “absolute love” (*‘ısq-ı mutlaq*) is the “sum of perfections” in which God’s “true love” (*‘ısq-ı haqq*) is returned as “divine love” (*‘ısq-ı ilahî*), or the love of human beings for god (Holbrook 1994: 144-146).<sup>110</sup> Sociologically, *muhabbet* largely overlapped with “total prestatation”, a term by which Mauss referred to the “total social context or relationships in which the exchange is embedded” (Seymour-Smith 1986: 232). Among people in Turkey, “love”, in its all variations, served as a set of forceful, *secular* idioms firmly rooted in Islamic tradition, seemingly retaining the emotional charge of *religious* idioms.<sup>111</sup>

Turkish nationalists often used this image of cohesion to theorise the relation between a collectivity and its members. For example, the Durkheimian Gökalp and the Turkist Nihal Atsız (see Çağlar 1990: 88-89) respectively regarded Turkish society and nation as a transcendental entity, treating people as having values, meanings and identities only in relation to these collectivities of a higher order. The same idea was also promoted by the MHP in its publications in reference to the relationship between the Turkish nation-state and its citizens (Ağaoğullar 1987:

---

<sup>110</sup> Holbrook states that the perfect model of this “absolute love” can be found in Muhammad’s communion with God in the Miraj (*Miraç*), his heavenly encounter with God, where the hierarchy inherent in the alternating roles they play, that is, the roles of the subject (lover) and the object (loved), is ultimately dissolved (1994: 147-148). This miraculous experience of redemption is one of the themes explored in the *Mevlüt Şerif* (see Ch. 8).

<sup>111</sup> Mardin (1994a; 1994b) elaborates on the idea of Islam as an idiom, by which he means “a set of conceptual facilities that enables one to classify the stimuli that come from the ambient according to a grid” (Mardin 1994a: 164). He emphasises that this idiom of thought also serves as an idiom of action, playing a crucial role in constituting one’s self, inclining one to take specific actions (1994b: 191-192). The idioms I am talking about here are of the same kind.

It is interesting here to note that *sevgi* and *saygı* are of Turkish origin, whereas *muhabbet* and *aşk* are borrowed from Arabic. *Muhabbet* comes from a verb حب (*Habba*), designating “to love”; *aşk* from عشق (*‘ashiqa*), denoting “to love passionately”. *Sohbet*, which is semantically almost coextensive with *muhabbet* in Turkish, has a different origin; it derives from صحب (*SaHiba*), meaning “to have social intercourse” or “to accompany”.

196). These theories almost verge on totalitarianism in arguing that people are supposed to be integrated into the sovereign collectivity through devotion and self-sacrifice.

A similar recognition of hierarchy could be seen in Circassians' self-image as "more royalist than the king himself", which stressed their loyalty to the regime of the Turkish nation-state in which their presence was tolerated, though not really welcomed, as "guests". It is possible to draw a parallel between Circassians here and *zimmi*, i.e. the subjugated non-Muslims in the Muslim state, divided into different denominational communities (*millet*). Non-Muslims were tolerated and protected as long as they accepted their own subordinate position and Muslims' supremacy (B. Lewis 1961: 105; 322-323). Similarly, Turkey showed great concern about how it was seen by the Western world into which it longed to be fully incorporated (G. Lewis: 1974: 89; 190-92). This also seems to reflect the same culturally specific understanding about the hierarchical relationship between the whole and the part incorporated in it.

*Worqs* recognised a similar relationship between the host and the guest, and particularly between the master and the slave, drawing on the terminology and imagery of Sufism deeply rooted in Turkish culture. They deployed the love-respect idiom, which generated recognition of the indirectness in which the part was defined in the light of its relations with the whole, to define the relationship between *worqs* and slaves and to legitimise the symbolic hierarchy between the two categories of Circassians.

Similar complexity can be found also in social relations recognised through the honour-shame idiom in various Mediterranean societies. Pitt-Rivers distinguishes honour and shame in terms of activeness and passiveness in creating one's self image: honour is a high value first felt and claimed by a person, and then accepted by the society and granted to him; shame is a low value imposed by the society upon a person and then internalised and felt by him (1965: 43). There is a difference between the two ideas in how actively a person shapes his relation with the society. An indirectness, in which a person constructs his identity through the eyes of society, is prominent in shame, allowing the self to exist only as the "me" object, but not as the "I" subject.

Typically, anthropologists have seen honour and shame as a moral system in which actors participate in a zero-sum game as relatively equal competitors: the aim is to maximise one's profit from scarce resources (Peristiany 1965: 9-10; Black-Michaud 1975). Honour and shame are located at the opposing ends of a single evaluation system, serving as "moral taxonomies" (Herzfeld 1980 341) that stratify antagonists, thus incorporating them into the society through participation in the competition. The love-respect set offers a different model of unity in which two parties are hierarchically incorporated in a harmonious whole by exchanging complementary symbols.<sup>112</sup>

The two parties are portrayed as engaged in "negative reciprocity" in the honour-shame model, and in "balanced reciprocity" (Sahlins cited in Jamous 1992: 190, n. 5) in the respect-love model. In the first, control over women's sexual chastity is an important criterion in stratifying male actors; the second is a more inclusive model where women are not treated differently from other categories of social juniors who compromise their autonomy by allowing their persons to be subsumed into their superiors' personhood, and are thus precluded from full development of personhood.<sup>113</sup>

Anthropologists have distinguished between vertical and positive "honour of precedence" and horizontal and negative "honour of virtue" (Pitt-Rivers 1965: 35; Stewart 1994: 55ff). This differentiation has allowed them to treat both leadership and egalitarianism in one society in one idiom.<sup>114</sup> The love-respect model allows the locals to promote both stratification and collaboration by switching the modes in which these two symbols of approval are reciprocated (see the next section).

---

<sup>112</sup> See Gilmore (ed.) (1987); Peristiany & Pitt-Rivers (eds.) (1992) on the importance of paying greater attention to the workings of reciprocal relations within honour-shame systems.

<sup>113</sup> Herzfeld refers to this process as "englobing" (1987: 88, n.1), borrowing Ardener's idea about the situation of dominance whereby "one structure blocks the power of actualization of the other".

<sup>114</sup> Similar ideas have been elaborated by anthropologists in various set idioms; e.g. "honour as *şeref*" and "honour as *namus*" (Meeker 1976) and "name" and "blood" (Di Bella 1992).

Gilsenan reports from a Lebanese village where the idiom of honour of precedence, ultimately symbolised by rule through arbitrary violence, has lost its rhetorical power (1990b: 220. See also Gilsenan 1996). The present Circassian community in Uzunyayla was in a similar situation: the formal titles that used to divide people had long since become practically meaningless, and current economic and social prestige largely contradicted traditional status.

Gilsenan asks what language is available in such a situation to construct and negotiate social relations (1990b: 220). In Uzunyayla, the respect-love idiom facilitated a new ideology that represented and organised social relations in a balanced reciprocity of care and service, opposed to a negative reciprocity of rule and submission. The idiom, borrowed from Turkish, opened up a space where the old, disjunctive ideology of exploitation could be replaced by a new, altruistic ideology presenting the image of affective oneness (see Parkin 1976). The respect-love exchange idiom helped to facilitate and negotiate a shift of social relations, since it appeared able to continue to present images of intimacy and mutual affection in a situation in which the nature of the dyadic relation was changing in economic or political domains (e.g. See Tachau 1984: 126-7; Guneş-Ayata 1994).

Davis argues that honour is a concept that concerns the whole person (1977: 98). Campbell more specifically states that honour entails a concept of integrity: a state in which a person remains “untouched” (1964: 269; 1965: 144). Naturally, the human body often serves as a metaphor of the maintenance, violation and recovery of a person’s honour (Delaney 1987: 40; Blok 2001: 43, 44). A person’s impeccable physical being may represent his flawless honour. The insights gained in this section about the intake of an alien substance into the human body can be understood in a similar way. The image of the slave who had his *hatır* ruined, revealing discomfort in his body, similarly visualised the flawed quality of his being, to which others attributed low value.

Drawing on Mead’s model of a self perpetually constituted and transformed through social interactions, Abner Cohen (1976) suggests an analysis that links the symbolic dimension of self and its political dimension. To produce interactions of a similar dual quality, that is, interactions with two dimensions related to both the construction of self and the pursuit of interpersonal politics, local people use the two set idioms, “respect and love” and “honour and shame”. These generated symbols that people evoked to approve or reject others’ value as social beings. The present work’s focus on memory practices involving *hatır(a)* demonstrated that *hatır* was a model of self composed of two aspects: self as an internal integrity and self as an effect, which was continually constituted, maintained and transformed in symbolic interactions with others. *Hatır* bridged the psychic dimension and the socio-political dimension of self. *Hatır* made it possible to locate these two dimensions of self in a historical context through memory practices, just as honour is a manifestation of one’s will to recognise oneself as a carrier of historical significance (Di Bella 1992: 152) passed down by one’s family. This “collective selfhood” was clearly manifested in the Turkish idea of *şeref* (Meeker 1976).

Slaves’ incarnation of History in *worqs’ oda* disclosed that the body was a site in which the self’s internal and social aspects were linked. The creation of an image of destruction of personal integrity can be understood within the scope of the same model. Kopytoff points out that anthropologists have paid more attention to the process of becoming a slave than to the state of being a slave; they have also been more interested in the process of slaves’ re-socialisation and re-integration than in their de-socialisation (1982: 221-222). In line with the greater interest anthropologists have shown to the aspects of slavery as a process, a focus upon the practice by which the self is implicated in the everyday interaction of remembering helps to shift attention from “slavery” (*kölelik*) as a social institution in the historical past to “slaveness” (*kölelik*) as a quality of being that continues to be reproduced to the present. Paying more attention to social practices also helps us understand how, in drinking sessions, Karakuyulu men appropriated and resisted *worqs’* “normative moral discourse” (Wikan 1984: 635) on society, history and memory.

### [3] Male Sociability in Teahouses

This section analyses everyday sociability among Karakuyulu men in teahouses, which had almost replaced *worqs’* guest rooms as the main public spaces in the village. Though in a similar

setting of commensality, male actors of various family backgrounds were here engaged in a different kind of interaction, generating positive meanings that empowered them equally. To compare the interactions in this space with hospitable receptions in guest rooms, I examine two related acts – *atmak* (“to toss”) and *götürmek* (“to take”) – in which these men indulged in order to define the nature of their own interactions in a personally advantageous manner. These actions served as idioms the men employed to transform drinking sessions into shared occasions where a new social relationship was forged. This undermined the domination of *worqs*’ more theoretical discourse, producing alternative connections with the communal past.

### **1) Tossing “Hot Air”: Declaring Oneself a Social Actor**

First, I look at the acts of *atmak* to which Karakuyulu drinkers committed themselves in their performative creation of masculine meanings, an interaction that Herzfeld (1985) called “the poetics of manhood”. The recurrent demonstration of these acts enabled men to act out a fantasy of power conjured up by ejecting objects out of the body, comparable to that evoked by taking objects into the body. The idiom of tossing induced an image of expelling. For instance, a phrase “to toss from the head/stomach” (*kafadan atmak*) denoted inventing a story: embroidered tales created in one’s head – the symbol of one’s autonomy – were tossed out through the mouth and exposed to other people’s judgement.

Words that were thus “tossed into the ultimate field of male actions” (*meydana/ortaya atmak*) were called *laf*. *Laf* largely overlapped with *söz* (talk or words), but men often used *laf* more specifically to signify boasting or “hot air”, though this Turkish term did not necessarily entail the negative value judgement carried by the English “hot air”. Below, I deliberately use the term *laf* only in this restricted sense, in reference to defiant remarks or confident statements, often provocative or polemical, to further illuminate the dominant mode of male sociality.

Just as not all the words one articulated were seen as *laf* in this sense, not all utterances were recognised as *laf atmak*. To win this accolade for one’s actions, the speaker’s words must convey his excessive self-confidence, defiantly manifesting his readiness to press a claim to a greater social significance than that of his male contenders, and thus gain the upper hand over them. The elderly Karakuyulu man who brought up the mythical connection between Circassians and the Hittites and effectively silenced an Avşar, offsetting Avşars’ traditional claim to Uzunyayla (see Ch. 5), provided a good example of an off-hand and witty *laf*, often praised simply as a “beautiful” (*güzel*) *laf*.

On the other hand, if the speaker’s words were interpreted as “empty” (*boş*), he immediately attracted counterattacks from other contenders, just as the man who talked about a horse race in explaining the origin of a Circassian village name was labelled a “slave” by a man closely related to the lord lineage of the village (see Ch. 3), regardless of whether this was historically accurate. The common ridicule, “Don’t toss from the stomach, catamite!” (*Işkembeden atma, lan!*), was aimed at emasculating the speaker and thus dispelling his threat. Another response, “He is tossing an air” (*Hava atıyor*), delivered when the speaker was considered to be shamelessly indulging his ego, expressed the notion that words were floating substances.

For words to be regarded as a *laf*, they needed to be clearly imbued with the speaker’s outstanding individuality, which deprived these words of fluidity and transformed them into his weapon. He needed to demonstrate his determination to stand out in a public space and his independent initiative in carving out his own identity. In line with this mode of male sociability, according to which a person who “gets his own name mentioned by society” (*topluma kendi ismini söyletmek*) was highly regarded, the speaker adopted an assertive attitude in claiming his own name, in contrast to the passivity of submitting oneself to an imposed, disempowering identity.

The speaker’s words were considered a *laf* if they took on the quality of the speaker’s singularity, vigorously expressing his manly intention to confront other actors. By tossing a *laf*, a man claimed integrity as an individual actor. *Laf* was often personalised as in “your *laf*”, just like tea and social “intercourse” (*sohbet*), all of which represented the person of the social actor in his wholeness. An individual’s unique *laf* produced a memory of that particular person, which was handed down to future generations, who made tactical use of it as a symbolic resource (see Ch. 8). The imbalance in social potency was produced through opposing images of intake and ejection of

diverse floating substances. The care taken to control bodily boundaries mentioned in Ch. 6 makes sense, given that one's impeccable body was a metaphor of one's flawless person and honour.

I have already mentioned that the local Circassians saw a dog-in-a-manger state of mind as a grave national problem of Circassians, calling it *çekememezlik*. *Çekememezlik* can be re-appraised as founded on the currently dominant mode of male sociality: it was a manifestation of one's unswerving determination to define oneself by establishing oneself as a subject, rejecting humiliating names imposed by others.

Literally, *çekememezlik* is an abstract noun made from the reduplicated, negative, "broad time" base of *çekmek* (to draw, to pull). The passive connotations carried by the root verb are clearly reflected in its passive form *çekilmek* (to withdraw, to retreat) and in its reflexive form *çekinmek* (to hesitate, to recoil through fear). These two forms refer to a meek attitude, entailing a tendency to withdraw to the sidelines of male social interaction and a failure to gain the recognition of other male actors. *Çekememezlik* may be positively re-evaluated as revulsion against retreating from male competition. It sublimates a man's active disposition to "toss oneself" (*kendini atmak*) into the male social arena through "tossing challenging words" as a metonymy of oneself.

This competitive spirit accounts for the fact that even *worqs*, who presented themselves as forming a unitary group, competed over historical details in order to claim superiority over one another. Disagreement about the reasons for particular instances of elopement when presenting a family's genealogy was one of the commonest examples. "Tossing a big talk" epitomised the primary mode of producing different versions of the same History, which nonetheless adhered to a common schema among *worqs*, who shared the right to participate in the debates they denied to slaves.

## **2) Taking: Visualising Male Competence**

Karakuyulu men "tossed hot air" repeatedly in everyday drinking sessions. These performative acts helped to display assertiveness by generating images of driving out objects from the body. Each of these acts contributed to conjuring up a fantasy that a man had achieved a coherent self whose integrity endowed him with a manful competence. The most important social beverage among these men was *rakı*. One was made to "drink" tea as a token of accepting a lesser identity in *worqs'* guest rooms. The intake of alcohol in the teahouses was referred to as "tossing", used also for *lafı*, or as *götürmek*, a verb with an enormous range of meanings, comparable to "to take" in English. The social context of drinking sessions must first be examined to shed light on the experiences defined through recurrent recourse to these demonstrative acts.

As mentioned, the teahouses maintained legitimacy as valued public spaces by retaining some continuity with guest rooms, referenced by the use of the respect-love idiom among their regular members. Equality and homogeneity were repeatedly stressed among comrades. Most of the drinkers belonged to roughly the same age group because of the norm of avoidance between adjacent generations, though the acceptance of proximity in age was often an effect of sharing various social activities there: it was not that they drank together because they were age-mates, rather that they came to regard each other as equals in age because they drank together. The two teahouses were patronised by different categories of men. Some dozen regular drinkers in one of the teahouses were "leading farmers", each of whom owned a tractor. The other attracted "the social outcasts", fewer in number, none of whom had a tractor, a characteristic shared by "the poor fellows" who stayed away from these teahouses, though the "strangers" were not necessarily worse-off than the "leading farmers".

This relative uniformity in age, occupation, wealth and style of life was elaborated as egalitarian comradeship by the ritualised manner of drinking. The shared consumption of cheap *rakı* homogenised drinking companions in the village, where only a limited variety of alcoholic beverages was available. Men poured the same amount of *rakı* into identical, small tea glasses with scrupulous care. When they did not have enough glasses, they passed the same glass around, drinking from it in turn. Even then, the same amount of *rakı* was poured into the glass, and everybody drunk equal amounts, at least at the beginning. Even sharing the same glass carried a significant message, "We are OK", given that an elder once deplored the decline of mutual trust in

the village, saying “People cannot drink water from the same glass nowadays”. These formalities were meticulously pursued in order to define all the participants in this male ritual of friendship as equal, which helped to produce significant others in relation with whom one’s honour was staked.

An offering of *rakı* was explained as equivalent to “inquiring about someone’s self” (*hatırını sormak*) by asking if his “spiritual condition” and “bodily state” were in their “proper places”: “*Keyfin, halin nasıl? Yerinde mi?*” I have already presented *hatır* as a notion of self that linked one’s internal integrity to the exercise of social influence. *Worqs* “reminded” (*hatırlatmak*) slave descendants of their lower status by “*Kimlerdensin?*”, making them re-experience an internal unease (*rahatsızlık*) revealed through their bodies. This amounted to *hatırını kırmak*, or shattering slave descendants’ memories as self-definition, to be replaced with a different set of memories of History imposed as their truer identity.

In drinking sessions, one’s *hatır* was to be respected, rather than being ruined by the question “*Kimlerdensin?*” Karakuyulu men asked after one other’s “spirit” and “health” by serving glasses of *rakı* to each other, so that their fellow drinkers would not be left feeling “ill at ease” (*rahatsız*). The reciprocal acts of “respecting someone’s self” (*hatırını saymak*) was understood as equal to “giving honour” (*şeref vermek*) to him. This was an essential component of subtle but repeated demonstrations of one’s intention to “to put” one’s peer “in the place of a real man” (*adam yerine koymak*: to hold someone in esteem). The leitmotif of the amicable interaction in teahouses was egalitarian reciprocity, as one of the drinkers put it, “If somebody asks about me, I will ask about him, too”.

Drinking companions called each other an “esteemed” (*muhterem*) friend, or “a friend I respect and love” (*saydığım, sevdiğim arkadaş*). This latter title was comparable with that of “a respected and loved person” (*sayılan sevilen kişi*), denoting an exceptionally influential person who monopolised both respect and love in *worq* discourse. Equality was, however, brought to the fore in the teahouses since these words of praise were reciprocated during drinking sessions. A hierarchy between respect and love was also denied by the image of a greater unity of “intimacy” (*samimiyet*) and “affection” (*muhabbet*), a communion (see n. 109) that emerged as an effect of reciprocal exchanges of approval between the partners. One drinker referred to this social cohesion as “democracy”.

The official ideology of respect and love dominated in a *worq* guest room, distinguishing the host from the guest. This hierarchy was transposed to the relationship between the master and the slave. Karakuyulus’ manful actions in the drinking session attached novel meanings to this set metaphor, appropriating the idiom to re-configure social relations in accordance with present conditions. This opened up a social space in which these men of diverse backgrounds can engage with each other on equal terms, in the middle of a village saturated with landmarks of History. This new sociability produced memories of conviviality, which would be remembered constantly in everyday contexts, and simultaneously legitimated the drinkers’ claim to their rightful connection with the Circassian national past.

A number of anthropological works have tackled alcohol consumption as a means of constructing everyday reality in Western contexts (Gibson & Weinberg 1980; Driessen 1983; Papataxiarchis 1991). Some recent studies focus on the mnemonic function of drinking sessions (Jones 1994; Algazi 1997; Abercombie 1998; Heatherington 1999), though drinking is more commonly associated with oblivion. As for alcohol drinking in Muslim societies, even a survey on social aspects of drinking merely mentions Qur’anic prohibition and the increase in alcoholism (Heath 1987: 24). As yet little work has been done on constitutive aspects of alcohol drinking in Middle Eastern contexts.

The prohibition of alcohol in Islam seems not to preclude people in various Muslim societies from elaborating a distinctive manner of alcohol drinking as a folk tradition. Actually, as Stokes argues, “Whenever it is consumed, in a predominantly Muslim society, drinking alcohol (is) an intensely semantic act” (1992: 148). The Qur’an counts wine as one of the pleasures in paradise, though this is a special, non-intoxicating wine. In the Sufi tradition, intoxication by wine has often been used as a metaphor of the state of self-renunciation in which the devotional worshipper experiences mystical oneness with God.

In a more localised context, Shankland draws a parallel between *sema* rituals and secular drinking sessions (*muhabbet*) in Alevi villages in Central Anatolia (1992: 163-167; 1999: 158-

159). Stokes also points out that drinking sessions among Turkish urban migrant workers draw on a number of Sufi vocabularies and images thorough *Arabesk* music (1992: 226-227). This is epitomised in the fact that the session itself is called *muhabbet* (“love”), an idea reminiscent of a state of mystic oneness with God. In the secular setting Stokes worked on, *muhabbet* is an occasion of memory, in which alienated drinkers openly express their feeling of separation from their families and longing for their friends, recalling the bittersweet memories of times lost in the past (ibid. 128).

The intake of alcohol into the body generated significance against the backdrop of *worq* elite discourse. Karakuyulu men did not drink *rakı* for the purpose of enjoying the taste, unanimously saying that *rakı* tasted and smelled awful. They added water and gulped the whitened liquid down. This style was referred to as *atmak* (to toss) or *götürmek* (to take). Drinkers said to their comrades, “Toss, let it go!” (*At, gitsin!*), or “Take! Take!” (*Götür, götür!*), urging one another to knock back a glassful of *rakı* at a gulp.

Tossed *out of* the body, a defiant *laf* consolidated the speaker’s identity as an actor striving to distinguish himself from others. Similarly, tossing *rakı into* the body announced the drinker’s self-assessment. I have already mentioned that the acts of drinking tea and tossing *laf* generated images that visualised a hierarchy of unevenly acknowledged potency. *Rakı*, not just *drunk* but *tossed into* but not *out of* the body, was similarly used to demonstrate the drinker’s claim to personal integrity, hereby performing the male potency considered to accompany coherent personhood.

The implications of *götürmek* need to be examined to elaborate this picture. In drinking sessions, *atmak* and *götürmek* were used to produce similar effects. *Götürmek* was the most general verb denoting “to take”. It meant “lifting up” in old Turkish (Clauson 1972: 706). This sense was still preserved in some metaphorical uses of the word, though often in a negative sense, as an inability to do so.

The recognition of inequality between the acting subject of *götürmek* and its object was most clearly illuminated in cases where the word was used for sexual acts. People used the single word *kaçırmak* in reference to both the consensual elopement of a loving couple and a man’s abduction of an unwilling girl, though modern Turkish civil law distinguishes them (Starr 1984). Culturally, whether the man and the woman actually had sexual intercourse was not very important. The woman’s “virginity” (*kızlık*: lit. “girlhood”, also hymen) was considered to have been “ruined” (*bozmak*) anyway. Virginity was social, not anatomical, just like other concepts related to human bodily orifices. The locals often described the forceful abduction of a woman as “taking her to the mountains” (*dağa götürmek*) or as “taking possession of her” (*malını götürmek*: to take one’s property). These uses of “taking” showed that a sexual act was an action through which a woman was transformed into a man’s “property”. A girl’s damaged “maidenhood” registered the execution of male agency on her body.

Consummation of marriage was also equal to “completing one’s job” (*işini bitirmek*) from a man’s viewpoint. Furthermore, Turkish men often referred to the male sexual organ as a man’s “property” (*mal*, or *mülk*) and the female counterpart simply as a “tool” (*alet*). This categorization disclosed a male perception that the male member served as a metonym<sup>115</sup> – a part standing for the whole – incarnating his exercise of male agency, while the female body part was a container of his one-way action, no more than an instrument that he “uses” (*kullanmak*; see Ch. 6 for the use of this word in the master/female slave relation). Men employed the term *sikmek* (“to fuck”) to refer to this asymmetric image of intercourse between male-actor and female-receptor, that is, an act a man committed upon his object. This stood in sharp contrast to *sevişmek* (“to make love to each other”; lit. “to love each other”), a word that acknowledged the reciprocal quality of intercourse, though the latter term, more romantic and more modern, perhaps sounded artificial to many men in Turkey.

Given this context, *götürmek* can be seen as an idiom used to create and articulate a visible disparity in personal potency between the agent and the recipient of his action. The word implied

---

<sup>115</sup> A Turkish saying, used especially in reference to the relationship between a sheep and its owner, goes “The property (sheep) will resemble its proprietor” (*Malı sahibine çeker*).

either sufficiency or deficiency in one's capacity for marking a desired effect, even in cases where the use of the word was even more clearly figurative. The following two examples of the contrasting uses of the word expressed the ambivalent relation between the current generations of local Circassians and Circassian customs; in one, a middle aged women in Kayseri from a Karakuyulu *worq* family, while expressing her views about life in her village, observed, "Due to their zeal for *worq* culture, slaves are 'upholding' (*götürüyor*) Circassian customs better than we are"; in another, a Circassian imam serving in Pınarbaşı said "Circassian customs are 'leading' us 'astray' (*götürüyor*)", lamenting the fact that Circassians' traditional non-segregation within inter-sex relations made it difficult to obey Islamic guidelines. Depending on whether the local people were the subject or the object of the action, *götürmek*, used in two different ways, pointed either to their ability to keep up their traditions or their inability to reject their tradition to follow religious teachings.

Another example, provided by a regular drinker in Karakuyu, more clearly demonstrated the sense of "to overwhelm" conveyed by *götürmek*. He said, "Excessive possessions will 'overburden' (*götürür*) us", while talking about the modest dreams – a tractor, a flock of sheep and an automobile – shared by small-scale farmers gathering at one of the teahouses. The latter two usages suggested that *götürmek* often served as an idiom that called attention to a negative effect one suffered or an experience of powerlessness and helplessness one underwent. It evoked an image of passiveness in which a person was crushed under a heavy load, unable to lift up the burden. People often described a person who lost integrity as a self-contained person under an external influence either as becoming an object of *götürmek*, or as being unable to *götürmek* something.

An ancient Turkish word for "taking away", *getirmek*, seemingly affiliated to *götürmek*, was also used to mean "to disperse" an object, forcefully scattering its elements (Clauson 1972: 705). This sense was also conveyed in uses of *götürmek* that produced imagery in which the coherence and autonomy of one's personhood could not be maintained and its parts became disintegrated. Becoming an object of another person's greater efficacy, one went through a metaphorical process of disintegration and reconstitution.

Karakuyulu men asked about their drinking companions' *hatır* by serving *rakı* to one another. They handed, or "sent" (*göndermek*) as they said, a glass of *rakı* to their comrades and urged them to finish it off at a gulp, with a word of encouragement, "Toss!" or "Take!" The drinker emerged as a manly subject by turning the drink into an object through tossing and taking. The intake of fluid into the body gave specific forms to both the subject and the object, distinguishing them clearly as an effect of the power realised in this action.

Men had to "gulp down" the *rakı*, because there was a recognised danger that they might be "carried off" from themselves by *rakı*, instead. An Abaza man in the town once deplored the fact that Circassian men often ended up "resting on masculinity" (*erkekliğine bindirmek*) while drinking, that is, abandoning control of situation to the competitive display of manly bravado. The local men bragged about their manly strength without thinking where the excessive drinking would "take" them. They lost command of themselves and became unable to keep the situation under control. Alcohol "took" men in that it caused them to abandon self-control. *Mahv-olmak* and *mahv-edilmek*, terms commonly denoting an awful state of drunkenness, literally meant "to be destroyed", conveying a graphical image of a state where one's self was completely broken apart.

A Karakuyulu man exposed himself to the eyes of his peers by gulping down a glass of *rakı*, just as they did by tossing *laf*s in the male field. He left them to judge whether he was "taking" that *rakı* or otherwise. Demonstrating *götürmek*, he professed his determination to offset alcohol's potential effect over him and to produce an image of himself as a person who could keep control of himself. The man who kept command of himself would control the situation, overwhelming the others, which reversed the idea that slaves were enslaved by their own physical impulses, and thus lost control over themselves.

Karakuyulu drinkers served a glass of *rakı* to one another to express a mutual recognition of their partners' value as men, showing both respect and love to one another. "Showing respect to someone's *hatır*" to "put him in a real man's place" here took the form of imposing a public challenge by "sending" *rakı* which might "take" one's fellows. This challenge was a mild one,

easy to meet. The aim of this playful confrontation was to reciprocally provide the members of the peer group with opportunities to demonstrate their manful comradeship.

The interactions in the teahouses celebrated male collaboration and egalitarian comradeship. The reason Karakuyulu men “took” and “tossed” rather than simply “drunk” *rakı* may be that the aim of this sociability was neither the physical consumption of alcohol, nor the evocation of the sense of indebtedness that the host had induced in his guest by serving him tea and making him drink it: they exchanged glasses of *rakı* to set the stage for each member of the drinking group to enunciate his own name as a contender, which facilitated the continual production of manly memories among relatively equal male peers.

The more power a person exercised, the greater the coherence of the personhood people imagined he could achieve. Such a person claimed autonomy as “I” in defining who he was, through an exertion of his own agency, and prevented others from reminding him of who he was, thus avoiding sinking to the status of “me” in relation with other acting subjects. *Worqs*, who saw themselves as the legitimate representatives of the local Circassian community, claimed their superiority by displaying a similar sense of autonomy that only they were allowed to enjoy.

By contrast, each male participant in drinking sessions was supposed to demonstrate his consummate autonomy by “taking” strong liquor that challenged the maintenance of his personal integrity. Here, a “real man” (*adam*) – a title I witnessed some inebriated men actually demanded from their fellows, sometimes even insisting that other terms of reference be replaced with it – was expected to meet this challenge. “Taking” alcohol and “tossing” *laf*, one strove to define oneself and stand out in the male arena. Above all, a “real man” was expected to have a strong commitment to identify himself as such and to make that determination known in public. His fellow competitors offered him a glassful of *rakı* to ask him how he felt and let him know that they respected and loved him as a person of great social significance, whatever his inherited status.

Fellow drinkers needed to demonstrate that they were not “hen-pecked stay-at-homes” (*kılibık*), mentally too attached to their female relatives, but were ready to leave the comfortable family space and eager to project themselves into the male arena. Even if one was from a highly famed family, it was not acceptable to hide behind the collective honour carried by the lineage name without demonstrating one’s own accomplishments as an individual actor. A *worq* man would not be distinguished from slave descendants if he confined himself to the guest room, where only his noble birth counted, and withdrew from the real social field outside it where only his personal achievements could register his worth on his contenders’ memories.

### **3) Çekememezlik: Masculinity as a Vehicle for Transition of Social Values**

Two opposing principles inevitably imbued social life among Karakuyulu men, in a changing balance: first, the values given to one’s inborn status, linked to *worqs*’ attempts to reproduce hierarchies in symbolic domains, and secondly, the egalitarian qualities of interaction that promoted the currently dominant mode of organising social relations, based on male comradeship and competition.

These two contesting ideologies were associated with different spaces: the former with the well-structured space of the guest rooms, where a man was given a place according to his lineage name and age, and the latter within the teahouses, where a man was required to open up his own place, carving out his own identity, through manful performances. As “the possessor of the word”, *worqs* were in an advantageous position to claim authority through their coherent personhood, an authority which was constituted within the normative moral discourse of *xabze* that they themselves produced. In contrast, to measure up to the present ideal of manhood, the “man of society” (*toplumun adamı*) with rich social contacts, one needed to start with asserting oneself in order to win recognition within a more competitive field, in which male contenders stood on relatively equal terms.

Ethnographies of the Middle East have demonstrated that actual human behaviour often fails to reflect the normative discourses upon which local people rely to explain their actions (Wikan 1984; Peters 1990). Early efforts to fill the gap between theoretical discourses and real practices focused on how social relations are organised from the bottom up (Barth 1959; Gronhaug 1974). More recent works locate elements of resistance to the social order, an order defined by the

dominant ideology, both in subversive discourses (Abu-Lughod 1986; 1990a; 1990b) and in non-discursive practices (N. Tapper 1991).

The social interaction of alcohol drinking, to which Karakuyulu men were committed, may be understood as demonstrating an alternative sociality to the one that *worq* social discourse prescribed. Sociability at teahouses enabled these drinkers, mostly of humble to middling family backgrounds, to recover recognition as acting subjects and restore a connection with the Circassian national past that was denied to them by *worqs*, providing them with empowering experiences in everyday life. The central stage of significant activities in this slave village had been shifting from the *unafe* and formal hospitable receptions to everyday casual gatherings among those who got along with each other. A corresponding transition had been proceeding in the dominant qualities and values that attached a sense of order to everyday interactions. These two ideologies may also be seen as abstractions that the locals themselves placed at the opposite ends of a continuum (see also Leach 1954). Actual social life was a process where these two values, neither of which was fully realised or completely eliminated, stood in tension and were negotiated in order to reach an acceptable compromise.

Gellner (1981) points to an inherent tension between egalitarianism and hierarchy in Islam. Circassians were well aware of this duality. Historically, members of the Circassian ruling class employed Islamic discourse to legitimate the slaves' servitude (*Yeni Kafkas* 1960 4/20, 17-19; Henze 1992: 69; Toledano 1998:105),<sup>116</sup> while Circassian commoners used it to promote equality between them and nobles (Longworth 1840: 145, 203; Bell 1840: 358; Karpat 1985: 66-67; 1990: 136). The fact that people in Uzunyayla were still looking to Islam for a source of justification for both status equality and hierarchy indicated that the contradictions of their historical experiences were yet to be resolved. The official state Islam of Turkey remained silent on this social issue, so central to the local Circassians. This gap was one of the local experiences of an irony with a wider social implication: the modern secular state advocated the nominal equality of all its citizens despite the actual unequal distribution of wealth and prestige, using Islam, which approves inequality among mankind, to promote social cohesion and reinforce the legitimacy of its rule.

Furthermore, Abzekhs, the "democratic tribe" from the North West Caucasus, among whom the commoners historically formed the dominant group, were locally articulate in championing an egalitarian social discourse despite their minority position amongst "aristocratic tribes" from the North Central Caucasus (Kabardians, Abazas and Hatukoys). They often said, "The *worq* is the one who is a real man" (*Worq, adamdır*), "A fine man is *worq*" (*Adam, worqtır*), or "The noble is the one who is brave" (*Asil, mert olandır*). They associated "nobility" with manliness, freeing it from the exclusive quality that the *worqs* of the "aristocratic tribes" usually attributed only to those born to prestigious families. It was possible to hear the maxim also among Kabardians, who attributed the saying to Kazanokho Jebago, a Kabardian legal reformer whose slave origin was well known.<sup>117</sup>

This redefinition of nobleness, founded on the manly qualities of an individual person, turned the juxtaposition of these opposing principles of social life into a social issue negotiated in the domain of desirable manhood. As heads of respective households, virtually all adult men in Karakuyu needed to present themselves on both types of social occasions characterised principally by one of these two opposing principles of interaction, though with variant levels of frequency and commitment. This necessity of everyday life, and the contradictions all men lived through, constructed a composite masculinity in which different ideas met.

Karakuyulu drinkers demanded that their fellows value them as *adam*. *Adam* is a term of Semitic origin with a semantic scope almost equivalent to that of English "man". *Adam* had an explicit overtone of judging a person: it bridged cultural expectations concerning how a "good person" ought to be and how a "fine man" ought to act, serving as an idiom used to stratify different people. Its strongly normative nature was shared by *şahsiyet* ("personhood"), as used by

---

<sup>116</sup> Also see Cooper (1980: 21-22) for a similar ambiguity reported from a different Muslim society.

<sup>117</sup> Jebago was sometimes used as a nickname for a man of slave origin, who wanted to have his say on every social issue, often interfering with other people's business. There was at least one local case in which "Jebago" originally used for such a man, had become almost like a lineage name referring to his descendants.

*worqs*, as a concept of a mature person with a great degree of coherence and autonomy. Some qualities that *worqs* shared with Western elites, including the importance given to the status of the self-defining subject, indicated that local Circassians attached a high value to personal autonomy.

At the same time, the coherence of *şahsiyet* was understood to be constituted in interaction with others, especially through a series of reciprocal exchanges of symbols of approval and prestige. As such, coherence served as the essence of the self, through which a person attained force as socially mature and capable. The fact that not a few local Circassians claimed that the qualities of a “real man” were the first prerequisite for nobleness indicated that *adam* largely overlapped with *şahsiyet*, a state which, *worqs* claimed, could be achieved only by members of the nobility. *Adam* also shared the relationalist and interactionalist understanding of person implied in *şahsiyet*. People understood that *şahsiyet* must be “constituted” (*oluşturmak*, see Ch. 6), and they linked the notion to the development of self-confidence and the accompanying sense of holding agency. Similarly, *adam* was understood as something one “becomes” (*olmak*), though people constantly examined whether a person should be recognised as *adam*.

*Adam* formed the *adam/uşak* dichotomy in the master-servant relation. This idea of manhood was also founded upon its contrasts with some other social categories such as “woman” (*kari*), “child” (*çocuk*), “the young-blooded” (*delikanlı*) and “the thick-headed” (*eşek*: lit. donkey), all conceived as lacking manful qualities like autonomy, maturity, responsibility and rational thinking. *Adam* was an idiom used to produce difference and hierarchy based on the unequal achievement of these manlike conditions that shared a sense of social competence.

*Adam* resembled *şahsiyet* in that both concepts were employed to evaluate a person as an autonomous individual. At the same time, both of them explicitly suggested that a man was a social being who did not exist totally separately from and thus independently of others. This idea of the two-dimensional person was familiar in Turkey: for instance, in a newspaper article, a noted Turkish sociologist, Mümtaz Soysal, presents a comparable model of the Turkish “individual” (*birey*) not as “self-oriented” (*özel*: private, personal), but as “collectivity-oriented” (*kamucu*),<sup>118</sup> a collectivity from which it remains inalienable. He defines the quality of such a group-minded individual not as independent (*bağımsız*: “unbound”) but as “autonomous” (*özerk*), by which he means a condition in which one “obtains power from within” (*öz + erk*: “self” + “force”/“energy”) (cited in Ergun 1991: 162-165). It is possible to draw a parallel between this understanding of “autonomy” (*özerklik*) and the above-mentioned image of agency derived from the coherence achieved by a social person, both indicating a dual nature, which also corresponds to *hatır(a)* as a concept of memory which links the internal and external aspects of self.

The norm of a “good person” or a “true man” turned on his demonstrating a great degree of “autonomy”, while at the same time fully recognising that he was a social entity, embedded within reciprocal relationships with others, owing an obligation to return their respect with love. People often said, “He became a doctor, but could not become an *adam*”, reproaching a man who neglected the responsibilities expected of an influential person; such a person was serving as the locus of intersection of multiple social networks. This disapproval was just one example illustrating that *adam* was a moral taxonomy, used to identify who was displaying or failing to display the merits demanded of a person of social significance.

*Worqs* identified the code of behaviour they saw as specific to their own group (*worq xabze*) with the system of authentic Circassian manners (*Çerkez usul/Adyghe xabze*). They also equated “worqness” (*worqlik/worqgha*) with Circassianness (*Çerkezlik/Adygagha*) and even “humanity” (*insanlık/tsufgha*). Equally, *worqs*’ use of *şahsiyet* was pertinent to an ideal of manhood, constructed in opposition to different sets of lesser persons including feminized slaves as well as women. Similarly, *adam* implied not only a social ideal of how a fine man ought to behave but also a wider ideal concerning how a human being ought to be, enabling Karakuyulu drinkers to effectively offset *worq* men’s attempts to monopolise the desirable qualities of a Circassian as well as those of a full person.

---

<sup>118</sup> Ergun (1991), who cites Soysal, uses the idea of the “collectivity-orientatedness” (*kamuculuk*) of Turkish citizens to maintain that promoting strong state control of the national economy (*devletçilik*: “statism”) serves the development of Turkey better than encouraging private enterprises.

Though largely overlapping semantically, *şahsiyet* and *adam* were relatively insulated from each other since they belong to different discursive, spatial and interactive domains: *şahsiyet* was talked about in the *worq* discourse of slavery and associated with hospitable reception in the guest room; *adam* was mentioned more explicitly in relation with manliness, one of the chief concerns of the male drinkers of mixed backgrounds in the teahouse. Furthermore, the actual usage of *şahsiyet* usually brought the internal aspect of self to the fore, whereas *adam* was more often used as an idiom for evaluating somebody in terms of his social attitude. This practical separation hindered their overt opposition as ideals of manhood competing for dominance.

The above-mentioned popular sayings, such as “The *worq* is the one who is a real man”, were often put forward as an alternative to the idea that birth alone should entitle one to noble status. This argument put the concept of manliness into the discursive domain of *worq*-slave relations that *worqs* usually discussed in the *şahsiyet* idiom. This intrusion of *adam* into the realm of *şahsiyet* allowed *adam* to encompass *şahsiyet* because of its greater semantic range, thus creating a hierarchical relation between the two. This hierarchy was based on an incorporation in which one model was subsumed into the other, facilitating the mediation of the potential tension between these two otherwise separate domains by the *adam* idiom. Thus, it is difficult to talk about the relation between *adam* and *şahsiyet* in terms of dominant and subordinate masculinities, though the two concepts were primarily associated with two opposing modes of sociality.

There was another ambiguity inherent in *adam* that further widened its semantic field beyond that of *şahsiyet*. *Adam* did not always designate the superior partner, as in the *adam*/servant relation, where the social senior was thought to monopolise honourable status, both as an example of mankind and as a real man. Interestingly, *adam* referred equally to the inferior partner, as in the master/slave (*efendi/adam*) relation in a historical context, or as in the patron/client (*patron/adam*) relation in modern situations. Here, *adam* denoted the social minor deprived of qualities as a socially significant person.<sup>119</sup> Used as a dual concept pertinent to two opposing conditions into which a social being was placed, *adam* often signalled a recognition of some imbalance of personal agency sensed, attained and exercised by different actors; this imbalance was one of the primary criteria that generated hierarchy within social relations.

Karakuyu drinkers seemed to be using this equivocal concept of *adam* as a vehicle that mediated the transition between the two modes of sociality, from one that valued inherited status and generated well-structured interactions founded on status difference, to one that stressed male comradeship, egalitarian competition and prominence as an individual person. The ambiguities deeply rooted in the idiom of *adam*, with a greater semantic range within which both manliness and coherent personhood were comprehended, allowed room for negotiation and manoeuvre to bolster one’s prestige as a man and aggrandise one’s dignity as a person, if not as a noble.

This seemed to be helping Karakuyulu men to respond to the necessities of everyday life in a village known by two contrasting names, “slave village” and “richest village”; they could thus get round the contradictions inherent in the juxtaposition of these two ideologies. People constructed interpersonal relations within the two types of sociability based on the same image of coherence as a person, an image they constituted, in part, by using the same set idiom of respect and love, reciprocated in two different ways: exchanged between *worqs* and slaves; and seemingly monopolised by one male actor at one stage but eventually reciprocated between peers. This use of common idioms contributed to an appearance of historical continuity and cultural coherence, two important elements of living in a minority community with a sense of having its own history. By maintaining these two elements, better-off Karakuyulu men could change, in real terms, the balance in the relative weight people assign to these two different ways of relating to others, just as the compliant and passive quality Circassian men attributed to their women helped the same wealthy Karakuyulus to pursue their economic advantage in the face of the shift from *denk* to *kismet* as a primary idiom used to endorse the choice of marriage partners (see Ch. 4).

---

<sup>119</sup> Apart from the uses relating to slaves, the use of *adam* in reference to those in socially inferior positions (whether employees or subordinates) may indicate a belief that even they deserve respect since they are nonetheless “ordinary persons” (*adam*), who entered such a relationship voluntarily, thus demonstrating a certain level of autonomy.

At the same time, the tight association of the two contesting social values with two separate spaces seemed to be retaining the contrast between the different social discourses highlighted. The relative insulation of the two different activities from each other kept their opposition visible, rather than rendering it indiscernible within a seamless continuum. Though the tension between the two ideologies was mediated through some shared idioms including manhood and reciprocity, the inevitable recognition of the opposition seemed to be manifesting itself in the lack of mutual trust often deplored in the village. In a wider context, the contradiction seemed to be expressing itself as *çekememezlik*, an overriding concern of local Circassian, whose symptoms included difficulty in achieving agreement, aggravation of competition, a disposition not to accept other people's leadership and a lack of local initiatives and co-operation.

This *çekememezlik* can, however, be re-interpreted positively, as I have already attempted to do. *Çekememezlik* seemed to derive from a public announcement of one's determination to identify oneself as a socially significant man, actively engaging in male competition and breaking away from the "me" bound to past memories that the others invoked. It may be understood as a collision of claims to male agency and social capacity supported by two different sets of values to changing degrees. Leading Karakuyulu figures eagerly generated a self-image as active persons by "tossing" and "taking" in drinking sessions. This manly attitude demonstrated that the currently dominant principle of sociability involved turning the challenge others pose by objectifying one as "me", into a unique opportunity to define oneself as an effective social actor, "I". *Benlik davası* (the "I"-ness dispute) mentioned in Chapter 4, must be understood in this historical context.

Far from a nostalgic occasion for indulging in memories of something left behind, the drinking session in Karakuyu was an occasion for drinkers to reconstitute, transform and reaffirm social realities, experiencing liberation from their burdensome past. Memories produced here were oriented towards the future. It was possible to observe a newly emerging form of comradeship in which one could exchange *rakı* glasses beyond the boundaries of inherited family status, as well as those of age group and residential quarter. This sociality revealed an on-going shift from the status consciousness that distinguished *worqs* from slaves, to a new class-consciousness based on one's achievements. This transition had been registered in the separation of the small-scale, independent farmers from the "strangers" and the "poor fellows", the two new categories of those who did not fit this new norm of being "real men", amid everyday interactions in the middle of the open space that had emerged as the new social centre of Uzunyayla.

#### [4] "Fuck the Past!": Making Bygones Be Bygones in the Construction of the Past

This section bridges the present discussion of male sociality and the next chapter: it links ideas concerning the integration and disintegration of "self" (*hatır*) to the reconstitution of "memory narratives" (*hatıra*) through manipulation of "material memories" (*hatıra*). The above examinations have shown that images of breaking objects apart were constantly generated to produce a hierarchy among the drinkers, though the effect lasted only momentarily. The same images were invoked more actively to dislocate and reconstitute a narrative which connected the past to the present by means of symbolic violation of material objects, just like the desecrated memory objects that told the story of the previous populations (see Chapter 2).

I sometimes observed the communal shovelling of *tezek* (dried sheep dung used as fuel) among young members of poor families from both quarters in Karakuyu. Several close friends worked together to shovel *tezek* off the floor of sheep barns, to be dried outdoors throughout the summer. In this remote village, where coal was neither easily available nor affordable, using *tezek* produced by the family's own livestock was a sign of minimum autonomy for those who could not afford a tractor.

On one such occasion, young men incessantly swore, "Let me fuck the past!" (*Geçmişini sikeyim*) and "Fuck the past!" (*Geçmişini siktir et*: "Fuck off"). Whenever they hurt themselves or overturned a pile of *tezek* loaded on a handcart, they "cursed the past [they] lived through", as one of them explained. What drew my special attention to this verbal expression was the fact that these phrases were by no means part of a repertoire of regularly used expressions, unlike their English counterparts. Actually this was the only occasion during my four-year stay in Turkey that

I heard people utter these words. This spontaneity demonstrated that their imagination enabled these young men to liken the past to objects that they could break apart and finish off, relying on their male potency.

The idea of the past transformed into an object of manly action serves as a useful graphic image that links this chapter to the next. As mentioned above, *sikmek* (“to fuck”) denoted the active role a man was expected to play in penetrative sex, a unilateral action that man executed on his object, conveying vivid visual imagery of “ruining” the object. The use of *sikmek* evoked a fantasy in which a human bodily orifice, whether vagina or anus, was destroyed by a phallus inserted in it, just like *parçalamak* mentioned above. It enabled the male actors to construct a hierarchical relation between an active penetrator and a passive patient receiving the former’s action. A submissive partner who received the act of *sikmek* on the body incurred a well-defined identity. The recipient’s person was disrupted through this image of the body torn apart at the point of entrance.

Saying “Fuck the past”, these young men swore at the pain they had just suffered or the vain effort they had just expended. This manifested their desire to send off these sufferings to the time that had already passed for good. They said “Go away to bygone times” to finish off the past events. They broke off the lingering effect of these experiences from the present and dispatched them decisively into the realm of time passed, well away from the present. The actual flow of time was a seamless continuity and its passage was composed of many strands with different rhythms and qualities. By “fucking” this unmanageable fluid, the young men moulded it into a well-bounded form as their object. They then named the preceding time “passed” (*geçmiş*), not “history” (*tarih*), burying it in a temporal space from which it would not return to affect the present.

The use of *sikmek* here implied that the young men invoked a reified image of the past as something tangible and breakable, sharing this quality, as objects of male acts, with various points of access to the human body. Karakuyulu elders said, “Do not stir up the past”, or “Do not step into history”, and repressed disempowering memories in order not to remember them. However, this silence turned the past into a transcendent history beyond their manipulation, whose haunting effects would not easily disappear. In contrast, the young men’s attitude towards the flow of time here involved a more active operation. Their sense of male potency enabled them to imagine the past in a pseudo-material form, to break it apart and reconstitute it as something that had decisively passed. In this way, they undid its relevance to the present, making bygones be bygones.

During my research I did not hear anyone actually crying out, “Fuck the past” to swear at History. Young Karakuyulus’ manifestation of their perception of the past as something to be decomposed and finalised, nonetheless, can be compared to a series of self-assertions Karakuyulu drinkers made by tossing *laf* and taking *rakı*. Through these demonstrative acts, the drinkers declared their determination to name themselves potent persons, striving to counter the challenges this self-presentation invited from other contenders. Given this parallel, each of these acts by Karakuyulu men in their prime might be understood as implicated in a process of dismantling the past to which those belonging to various categories of the previous underclass were rhetorically and socially bound by others who had a better command of historical discourses.

In the next chapter, I will take a closer look at some memories of well-remembered *laf*s tossed by Abaza Hajji Huta, a controversial figure in Karakuyu, which were contested even now. Each of his *laf*s was an assertive self-presentation that produced novel meanings with an eye towards the future. I shall show that his famous *laf*s did not simply shatter the past into pieces but re-assembled its elements into a new narrative with a fresh image of the past. This created a series of yet-to-be-settled memories serving as instruments with which present generations of Karakuyulus could reconstitute their everyday life, despite the dominant narrative of history and society forced on them by elite *worqs*. The young men in Karakuyu turned the past into a tangible object they could disperse to finalise it. Huta made an effective use of such materialisation of the past to manipulate and eventually dismantle it, generating empowering meanings, not only for himself but also for the following generations living in the slave village.

## [5] Conclusion

Alcohol drinking in a new public space facilitated a competitive display of masculinity through challenges and counter-challenges, disclosing the sociality that generated everyday social life in present-day Karakuyu. Here, the cultural imagination involving images of power produced by intake and ejection through bodily orifices played an important role. The image of difference in the degree of accomplished personhood was used to legitimate the status difference between *worqs* and slaves in the dominant discourse. The imagery was appropriated to produce a different type of hierarchy within the drinking group in Karakuyu. At the same time, a drinking session provided each of the group members with an opportunity to meet challenges, as both a token and a means of reciprocal approval. This attached an egalitarian quality to the male competition, to which membership was nonetheless restricted.

An elderly woman of an eminent *worq* lineage from a nearby village accounted for the striking consumption of alcohol in Karakuyu by saying that men of slave origin developed a zeal for alcohol since all the past male members of leading *worq* families in the village liked drinking very much. Regardless of the truthfulness of her account, drinking in Karakuyu seemed to be performed against the backdrop of the memories of the period represented as the age of poverty, in which alcohol consumption was a luxury only wealthy *worqs* could afford, and other people could not drink as the current generations did. At the very least, it seems safe to assume that current drinking practices were providing those people who would not have sat together in the past, separated by status factors, with a number of opportunities to engage in constructing more egalitarian social relations.

A home-made beer called *makhsuma* was known in the past among local Circassians. Drinking *makhsuma* was an official occasion during which all the men drank at the same time following *xoaxa* speeches given, in turn, by senior members to propose a toast.<sup>120</sup> *Wereds* sung on these occasions and handed down as historical memories, disappeared alongside *makhsuma* and *xoaxas*.

That which was no longer practised seems significant here, since it revealed the struggle fought in the past, who the protagonists were and what was at stake, just like the selective restoration of Circassian customs pursued in the brideprice debate (see Ch. 4). *Makhsuma* was prepared and provided only by affluent families, whereas cheap *raki* was easily available to most people today. *Makhsuma* was served as a token of hospitality; *raki* was shared among peers. Formal *xoaxas* gave the right of speech only to specific people. Age and lineage status counted here. Most *wereds* were epic songs about the heroic deeds of warlords and their *worq* chevaliers, relating an elite history as constructed from a particular viewpoint. Each of these traditional institutions concerned different aspects of the production of dominant knowledge about History: respectively, specifying authoritative narrators, outlining the scope of acceptable stories, and providing a medium.

In contrast, the present practice of drinking was a vehicle that helped men of divergent origins foster a sense of comradeship across the boundaries of traditional status. It also enabled these men to reassert the legitimacy of their relation to the Circassian national past through the continuation of a non-Islamic tradition their ancestors brought from the Caucasus. As a Circassian tradition prohibited in Islam, at a time when Islamic discourse seemed more and more prevalent in the region, the consumption of alcohol allowed Circassian men to open up a space in which they could be Muslims without being absorbed completely within a strictly Muslim identity.

*Raki* drinking marked an occasion to create new memories about present life in the village that might be remembered in the future. The struggles fought in the field of everyday sociability had provided the better-off section of Karakuyulus with an alternative narrative. It was a narrative founded on male interaction, a narrative that encompassed the construction of public space, the nature of memory, the model of manhood and social value, all different from those in *worqs*' social discourse. This commensal interaction was facilitating an egalitarian fellowship amongst men who shared a style of life.

---

<sup>120</sup> Such a formality is still maintained in the Caucasus (Johns 1994).

At the same time, this new form of sociability registered the emergence of a new social inequality accompanied by new social categories that divided fellow villagers. Drinking peers had acquired the opportunity to make their voices heard and reclaim their share of Circassian national history. Those who stayed away, especially those from ex-slave *xexes* families still in poverty, remained muted. For them, the continuity with history was experienced in the discomfort they embodied at social gatherings. Poverty here meant exclusion from social relations in a significant social arena and the burden of history.

The following episode illustrates this point well. During my stay in the village a twenty-five-metre minaret was constructed for the mosque in the Lower Quarter. This undertaking was immediately imitated by those living in the Upper Quarter, which had its own mosque and imam. Karakuyulus, who did without a minaret for one and half centuries after the foundation, built two minarets in a single summer, reflecting continuity with the past when the two separate quarters were two rival villages. The idea originated with the youngish “leading farmers” of the Lower Quarter who regularly met and drunk at one of the teahouses. They donated some money and collected more from successful urban industrialists who originated in the region.

The Turkish imam serving at the mosque summoned the men in the quarter, including myself, to provide a week’s communal labour to build the foundations for the minaret. Throughout the week, the well-off farmers who had initiated the plan busily occupied themselves with their own work, preparing their tractors, a symbol of wealth, self-sufficiency and pride as small-scale, independent farmers. Nobody from this group participated in the communal manual work.

In contrast, those who did the work were poor men from ex-slave or *xexes* families. They called the planners “the rich”, who did not even ask these “poor fellows” to contribute economically, hence rejecting the latter’s full membership in the congregation (*cemiyet*) of the quarter. Through labouring in silence, the poor men passively incarnated the inequality reflected in a new sociability that had replaced the traditional mode as the principle of social organisation, just like Nora’s seashell left on the sandy beach.

Karakuyulu men were denied possession of historical knowledge as well as agency as social actors within the dominant discourse of the *worqs*, who regarded themselves as the only legitimate inheritors of History. The drinkers constituted a muted category, whose memories remained unasked for. They asserted the legitimacy of their sense of belonging to a community with its own history and their sense of male agency through embodied acts and sensory experiences in drinking sessions without recourse to elaborate verbal accounts.

“Tradition” (*gelenek*) was one of the categories through which people establish and negotiate the relevance of the past to the present. Though *gelenek* literally denoted “that which has come down to the present”, the frequent use of the word indicated people’s ambition to establish new traditions, and thus to connect past, present and future (see Ch. 5). Alcohol drinking had become an instrument that enabled the better-off farmers to reconstitute social reality in the village and recover their membership of the ethnic community. This commensal occasion had provided a cultural resilience with which they reshaped their society in resistance to the articulated discourses of History that disempowered them, without breaking away from the communal past completely. Drinking sessions offered occasions for commensal gatherings, which attached alternative meanings to manhood, registering a new hierarchy experienced as a discontinuity from certain aspects of the past by “the rich” and as a continuity with History by “the poor”.

Wealthy Karakuyulu men’s attempt to recover their share of the Circassian national past resulted in “re-covering” (Zerubavel 1996: 8-9) the voice of those people on whom silence remains imposed. This implied a more egalitarian society, which the affluent section of the slave village, the richest in Uzunyayla, imagined in order to replace past social relations, in which ascribed status had counted for much more than acquired identity. Historical memories re-lived in commensal drinking thus promoted the reconstitution of society, producing a new foundation for organising social life in the affluent village. The society was “re-membered” (Cole 1998) in social practice. However, this new configuration, which could be attributed in part to the effects of the Land Distribution implemented by the state in the 1950s (see Ch. 5), restricted who could participate in the currently dominant form of sociability.

## Chapter 8 Memories of Huta: Re-construction of the Past through Memory

### [1] Introduction: Abaza Hajji Huta

In the light of insights gained in the previous chapter, I shall read some memories (*hatıra*) of the controversial words and deeds of an outstanding ex-slave, Abaza Hajji Huta, who spent the second half of his life in Karakuyu. I shall explore some ways in which this distinguished personality appropriated the dominant meanings of the *worqs*' discourse and presented fresh narratives, which allowed him to re-compose the past and to reconstruct social and historical representations.

In this chapter, in place of the *worqs*' memories, which silenced Huta (see Ch. 6), I shall examine the memories of Huta presented by Karakuyulus (see Figure 3) in the light of alternating images of achieving integrity and disintegration. I shall interpret memories of *lafs* that Huta tossed into the male field of power so as to declare himself a social actor and to pose challenges to others. I shall also look at Karakuyulus' own efforts to create new narratives of history, generating positive meanings and empowering experiences in spite of the dominant discourse. These attempts were made possible partially by the "fabulous tales" that Huta left for them as "a repertoire of tactics for future use" in their everyday practice, through which they could "reverse the relationships of power" (De Certeau 1984: 23). Huta's stories served as "weapons of the weak against the reality" (ibid.) of the order established by *worq* historiography with its dominant social categories.

Huta was known to have been an ex-slave of Abaza origin, who had been "sold off seven times" or had "served seven doors" before his liberation. He was born in 1290 (1873) according to the village census book. The way he achieved his freedom was not known precisely, though *worqs* agreed that he belonged to the last group of ex-slaves to do so. His frequent changes of "doors" were accounted for by his "rebellious spirit" (*isyancı ruhu*). After freedom, he married the much younger widow of his deceased elder brother, herself from one of the Jenak's slave families in the Lower Quarter of Karakuyu, and settled in her natal village. His grandsons in the village said that he brought with him his first son (b. 1919) still in a cradle, as well as the only son (b. 1913) left by the brother. From this, it can be inferred that he moved to Karakuyu when he was in his mid forties. This almost coincided with the transition from the late Ottoman regime – the slave trade was banned in 1907 – to the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, when the legal demise of slavery was said to have finally begun to have a substantive effect in these Anatolian hinterlands. He was to spend the next thirty years in Karakuyu.

Before his liberation, Huta was a robust horse-herdsman (*yılıkcı*). He travelled many times between Uzunyayla and the Çukurova plain in Adana, leading a large herd (*yılki*) of mares. After settling in Karakuyu, he became one of the wealthiest men in the village, blessed with four more sons born of two co-wives (b. 1886 and 1894 respectively) as well as an industrious nature. According to his descendants, he owned fifty to seventy horses and three flocks of sheep and employed five or six men as farm hands in his heyday during the 1940s-50s. He owned six hundred *dönüms* (sixty ha.) of arable land and another four hundred fifty *dönüms* were allocated to his sons under the Land Reform in 1953. After his sons grew up he dedicated himself to waiting on guests in his guest room. He went on the haj pilgrimage in his later years before he died in Karakuyu in the late 1950s. A Karakuyulu man described him as "a man who slept and got up with both slaves and *worqs*". Most of his stories unfolded within the context of his rich web of social relations.

His lifetime was remembered, and his words and deeds were interpreted, in diverse ways, even more than forty years after his death. Concerning the fact that this horse-herdsman accumulated huge assets in a relatively short period of time, some Karakuyulu *worqs* heard that he stole money from his master, who died in Adana on a journey with the horses. Present members of the master's lineage dismissed this rumour, though they said that Armenian robbers killed one of their ancestors in Adana.

The contested evaluation of his life was clearly reflected in the opposing attitudes taken by his two living sons towards their memories of their father. The second wife's son (b. 1929), who was left in the village, totally refused to talk to me about his father, saying "I did not hear or

see anything about my father. I do not know anything about him”. The youngest son (b. 1939), who lived in Ankara, invited me to his house and spent a whole day talking about his memories of his father (see *Haturas* 3 and 7). One of the first *Karakuyulus* with a university education, he was now a high-ranking civil engineer, living in a luxurious house next to the president of the Circassian Association, who was also an Abaza from Uzunyayla. The contrasting attitudes of these half-brothers show that their father was a controversial figure, and that there is no agreement about the significance for the present of his hard but fascinating life.

It was not easy to get *Karakuyulus* to talk about Huta. Many revealed confusion about how they should relate their memories. They hesitated a while before making up their minds about the kind of historical narrative in which to locate their memory fragments, regardless of whether they were to run him down as an uncultured *nouveau riche* slave or to praise him as a “man of society”. The evaluation of the period of drastic changes that Huta incarnated was yet to be settled. Recalling his memory offered the speakers an opportunity to compare his time and the present and to contemplate how they are linked to each other.

Below, I look at episodes centred on Huta’s unsettling *lafıs*, presented by *Karakuyulus*. These memories enabled me to reconsider the dominant mode in which historical representations were produced. In fact, these stories led me to think long and hard, and greatly affected the overall argument of my thesis, which emerged from a highly reflexive process.

*Hatura* was a notion that bridged two aspects of memory: memory as mnemonic objects and memory as oral accounts. In this chapter I weave memories of Huta into a single narrative, aiming to retrace his long journey of self-salvation: he endowed memory objects, which made him recall his past through the memories embodied in them, with new meaning, and recomposed these *haturas* to undo that disempowering past, first as objects and consequently as historical narratives. Huta tried to dismantle that past by disintegrating piece by piece those objects that constituted his memories, and thus to dislocate the significance of the past. By doing this, he worked out a new set of positive meanings that allowed him to “get by” and shape his life situation to his own advantage.<sup>121</sup>

The four different *haturas* presented below are so ordered as to allow a single narrative to emerge throughout the chapter: first, the *hatura* of the cigarettes demonstrates how the past was materialised in an object; second, the *hatura* of the barn shows that manipulation of a mnemonic object affected the memory objectified in it; third, the *hatura* of the guest-room door demonstrates that memory as such served as a tool for destabilising the dominant narrative and for constituting an alternative; and, finally, the *hatura* of the pancakes focuses on an aspect of memory as something produced towards the future. All together, these episodes featuring Huta form a narrative that reveals how people used the dual nature of memory to dislocate their disempowering past and reconstruct the past in an empowering image in their everyday practices.

My attempt may salvage the voices of *Karakuyulus* that have been marginalized in *worqs*’ representations. In this sense, this chapter is a collaboration, over space and time, between Huta the heretic figure, the many *Karakuyulus* deprived of the right to speak, and myself, with my own painful memories of contributing to their mutedness.

## **[2] Reconstruction of the Past through Materialised Memories**

Many memories of Huta were stories in which his remarks caused a disturbance in a public space. These words not only won recognition as *lafıs* among his contemporaries, but still held significance among present-day generations. These *lafıs* revealed Huta’s unique personality and manifested his challenge to others. He was remembered as not having had any “inferiority complex” (*kompleks*) regarding his lowly origins and as never having denied his slave origins. By recounting his well-remembered *lafıs*, people expressed their praise for his having countered challenges posed by others in more advantageous social positions and as having turned these

---

<sup>121</sup> See Roseman (1996) and McEachern (1998) for other cases of manipulating everyday situations through memory work.

threats into opportunities to demonstrate his own greater social potency, the prime condition for a real man.

*Worqs* usually ascribed certain attributes to slaves. In contrast, Huta's *lafs* conveyed his idiosyncratic character and demanded that people value him as a man recognised as an extraordinary figure. As the manner of alcohol drinking revealed, what counted in significant sites of male interaction was not the passivity with which one accepted an embarrassing name, nor a reliance on inherited noble status, but the assertiveness with which one actively distinguished oneself from other actors and became prominent among them.

During the thirty years Huta spent in Karakuyu, many famed *worq* families still lived there and many *xexes worqs* settled there with their maternal or affinal relatives. Karakuyu then had a reputation as a "*worq* village", alongside the title of slave village retained to the present. Huta seems to have become a key target of slander, as a *xexes* freed slave, richer than most of these *worqs*. His youngest son mentioned that his father was opposed to the village all through his life. The fact that in this adverse environment Huta tossed a number of bold *lafs* that were remembered to the present day, illuminates his defiant disposition and determination not to withdraw from the male arena. Resisting the order of the *worq* village required dismissing the humiliating names imposed by those who excelled in employing the dominant discourse for their own ends, and making known one's counter-challenges to them. This was an act of protruding into the field of power to make society utter one's own name as a real man.

In their attempt to prevent the painful past from returning to affect the present, young Karakuyulu men swore at it, to turn it into an object on which their manly acts could be performed. Huta materialised the past more substantially through the use of a series of memory objects that bound him to humiliating memories. The *worqs*' discourses turned slave descendants into mnemonic objects. They disclosed a sense of self-alienation in public space, conjuring up the "feudal" past in which masters exercised absolute authority over their slaves' fate. They re-enacted the history of humiliation that their ancestors had undergone and embodied their own past poverty as well as present hardships. Their bodies were transformed into signs, which merely delivered already-encoded messages.

Huta did not simply communicate these static representations. He manipulated memory objects and created novel meanings that disquieted History. He re-constituted the existing representations that threatened to submerge him in the dominant narrative. Huta materialised the past in some physical objects, subjecting them to a variety of tactical operations including disposal, exchange, restoration, disassembly and re-assembly.<sup>122</sup> He used these tangible symbols of the past to dislocate the prevalent narratives and to negotiate his relation with the past. These demonstrations forced people to reconsider History and enabled them to keep history open-ended, susceptible to continual re-evaluations and contestation in the light of the ever-changing present.

Young Karakuyulu men invoked a gendered image of breakup to deny the relevance of the past to the present. In the memories they presented, Karakuyulu speakers had Huta go even further; they had Huta use these mnemonic tools figuratively to reconstruct narratives that related the past to the present. This stimulated the re-examination of grand narratives, including my own attempt to re-appreciate the historical stories recounted by Karakuyulus in hesitation. The first half of this thesis demonstrated that *worqs* produced History by editing a number of social events, weaving them into a specific plot within a framework that made history take place; memories of Huta allowed the creation of a new story in which the past was re-connected to the present and the future – a "poesis", not unlike a process of creation which Lambek (1998) found in the performance of religious rituals in a different context.

### 1) Cigarettes: Materialising the Past

---

<sup>122</sup> Kuchler (1987; 1988) and Battaglia (1992; 1993) are seminal works on the use of objects to produce memories and to facilitate forgetting, respectively. Also see Mines and Weiss (eds.) (1997), on the diverse ways of disposing objects to forget.

*Hatura 3:* Huta's youngest son spent a whole day telling me (the present author) his memories of his father: "My father was a slave. I am not. I have no inferiority complex.... All the 'prestige' (*saygınlık*: lit. respectedness) we have won (*kazanmak*) in our country comes from education. Those in the village are uncultured (*kültürsüz*).... My father was a horse-herdsman, not a shepherd. Not everybody can lead a horse herd. My father was a strong man.... My father resisted the village all through his life. He never tolerated a lie and never hesitated to reproach wrongs. So my father may not have been 'loved', though many people showed him 'respect'. We grew up in 'esteem' (*saygınlık*). I do not have any shame about my father".

I asked for some of Huta's *laf*s he knows. He hesitated for a moment. Urged by his wife, also from an ex-slave family which had served the same Abaza prince lineage as Huta, he said: "They said my father told Gazi bey of the Hatukoshoko 'Give me a little of your nobility (*asalet*). I will give you a packet of cigarettes'". All three of us giggled in embarrassment at the absurdity of the story, nonetheless feeling some sense of relief at the same time.

*Hatura 4:* The Mertez was a lord lineage which first settled in Kars, leading their village. During the Russo-Ottoman War they re-migrated together to Uzunyayla. Here, they became very poor and sold a number of slave girls to the slave market in Istanbul. A girl who later would become Huta's second wife was one of them. Mertez Mahmut was a very poor man. One day, Huta came across a Turkish shepherd of the *Mertez-ey*. He took a bank note out of his pocket and gave it to the shepherd, saying "Give this five lira to Mahmut bey". Looking at the bank note, the shepherd replied, "This is not a five-lira note. It is a ten-lira note". Five lira was a vast amount of money at that time. Nobody walked about with five lira in his pocket. Huta had ten lira. He said, "You are an honest man. It does not matter. Buy some cigarettes for Mahmut bey with this money".

(An elderly Karakuyulu man, from a non-slave family)

In *Hatura 3*, Huta confronted an old man (Gazi bey) from the Hatukoshoko, locally known as the highest-ranking princely lineage of Kabardians, and pressed him to exchange a "little portion" (*biraz*) of his noble status for cigarettes. On resettling in Ottoman territory, the "prince of princes" family was given vast plots of land in various parts of Anatolia, including a farm on the Çukurova plain in Adana and another in Altınovaş, Tokat. The family also founded two villages in Uzunyayla that were named after them, including Yahyabey, or Old Hatukoshoko-ey, location of the first brideprice meeting in the 1960s.

When Gazi bey's elder brother, Musost bey, married in 1899, an enormous wedding procession (*nusasha*) of mounted *worqs* fetched the bride, a daughter of the Marshal (*Müşür*) Karzek Süleyman, all the way from Erzincan in Eastern Turkey. All the participants were leading figures of prominent *worq* lineages, from all the Circassian villages in the region. The local narrators gave me varying estimations of the number of participants, ranging from 60 to 300. The girl died after a few years, and Musost bey died childless, which left Gazi bey the only male member of the lineage. Later on, this "last prince in Uzunyayla" became impoverished and sold off all his land. As an old man, he made it a custom to spend some summer months in Uzunyayla every year, staying with close friends from famed *worq* families.

According to one old Karakuyulu man, the young Huta accompanied this legendary procession to look after the horses – an episode that demonstrates how much he was trusted as a skilful horse-herdsman. This wedding procession serves as a background for Huta's future re-encounter with the "last bey" many decades later, during a period of drastic social change in which the life situation of these two contemporaries altered completely.

*Worqs* presented nobility as an inherent quality of people born into aristocratic families, which could not be alienated from their person. They still demanded that slaves show respect to this inborn quality that they monopolised. In contrast, slaves were perceived as lesser persons with impaired integrity. Slaves had lost the qualities of "freemen" (*hür*) such as autonomy and dignity, regarded as conditions for full membership of the local Circassian society, which Meeker summarized as "honour" in a different context (1996: 51-52). *Worqs* also saw slave men as

robbed of “honour” because their female family members, over whom they were expected to extend their protection, were sold off.

Huta was said to have served seven different *kapis* before liberation, repeatedly passing through the “commodity phase” (Appadurai 1986), followed by a period of re-socialization. Besides, Huta belonged to the “meanest” (*en adi*) group of slaves, who gained freedom with the gradual disappearance of slavery in the late Ottoman to early Republican period, and who were wittily termed by a local man “super slaves” (*süper köle*). Huta’s second wife was moreover from a slave family bound to the *Mertez*, the *worq* lord lineage in *Hatıra 4*. She was a *saraylı* woman, who had once been sold off to the slave market in Istanbul but returned to *Uzunyayla* upon the closure of Ottoman harems. Later, she stayed in *Karakuyu* with her elder brother, an *efendi* who had received a high-level religious education at *al Azhar* in Cairo (see Ch. 2), who was serving as an imam in the Lower Quarter. She eloped with Huta and became his second wife in a polygamous marriage. For *worqs*, Huta was a slave of the lowest rank, deprived of honour in a double sense.

This normative discourse served as a context which gave sense to the past that Huta intended to materialise in cigarettes. Huta pressed the prince to exchange a small part of his nobility for a packet of cigarettes. *Asalet* is a word of Arabic origin associated with many other words sharing the basic meaning of “rootedness”. It is derived from an Arabic verb, *اصل* (*aSula*), which denotes “to be/become firmly rooted”, “to be firmly established” and “to be of noble origin”. *Asalet* shares that base with another word *asil* (n.: origin, root; adj.: real, inherent) and means a state of being firmly rooted in the past (*asil*: of noble origin), stressing a continuity of “generations” (*nesil*) extending from the remote past. *Asalet* also implies the title of guardian of the “authentic manner” (*usul*<sup>123</sup>), or *Adyghe xabze*, regarded as the foundation of Circassian customs (*âdet*). Circassian customs were not only often referred to as *worq* customs, but were constructed as such through the intricate connection amongst these frequently mentioned words that commonly stressed inherent “rootedness”, though most men were not aware of how these notions were linked etymologically.

In the two episodes above, Huta gave cigarettes to two different lords. He offered them something as material and inherently worthless as a “pack of fags” in exchange for their supreme and inestimable value (honour and nobility), thereby challenging that value. By telling these stories, it seemed, the *Karakuyulu* speakers wanted to have Huta say “Have a pack of fags, that’s all your claim to honour is worth” – a message many people from lower-to-middle status families usually could not articulate, or perhaps more precisely did not bother to voice partly because they knew that everybody accepted its truthfulness, more or less.

Huta suggested the commensurability of *asalet* with cigarettes. This equation of the intrinsic attribute of a noble person with a commodity reversed the picture of the relatively recent age of poverty when slaves were masters’ disposable property, often traded for “three scoops of wheat”. Here, *asalet* was not an inherent quality inseparable from a *worq*’s person, but an alienable object, which could be divided, measured, acquired, exchanged, lost and bought. Huta urged the lord to turn his *asalet* into a partible commodity, aiming to recover his own personhood from the alienation he experienced as a frequently commodified slave.

*Worqs*’ accounts portrayed Huta as a slave deprived of the honour of a full person. Huta pushed the prince for the exchange that would enable him to restore his flawed personhood. The cigarettes were offered in exchange to detach *asalet* from the prince’s person as alienable substance. The cigarettes were made to stand for the age of poverty when some men were nothing more than other persons’ property, or an idealised social order that *worqs* referred to as *Adygagya*. The exchange Huta demanded would allow ex-slaves to regain the honour and genealogical depth they were denied as the “rootless”.

Based on the insights on commensality gained in the previous chapter, I offer another possible way to analyse the significance of Huta’s cigarettes in these two memories. First, the differentiating effect of cigarettes, recognised by the locals, needs to be explained. As almost the

---

<sup>123</sup> In Arabic, *usul* (اصول) is the plural form of *asil* (اصل).

only alcoholic drink consumed in male gatherings in Karakuyu, *rakı* had a homogenising effect. By contrast, with a greater variety of brands and a wider price range (imported Marlboro for instance, was four times more expensive than the Turkish *Birinci*), cigarettes served to differentiate people. Like *rakı*, cigarettes were often exchanged between men, just as one offered them to a friend, a guest or even to a stranger. They were reciprocated in a generalised manner within a wide and diffuse circle of local men, not restricted to a particular village tearoom. But, unlike *rakı*, cigarettes, thus offered, were frequently turned down. Men usually explained this rejection by stressing the brand they habitually smoked, often taking out a packet from a shirt pocket: "I don't smoke anything but Marlboro". Taste was the significant medium through which local men enacted their economic inequality as a difference in everyday consumption and cultural orientation (see Bourdieu 1986).

*Rakı* belonged to the domain of male actions ("tossing" or "taking"), by which the recognition of male equality was performatively produced. Just like the tea that a host offered to a guest in his guesthouse, cigarettes belonged to the realm of social actions ("eating" or "drinking") in which inequality was created in terms of two opposing roles, active or passive, played by different partners, whose dyadic interaction was forcibly made into a relationship between the "feeder" and the "fed" in the idiom of commensality. Cigarette smoke was a floating substance, which summoned and consolidated a person's identity in an interaction, in which the person who offered a cigarette induced the other to "drink" or "take in" (*içmek*) the fluid. At the same time, this causative act made power visible by producing an image that wrecked the autonomy presumed to be the essence of the other's personhood.

The everyday exchange of cigarettes and the refusal to accept them turned an unequal distribution of resources into an observable social distance, though a young Karakuyulu man from a poor, former slave family emphasised the quality of cigarettes as a shared commodity, saying they were the only luxury people<sup>124</sup> in the village could enjoy. This understanding of cigarettes as a material idiom employed in the interpersonal politics of "eating", "drinking" and "making someone eat or drink", seemed to serve as a social as well as cultural context in which the Karakuyulu speakers related their memories of Huta's cigarettes.

Huta challenged the lords by offering cigarettes. He attempted to forcefully dismantle their inborn status, pressing them to accept new identities that reflected the shift in the set of values and qualities generative of everyday interactions. This confrontation made one reconsider whether it was really the male relatives of the slave girl whose honour was ruined by her sale, as History insisted. It could equally be her master, who became too poor to fulfil his responsibility to provide his slaves with protection and provision in return for their service, in the love-respect exchange. Materialising the past metaphorically in cigarettes, Huta compelled a revision of History.

These lords' responses to Huta's challenges were not remembered. They failed to leave behind a single memory concerning whether they accepted Huta's cigarette and smoked or "drank" it. Even if they rejected the cigarette, one may still wonder whether it was because the cigarette Huta offered was not to their taste, or because they could not "make their pride/self-esteem accept" (*gururuna/kibrine yedirmek*: lit. to feed one's pride) the disgrace of receiving a cigarette from a former slave of the lowest category. For the prince, Huta was a slave horse-herdsman, hired from his master to serve the *worq* attending his brother's wedding procession; for the *worq* lord, Huta was the husband of a sub-human slave girl, whom his family once treated as a disposable and transferable object. These two lords failed to counter Huta's confrontation by tossing back a memorable *laf*, impregnated with their manful determination to distinguish themselves as unique persons of great social capacity. These two episodes were not stories of the fall of celebrated lords, but related monumental social events in which Huta was the protagonist.

There were many stories about the miserable end of insolvent lords. These lords were not the producers of history, but its passive victims, who could not adapt to shifts in

---

<sup>124</sup> Smoking cigarettes was far from restricted to men among local Circassians.

the principle of social organisation and economic activity. The “last bey” of Uzunyayla was known to have made vain efforts to continue to behave as the “prince of princes” by giving away money to poor people in the region. This money was collected from wealthy *worqs* and covertly inserted into a jacket pocket at night. A local man said, “He was the kind of person who would kill sheep to feed others while he does not have a chicken for himself”. Through demonstrating generosity to fulfil his *noblesse oblige*, this ruined prince embodied an irony in which the incongruity between appearance and reality was made explicit.

In many villages, destitute lords of the past were not recognised as social actors with the capacity to change the course of history. They were often portrayed as high-minded persons above everyday trivial concerns. This made a remarkable contrast to Huta, who was always remembered as actively engaged in social relations. Some poverty-stricken local princes were said to have maintained their dignity even on their deathbeds. This image was, however, subsumed into legendary tales of heroes, which deprived these princes of uniqueness. This homogeneity, which treated princes and lords as almost identical characters in similar stories, also presented a striking contrast to Huta’s singularity, brought to the fore in memories related by Karakuyulus.

When I retold the story of this re-encounter of the “super slave” with the “prince of princes”, it provoked rejections from a number of *worq* elders who had known the prince personally in their youth. They tried to rationalise Huta’s *laf* by saying that it was only a product of the ignorance of a man who “spent all his life among horses, away from civilisation”. One of the elders stated that the story could not have been true, since the *worqs* around the prince would not have allowed Huta to toss such raw words at him. He attempted to silence the rebellious slave retrospectively and to reinforce the mutedness of slaves, drawing on the *worqs*’ typical self-image as the “cavalry” (*şövalye*) guarding the prince, an image clearly reproduced in the memory of the gigantic wedding procession. *Worqs* nostalgically retold the story of the century-old event, which their ancestors attended. This event embodied the time-passed of *Adygagya*, in which a prince was a real prince, and *worqs* were his armed horsemen. Huta was also in the group of mounted men, but he was not a constitutive part of the “cavalry”; he was there solely to look after the horses. An elderly man from the Abaza lord family to which Huta was born said, “The story the son told you cannot be true. He does not know about his father well since he was still very small”. Here, as a descendent of Huta’s ex-master, he claimed to monopolise the right to tell Huta’s true story, treating memories of Huta as part of his inheritance.

Huta’s son exhibited a sharp contrast to these *worqs*. He founded his claim to the status of rightful speaker upon his own social success, which had apparently wiped away the “inferiority complex” usually attributed to slave descendants. *Worqs* did not feel it necessary to define themselves as other than *worqs* to gain the right of speech. The son turned to an explicit differentiation from others he called “uncultured”, including his elder half-brother who opted to remain silent about his father’s life, and this supported his sense of being qualified as a legitimate narrator. By this, he formed a bridge between himself and his father, who also struggled to establish himself as a unique social actor through his own prowess, industriousness, determination and ingenuity. This shared sense of capacity linked the agent in the narrative event with the agent in this narrated event.<sup>125</sup> His self-confidence enabled the speaker to reject “love” from the superior others, and to transform “respect” from a negative honour carried in *worqs*’ blood and lineage name, an honour one could only lose, to a positive honour one could only “win” and “acquire” through one’s own extraordinary achievements.

The speaker’s intention, which made him a protagonist in the present event, also made him portray Huta as a social actor endowed with his own consciousness: a fifty-

---

<sup>125</sup> See Bauman (1986: 6) for insight into the interplay of the performance of narration and the past event recounted in this event of narration.

year-old event regained the quality of a significant social action (see Barth 1992: 21-24), which offered the speaker a means to rearrange the dominant representation of society. Huta's defiant *laf*s forcefully registered the recognition of drastic social change on people's memories. The above-mentioned descendent of Huta's former master elaborated on this perception, which was not articulated in Karakuyulus' memories of Huta's cigarette:

I saw Huta as my real uncle. I never discriminated against him because of his slave status. I "loved" him very much as my uncle. I cannot talk about him, since his son [the elder son in the village] did not talk. The only thing I can tell you is that, whichever *worqs* were in Karakuyu in his time, Huta was a superior *worq* to any of them. Whoever they were, all the *worqs* in Karakuyu were left in need of Huta's help. None of them possessed money to pay tax during the period of CHP single party rule. All of them borrowed from Huta. Some of them returned the money to him. Others never paid back their debts. Now that Huta is dead, their debts are forgotten.

Memories of Huta's cigarette that Karakuyulus related to me led me to reconsider in what way "nobility" retained its significance for the current generations of local Circassians. The above account echoes the common saying, which I frequently heard among locals, "The *worq* is the one who is a real man". Here, nobility was not an exclusive quality attributed only to those born to prestigious families: strongly associated with manliness, nobility here concerned how firmly you were "rooted" in the local society, which was the original meaning of *asalet*.

## 2) The Barn: Dislocating and Reconstituting the Past

*Hatura 5*: The Abaza princely family to which Huta was born sold him off to another Abaza princely family. This family, which produced the first mayor of Pınarbaşı, used to have a luxurious house in the town with six wooden-floored and panelled rooms. Later on, the family declined and had to put a barn up for sale. In his childhood, Huta was frequently tied to its pillars by a rope as a punishment for his misbehaviour. Learning that the barn was up for sale, Huta hired 12 oxcarts. Though I was still small, I could drive a cart. So I accompanied them. Huta had the barn dismantled (*bozmaq*). He had the wooden beams and columns loaded onto the carts and carried to Karakuyu. He had it re-built here. I heard that Huta said, "Thank God! I pulled it down (*yıkmak*). How many times they tied me up in the barn! How many times they beat me! Finally, I am redeemed (*kurtarılmak*)". I was not present there, but everybody said so. His *laf* became so famous, and I heard that he later prohibited mentioning it. The barn is left for his son and is still called "Huta's barn".

(An elderly Karakuyulu man, from a non-slave family)

In this section, I focus on the active re-constitution of the past through decomposing and re-assembling a memory object. The narrator was an old Karakuyulu man (b. 1922), whose lineage was not recognised as having a particularly prestigious status. As he said he was still a child, this event ought to date back to the mid 1930s.

The story that Huta purchased the barn when his ex-master's family declined, and had it transported to Karakuyu, 30-40 km away, was well known. Usually, along with fields and pastures, barns (*ahır*) were associated with slaves' animal-like labour. They sharply contrasted with guest rooms, where *worqs* who relied on slaves' sweat busied themselves with their flamboyant social life.

The spectacle of a large parade, consisting of twelve oxcarts, loaded with piles of thick juniper timbers, passing through a number of villages, plus Huta himself, who was not remembered as ever having dismounted his fully-harnessed horse – all this evoked a vivid image of the wedding procession that fetches the bride and brings her to the groom's village, an important Circassian custom which continues today.

This "bride taking" (*nusa sha*) symbolised ritually a dual process in which the bride's past social relations were made to converge into a visible and tangible form and were then disintegrated, while new social relations were formed. The procession carried a trousseau

prepared by the bride's family with help from relatives, neighbours and friends, which represented the girl's position in a social network formed around her natal family. The oxcart on which the bride was carried in the past, now replaced by an automobile, was covered by a *gosha teypha* (lit. "princess" + "cover"), a red cloth with white borders, about a meter square. According to a knowledgeable old man, the white signified that the bride was "clean" (*temiz*), which meant that her "hymen" was not "open" (*açık*), and the red signified blood: this *gosha teypha* symbolised the integrity of the girl's person, often referred to as her *namus* (female sexual honour).

While this procession was passing villages on the way, the youth of these villages pursued it on horseback, attempting to snatch the *gosha teypha* and ride away. The young guards of the bride protected the symbol of the girl's *namus* from these attacks. The dramatised horseback chase enacted the difficulty of protecting the girl's *namus*, thus increasing its value. This integrity of the girl's person was dismantled when her hymen was broken by the groom as the marriage was consummated on the same night. The fluid substance shed across her bodily boundaries registered a man's potency exerted upon her body. Her identity underwent a re-definition heteronomously in the light of her new relation with the man who now provided her with "love".

All the items of the girl's trousseau used to be given away as gifts to women of the groom's family, relatives and neighbours, except her headgear (*taç*). All her clothes and accessories, including the rings she wore as a maiden, were distributed as mementos, or memory objects (*hatıra*) inalienable from her "self" (*hatır*).<sup>126</sup> The giving away of the bride's personal belongings as keepsakes symbolised the dismantling of the past social relations that constituted the girl as a social person. This simultaneously facilitated her incorporation into new social relations amongst women who received the fragments of her divided self. Here, images of disintegration of the past, as well as those of shaping the future, were actively produced through a ritual-like process. The bride whose person was thus disintegrated, both physically and socially, went through reconstitution as a new person, a locus at which two social networks were linked.

Huta had the barn, his memory object, broken down into its basic components. As if selecting materials of the new past to be reconstituted, he had its thick timbers loaded upon oxcarts, leaving the stones and clay as a ruin, now signifying the fall of the prince family. He then had these usable elements carried through Uzunyayla like a wedding procession. He had the barn re-assembled in Karakuyu, like the person of a bride that went through a ritualised reconstitution. He, thus, dismantled the disempowering past and constituted another story. For Huta, the past, to which he was still bound by haunting memories, seemed to have been associated with the barn in which he was frequently tied up in his servile childhood.

Huta's own words, "Finally I am redeemed" (*Artık kurtarıldım*), clearly defined the context in which this episode should be read. The original form of that verb, *kurtarmak*, has some mutually connected meanings: 1) to save, to salvage; 2) to recover something pawned; and, 3) to redeem something lost. In this memory of Huta's salvation, the disassembly and the re-assembly of the barn, a physical metaphor of his slave past, amounted to the disintegration of his memories and the re-constitution of the past composed of them.

The purchase had a great significance for him as "redemption" from the experience of being sold off and cut off from natal ties (three of his brothers died in the villages to which they were sold), shackled as he was to the past by memories of having been bound to the barn. He "bought back" his own lost personhood, that is, the integrity of his own person, which had been impaired through repeated commodification. He "recovered" from the status of a lesser person, "recuperating" his person as a full social being. He "restored" the honour he had been deprived of and "reacquired" full citizenship in local Circassian society. This experience chimes with the

---

<sup>126</sup> The Turkish idea of memento, in which one's person (*hatır*) and memories (*hatıra*) of that person are inseparable, reminds me of the Japanese idea of *katami*, keepsakes distributed among the relatives of a deceased person. It is customary to transcribe *katami* with two Chinese letters signifying "image" (*kata*) and "look"/"see" (*mi*). However, it is semantically as well as phonetically possible to understand *katami* also as composed of two different words, denoting "fragment" (*kata*) and "body"/"self" (*mi*). Actually, *katami* carries both meanings, i.e. as an object in which one can see the image of the deceased, and as a fragment of the self of the deceased. Turkish idea of *hatıra* also seems to have both meanings, though it is not associated particularly with objects left when someone dies.

“regaining” of the roots denied to slaves in the two earlier episodes, in which he demanded “rootedness” in exchange for cigarettes. By all these, Huta underwent “self-salvation” from *ezilmişlik*, a flaw in one’s personal quality caused by the memories of suffering, which *worqs* claimed all former slaves and their descendants received from their unknown ancestors (see Ch. 6), who had been enslaved and thus deprived of the privileges that only freepersons enjoyed.

Karakuyulus remembered Huta as the person who held *mevlût* gatherings for the communal recitation of commemorative poems (*kaside*) and hymns (*ilahi*) more often than anybody else in the region. *Mevlût* was a formal recital of a medieval Turkish poem (*Mevlût Şerif*) by Süleyman Çelebi, held to honour the soul of a newly deceased member of the family which organised the gathering. This long poem concerned the birth and life of Muhammad. The narrative climaxed in the Prophet’s miraculous journey to heaven (the Miraj), where his appeal for human salvation was granted by God (Tapper and Tapper 1987: 75. See also n. 109 above).

When somebody died in Karakuyu, the family of the deceased usually organised a small *mevlût* gathering in their house for three consecutive nights after evening prayer (*yatsı namazı*). During my stay in the village, well-off families also held larger *mevlût* gatherings in the mosque on the 40th or 52nd day after the death of a family member. Further, better-off families sometimes held *mevlût* for the salvation of the souls of their ancestors as a whole, at any time of the year and not directly connected to the death of a particular person.

These commemorative ceremonies were usually attended by over one hundred people, comprising relatives, friends, fellow villagers (mostly male household heads) and several imams serving in neighbouring Circassian villages, as well as the imams from two separate quarters of Karakuyu.<sup>127</sup> These imams, often Circassians of local origin, served as cantors, who separately recited chapters of *Mevlût Şerif*, verses (*ayet*) of the Qur’an or prayers (*dua*). All the other participants responded to the cantors’ recitation with a term of agreement, “*Amin!*” (So be it!), demonstrating their wish for the redemption of those for whose souls these eulogies were read. They also joined in *zikir* (“remembrance”), in which the name of God was recited collectively – “There is no god but Allah” – 70,000 times in total. These large gatherings, which lasted for about one hour and closed with the midday prayer (*öğle namazı*), were always followed by a period of intense commensality. The closest neighbours usually helped the host serve meals for the guests, inviting a portion of the guests, often a whole group from a particular village, to their houses.

Some locals told me that Islam did not allow slaves to be buried as Muslims, and that the fear of this segregation from the community of believers was overwhelming for slaves in the past. I heard a story of a manumitted slave who thanked his ex-master, saying “Finally, my body can be laid alongside other Muslims”. Given the fact that some locals still believed that the discrimination against slaves continued after their death, Huta’s devotional attitude towards having *mevlût* poem read for the redemption of his ancestors and brothers, who died as slaves without ever being freed, gains a further significance. Actually, the communal reading of the *mevlût* was regularly held for the repose of the souls of slaves who served in the Ottoman Palace (MacCallum 1943: 14).

In the *mevlût* ceremony, the local religious leaders recited the poem, communicating the message of salvation. Their appeals on behalf of Huta’s ancestors were joined by a large group of co-believers, including the members of all the households in the quarter, a congregation based on the mosque, who also embodied the social network of which Huta was the central locus. This seems to have ensured the ancestors’ redemption not only as spiritual beings but also as full social beings.

During my research, Huta’s pious acts were continued by his descendants, five households of which were left in the village. All of them were better off. One of Huta’s grandsons donated a

---

<sup>127</sup> All the large *mevlût ceremonies* I am aware of were actually held by wealthy families or lineages in the Upper Quarter. Also the mutual invitation for supper (*iftar yemeği*) during the Ramazan month was much more common there. A poor *xexes* man in the Upper Quarter, from a former slave family, said, “We have only a week left before the end of the Ramazan month. I ate supper at home only three times”. People in the Upper Quarter explained this disparity, saying “There are a lot of destitute people in the Lower Quarter”, or “Many people in the Lower Quarter do not speak each other”. A man in the Lower Quarter explained this by the shortage of young girls to serve the guests.

new barn for a Circassian imam, who replaced the Turkish imam of the mosque in his quarter. I heard that another grandson (the permanently drunken owner of the petrol station; see Ch. 7) had paid for the extension of the quarter's cemetery a few years earlier. Huta's descendants held a large *mevlût* recital for their ancestors every year, making other people remember Huta's meritorious deeds and their indebtedness to him, and inserted him anew into their current network of social ties.

I believe my analysis of the memories of Huta's salvation largely reflects Karakuyulus' own imagination; the comments of another grandson of his, the headmaster of the school in the village (see Ch. 2) appear to back up this belief. On the occasion of *mevlût* held by a different family following the death of an old woman, he explained the purpose of *mevlût* to me, saying:

All the good deeds you do in your life are counted as meritorious acts (*sevap*), and all the bad deeds as sins (*günah*). The "account book" (*defter*) in which your merits are registered closes on your death. The only thing your family can do for your soul is pray to Allah to forgive your sins. People are "indebted" (*borçlu*) to Allah for having created them and for allowing them to live on. Allah wants something from them in return (*karışlık*). Namely, the five pillars of Islam [the declaration of faith, the five daily ritual prayers, almsgiving, fasting, and the pilgrimage to Mecca], which you carry out to fulfil your promise to Allah.

In addition, to make atonement (*kefalet*) for your sins, you need to pay back your "debt" (*borç*) by having your family hold a *mevlût* gathering, make a sacrifice (*kurban*) and offer the meat to the poor at your funeral, and by having *mevlût* recited again on the 40th and 52nd days after your death. A sacrifice is offered because blood needs to be shed and a life given in "return" for your sins being forgiven on the Day of Judgement. The fresh meat is given away at the funeral and the meals are served at *mevlût*, so as to make people in the village forgive any bad feeling (*küskünlük*) that may have existed between you and them. Let them pray to Allah to forgive your sins, and say "*Âmin! Allah kabul etsin!*" (Amen! May God accept it!).

Though I never had an opportunity to ask him about his ancestors' slave past, the motif of human redemption was clearly articulated in his account, which also emphasized the importance of the help one received from other members of the community of co-believers for the expiation of one's sins and thus ultimately for one's salvation. Here, human spiritual redemption was made possible partly by social reconciliation with other Muslims, by which one's status as a full social being was ensured, or even recovered posthumously. In holding *mevlût*, Huta mobilised his social network to pray for the redemption, both spiritual and social, of his ancestors, which in turn served as a key factor in allowing them to recuperate a fully developed personhood (*şahsiyet*) denied to them in the dominant discourse. This restoration of person (*şahıs*) for his ancestors also served to recover his own personhood from the burden of *ezilmişlik*. Huta's descendants took over his endeavours, and continued to do so during my field research.

The above discussion of *mevlût* demonstrates that the salvation that Huta experienced through purchasing and reconstructing the barn can best be understood as part of his efforts to recover the qualities of free men – personhood, citizenship and honour – for his ancestors, who lost them. In this way, Huta's own *ezilmişlik*, the memories of oppression experienced in unknown past generations, was also effectively disintegrated and dispersed, which allowed him to enjoy a great sense of relief and liberation.

*Worq* discourse represented slave's memories as characterised by oblivion and silence. Slave descendants were supposed to forget their past, only to be reminded of it by a question which broke apart their personhood. Also, many Karakuyulu elders avoided reference to their past poverty, repressing memories of humiliating conditions in order to manage their life in the present. The past thus repressed, however, returned as an uneasy atmosphere and unhelpful attitudes towards my research on the history of the village. Current Karakuyulus presented the village as harmonious: for them, unwanted problems always came from outside, just like my research, to stir up the past of a society in which the people were content with its quietness. Taylor (1993) calls this passive not-remembering by repressing memories, "dis-remembering", which should not be confused with the more active and reflexive sense of "dis-remembering" (Carsten 1995) with which Huta was engaged here.

Huta came to terms with the past more skilfully and definitely, forbidding a return of the repressed. He dismantled the memory of having been tied up in the barn by disassembling the barn itself. Here, he was the agent of the memory practice who broke apart the materialised past by ruining its memory objects. Huta re-collected objects that continued to bind him to the burdensome past, to bring about a narrative of reconciliation with the past and the community. These physical memories included those directly related to his own personal experiences like this barn, and those with a collective quality connected to the History that *worqs* forced on slaves as a category like the *kapı* below. He manipulated, or even disposed of, these mnemonic objects to disintegrate the disempowering memories they incarnated.

Huta untangled memories of the slave past and reassembled the memory fragments into a new narrative of history. He re-constituted the past by incorporating changes in the narrative. He re-formed the past in the ever-changing present, sending the new story forward to the future with a fresh significance. This reflexive refiguring of the past can be compared with the active processes anthropologists have referred to as “re-membering” or “dis-remembering”. Here, forgetting was understood as an active disintegration of memories, which was deliberately aimed at reconstructing the social space one lived in.

Fifty years after his death, the barn still stood in Karakuyu, where it was called Huta’s barn. Above all, Karakuyu itself remained deeply associated with memories of his unique personality. It was even possible to hear old people in the region mention Karakuyu as “Huta’s village”. This fact itself was a great accomplishment, in the light of the naming practices among local Circassians, which entailed an obvious quality of social control (see Antoun 1968).<sup>128</sup> For descent groups derived from freed slaves, patronymics taken from their recent male ancestors or certain derogatory terms were commonly used as Circassian family names rather than established lineage names (*süilale ismi*), which Circassians called “extended family” names (*unagots’e*) in their language. The newness of these uneasy “nicknames” (*lakap*) served as a reminder signalling their recent slave past and that they merely appeared to form a separate descent group.

Huta’s current descendants were called “the Abaza”. This nickname registered the fact that they had shallow origins as a *xexes* family of a different ethnic group who had settled among Kabardians, disclosing their lack of an authentic lineage name traceable to the Caucasus. One of Huta’s deceased sons was reported to have once deplored, “We would still remain *xexes* in Karakuyu even after a hundred years”. Indeed, a *worq* man in the village voiced his recognition of their “rootlessness”: “Never mind! They are just Abazas. They came to the village only yesterday. Huta was the foreman of slaves. Only slaves exalt him. As *worq*, we do not want to talk about him”.

Names among Circassians, however, also served as vehicles for immortalising memories of outstanding individuals, serving as a register of one’s achievement in society (see also Parkin 1989; Weiss 1999). For instance, the majority of names of Kabardian princely lineages were said to have originated from distinguished figures produced by one and the same lineage of the legendary King Yinal of the fifteenth century (see Noghmuka 1974: 84-90). Names of many noble lineages known in Uzunyayla also had derived from first names of persons assumed to have been the founders of the lineages. This practice still had echoes in the tendency for socially successful local Circassians to change their Turkish family names to distinguish themselves from the rest of their lineage, a practice that I often observed among Karakuyulus. On the other hand, failed *worqs* often chose to cloak themselves with the fame of a celebrated branch or a reputed figure produced by the same lineage and thus remained entrenched in the us/them dichotomy authorised within History.

The fact that Karakuyu, founded as *Kundet-ey*, was now associated with memories of Huta was proof that he made himself accepted as a prominent personality without relying on inherited status. This was in striking contrast to his contemporary, a *worq* man (1878-1940) in Karakuyu, known to have possessed even greater wealth.<sup>129</sup> He was the only Karakuyulu man who could

---

<sup>128</sup> See also Kunt (1998) for the traces of slave origin left in the names of Ottoman high officers (*kapıkulu*).

<sup>129</sup> Part of the lineage of this man, Karakuyu’s wealthiest, settled in Sinop from the Caucasus. This section produced a man (Cevdet Kerim İncedayı 1893-1951) who was elected member of parliament five times, serving as Minister of Communication and Transport (1940-41) and as Minister of Public Works (1946-47)

afford to pay military exemption tax (*bedel*) of 200 lira in specie and escaped the draft in the *Seferberlik*. He was barely remembered, except for some episodes about houses and barns he usurped from women left without menfolk during the war.

As in many societies, wealth was evaluated, not by quantity, but according to the way it was used. Among the locals, one's engagement with society was the primary criterion for winning praise for one's success. The shift in perception that had made it possible for a drinker of slave origin to say, "This is Karakuyu, not Kundet-ey", may be credited partially to Huta's unprecedented words and deeds. Huta's actions in fact produced a cultural continuity with the past in that Circassian society had always regarded an outstanding figure highly, calling him a "man who makes society utter his name" or a "man of society".

The younger men in Karakuyu swore, "Let me fuck the past!", to finish off the past. They relied on their sense of male potency that allowed them to break an object into pieces. Huta used the same image of dismantling, not merely to deny the relevance of the past to the present, but to reshape the past. This did not merely send away the past beyond the horizon of the present, but attached fresh meanings to the past in the light of the fluid present. In this way, stories of Huta destabilised the static framework of History and provided the possibility of a new narrative that connected the past to the present and also linked it to the future. Huta's memories thus provided Karakuyulus with fabulous tales they could utilise as resources in resisting and debunking the elite discourse.

This is illustrated by the fact that many Karakuyulu said to me, "You should have come in 'the time of Huta'. He would never have left you alone". The age of Huta coincided with a period in which Karakuyu was reputed for the presence of a large number of noted *worq* families. Nonetheless, many present Karakuyulus remembered the period through the representations of this outstanding ex-slave man, who clearly registered his marks in the "*worq* village", more commonly known as Huta's village.

### 3) *Kapı*: Rearranging the Social Order

*Hatıra 6*: A young Karakuyulu man was working for the Sasık, the lord lineage of a neighbouring village [*Sasık Hable*]. He eloped with a girl from that family. His master got enraged about his daughter who had run away with his farmhand. The master said, "We are not prepared to marry off the daughter. We do not need bridewealth, either". Elders and notables in the region were invited to an *unafe* meeting. Huta had served that lord family as a slave and was also a close neighbour of that young man's family in Karakuyu. He was present in the *unafe* meeting, sitting beside the *kapı* of the guest room. Pointing at the best seat, Huta said, "If you allow me to sit there I will take care of the affair". Those present replied, "Please, please, take the seat". Huta said, "No, I cannot. I know my place. I cannot sit there". Then, he called one of his sons and said to him, "Choose the best horse and oxen from my barn. Take them to the girl's family". The son did what his father told him to do. The trouble was resolved.

(An elderly Karakuyulu man, from a slave family)

This fragment of Huta's story is apparently a different version of the same event mentioned in *Hatıra 1* (see Ch. 6). This rendition was offered by an older man (b. 1928) in Karakuyu from an affluent family frequently said to be of slave origin. The man himself stated, "Whatever wealth our family had, it all came from our grandfather's sister. She was married to an Egyptian pasha in Istanbul", implying that his family had a *saraylı* woman in a preceding generation. Some Karakuyulus said that his grandfather, after whom his lineage was now known, went on a haj on camelback by selling the girl to the slave market in Istanbul, though the present speaker never mentioned that she was actually sold off.

---

(Ünal 1996: 155). These two sections had no contact after the death of the Karakuyulu man in 1940. This man seems to have had some contacts with Circassian elites in Istanbul, since he came back to the village from Istanbul where he became fatally ill. This was the first occasion that most Karakuyulus had seen an automobile.

In *Haturas* 1 and 2, told by *worqs*, Huta was reproached by *worqs* for his unsuitable behaviour. He was considered to have forgotten himself and was pulled back to the *kapi* and silenced. Frequently associated with the marginal social position of slaves, the *kapi* served for Huta as a *hatıra* about his past servitude. Slaves were bound to the *kapi* opposite the “dining table”, excluded from the main stage in *worqs*’ guest rooms and denied the capacity to become social actors.

In this slave version, Huta said “I know my place” and voluntarily stayed there. He reciprocated respect for the *worqs*’ love, symbolised by their offering him a suitable place in the spatialised hierarchy they had constructed. He deliberately displayed his willingness to comply with that well-structured order of things, where *worqs* alone allotted places and gave meanings to things. In doing so, Huta implied the failure of *worqs*’ vociferously articulated representation either to shape social reality totally or to reflect it in its entirety.

His enactment of that allegory must be distinguished from the incarnation of irony by the destitute prince, who still felt obliged to fulfil his *noblesse oblige*, though this “prince of princes” was painfully aware that everybody knew that he was destitute. The weight of history prevented the “last bey of Uzunyayla” from living just as the poor man he really was; he was passively made to disclose the absurdity of his vain efforts to maintain an appearance whose inauthenticity he himself recognised. Huta playfully underlined the widely recognised tragicomedy entailed in the contradiction between imposed claims and observed reality. He demonstrated a great social capacity from a marginal position (*kapi*), a position opposed to the assumed location of power (*sofra*) within the public space (*oda*), thus depriving these places of their *worq*-imposed meanings. He outwitted and destabilised *worqs*’ *spatialized* politics without overtly opposing their *spatializing* politics.

The *worqs*’ domination, achieved by spatializing politics, was “only apparent if it merely serve[d] as a framework for the... everyday practices that ma[d]e use of it”, just as “the imposed knowledge and symbolisms bec[a]me objects manipulated by practitioners who ha[d] not produced them” (de Certeau 1988: 32). Huta’s “practice of the order constructed by others redistribute[d] its space”, demonstrating a good example of “the resistance to the historical law of a state of affairs and its dogmatic legitimations” (ibid. 18).

Huta’s ingenious act here provoked laughter as a powerful catalyst of reconciliation with the past, just as the cigarettes he offered to the prince in *Hatura* 3 induced a giggle from the narrator (Huta’s son) and the listener (the ethnographer) and alleviated the weightiness of discussing one’s past servitude. In his novel *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting* Milan Kundera probes the manipulation of memory and the production of forgetting pursued by the absolutist regime that came to power in Czechoslovakia after the Russian invasion of 1968. He elucidates the close affinity between laughter and forgetting, arguing that laughter occurs when the details of life make people aware that things are less austere and serious than those in power claim them to be; they thus experience a sense of relief that lets them live a little more freely (1996: 86-87, 99), just as forgetting helps people unshackle themselves from their disempowering past.

In his classic work on popular festive life, Bakhtin explored the healthy and hearty gales of laughter heard at carnivals, where the underclass dramatises and inverts the reality of power, relativizing and parodying the official certainty and seriousness (Dentith 1995: 66, 68). Karakuyulus quietly accepted *worqs*’ imposed and rigid representation but clearly perceived its absurdity and recognised that it had little to do with the fluid quality of their lives. For them, just as they had a good laugh when talking about their memories of Huta, laughter appeared to function more subtly within everyday life than can be described by the dramatic allegory of a grotesque and anarchic carnival, which too formalistically and thus naïvely opposes folk culture to official culture (ibid. 73-74; Pan’kov 2001: 47). Nonetheless, laughter, even when it was suppressed into a shy or cynical giggle, provided people in the “slave village” with a fleeting salvation from burdensome memories, helping them forget a humiliating past.

Huta lived in a period in which freed slaves were said to have been unable to deny their ignoble origin. Huta accepted the position he was given in society, turning this forced identity into a foothold to take advantage of the occasion for his own purpose. Overcoming such burdens epitomised in the slave name, he transformed that politicised space of *oda* into a venue where he exerted his own agency, in accordance with the principle currently governing male confrontations

in the Middle Quarter. Here, a social order constructed discursively to symbolically dominate slaves was usurped as the extraordinary slave made himself stand out as a social actor who registered an irony of history. An ex-slave who made a name for himself, and became accepted by society as an extraordinary man, would be valued all the more. Here the *kapı* was a symbol, whose meaning was contested between different social discourses. At the same time, the *kapı* served as a symbolic vehicle through which the validity of these different narratives was contested.

Huta transformed the *kapı*, a symbol of slaves' marginal position in the *worq* discourse, into a symbol of access to power, standing for the inner mobility towards the centre of society. He actively turned hardship in the past into an identity that served as a foundation for marvellous actions, unlike passive slaves made to embody a "feudal" past. He asserted his uniqueness by tossing *laf*s, repelling *worqs*' threats to mute him. He demonstrated that it was important to win a name as a "man of society" and to register one's own name as a "real man" in local history, regardless of one's inherited status.

In Huta, "I", a spontaneous, unconventional and creative aspect of self, gained prominence over "me", a passive aspect of self acting according to the memories inscribed upon one by the superior other. Huta certainly had memories. However the memory here was far from a burden that made one's life in the present unpleasant, under the command of the shameful past. For Huta, memory was a medium to produce a sense of being a historically contextualised actor and was also a resource he himself left for future generations. This idiosyncratic personality also defied the collective "we" in which *worqs* entrenched themselves. The memory, imposed by *worqs* who claimed collective ownership of true stories about him, served to endow Huta with an identity carrying a sense of historically situated agency, which allowed him to create novel memories in turn.

For Huta, memory is really what de Certeau calls practical memory; a resource one mobilises, in response to an invocation and imposition of a disempowering memory by those in power, to insert a subversive episode into a rigidly structured whole so as to re-constitute it into a novel and favourable whole (1988: 86). De Certeau stresses the importance of "the act of the 'I' who speaks" in appropriation of language (as "langue") aimed to modify the configuration and dynamics of a power relation, i.e. everyday practices of language use by which the present and thus history are inserted into the linguistic system to reconfigure it (ibid. 33). The ingenious action of Huta's "I" in memory practice certainly established the present, "which creates a before and after" (ibid.) anew.

Even almost 50 years after his death, Huta's memories continued to be used to disrupt the *worqs*' rigid representations. Huta demonstrated that it was possible to destabilise these articulate memories and redefine the significance of the past in a new context. In the memories told to me by silenced people in Karakuyu, his behaviour, unsuitable for one in his social place, unsettled the hierarchized space that included that very place within it.

The family of the young Karakuyulu man in *Hatıra 6* was often said to have been Christian, Russian or slave at the time of migration. They travelled separately from other families and first settled just above Karakuyu, before they were eventually incorporated into it. The lord family, the Sasık, produced a member of the "Special Organisation" (*Teşkilat-i Mahsusa*)<sup>130</sup> during WWI, who then worked closely with Atatürk as a colonel in his nationalist forces (*Kuvayi-Milliye*) (Ünal 1996: 83-84).<sup>131</sup> They were the last family Huta served as slave and he was freed from their *kapı* before moving to Karakuyu.

Huta took on a poor neighbour's payment of bridewealth and made the girl's family accept it. This meant that he indirectly took a bride from his ex-master's family. This exchange may be counted as a unique case of so-called slave's revenge, which *worqs* considered to mark the reversal of social relations. It symbolised the achievement of an ex-slave, whose ex-master recognised his equal or even higher social standing.

---

<sup>130</sup> This organization, comprising the CUP members close to Enver Pasha, "played an important behind-the-scenes role" in WWI (Zürcher 1998: 114).

<sup>131</sup> According to Ünal, in Kilis district of Gaziantep, there are a sub-district (Polateli) and a village (Polatköy) named after him for his great contribution in the Liberation War.

The Abaza lord family that Huta first served also declined. Their village, which had been once home to around five hundred Abaza residents, was now peopled exclusively by Avşars. An elderly man in a nearby Chechen village told me not to interview the members of the lord family since they “fell to Huta’s ‘door’” (*kapisına düşmek*) out of economic necessity: they sought employment at Huta’s farm and worked for their ex-slave. After Huta’s death, one young man of the lord family eloped with a girl and entrusted her to one of Huta’s sons for protection. The son prepared the girl for the wedding and also paid the bridewealth to her family, according to a Circassian custom in which the *atalık* (foster father) looked after his *qan* (foster child). Here, the noble family’s “rootedness” (*asalet*) or “genealogical depth” (*nesil*) was secured by reliance on a slave once bound to their *kapı*.

The slave narrator of this memory was well-known for his sharp *lafı*, just like Huta himself. His neighbour’s daughter, in her late teens, called him the “charismatic” (*karizma*) of the village. Her Turkish mother praised his historical knowledge, judging it “powerful” (*küvvetli*). This woman married into a slave family, which once served the Jenak, to which the narrator’s ancestor was also said to have been bound. Referring to the *worq*-slave distinction, she said “It is merely a thing Circassians talk about among themselves”. Alongside her high opinion of the narrator’s knowledge, this rejection of inherited status seemed to reflect her capacity, as a non-Circassian woman who had been living in a Circassian village for almost forty years, to observe the everyday life of male Circassians in the village more objectively than they themselves could. She seemed able to make a more unbiased judgement concerning whose words actually carried weight, and to assert that history was not constituted solely of events that conformed to the unitary model deployed by *worq* men and its standard themes.

The narrator himself manifested confidence in the richness of his own social experience. He said, “The person who knows is a person who gets about”, quoting a common saying that suggested that the abundance of one’s knowledge was proportional to one’s social contacts. This idea, expressed to me in Turkish, was also endorsed by a Kabardian proverb, “The more you see, the more you know”. The narrator suggested that what reinforced one’s knowledge was not the prestige of one’s lineage, but one’s “dense relations” (*yoğun ilişik*) with society. His younger brother (b. 1933) had won even higher public recognition as the illuminating personification of “a man of society”, through having enthusiastically taken part in social activities since his youth. One of their sisters (b. 1930) eloped with Huta’s son who paid the brideprice in this episode. This son was born of his first wife, also an ex-slave woman of the Jenak’s.

These brothers admitted Huta’s ignorance. They also agreed that Huta “suffered” (*çekmek*) greatly in his life. *Çekmek* (lit. to pull) in this context denoted long-term hardship, but it also connoted the speaker’s praise for the resilience of one who endured such affliction. Furthermore, the use of *çekmek* implied a compassion in which the speaker put himself in the place of a person undergoing difficulties. Saying Huta “endured well”, the brothers expressed their sympathy for him, since all three were “men of society” who had, despite their slave origin, distinguished themselves by powerful *lafı* and made society accept them as outstanding personalities. The use of *çekmek* here manifested a sense that the brothers shared Huta’s experiences.

The narrator continued, “The greatest man is Atatürk. He brought about a condition where I am I and you are you. Who cares for whom now? (*Kim kime oldu*) May he go to heaven.” Many locals equated the establishment of the Turkish Republic by Kemal Atatürk with the liberation of slaves. Though that association was left understated in Karakuyu, the saying “Who cares for whom?”, which articulated the idea that people ought to concentrate on their own work without intervening in other people’s life, seemed to reflect the current norm that regarded separate households as independent enterprises. This stress on self-containedness was the direct opposite of the idea manifested in the question “From whom are you?” that bound one to past social status, underlining the collective quality of honour and dishonour.

Today, with this work ethic to the fore, Karakuyulu men managed the resources they owned or rented to sustain their households as economically viable units. They engaged in small-scale commodity production and competed in the market economy on relatively equal terms (see Keyder 1993: 184-185). A retired agricultural technician said that Karakuyu contained a number of “forward-looking people” (*ileri görebilen insan*), who could quickly adjust themselves to change in ideas and skills, especially in adopting technical innovations in farming. The current

generation took pride in their autonomy as managers of separate economic units. Their new ideal valued neither the comfort realised by exploitative reliance on the labour of others nor passive concealment behind the fame of one's lineage. Only around twenty of the seventy household heads could comply with this norm.

A paternal aunt (b. 1897) of the narrator had married into another slave family known to have become wealthy by working hard over three generations "like ants". This family was also said to have served the Jenak. The old man – mentioned above – of this renowned *worq* lineage purchased one of the first tractors in the village in the early 1950s with his younger brother, through his affiliation to the ruling Democratic Party. They themselves did not engage in manual labour in the wheat fields; two brothers from one of their ex-slave families, unable to leave their master's *kapi* through poverty, even after the demise of slavery, operated the tractor.<sup>132</sup> Despite their large investment in mechanisation, the year's crop was severely damaged by a summer frost. They were financially ruined, which eventually led to their going to Germany to work as labourers in the 1960s.

A grandson (b. 1941) of the narrator's aunt was one of the men named by the retired agricultural engineer as "forward-looking" persons in Karakuyu. He remarked on the decline of his ancestors' master family, "You need to do your own work. You cannot leave it to somebody else. Even after reaching this age, I am still pasturing my sheep flock myself". The internalisation of a new work ethic seemed to be the key factor compelling small-scale farmers to maintain their autonomy. Telling Huta's memories seemed to help to articulate a narrative that stressed the relevance of this work ethic.

Huta remained one of the primary subjects of social tales kept alive to the present day. Webber (1991: 15-16) mentions that folklore is a cultural resource a social group can draw upon to reflect on, understand, evaluate, maintain and transform its own practice, and serves as a force for both stability and change as well as both repression and liberation (ibid. xx). The contestation over Huta's memories showed that he played a vital but ambivalent role in diverse historical narratives as a symbolic tool for control and domination as well as for resistance and salvation. The different versions of memories of what was apparently the same event at the *kapi* demonstrated how *worqs* employed their memories to sustain symbolic domination over slaves, and how slave descendants appropriated the same story to dislocate that order.

Huta was a subject constructed differently in two opposing historical and social narratives, depending on how narrators positioned themselves *vis-à-vis* local ethnic society. At times he was little more than an instrument, passively made to incarnate slaves' past affliction; at other times he was given the status of an agent of history, who used his slave status as a foothold to constitute his own identity, which entailed the capacity for social transformation. Huta became a subject of social tales who could maintain or subvert the social order. *Worqs* were eager to legitimise their monopoly over Huta's memories as a scarce resource, as his ex-masters or as the only authorised holders of knowledge. Some ex-slaves, though far from all, usurped the story, helped by their own unique qualities, accomplishments and strong spirits. They promoted a new norm, which legitimated the present inequality partially created by land distribution in the 1950s. This appeared to be keeping Huta's memories alive to the present.

The contestation over Huta's memories was a symbolic struggle over how local Circassian society was to be represented. Karakuyulus were denied both command of authentic knowledge and the right to be listened to. They recalled Huta with sympathy, weaving a series of his memory fragments, formed around various memory objects, into an alternative narrative. They told these memories to open up a space in history, in which Huta's ingenious acts allowed them to breathe more freely. The laughter evoked in the course of re-membering these memories enabled the narrators to attain the critical distance from the past needed to finish with it, thus making possible some degree of liberation from the dominant discourse.

---

<sup>132</sup> None of these four families mentioned in this section as having descended from the Jenaks' slaves was actually marked as slave in the village census book. Their ancestors' liberation is understood as dating back earlier than this pre-Republican record, though they may really have been slaves.

It is possible to draw a parallel between the narrative space these Karakuyulu elders opened up in their efforts to erode and displace dominant meanings, and the social space that the younger generations opened up through drinking. In the latter case, people with diverse backgrounds helped and competed with each other on more or less equal terms, against the prevalent social discourse. The elders employed Huta's memory as a means to free history from *worqs*' elite representations, which aimed to maintain slaves' symbolic subordination.

#### 4) *Lokum*: Being a Circassian

*Hatura 7*: When my elder sister was marrying, my father [Huta] served meals to many guests at our house in Pınarbaşı. At a wedding banquet, meals should be prepared according to the family's material condition. We were affluent. While serving *lokum* (fried pancakes), my father said, "Eat! Eat! You won't find them again!" This saying was so cherished. It became something like an epigram (*vecize laf*) of the time. It circulated from mouth to mouth, adding some other words to itself.

(Huta's youngest son)

*Hatura 8*: Neither vegetable oil nor margarine were available then. *Lokum* was fried with home-made butter. Most people were very poor in the past. Those who had butter did not have flour. Those who had flour did not have butter. Huta had a huge herd of livestock for milking. If even he was running out of butter, nobody in the country could prepare *lokum*. Huta was a simple man. He uttered spontaneously whatever entered his mind without thinking how others would feel. This offended some people and pleased others. Huta was a father of the poor. There is nobody in the region who did not eat his meals. His guest room was not left empty three days a year. I have met many people who prayed for his soul.

(Huta's grandson, in Karakuyu)

I think it fitting to close this chapter by briefly presenting Huta's most celebrated *laf*, Huta's *lokum*. This episode seems to support my re-reading of the previous memory accounts, which suggests that he was concerned with the past not as something he was bound to by disempowering memories, but as something he could recompose by manipulating his *haturas* in two connected aspects. In the novel discourse of memory that Huta had made possible, memory was not a burden but a process in which a person made a name for himself to be remembered by future generations.

*Lokum* was fried dough,<sup>133</sup> which had acquired importance as a popular ethnic snack among the residents in Uzunyayla. Piles of *lokum* were served at every Circassian wedding feast. At the wedding of his daughter (b. 1926) in the mid 1940s, Huta said to the guest, "Eat! Eat! You won't find *lokum* again!" As Abaza, Huta never learned to speak Kabardian well. Some people who told me the story stated that what he really meant to say was simply "Fill your stomach," but all he could say in his broken Kabardian was "You won't find it again".

*Worqs* offered me slightly different versions of this story in which they had Huta say, "This is Huta's last *lokum* [or butter]. You won't find it again," or "You won't find such delicious *lokums* anywhere else". They explained that Huta, a boastful, nouveau-riche ex-slave, tried to show how wealthy he was by suggesting that other families would not be able to prepare the *lokum* – a luxury at the time – in such abundance. These *worqs* recognised the words they attributed to Huta as a *laf* tossed on a festive occasion in order to pose a challenge to their group, which was in decline.

That this rendering was widespread can be inferred from *Hatura 8*, recounted by the first son (b. 1947) of Huta's daughter, who married in this episode. Assuming I already knew the story, he did not even think it necessary to quote Huta's *laf*. Asked about his own mother's wedding, he immediately, though hesitantly, started to explain what this *laf* insinuated and why it still provoked antipathetic reactions from some people and laughter of relief from others. Even here,

---

<sup>133</sup> This must not be confused with *lokum*'s more usual referent, "Turkish delight".

Huta's uniqueness was underlined by the narrator's opting to call his own grandfather by his individual name.

As Huta's youngest son mentioned (*Hatura* 7), it is most likely that some immodest sentences were later attached to Huta's brief remark as it was passed from one person to another. The son compared his father's words to an "epigram", a terse remark expressing a witty and satirical observation. The dual character of people's attitudes towards the shift of social relations kept this *laf*, about 50 years old, potent as a "heretic discourse" (Bourdieu 1993: 178-80), which compelled people to bring to mind a latent reality of everyday life, enlivening a controversy over history.

Seremetakis (1994: Ch. 3) argues that memories of sensory experiences of commensality are deposited at a deep level of unconsciousness beyond articulation through language, and that these may provide a foundation for critiques of the grand narratives. Huta's grandson said, "There is nobody in the region who did not eat Huta's meals". Eating and drinking involved the senses of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch, all linked to one another in the unity of *muhabbet*. Memories of morally indebtedness to Huta remained registered in many people in Uzunyayla, including a number of *worqs*.

This episode of Huta's *lokum* was known to virtually everyone above a certain age in the region. Whenever *lokum* was served at wedding parties, they were reminded of Huta's unique character with a reawakened sense of indebtedness to him, as well as sympathy or pain. Animated conversations on these commensal occasions made it possible for his memories to be handed down to new generations. Wedding parties had become the most important occasions on which local Circassians felt that they belonged to a community with a distinctive culture and history. During these parties, most men found an excuse to drink alcohol, raising their communal consciousness and competitive spirits beyond status boundaries.

A university student from Karakuyu, then studying in a small, faraway town in East Turkey, told me the memory of a dramatic sensory encounter. One day he was excited by an unexpected smell of *lokum* on the street of this distant town. He spontaneously started to chase that irresistibly sweet aroma, deeply associated with home in Uzunyayla. The olfactory sensation evoked the idea that there was another Circassian in that remote town, and agitated his whole person into an impulsive action.

Such apperceptive experiences as members of a Circassian community were felt at a deep level of being and were linked, not to a legend of heroic princes, but to the memory of off-hand but cutting *laf*s that an uneducated ex-slave of the lowest category tossed in a festive atmosphere. This was a sign of the effect of the extraordinary new memories Huta created through his determination to "get his own name mentioned" as a respectable man. Every pancake made was a memory object of Huta's creativity; current generations used this material innovatively in narrative events. Huta was a protagonist in a narrative of social transformation, usually unarticulated but fully recognised in Karakuyu. The transition from an age in which one's traditional family status counted to an age in which every male was evaluated as an individual, was an essential part of everyday experience for most people in the village, belonging to a local community with a distinctive history, a history rooted in the past but also stretching into the future.

Sensory memories produced on two different commensal occasions seemed to provide the most persuasive critiques of the dominant narrative of local Circassian society. In this chapter, I have presented memory fragments of Huta as told by ordinary Karakuyulus and then remembered them into a counter-memory to shed light on an alternative narrative of history that people told to themselves. Huta himself tried to re-collect memory objects that bound him to the past in servitude and came to terms with this past by disintegrating and reconstituting the memories materialised in these objects. By telling me their memories of Huta, Karakuyulus also obtained the opportunity to reflect on their history and to voice their – often ignored – critiques of the authoritative and monolithic representations of the past that *worqs* produced to mute them. The workings of these *hatiras* had demonstrated that objects caused people not only to remember but also to forget, by enabling them to dismantle memory and then rearrange the fragments into a new story.

I have attempted to provide a way to re-read *hatiras* of Huta's witty *laf*s here, to help merge Huta's own memories of the slave past into the memories of Huta recounted by different

narrators, who were also bound to their own past. My aim was to illustrate the efforts of both Huta and present-day Karakuyulus to free themselves from disempowering memories, as a collaborative enterprise over time. Ordinary people delivered a collection of thought-provoking aphorisms, using Huta's fabulous tales as a resource.

This reading was based on insights gleaned from the sociality to which better-off Karakuyulus were eagerly committed, as well as from the male agency that worse-off youths strove to demonstrate. The values and qualities that generated these manly activities reflected a cultural understanding of the person as constituted and re-constituted in interaction with others and a model of society as something that emerged amid that process. This interactive understanding founded on everyday practice made a marked contrast to *worqs'* discursive practices where a person's value relied on his inborn status in a rigidly stratified, static society. I hope that this collaboration among many different actors salvaged the voices of Karakuyulus that were muted in the dominant discourse. This was also my attempt to come to terms with my own bitter memories of field research, during which I internalised the *worqs'* view of most Karakuyulus as slave descendants who did not know and could not speak.

Economically, Karakuyu had been the leading village of Uzunyayla since the 1950s, had considerably benefited from the land and agricultural reform, and was currently becoming its new social centre as well. I learned recently through the Internet that after I left the village local Circassians founded a new Uzunyayla Development Foundation (*Uzunyayla Kalkınma Vakfi*) based in Karakuyu. The plan of a new boarding high school in Karakuyu seems to be under way as well. Though they may not mention it overtly, people in the "slave village" were deeply aware of history as they considered these developments and appreciated them as changes for the better. History was also present in how people engaged with others in everyday social interaction.

## Chapter 9 Conclusion

I started this thesis by defining memory as a symbolic vehicle through which people reflect and work on their relationship with history; such history is a narrative that connects the present to the past and the future in a specific way. I then followed de Certeau's idea of everyday practice to investigate how memories enable people to generate positive meanings in their efforts to manage life situations not necessarily favourable to them. I acknowledged people's agency as producers of memory, gradually shifting the focus from Avşars and Circassian urban intellectuals to local Circassians and then from *worqs* to Karakuyulus. Finally, I presented an outstanding figure who counteracted the *worqs*' attempts to confine him to the imposed image of a muted ex-slave, and actively transformed the existing historical discourses to produce innovative narratives.

As a conclusion, I would like to identify narrative strands that link the chapters of the thesis. One of the central themes was the art of forgetting; that is, how people manipulate mnemonic objects and purposefully produce forgetfulness to generate positive experiences. In Chapters 2 and 3, I investigated the inscription of memories on the local landscape and proposed that memory be understood as a process through which particular images of the past are evoked and transformed, and changes are incorporated into history. Memory thus inevitably becomes a contested arena of interpersonal politics, since a specific narrative of history empowers a certain section of society by victimising another. Attempts to assign a selected image of the past to oblivion by symbolically breaking apart its mnemonic objects and thus denying its effects to the present are part of the labour incorporated into this memory process.

Customs have been made the object of conscious manipulation (see Ch. 4), as one of the central categories around which a group's relations with history are formed. Objectified, fractured and compartmentalised, customs serve as potent tools for negotiating historical narratives: they can be used to produce continuity with a specific past as well as to negate the relevance of this past to the present. This malleability of history, though not infinite (Appadurai 1981), reflects an everyday historicity in which the significance of the past is continually redefined, so that historical narratives remain subject to constant rewriting. The understanding of customs, not as bound to the past, but as open to selection and erasure, underpins a historical consciousness in which history remains incomplete.

Descendants of Circassian slaves were transformed by *worqs* into the embodied metonymy of *Adygagha* and forced to play a role as one of the major mnemonic objects that conjured up the "feudal" image of the past in its wholeness. The objectification of slave descendants as *worqs*' shared property enabled these possessors of authoritative knowledge to treat Circassian national history itself as a private, common heritage belonging exclusively to their status group. In the local Circassian culture, as I understood it by way of Turkish, the realm of memory politics had a broad range, in which memory as oral narrative (see Chs. 4-5) was linked to various elements that constituted cultural concepts and everyday practices, including the composition of the person and human agency, the construction of spatialised social order and reciprocal interpersonal interaction generative of both equality and hierarchy (see Ch. 6). The elite mnemonics that incorporated slave descendants operated through a process in which *worqs* broke up slave descendants' memories and re-inscribed another specific image of history onto their bodies. *Worqs* metaphorically reworked slave descendants' memories by generating an image in which the slave self, linked with the past as contained within his own memories, disintegrated, thus establishing a hierarchy between these unequally empowered actors.

People in Karakuyu, a "slave village", were denied the role of social actors within the *worq* discourse of memory (*hatır/hatıra*). Karakuyulu men pressed claims to a legitimate relation with Circassian history by committing themselves to a Circassian tradition of alcohol drinking (see Ch. 7). In their daily sociability, they evoked alternating images of integration and disintegration to register their male agency. Making use of a gender model that acknowledged the supremacy of the acting subject over its object, these men turned the past itself into an object on which their male efficacy was exerted, thus producing a fantasy in which they symbolically broke apart the particular past and finished it off. They thus reaffirmed its "bygoneness", demonstrating one way of effecting a desired forgetting.

*Hatura* is a notion of memory that bridges a mnemonic object and the historical narrative this object invokes, while *hatir* may be seen as a notion of memory that links a person's identity to his past. A distinguished ex-slave in Karakuyu broke up his *hatura object* as a metaphor of a specific past and disintegrated the *hatura narrative* associated with that memory object (see Ch. 8). He then reassembled the object and wove a narrative that linked the past to the present anew. He reconstituted the memory, thus reconstructing history. Memory objects served to produce active forgetting, facilitating a salvation from a burdensome past, despite the fact that such objects are usually associated with the preservation of memories. The new memory thus recreated provided a resource with which future generations could undermine the dominant discourse, generating experiences empowering them to manage their own lives.

We are now in a position to make concluding observations on social memory as a framework in which various historical accounts are produced in relation to each other. The idea of hegemony and subalternity has often been used as a framework for interpreting the link between, on the one hand, the official and public discourses of history produced by the ruling elite of the state, and on the other the personal and private memory accounts presented by subordinate groups of people, themselves qualified and empowered unevenly by their culture, locality, class, age and gender. For instance, Shryock mentions in a Middle Eastern context that subaltern discourses are incorporated into the dominant discourse in opposition to which they were produced, further reproducing the latter (1997: 190, 194). As Swedenborg remarks, such subaltern narratives in popular memory seem to be affected by two types of attempt to control the production of knowledge: first, there are attempts to establish domination through repressing or erasing the traces of alternative histories written from below, by means of violence and coercion; and, secondly, attempts to achieve hegemony through incorporation and persuasion, thus precluding the full development of alternative narratives (1991: 158).

In Figure 4, I provide a schema to compare *worqs'* articulate memory and the alternative memories of those in subordinate positions, including both ordinary Karakuyulus and slave descendants, within the limitations of colloquially expressed texts. This comparison between verbal accounts produced by two different categories of memory producers reveals that the alternative memories were encompassed, or "englobed" (see n. 112 above), by the *worqs'* memories against which they were originally produced. *Worqs'* highly articulate social discourse constructed slave descendants as a muted category and repressed the latter's memory in order to enforce their silence and hinder the production of counter-discourses. This suggests that *worqs'* historical narrative had achieved domination over the historical accounts of slave descendants.

This dominant discourse also revealed characteristics of hegemony. Firstly, it was equipped with a meta-discourse of memory, which hierarchized historical knowledge produced by different sets of people and unilaterally represented slaves' memory. The *worqs'* memory covered a broader realm, which subsumed slave descendants' oral testimonies. Further, the slaves' oral memories borrowed both social (*us : them*) and temporal (*now : then*) dichotomies from the *worq* discourse. With this dual dichotomy, slave descendants assigned history to the past beyond human manipulation and froze it. They also exercised voluntary censorship to avoid emotional pain, and were thus unable to voice their doubts about the elite representation. These accommodations can be understood as showing the hegemonic relation of the *worqs'* narrative to the slave descendant's accounts. On some occasions, I heard slave descendants use the term "slave" as a derogatory metaphor, as in "My mother worked just like a 'slave'. She says, 'I don't want my children to suffer as I did in my youth'", whereas *worqs* tended to mention slaves as having worked like "ants" or "bees". This metaphorical use of slave was another indication of the hegemony achieved by the *worqs'* narrative.<sup>134</sup>

The representation of history aired by the local Circassian elite, however, could not achieve full hegemony or dominance. It was far from being a myth immune to re-examination and criticism. This may be partly because the *worqs'* narrative was not endorsed by the Turkish state,

---

<sup>134</sup> See also Account 7 in Ch. 6, given by a young member of an ex-slave family, reproducing how his own family is talked about by *worqs*, with whom he identifies himself here to distinguish his wealthy family from the rest of the ex-slave families in the village.

which was eagerly promoting the assimilation of its ethnic minorities. It may equally be because this local elite narrative was not formulated consciously within formal nationalist movements operating in the realm of real politics, such as the politics involved in promoting Circassians' "collective" interests in the public domain, by demanding cultural autonomy such as free language education. Also, the fact that historical accounts presented by slaves were heterogeneous proves that their identity was not constituted as represented by *worqs*. The fragmentary nature of these oral testimonies indicated that they were a discourse of negation formed each time from scratch in opposition to the *worqs*' homogeneous narrative, though they did not make clear reference to it.

Hegemony is an on-going process of domination and resistance between an authorised discourse and alternative discourses. The *worq*'s meta-memory involved a broad domain of politics, defining slaves' personhood and the social order and shaping social interaction through the reciprocal transactions of the respect-love idiom, all employed to construct the slave subjectivity as represented through a *worq* gaze. All these elements were brought together when *worqs* drew attention to slaves' identity by saying "*Kimlerdensin?*" (From whom are you?) (see Ch. 6). This was a threatening question aimed at preventing slaves' oppositional discourses from being articulated in public space, thus restricting the production of legitimate knowledge. The silence prevalent among slave descendants can however be re-interpreted, not as an effect imposed by the masters of speech, but as willed forgetting. This re-evaluation facilitates re-appreciation of a narrative of silence that carried its own themes and messages, including the "time of community" (see Ch. 5).

The homogeneity of *worqs*' accounts may be taken to mean that *worqs* had successfully formed a community of memory. This seeming narrative coherence had, however, been made possible by forgetting and erasure on their part, including the frequent subsuming of worse-off *worqs*' accounts into those presented by more influential *worqs*. Even this discourse, which had thus achieved apparent narrative closure, could not nowadays be mentioned openly in the presence of slave descendants. The latter forced the *worqs* to be silent; their stories were contained in private spaces, blurring the boundaries of "public transcripts" and "hidden transcripts" (Scott 1990).

A schematisation that distinguishes dominant and subordinate discourses or hegemonic and subaltern narratives may not be the most useful frame of analysis for tackling the social memory of local Circassians. To hear the voice of those silenced as a muted category within the dominant mode of communication, it may be more rewarding to locate within social practices two different arts employed to operate everyday life, those of "making do" and "getting by".

The alternative oral narratives presented by slave descendants certainly revealed some concessions to *worqs*' narratives. The slave accounts presumed the *worq* discourse and were generated in opposition to it. Nonetheless, they borrowed the basic structure of the *worq* narrative and did not openly criticise it. The alternative narratives inevitably invoked the elite discourse that they negated in silence. As far as their verbal expressions were concerned (Chs. 4-5), slave descendants' efforts seemed largely confined to neutralising the disempowering meanings imposed on them by the dominant narrative. In this sense, slaves' oral accounts can be compared to "making do", aimed at managing unfavourable circumstances by evading emotional pain, though their significance as arts of everyday life must be acknowledged.

Everyday resistance was, however, composed of both narratives and actions. The exercise of agency by slave descendants was not restricted to accommodation. "Getting by" refers to a more active engagement in one's life conditions, through which one appropriates the dominant discourse, social order, values and mode of interaction, turning them into a resource for empowerment. One deploys, or "re-uses" in de Certeau's terms, the dominant mode of communication, in a disempowering context, in order to constitute affirmative identities, which enable one to re-configure the situation to one's advantage. This ingenuity is the key to an art of living through which one can offset existing, rigid representations and gain the upper hand over authoritative discourses and dominant categories.

This style of resistance was clearly observable in the historical consciousness formed and ritually expressed through social practices (see Chs. 7-8). The new memory narrative, whose production was promoted in social interactions, exerted its symbolic effects by affecting

mnemonic objects, metaphors and metonymies of the dominant discourse of history, and thus helped constitute a fully-fledged, powerful counter-memory. The reversibility of the dominant narrative was expressed, above all, in the everyday interactions of those denied the status of significant actors within it.

This thesis has examined how slave descendants were constructed by *worqs* as a muted category. The fact that their voice becomes most clearly audible in symbolic expressions certainly indicates a similarity with the mutedness of women, originally pointed out by Ardener. However, the articulation of slaves' voices through the manipulation of mnemonic objects was far more purposeful and thus active. As the protagonist in Ch. 8 has demonstrated, this sometimes allowed Foucauldian counter-memories – event-specific, fragmentary, unauthored (see n. 81 above) – to be fused into a well-developed oppositional and subversive narrative, which corresponded to Zerubavel's idea of counter-memory (1995: 10-12). Slaves' agency as innovators of historical consciousness must be positively evaluated.

One of the criticisms directed at Ardener's idea of mutedness has been that he treated women as biological and thus homogeneous entities, but not as a gender category, which, along with that of men, differentiates people as social entities (Mathieu 1973). The heterogeneity of slave descendants' voices proved that, despite *worqs*' representation of them as forming a group, they were divided according to various social factors. Certainly, negatively valued qualities, ascribed to women and children in their relations with men and adults respectively, were also attributed to slave descendants, thereby represented as lesser persons (see Ch. 6). The social knowledge and historical memories that slaves recounted were often claimed to be the products of their "inferiority complex", thus not worth listening to.

Local discussions about the ideal person, however, went far beyond the model of personhood (*şahsiyet*) whose full embodiment *worqs* monopolised. This wider discourse of the "real man" (*adam*) enabled slave descendants to pursue honour of a less collective quality through their own achievements, and to produce a historical consciousness and social experience different from those presented in *worqs*' discourse (see Ch. 7). It is, however, also true that the new dominant mode of sociability had registered a new differentiation between various actors, reproducing the silence of even weaker sections of society.

Throughout this thesis, I have analysed political aspects of social memory among Circassians in Uzunyayla. I started by shedding light on both the practical and symbolic means they had used to consolidate their rootedness in a new homeland, as well as on the social price they had been paying in that process to the present day (see Chs. 1-2). Memory accounts played a significant role in their attempt to reinforce their connection with the territory. Local Circassians produced their own historical accounts by opposing the official discourse of Turkish nationalism, abused by the rival group in the region. At the same time, they also effectively borrowed prevalent social idioms from Turkish as their own resource (see Ch. 6), an activity that undermined the assumption of threatening assimilation.

In inscribing their national history on the natural geography of the new homeland, Circassians emphasised the ideal of a local ethnic community, including the notion of a unique history founded on a distinctive social formation. This communal ideal served as a discourse unfavourable to a certain section of society, comparable to the newly emerging, totalising discourse of nationhood threatening to engulf diverse identities constituted by Turkish Circassians located in different life situations (Ertem 2000) in terms of gender, age, class, education, geography and political view. From her research on an urban Circassian club for friendship and mutual assistance, Ertem (1999) points out that the stress on ethnic boundaries among Circassians has muted female members of the community as woman, if not as something else, preventing them from participating in the solidarity of women beyond their ethnic affiliation. It may be possible to draw a parallel between these urban educated women and Circassian slave descendants in Uzunyayla, since the latter were also silenced in the process of "getting by" engaged at the level of local community, a pursuit that had resulted in producing a culture where ethnic

boundaries are stressed.<sup>135</sup> At the same time, slave descendants produced counter-memories by various means, attempting to become social actors by generating empowering experiences for themselves, despite the disempowerment they face as a consequence of an essentialist discourse.

A well-known Kabardian author in Turkey points out the lack of research on Circassian social structure, which must have played a crucial role in the course of events leading to the mass displacement of Circassians from their homeland (Tuna 1977: 103). Lewis claims that Muslim historians are reluctant to work on Islamic slavery because slavery remains a sensitive issue in Muslim societies (1990: vi). On the insufficiency of the anthropology of slavery, Kopytoff (1982) states that the traditional subject matter of the discipline, the participatory method of fieldwork and ethical questions surrounding anthropologists in their own countries, all have obstructed the adequate development of anthropological investigations of slavery.

Toledano mentions that, though long abolished as an institution, the tenacious effects of slavery still remain at the root of certain social problems in Middle Eastern societies. He remarks that there is no community of ex-slaves who wish to come to terms with the shared heritage of slavery, thus explaining the dearth of studies on Islamic slavery from the opposite point of view (1998: ix). Most of these observations hold true for Circassian society in Uzunyayla, where the memories of slavery were implicated in a political competition for status and influence. This illuminates the difficulty of forming a culture that empowers community members without silencing a certain section.

Focusing on the variety of historical discourses produced by Circassians within a particular region, this thesis tried to locate the voice of these Circassians on the Turkish periphery as contested narratives over the means and costs of resettlement. This was the voice silenced in the publication by Circassian urban intellectuals who continued to label Circassians as a displaced people. I have relied heavily on Turkish social idioms to create a frame of analysis, believing that a study of diaspora – in the sense of “sowing seeds” in new frontiers – is more rewarding, if one investigates cultural experiences specific to a particular locality, in which a particular history unfolds.

## Bibliography

Abadan-Unat, Nermin  
(1993) “Impact of external migration on rural Turkey”, in Paul Stirling (ed.), *Culture and Economy: Changes in Turkish Villages*, Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire: the Eothen Press

Abercombie, Thomas A.  
(1998) *Pathways of Memory and Power: Ethnography and History among an Andean People*, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press

Abu-Lughod, Lila  
(1986) *Veiled Sentiments: Honour and Poetry in a Bedouin Society*, Berkeley: California University Press

(1990a) “Shifting politics in Bedouin love poetry”, in Catherine Lutz & Lila Abu-Lughod (eds.), *Language and the Politics of Emotion*, New York: Cambridge University Press

---

<sup>135</sup> This thesis could not sufficiently investigate the question of “Circassian girl” (*Çerkez kıızı*), which serves as a prominent idiom, alongside “slave”, with which the local Circassians negotiate their relationships with history as well as with the wider society. Rather than reifying Circassian women (girls) as a single category (see Shami 1993), a more rewarding approach is to explore how images of Circassian women (girls) intersect those of Circassian slaves. Kaindyoti’s literary study in a historically specific context (1988) is applicable equally to an ethnographic investigation.

(1990b) "The romance of resistance: tracing transformation of power through Bedouin women", *American Anthropologist*, 17(41), pp. 41-55

Afshar, Haleh

(2000) "Age, gender and slavery in and out of the Persian Harem: a different story", *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 23(5), pp. 905-916

Ağaoğlulari, Mehmet Ali

(1987) "The ultranationalist right", in Irvin C. Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak (eds.), *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Akbaş, S. Burhanettin

(n.d.) *Kayseri Yöresinde Yerleşen Türk Boylar ve Akraba Toplulukları*, Kayseri: Geçit Yayınları

Akçetin, Elif

(2000) "Anatolian peasants in the Great Depression 1929-33", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 23, pp. 79-102

Aktan, Reşat

(1966) "Problems of land reform in Turkey", *Middle East Journal*, 20(3), pp. 317-33

Algazi, Gazi

(1997) "Lords ask, peasants answer: making traditions in late medieval village assemblies", in Gerald Sider & Gavin Smith (eds.), *Between History and Histories: the Making of Silence and Commemoration*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press

Altınay, Ayşe Gül

(1999) "*Mehmedin Kitabı*: challenging narratives of war and nationalism", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 21, pp. 125-145

Amara, Muhammad Hasan

(1999) "Hebrew and English borrowings in Palestinian Arabic in Israel: a sociolinguistic study of lexical integration and diffusion", in Yasir Suleiman (ed.), *Language and Society in the Middle East and North Africa: Studies in Variation and Identity*, Surrey: Curzon Press

Andrews, Peter Alford

(forthcoming) "Reappraisal", in his (ed.) *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey* (second edition), Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag

(ed.) (1989) *Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey*, Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag

Antoun, Richard

(1968) "On the significance of names in Arab village", *Ethnology*, 7(2), pp. 158-170

Antze, Paul & Michael Lambek

(1996) "Introduction: forecasting memory", in their (eds.), *Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory*, London: Routledge

Appadurai, Arjun

(1981) "The past as a scarce resource", *Man*, 16, pp. 201-219

(1986) "Introduction: commodities and the politics of value" to his (ed.), *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

(1996) *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

- Ardener, Edwin  
 (1975) "The 'problem' revisited", in Shirley Ardener (ed.), *Perceiving Women*, London: J. M. Dent & Sons,
- Argyrou, Vassos  
 (1996) *Tradition and Modernity in the Mediterranean: the Wedding as Symbolic Struggle*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Arıcanlı, Tosun  
 (1986) "Agrarian relations in Turkey: a historical sketch", in Alan Richards (ed.), *Food, States, and Peasants: Analysis of the Agrarian Question in the Middle East*, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press
- Armstrong, Karen  
 (2000) "Ambiguity and remembrance: individual and collective memory in Finland", *American Ethnologist*, 27(3), pp. 591-608
- Askerbi, Şortan  
 (1970) *Çerkez Büyük Düşünürü Kazanokue Jabağı, Hayatı, Görüşleri*, Ankara: Kafkasya Kültürel Dergi Yayınları
- Aswad, Barbara C.  
 (1971) *Property Control and Social Strategies in a Middle Eastern Plain*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press
- Bahloul, Joelle  
 (1996) *The Architecture of Memory: A Jewish-Muslim Household in Colonial Algeria 1937-62*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Baj, Jabaghi  
 (1995) *Çerkesler*, Ankara: Ayyıldız Yayınları, (Originally written in 1921, and published in 1969 as *Çerkesya'da Sosyal Yaşayış ve Adetler*, Ankara: Kafkasya Kültür Dergi Yayınları)
- Banton, Michael  
 (1996) "Assimilation", in Ellis Cashmore (ed.), *Dictionary of Race and Ethnic Relations* (4th edition), London: Routledge
- Barret, Thomas M.  
 (1995) "Lines of uncertainty: the frontiers of the North Caucasus", *Slavic Review*, 54(3), pp. 578-601
- Barth, Fredrik  
 (1959) *Political Leadership among Swat Pathans*, London: Athlone Press  
 (1992) "Toward greater naturalism in conceptualising societies", in Adam Kuper (ed.), *Conceptualizing Society*, London: Routledge
- Başgöz, İlhan  
 (1973) "Love themes in Turkish folk poetry", *Review of National Literature*, pp. 99-114
- Basso, Keith H.  
 (1988) "Speaking with names: language and landscape among the Western Apache", *Cultural Anthropology*, 3(2), pp. 99-130
- Bauman, Richard

(1986) *Story, Performance, and Event: Contextual Studies of Oral Narrative*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Bates, Daniel G.

(1973) *Nomads and Farmers: a Study of the Yörük of Southern Turkey*, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press

(1974) "Normative and alternative systems of marriage among the Yörük of southeastern Turkey", *Anthropological Quarterly*, 47(3), pp.270-87.

Battaglia, Debora

(1992) "The body in the gift: memory and forgetting in Sabri mortuary exchange", *American Ethnologist*, 19(1), pp. 3-18

(1993) "At play in the fields (and borders) of the imaginary: Melanesian transformation and forgetting", *Cultural Anthropology*, 8(4), pp. 432-442

Bayerle, Gustav

(1997) *Pashas, Begg, and Effendis: a Historical Dictionary of Titles and Terms in the Ottoman Empire*, Istanbul: The Isis Press

Behar, Ruth

(1986) *Santa Maria del Monte: The Presence of the Past in a Spanish Village*, Princeton: Princeton University Press

Bell, James Stanislaus

(1840) *Journal of a Residence in Circassia: During the Years of 1837, 1838 and 1839*, London: Edward Moxton

Bender, Barbara

(1993) "Introduction: landscape – meaning and action", in her (ed.), *Landscape: Politics and Perspectives*, Oxford: Berg

Berg, D. Lawrence & Robin A. Kearns

(1996) "Naming as norming: 'race', gender and the identity politics of naming places in Aotearoa/New Zealand", *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 14, p. 99-122

Berktaş, Halil

(1992) "The search for the peasant in Western and Turkish history/historiography" in Halil Berktaş & Suraiya Faroqhi (eds.), *New Approach to State and Peasant in Ottoman History*, London: Frank Cass

Bgazhnokov, B.Kh.

(1983) "The organization of space and etiquette", *Soviet Anthropology and Archaeology*, Fall, pp. 49-72. (For Turkish Translation see *Kafdağı*, 1987, 1(6-7), pp. 38-51).

Bjedug, Murat & Erol Taymaz

(1995), "'Sürgün' halk Çerkezler", *Birikim*, 71-72, pp.118-24

Black-Michaud, Jacob

(1975) *Cohesive Force: Feud in the Mediterranean and the Middle East*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell

Bloch, Maurice E.

(1989) *Ritual, History and Power: Selected Papers in Anthropology*, London: the Athlone Press

(1998) *How We Think They Think: Anthropological Approaches to Cognition, Memory, and Literacy*, Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press

Blok, Anton

(2001) *Honour and Violence*, Cambridge: Polity Press

Bohalin, Anna

(1998) "The politics of locality: memories of District Six in Cape Town", in Nadia Lovell (ed.), *Locality and Belonging*, London: Routledge

Boratav, Korkut

(1990) "Inter-class and intra-class relations of distribution under 'structural adjustment': Turkey during the 1980s", in Tosun Arıcanlı & Dani Rodrik (eds.), *The Political Economy of Turkey: Debt, Adjustment and Sustainability*, London: Macmillan

Bouhdiba, Abdelwahab

(1998) *Sexuality in Islam*, London: Saqi Books

Bourdieu, Pierre

(1977) *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

(1988) *Jissen Kankaku I*, Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo (Japanese Translation of *Le Sens Pratique* 1980)

(1993) *Hanasutoiukoto: Gengo Koukan no Ekonomi*, Tokyo: Fujiwara Shoten (Japanese translation of *Ce Que Parler Veut Dire: L'economie des Echanges Linguistiques* 1982)

Boyarin, Jonathan

(1992) *Storm from Paradise: The Politics of Jewish Memory*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press

(1994) "Space, time, and the politics of memory", in his (ed.) *Remapping Memory: The Politics of TimeSpace*, Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press

Bozan, Michel & Anne-Marie Thiesse

(1986) "The collapse of memory: the case of farm workers (French Vexin, pays de France)", *History and Anthropology*, 2. pp. 237-59

Bozgeyik, Burhan

(1995) *Çerkez Ethem: Hain Mi? Kahraman Mi?*, Istanbul: Temas Yayınları

Brow, James

(1990) "Notes on community, hegemony, and the use of the past", *Anthropological Quarterly*, 63(1), pp.1-6

Brunner, Edward M.

(1984) "Introduction: the Opening up of Anthropology", in his (ed.), *Text, Play and Story: the Construction and Reconstruction of Self and Society*, Illinois: Waveland Press

(1986) "Ethnography as narrative", in Victor W. Turner and Edward M. Brunner (eds.), *The Anthropology of Experience*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press

Burke, Peter

(1989) "History as social memory", in Thomas Butler (ed.), *Memory: History, Culture and the Mind*, Oxford: Blackwell

Butchart, Alexander

(1998) *The Anatomy of Power: European Constructions of the African Body*, London: Zed Books

- Çağlar, Ayşe Neviye  
(1990) "The Greywolves as metaphor", in Andrew Finkel & Nukhet Sirman (ed.), *Turkish State, Turkish Society*, London, New York: Routledge
- Campbell, J. K.  
(1964) *Honour, Family and Patronage: a Study of Institutions and Values in a Greek Mountain Community*, Oxford: Clarendon: Press
- Canak, Ahmet Fahri  
(1989) *Kafkaslardan Uzunyaylaya*, Ankara: San Matbaası
- Canefe, Nergis  
(2001) "The legacy of forced migration in modern Turkish society: remembrance off the things past?", *Balkanologie*, 5 (1-2), pp. 153-177
- Caplan, Patricia  
(1997) *African Voices, African Lives: Personal Narratives from a Swahili Village*, London: Routledge
- Carsten, Janet  
(1995) "The politics of forgetting: migration, kinship, and memory on the periphery of the Southeast Asian state", *JRAI*, 11(2), pp. 317-335
- Casson, Ronald W. & Banu Özertuğ  
(1976) "Respect and address in a Turkish village: a quantitative sociolinguistic account", *American Ethnologist*, 3(4), pp. 587-602
- Casey, Edward S.  
(1992) "Forgetting remembered", *Man and World*, 25, pp. 281-311
- Caton, Steven C.  
(1985) "The poetic construction of self", *Anthropological Quarterly*, 58(4), pp. 141-160  
(1987) "Power, persuasion, and language: a critique of the segmentary model in the Middle East", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 19, pp. 77-102
- Cheater, Angela  
(1999) "Power in the postmodern era", in Angela Cheater (ed.), *The Anthropology of Power: Empowerment and Disempowerment in Changing Structure*, London: Routledge
- Chesnov, IA. V.  
(1993) "Male and female origins in the birth of a child perceived by the Abkhaz-Adyge peoples", *Anthropology and Archeology of Eurasia*, Fall, pp. 19-46
- Clauson, Gerald  
(1972) *An Etymological Dictionary of Pre-Thirteenth Century Turkish*, Oxford: Clarendon Press
- Clifford, James  
(1994) "Diaspora", *Cultural Anthropology*, 9(3), pp. 302-38
- Cohen, Abner  
(1976) *Two Dimensional Man: an Essay on the Anthropology of Power and Symbolism in Complex Society*, Berkeley: University of California Press

- Cohen, Anthony, P.  
 (1985) *The Symbolic Construction of Community*, Chichester: Horwood  
 (1987) "Of symbols and boundaries, or does Ertie's greatcoat hold the key?", in his (ed.), *Symbolic Boundaries: Identity and Diversity in British Culture*, Manchester: Manchester University Press  
 (1993) "Segmentary knowledge: a Whalsay sketch", in Mark Hobart (ed.), *An Anthropological Critique of Development: The Growth of Ignorance*, London: Routledge  
 (ed.) (1982) *Belonging: Identity and Social Organisation in British Rural Cultures*, Manchester: Manchester University Press
- Cohen, Robin  
 (1995) "Rethinking 'Babylon': iconoclastic conceptions of the diasporic Experience", *New Community*, 21(1), pp. 5-18  
 (1996) "Diaspora and the nation-state: from victims to challengers", *International Affairs*, 72(3), pp. 507-520
- Cole, Jennifer  
 (1998) "The work of memory in Madagascar", *American Ethnologist*, 25(4), pp. 610-33
- Collard, Anna  
 (1989) "Investing social memory in a Greek context", in Elizabeth Tonkin, Maryon McDonald, and Malcolm Chapman (eds.), *History and Ethnicity*, London: Routledge
- Connerton, Paul  
 (1989) *How Societies Remember*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Cooper, Fredrick  
 (1980) *From Slaves to Squatters: Plantation Labour and Agriculture in Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya*, New Haven: Yale University Press
- Copeaux, Etienne  
 (1996) "Hizmet: a keyword in the Turkish historical narrative", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 14, pp. 97-114  
 (1998) *Tarih Ders Kitaplarında (1931-1993) Türk Tarih Tezinden Türk-İslam Sentizine*, Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları
- Cornwall, Andrea & Nancy Lindisfarne  
 (1994) "Dislocating masculinity: gender, power and anthropology", in their (eds.), *Dislocating Masculinity: Comparative Ethnographies*, London: Routledge
- Coser, Lewis A.  
 (1992) "Introduction: Maurice Halbwachs 1877-1945", in Maurice Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, Chicago: Chicago University Press
- Çerkez Ethem  
 (1993) *Anılarım*, Istanbul: Berfin Yayınları, (Originally published as *Çerkez Ethem'in Hatıraları*, 1962)
- Darian-Smith, Kate & Paula Hamilton  
 (1994) "Introduction" to their (eds.), *Memory and History in Twenty-Century Australia*, Melbourne: Oxford University Press
- Davis, John  
 (1977) *People of the Mediterranean: An Essay in Comparative Social Anthropology*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul

(1987) *Libyan Politics: Tribe and Revolution*, London: I. B. Tauris  
(1992) "History and the people without Europe", in Kirsten Hastrup (ed.), *Other Histories*, London and New York: Routledge  
(1994) "Social creativity", in Chris M. Hann (ed.), *When History Accelerates: Essays on Rapid Social Change, Complexity, and Creativity*, London: Athlone Press

Davis, Natalie Zemon & Randolph Starn  
(1989) "Introduction" to their (eds.), *Representations: special issue on Memory and Counter-Memory*, 26, pp. 1-6

De Certeau, Michel  
(1984) *The Practice of Everyday Life*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press

De Coppet, Daniel  
(1992) "Comparison, a universal for anthropology: from 're-presentation' to the comparison of the hierarchies of values", in Adam Kuper (ed.), *Conceptualising Society*, London: Routledge

Delaney, Carol  
(1987) "Seeds of honor, fields of shame", in David Gilmore (ed.), *Honour and Shame and the Unity of the Mediterranean*, Washington: American Anthropological Association  
(1991) *The Seed and the Soil: Gender and Cosmology in Turkish Village Society*, Berkeley: University of California Press  
(1993) "Traditional modes of authority and co-operation", in Paul Stirling (ed.), *Culture and Economy: Changes in Turkish Villages*, Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press

Dentith, Simon  
(1995) *Bakhtinian Thought: an Introductory Reader*, London: Routledge

Dhupelia-Mesthrie  
(2000) "Dispossession and memory: the Black River community of Cape Town", *Oral History*, Autumn, pp. 35-43

Di Bella, Maria Pia  
(1992) "Name, blood and miracles: the claims to renown in traditional society", in John G. Peristiany & Julian Pitt-Rivers (eds.), *Honor and Grace in Anthropology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Diawara, Mamadou  
(1989) "Women, servitude and history: the oral historical traditions of women of servile condition in the kingdom of Jaara (Mali) from the fifteenth to the mid-nineteenth century", in Karin Barber (ed.), *Discourse and Its Disguises: The Interpretation of African Oral Texts*, Birmingham: Centre of West African Studies

Dino, Guzine  
(1986) "The Turkish peasant novel, or the Anatolian theme", *World Literature Today*, 60, pp. 266-75

Dirven, Rene  
(1994) *Metaphor and Nation: Metaphors Afrikaners Live by*, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang

Dominguez, Virginia R.

(1986) *White by Definition; Social Classification in Creole Louisiana*, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press

(1989) *People as Subject, People as Object: Selfhood and Peoplehood in Contemporary Israel*, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press

Douglas, Mary

(1980) "Introduction: Maurice Halbwachs", in Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*, New York: Harper & Row

(ed.) (1987) *Constitutive Drinking: Perspectives on Drink from Anthropology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Dresch, Paul

(1986) "The significance of the course of events in segmentary systems", *American Ethnologist*, 13, pp. 309;24

(1993) *Tribes, Government, and History of Yemen*, Oxford: Clarendon Press

Driessen, Henk

(1983) "Male sociability and rituals of masculinity in rural Andalusia", *Anthropological Quarterly*, 56 (3), pp. 125-133

Duben (Dubetsky), Alan

(1976) "Kinship, primordial ties and factory organization in Turkey: an anthropological view", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, pp. 433-451

(1982) "The significance of family and kinship in urban Turkey", in Çiğdem Kağıtçıbaşı (ed.), *Sex Roles, Family and Community in Turkey*, Indiana: Indiana University Press

Duman, Hasan

(1987) "Köylerimizin tarihi", *Kafdağı*, 6-7, pp. 28-33

(1994) \_\_\_\_\_, Nalchik:

Duman, Taner

(1996) "Örenşehir'de aile-emek örgütlenmesinin değişimi", in *Türkiye Çerkeslerinde Sosyo-Kültürel Değişme*, Ankara: Kaf Der Yayınları

Dumanıç, Hayri

(1999) "Türkiye Çerkezlerinde köleliğini kaldırması ve Dumanışzade Mahmut Efendi'nin etkisi", *Nart*, May-August, pp. 54-56

Dundes, Alan, Jerry W. Leach & Bora Özkök

(1970) "The strategy of Turkish boys' verbal duelling rhymes", *Journal of American Folklore*, 83, pp. 325-349

Edwards, Jeanette

(1998) "The need for a 'bit of history': place and past in English Identity", in Nadia Lovell (ed.), *Locality and Belonging*, London: Routledge

Eickelman, Dale F.

(1977) "Time in a complex society: a modern example", *Ethnology*, 16(1), pp. 39-55

(1991) "Traditional Islamic learning and idea of the person in the twentieth century", in Martin Kramer (ed.), *Middle Eastern Lives: The Practice of Biography and Self-Narrative*, Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press

(1998) *The Middle East and Central Asia: an Anthropological Approach* (third edition), New Jersey: Prentice Hall

- Emirođlu, Kudret  
(1989) “Çocukluđunu bilmek: ođuldan uřađa, mahduma”, *Tarih ve Toplum*, 12(69), pp. 8-13
- Erdem, Y. Hakan  
(1996) *Slavery in the Ottoman Empire and its Demise: 1800-1909*, Hampshire; London: St. Martin’s Press  
(1998) “Osmanlı toplumunda köle kimliđi kusatan uygulama ve zehniyet yapıları”, in *Tarih Eđitim ve Tarihte ‘Öteki’ Sorunu: 2. Uluslararası Tarih Kongresi, 8-10 Haziran 1995 İstanbul*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt
- Ergun, Dođan  
(1991) *Türk Bireyi Kurmına Giriř: Türk Kültürünün Olanakları*, İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınları
- Eriksen, Thomas Hylland  
(1993) *Ethnicity & Nationalism: Anthropological Perspective*, London: Pluto Press
- Erman, Tahine  
(1998) “Becoming ‘urban’ or remaining ‘rural’: the views of Turkish rural-to-urban migrants of the ‘Integration’ Question,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 30, pp. 541-561
- Ertem, Bayan Gönül  
(1999) “Off the feminist platform in Turkey: Cherkess gender relations”, in Rae Bridgman et al. (eds.), *Feminist Fields: Ethnographic Insights*, Ontario: Broadview Press  
(2000) Dancing to Modernity: Cultural Politics of Cherkess Nationhood in the Heartland of Turkey, Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Texas at Austin
- Eser, Mehmet  
(1996) “Uzunyayla bölgesindeki Çerkez köyünde sosyo-kültürel deđişme”, in *Türkiye Çerkeslerinde Sosyo-Kültürel Deđişme*, Ankara: Kaf Der Yayınları,
- Fabian, Johannes  
(1983) *Time and the Other: How Anthropology Makes Its Object*, New York: Colombia University Press
- Faiz, Suha  
(1991) *The City of Heart: Yunus Emre’s Verses of Wisdom and Love*, Shaftesbury: Element
- Fentress, James & Chris Wickham  
(1992) *Social Memory*, Oxford: Blackwell
- Foster, George  
(1965) “Peasant society and the image of limited good”, *American Anthropology*, 67, pp. 293-315
- Forty, Adrian  
(1999) “Introduction” to Adrian Forty & Susanne Küchler (eds.), *The Art of Forgetting*, Oxford: Berg
- Frey, Frederick W.  
(1963) “Political development, power, and communications in Turkey”, in Lician W. Pye (ed.), *Communications and Political Development*, Princeton: Princeton University Press  
(1968) “Socialization to national identification among Turkish peasants”, *Journal of Politics*, 30(4), pp. 934-65
- Gellner, Ernest

- (1981) *Muslim Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Georgacas, Demetris J.  
(1971) *The Names for the Asia Minor Peninsula and a Register of Surviving Anatolian Pre-Turkish Placenames*, Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag
- Gerholm, Tomas  
(1977) *Market, Mosque and Mafraj: Social Identity in a Yemen Town*, Stockholm: University of Stockholm
- Gibson, James A. & Daniela Weinberg  
(1980) "In vino communitas: wine and identity in a Swiss Alpine village", *Anthropological Quarterly*, 53(2), pp. 111-121
- Gill Helene  
(1999) "Language choice, language policy and the traditional-modernity debate in culturally mixed postcolonial communities: France and the 'Francophone' Maghreb as a case study", in Yasir Suleiman (ed.), *Language and Society in the Middle East and North Africa: Studies in Variation and Identity*, Surrey: Curzon Press
- Gillis, John. R.  
(1994) "Introduction" to his (ed.), *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*, Princeton: Princeton University Press
- Gilmore, David  
(1987) "Introduction: the shame of dishonour", in his (ed.), *Honour and Shame and the Unity of the Mediterranean*, Washington: American Anthropological Association
- Gilsenan, Michael  
(1990a) *Recognizing Islam: Religion and Society in the Modern Middle East*, London: I. B. Tauris  
(1990b) "Word of honour", in R. Grillo (ed.), *Social Anthropology and the Politics of Language*, London: Routledge  
(1996) *Lords of the Lebanese Marches: Violence and Narrative in an Arab Society*, London: I. B. Tauris
- Gökalp, Ziya  
(1966) *Çınaraltı Konuşmaları*, Diyarbakır: Diyarbakır Tanıtma ve Türizm Derneği Yayınları
- Goldenberg, Suzanne  
(1994) *Pride of Small Nations: The Caucasus and Post-Soviet Disorder*, London: Zed Books Ltd
- Grillo, R. D.  
(1989) *Dominant Languages: Language and Hierarchy in Britain and France*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Gronhaug, Reidar  
(1974) *Micro-Macro Relations: Social Organization in Antalya, Southern Turkey*, Bergen: University of Bergen, Department of Social Anthropology
- Güleç, Ertuğul  
(n. d.) *Türk At Irkları*, Anadolu At Irklarını Yaşatma ve Geliştirme Derneği
- Güler, Ali

- (1997) *Osmanlı Devletinde Azınlıklar*, Istanbul: Turan Yayıncılık
- Güneş-Ayata, Ayşe  
(1994) "Roots and trends of clientelism in Turkey", in L. Roniger & Ayşe Güneş-Ayata (eds.), *Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers
- Gupta, Akhil & James Ferguson  
(1997) "Culture, power, place: ethnography at the end of an era", in their (eds.), *Culture, Power, Place: Explorations in Critical Anthropology*, Durham and London: Duke University Press
- Güsar, Vasfi  
(1969) "Eski Çerkeslerde sınıf ve dereceler", *Kafkasya Kültür Dergi*, 6(25), pp. 33-36
- Habiçoğlu, Bedri  
(1993) *Kafkasya'dan Anadolu'ya Göçler*, Istanbul: Nart Yayıncılık
- Haghur, Ahmet Midhat  
(1969) "Çerkesyada hükümet şekli ve uygarlık düzeni", *Kafkasya Kültür Dergi*, 5(21), pp. 27-29, (Originally published in *Kırkanbar* 13, 1874)
- Halbwachs, Maurice  
(1980) *The Collective Memory*, New York: Harper & Row  
(1992) *On Collective Memory*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Hale, William  
(1981) *The Political and Economic Development of Modern Turkey*, London: Croom Helm
- Hall, Stuart  
(1996) "Introduction: Who needs identity?", in Stuart Hall & Paul du Gay (eds.), *Questions of Cultural Identity*, London: Sage
- Hamilton, Paula  
(1994) "The knife edge: debates about memory and history", in Kate Darian-Smith & Paula Hamilton (eds.), *Memory and History in Twentieth-Century Australia*, Melbourne: Oxford University Press
- Hann, Chris. H.  
(1985) "Rural transformation on the East Black Sea Coast of Turkey: a note on Keyder", *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 12(4), pp. 101-110  
(1990a) *Tea and the Domestication of the Turkish State*, Huntingdon: The Eothen Press  
(1990b) "Second thoughts on smallholders, tea production, the state and social differentiation in the Rize region", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 4, pp. 57-79  
(1993) "The sexual division of labour in Lazistan", in Paul Stirling (ed.), *Culture and Economy: Changes in Turkish Villages*, Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire: the Eothen Press
- Hastrup, Kirsten  
(1992) "Introduction" to her (ed.), *Other Histories*, London: Routledge
- Heath, Dwight B.

(1987) "A decade of development in the anthropological study of alcohol use", in Mary Douglas (ed.), *Constitutive Drinking: Perspectives on Drink from Anthropology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 3-16

Heatherington, Tracy

(1999) "Street tactics: catholic ritual and the senses of the past in central Sardinia", *Ethnology*, 38(4), pp. 315-334

Henze, Paul B.

(1992) "Circassian resistance to Russia", in Marie Bennigsen Broxup (ed.), *The North Caucasus Barrier: The Russian Advance towards the Muslim World*, London: Hurst & Company

Herzfeld, Michael

(1980) "Honour and shame: problems in the comparative analysis of moral system", *Man*, 15, pp. 339-351

(1985) *The Poetics of Manhood: Contest and Identity in a Cretan Mountain Village*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press

(1987) "'As in your home': hospitality, ethnography, and the stereotype of Mediterranean society", in David Gilmore (ed.), *Honour and Shame and the Unity of the Mediterranean*, Washington: American Anthropological Association

(1992) "Segmentation and politics in the European nation-state: making sense of political events", in Kirsten Hastrup (ed.), *Other Histories*, London: Routledge,

Heyd, Uriel

(1950) *Foundation of Turkish Nationalism and Teachings of Ziya Gökalp*, Luzak & Company and the Harvill Press

Hiçyılmaz, Ergun

(1993) *Gizli Belgelerle Çerkez Ethem*, Istanbul: Varlık Yayınları

Hirsch, Eric

(1995) "Introduction: Between Place and Space", in Eric Hirsch and Michael O'Hanlon (eds.), *The Anthropology of Landscape: Perspectives on Place and Space*, Clarendon Press: Oxford

Holbrook, Victoria Rowe

(1994) *The Unreachable Shores of Love: Turkish Modernity and Mystic Romance*, Austin: University of Texas Press,

İnalçık, Halil

(1960), "Çerkes", *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (new edition), Leiden: Brill

Irwin-Zarecka, Iwona

(1994) *Frames of Remembrance: The Dynamics of Collective Memory*, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers

Işık, Mahmut

(1963) *Afşarlar: Tarihi, Yetiştirdiği şahıslar, Folkloru*, Ankara: Kardeş Matbaası

İzbrak, Resat

(1945) *Uzunyayla'da Coğrafya Araştırmaları*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi

İzzet, Met Cunatuko

(1976) "Kafkas Tarihi", *Kuzey Kafkasya*", 7(39), pp.30-31, (Originally published in 1914, Istanbul: Çerkez Teavün Cemiyeti İstanbul Merkezi)

- Jaimoukha, Amjad  
(2001) *The Circassians: a Handbook*, London: Routledge Curzon
- James, Alice  
(2001) "Memories of Anatolia: generating Greek refugee identity", *Balkanologie*, 5 (1-2), pp. 229-238
- Jamous, Raymond  
(1992) "From the death of man to the peace of God: violence and peach-making in the Rif", in John G. Peristiany & Julian Pitt-Rivers (eds.), *Honor and Grace in Anthropology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Jones, Stephen F.  
(1994) "Old ghost and new chains: ethnicity and memory in the Georgian republic", in Rubie S. Watson (ed.), *Memory, History and Oppression under State Socialism*, Santa Fe: School of American Research Press
- Jun, Jin  
(1999) "Village dammed, village repossessed: a memorial movement in Northwest China", *American Ethnologist*, 26(2), pp. 324-343
- Kağıtçıbaşı, Çiğdem  
(1970) "Social norms and authoritarianism: a Turkish-American comparison", *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 16(3), pp. 444-451  
(1971) "Individualistic vs. relational models of man: the case of an intervention research", in Mübeccel Kıray (ed.) *Structural Change in Turkish Society*, Indiana: Indiana University Turkish Studies
- Kanbolat, Hasan & Erol Taymaz  
(1990) "Kafkasya-Osmanlı ilişkileri ve köle ticareti", *Tarih ve Toplum*, 79, pp. 35-44
- Kanbolat, Yahya  
(1989) *1864'e Kadar Kuzey Kafkasya Kabilelerinde Din ve Toplumsal Düzen*, Ankara: Bayır Yayınları
- Kandiyoti, Deniz  
(1988) "Slave girls, temptress, and comrades: images of women in the Turkish novel", in *Feminist Issues*, 8(1), pp. 35-49
- Kaplan, İsmail  
(1999) *Türkiye'de Milli Eğitim İdeolojisi*, İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları
- Karakasidou, Anastasia N.  
(1997) *Field of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passage to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia 1870-1990*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Karpat, Kemal H.,  
(1985) *Ottoman Population 1830-1914, Demographic and Social Characteristics*, Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press  
(1990) "The hijra from Russia and the Balkans: the process of self-definition in the late Ottoman state", in Dale F. Eickelman & James Piscatori (eds.), *Muslim Travellers*, London: Routledge  
(1993) "Avrupalı egemenliğinde Müslümanların konumu: Çerkezlerin sürgünü ve Suriye'deki iskani", in *Çerkezlerin Sürgünü (21 Mayıs 1864)*, Ankara: Kafder Yayınları

Katz, Shiela Hanna  
(1996) "Adam and adama, 'ird and ard: en-gendering political conflict and identity in early Jewish and Palestinian nationalism", in Deniz Kandiyoti (ed.), *Gendering Middle East: Emerging Perspectives*, London: I. B. Tauris

Kazgan, Gülten  
(1981) "Labour force participation, occupational distribution, educational attainment and the socio-economic status of women in the Turkish economy", in Nermin Abadan-Unat (ed.), *Women in Turkish Society*, Leiden: E. J. Brill

Keyder, Çağlar  
(1983a) "The cycle of sharecropping and the consolidation of small peasant ownership in Turkey", *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 10(2-3), pp. 130-45  
(1983b) "Paths of rural transformation in Turkey", *Journal of Peasant Studies*, 11(1), pp. 34-49  
(1986) "A model of differentiated petty producing peasantry", in Altan Gökalp (ed.), *La Turquie en Transition: Disparités, Identités, Pouvoirs*, Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose  
(1993) "The genesis of petty commodity production in agriculture: the case of Turkey", in Paul Stirling (ed.), *Culture and Economy: Changes in Turkish Villages*, Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press

Kirmayer, Laurence J.  
(1996) "Landscape of memory: trauma, narrative, and dissociation", in Paul Antze & Michael Lambek (eds.), *Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory*, London: Routledge

Kolars, John  
(1973) "The integration of the villagers into the national life of Turkey", in Kemal H. Karpat (ed.), *Social Change and Politics in Turkey: A Structural-Historical Analysis*, Leiden: E. J. Brill

Kondo, Dorrine  
(1990) *Crafting Selves: Power, Gender and Discourses of Identity in a Japanese Workplace*, Chicago: Chicago University Press

Kopytoff, Igor  
(1982) "Slavery", *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 11, pp. 207-230

Kosswig, Leonore  
(1974) "Eigentumszeichen (damga) in Anatolien", *Oriens*, 23-24, pp. 334-403

Köy İşleri Bakanlığı  
(1968) *Köy Envanter Etüdlerine Göre: Kayseri 38*, Ankara: Köy İşleri Bakanlığı Yayınları

Krag, Helen & Lars Funch  
(1994) *The North Caucasus: Minorities at a Cross Roads*, London: Minority Rights Group

Küchler, Susanne  
(1987) "Malagan: art and memory in a Melanesian society", *Man*, 22, pp. 238-255  
(1988) "Malagan: objects, sacrifice, and the production of memory", *American Ethnologist*, 15, pp. 625-637  
(1993) "Landscape as memory: the mapping of process and its representation in a Melanesian society", in Barbara Bender (ed.), *Landscape: Politics and Perspectives*, Oxford: Berg

Kudat, Ayşe (Sertel)

(1971) "Patron-client relations: the state of the art and research in eastern Turkey", in Engin D. Akarlı & Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds.), *Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems*, Istanbul: Boğaziçi University. Department of Social Sciences

Kuipers, Aert H.

(1960) *Phoneme and Morpheme in Kabardian (Eastern Adyghe)*, 'S-Gravenhage: Mouton & Co.

Kundera, Milan

(1996) *The Book of Laughter and Forgetting*, London: Faber & Faber

Kunt, Metin

(1998) "Osmanlı dirlik-kapı düzeni ve kul kimliği", in *Tarih Eğitim ve Tarihte "Öteki" Sorunu: 2. Uluslararası Tarih Kongresi, 8-10 Haziran 1995 İstanbul*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt

Kushner, David

(1977) *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876-1908*, London: Frank Cass

Kutay, Cemal

(1990) *Çerkez Ethem Dosyası*, İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları

Kwint, Marius

(1999) "Introduction: the physical past", in Marius Kwint et al. (eds.), *Material Memories*, Oxford: Berg

La Fontaine, J. S.

(1985) "Person and individual: some anthropological reflections", Michael Carrithers et al. (eds.), *The Category of the Person*, Cambridge: University Press

Lambek, Michael

(1998) "The Sakalava poiesis of history: realizing the past through spirit possession in Madagascar", *American Ethnologist*, 25(2), pp. 106-127

Lass, Andrew

(1994) "From memory to history: the events of November 17 dis/remembered", in Rubie S. Watson (ed.), *Memory, History and Oppression under State Socialism*, Santa Fe: School of American Research Press

Lattas, Andrew (ed.)

(1996) *Articulation of Memory: the Politics of Embodiment, Locality, and the Contingent*, a special issue of *Oceania*, 66(4), pp. 257-265

Lavie, Smadar

(1990) *The Poetics of Military Occupation: Mzeina Allegories of Bedouin Identity under Israel and Egyptian Rule*, Berkeley: University of California Press

Leach, Edmund R.

(1954) *Political Systems of Highland Burma*, London: Athlone Press

Leonard, Karen

(1997) "Finding one's own place: Asian landscapes re-visioned in rural California", in Akhil Gupta & James Ferguson (eds.), *Culture, Power, Place: Explorations in Critical Anthropology*, Durham and London: Duke University Press

- Lewis, Bernard  
 (1961) *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Oxford: Oxford University Press  
 (1975) *History: Remembered, Recovered, Invented*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press  
 (1988) *The Political Language of Islam*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press  
 (1990) *Race and Slavery in the Middle East: an Historic Enquiry*, New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Lewis, Geoffrey, L.  
 (1974) *Modern Turkey*, London; Ernest Benn  
 (1985) *Turkish Grammar*, Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Lincoln, Bruce  
 (1989) *Discourse and the Construction of Society: Comparative Studies of Myths, Ritual, and Classification*, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Lindholm, Charles  
 (1996) *The Islamic Middle East: An Historical Anthropology*, Oxford: Blackwell
- Lipsitz, George  
 (1990) *Time Passages: Collective Memory and American Popular Culture*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press
- Longworth, J. A.  
 (1840) *A Year among the Circassians*, London: Colburn
- Lovell, Nadia  
 (1998) "Introduction: belonging in need of emplacement?", in her (ed.), *Locality and Belonging*, London: Routledge
- Luzbetak, Louis J.  
 (1951) *Marriage and the Family in Caucasia: A Contribution to the Study of North Caucasian Ethnography and Customary Law*, Vienna: Studia Instituti Anthropos 3
- MacCallum, F. Lyman  
 (1943) *The Mevlidi Sherif by Süleyman Chelebi*, London: John Murray
- Magnarella, Paul J.  
 (1974) *Tradition and Change in Turkish Town*, New York: John Wiley and Sons  
 (1979) *The Peasant Venture: Tradition, Migration and Change among Georgian Peasants in a Turkey*, Boston, Mass: G. H. Hall & Co.  
 (1998) *Anatolia's Loom: Studies in Turkish Culture, Society, Politics and Law*, Istanbul: ISIS
- Malkki, Liisa  
 (1992) "National geographic: the rooting of peoples and the territorialization of national identity among scholars and refugees", *Cultural Anthropology*, 7(1), pp. 24-44
- Mandel, Ruth  
 (1990) "Shifting centres and emergent identities: Turkey and Germany in the lives of Turkish Gastarbeiter", in Dale F. Eickelman & James Piscatori (eds.), *Muslim Travellers*, London: Routledge
- Marcus, Julie  
 (1992) *A World of Difference: Islam and Gender Hierarchy in Turkey*, London & New Jersey: Zed Books

- Mardin, Şerif  
 (1966) "Opposition and control in Turkey", *Government and Opposition*, 1(3), pp. 375-387  
 (1975) "Center-periphery relations: a key to Turkish politics?", in Ergin D. Akarlı & Gabriel Ben-Dor (eds.), *Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems*, Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Publications  
 (1977) "Religion in modern Turkey", *International Social Science Journal*, 29(2), pp. 279-297  
 (1981) "Religion and secularism in Turkey", in Ali Kazancıgil & Ergun Özbudun (eds.), *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, London: Hurst & Co.  
 (1982) "Turkey: Islam and westernization", in Carlo Caldarola (ed.), *Religions and Societies: Asia and the Middle East*, Berlin: Mouton  
 (1984) "A note on the transformation of religious symbols in Turkey", *Turcica*, 16, pp. 115-127  
 (1993) "The Nakshibendi order of Turkey", in Martin E. Marty & R. Scott Appleby (eds.), *Fundamentalisms and the State: Remaking Politics, Economics, and Militance*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press  
 (1994a) "Islam in mass society: harmony versus polarization" in Metin Heper & Ahmet Evin (eds.), *Politics in the Third Turkish Republic*, Boulder: Westview Press  
 (1994b) "Culture change and the intellectual: a study of the effects of secularisation in modern Turkey", in his (ed.), *Cultural Transitions in the Middle East*, Leiden: E. J. Brill  
 (1995) "Civil society and Islam", in John A. Hall (ed.), *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison*, Cambridge: Polity Press

Mathieu, Nicole-Claude

- (1973) "Homme-culture et femme-nature?", *L'homme*, 13(3), pp.101-141

McCarthy, Justin

- (1983) *Muslims and Minorities: The Population of Ottoman Anatolia and the End of Empire*, New York: New York University Press  
 (1995) *Death and Exile: The Ethnic Cleansing of Ottoman Muslims, 1821-1922*, Princeton, New Jersey: Darwin Press

McEchern, Charmaine

- (1998) "Mapping the memories: politics, places, and identity in the District Six Museum, Cape Town", *Social Identities*, 4(3), pp. 499-521

Meeker, Michael

- (1976) "Meaning and society in the Near East" 2 parts, *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 7, pp. 243-260, 383-422  
 (1979) *Literature and Violence in North Arabia*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press  
 (1996) "Concepts of person, family and state in the District of Of", in Gabriele Rasuly-Palczyk (ed.), *Turkish Families in Transition*, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang

Meneley, Anne

- (1996) *Tournaments of Value: Sociability and Hierarchy in a Yemeni Town*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press

Mernissi, Fatima

- (1975) *Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in a Modern Muslim Society*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman

Mesbase, Ishak

- (1994) *Bitmeyen Umutlar: Çerkes Halkının Özgürlük Kavgası*, Ankara: Ardiç Yayınları

Meyer, A. J.  
(1959) *Middle Eastern Capitalism: Nine Essays*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press

Middleton, David & Derek Edwards  
(1991) "Introduction" to David Middleton & Derek Edwards (eds.), *Collective Remembering*, London: Sage.

Mines, Diane P & Brad Weiss (eds.)  
(1997) *Materialization of memory: the substance of remembering and forgetting*, a special issue of *Anthropological Quarterly*, 70(4)

Mitchell, Jon P.  
(1998) "The nostalgic construction of community: memory and social identity in urban Malta", *Ethnos*, 63(1), pp. 81-101

Murray, Stephan O. & Will Roscoe  
(1997) *Islamic Homosexualities: Culture, History and Literature*, New York and London: New York University Press

Neyzi, Leyla  
(1999) "Gülmser's story: life history, narrative, memory and belonging in Turkey", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 20, pp. 1-26

Nicholson, Reynold A.  
(1963) *The Mystics of Islam*, London: Routledge, (Originally published in 1914)

Noghumuka, Şora Bekmurze  
(1974) *Adighe-Hatukhe Çerkes Tarihi*, Istanbul: Baha Matbaası, (Originally published in 1842)

Nora, Pierre  
(1989) "Between memory and history: les lieux de memoire", in Natalie Zemon Davis & Randolph Starn (eds.), *Memory and Counter-Memory*, a special issue of *Representations*, 26, pp. 7-25

Olujić, Maria B.  
(1998) "Embodiment of terror: gendered violence in peacetime and wartime in Croatia and Bosna-Herzegovina", *Medical Anthropology*, 12(1), pp. 31-50

Özbay, Özdemir  
(1994) *Anadolu'da Kafdağı Oyküleri*, Istanbul: Nart Yayıncılık  
(1995) *Dünden Bugün Kuzey Kafkasya*, Ankara: Kaf-Der

Pamuk, Şevket  
(1988) "War, state economic policies, and resistance by agricultural producers in Turkey, 1939-45", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 2(1), pp. 19-36

Papataxiarchis, Evthymios  
(1991) "Friends of the heart: male commensal solidarity, gender, and kinship in Aegean Greece", in Peter Loizos & Evthymios Papataxiarchis (eds.), *Contested Identities: Gender and Kinship in Modern Greece*, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press

Parkin, David

(1976) "Exchanging words", in Bruce Kapferer (ed.), *Transaction and Meaning*, Philadelphia: ISHI Publications

(1989) "The politics of naming among the Giriama", in Ralph D. Grillo (ed.), *Social Anthropology and the Politics of Language*, London: Routledge

Parla, Taha

(1985) *The Social and Political Thought of Ziya Gökalp 1876-1924*, Leiden: E. J. Brill

Parvin, Manoucher & Mukerrem Hic

(1984) "Land reform versus agricultural reform: Turkish miracle or catastrophe delayed?", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 16, pp. 207-32

Passerini, Luisa

(1983) "Resume of the final session of the International Conference on Oral History", *History Workshop Journal*, pp. 195-196

Patterson, Orland

(1982) *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Pehrson, Robert N.

(1966) *The Social Organization of the Marri Baluch*, New York: Wenner-Gren

Peirce, Leslie P.

(1993) *The Imperial Harem: Women and Sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Peristiany, John G.

(1965) "Introduction" to his (ed.), *Honour and Shame: the Values of Mediterranean Society*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson

Peristiany, John G. & Julian Pitt-Rivers (eds.)

(1992) *Honor and Grace in Anthropology*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Peters, Emrys L.

(1990) *The Bedouin of Cyrenaica: Studies in Personal and Corporate Power*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Pinson, Mark

(1972) "Ottoman colonization of the Circassians in Rumeli after the Crimean War", *Etudes Balkaniques*, 3, pp. 71-85

Pitt-Rivers, Julian

(1965) "Honour and Social Status", in John G. Peristiany (ed.), *Honour and Shame: the Values of Mediterranean Society*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson

Portelli, Alessandro

(1990) "Uchronic dreams: working-class memory and possible worlds", in Raphael Samuel & Paul Thompson (eds.), *The Myths We Live By*, London: Routledge

Rappaport, Joanne

(1994) "Geography and historical understanding in indigenous Colombia", in Robert Leyton (ed.), *Who Needs the Past?: Indigenous Values and Archaeology*, London: Routledge

Rappaport, Nigel & Joanna Overing

- (2000) *Social and Cultural Anthropology: The Key Concepts*, London: Routledge
- Reed-Danahay, Deborah  
 (1993) "Talking about resistance: ethnography and theory in rural France", *Anthropological Quarterly*, 66(4), pp. 221-229
- Rosebury, William & Jay O'Brien  
 (1991) "Introduction" to their (eds.), *Golden Ages, Dark Ages: Imagining the Past in Anthropology and History*, Berkeley and Oxford: University of California Press
- Roper, Joyce  
 (1974) *The Women of Nar*, London: Faber and Faber
- Roseman, Sharon R.  
 (1996) "'How we built the road': the politics of memory in rural Galicia", *American Ethnologist*, 23(4), pp. 836-860
- Rosen, Lawrence  
 (1984) *Bargaining for Reality: The Construction of Social Relations in a Muslim Community*, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press
- Sahni, Kalpana  
 (1997) *Crucifying the Orient: Russian Orientalism and the Colonization of Caucasus and Central Asia*, Oslo: White Orchard Press, The Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture
- Sakaoğlu, Saim  
 (1986) *Dadalöğlü*, Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları,
- Samuel, Raphael & Paul Thompson  
 (1990) "Introduction" to their (eds.), *The Myths We Live By*, London: Routledge
- Sant-Cassia, Paul  
 (1999) "Tradition, tourism and memory in Malta", *JRAI*, 5(2), pp. 247-264
- Santos-Granero, Fernando  
 (1998) "Writing history into the landscape: myth, and ritual in contemporary Amazonia", *American Ethnologist*, 25(2), pp. 128-148
- Sarup, Madan  
 (1996) *Identity, Culture, and the Postmodern World*, Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press
- Şaşmaz, Musa  
 (1996) "İngiliz Kaptan Cooper'in Kayseri Konsolosluğu (1879)", in *1. Kayseri ve Yöresi Tarih Sempozyumu Bildirleri* (11-12 April, 1996), Kayseri: Erciyes Üniversitesi
- Schama, Simon  
 (1995) *Landscape and Memory*, London: HarperCollins
- Schiffauer, Werner  
 (1993) "Peasant without pride: migration, domestic cycle and perception of time", in Paul Stirling (ed.), *Culture and Economy: Changes in Turkish Villages*, Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press

- Schimmel, Annemarie  
(1995) *Mystical Dimensions of Islam*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press
- Schmitt, Arno  
(1992) "Different approaches to male-male sexuality/eroticism from Morocco to Uzbekistan", in Arno Schmitt & Jehoeda Sofer (eds.), *Sexuality and Eroticism among Males in Moslem Societies*, New York: Harrington Park Press
- Scott, James C.  
(1990) *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*, New Haven: Yale University Press
- Şener, Cemal  
(1994) *Çerkez Ethem Olayı*, Istanbul: Ant Yayınları
- Seng, Yvonne J. & Betty Wass  
(1995) "Traditional Palestinian wedding dress as a symbol of nationalism", in Joanne B. Eicher (ed.), *Dress and Ethnicity: Change across Space and Time*, Oxford: Berg
- Seremetakis, C. Nadia  
(1994) *The Senses Still: Perception and Memory as Material Culture in Modernity*, Chicago: Chicago University Press
- Seymour-Smith, Charlotte  
(1986) *Macmillan Dictionary of Anthropology*, London: Macmillan
- Shami, Seteney  
(1993) "Feminine identity and ethnic identity: the Circassians in Jordan", in Margaret Brugmann et al. (eds.), *Who's Afraid of Femininity? Questions of Identity*, Amsterdam: Rodopi  
(1994) "Displacement, historical memory, and identity: the Circassians in Jordan", in her (ed.), *Population, Displacement, and Resettlement: Development and Conflict in the Middle East*, New York: Center for Migration Studies  
(1995) "Disjuncture in ethnicity: negotiating Circassian identity in Jordan, Turkey, and the Caucasus", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 12, pp. 79-95  
(1998) "Circassian encounter: the self as other and the production of the homeland in the North Caucasus", *Development and Change*, 29, pp. 617-646  
(2000) "Prehistories of globalization: Circassian identity in motion", *Public Culture*, 12(1), pp. 177-204
- Shankland, David  
(1992) *Alevi and Sunni in Rural Turkey: Diverse Paths of Change*, Ph.D. thesis submitted to Cambridge University  
(1994) "Social change and culture: responses to modernization in an Alevi village in Anatolia", in Chris. M. Hann (ed.), *When History Accelerates: Essays on Rapid Social Change, Complexity, and Creativity*, London: Athlone Press  
(1999) *Islam and Society in Turkey*, Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire: the Eothen Press
- Shelmey, Kay Kaufman  
(1998) *Let Jasmine Rain Down: Song and Remembrance among Syrian Jews*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Shepherd, Gill  
(1980) "The Comorians and the east African slave trade", in James L. Watson (ed.), *Asian and African Systems of Slavery*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell

- Sherrif, Robin E.  
(2000) "Exposing silence as cultural censorship: a Brazilian case", *American Anthropologist*, 102(1), pp. 114-32
- Shryock, Andrew  
(1997) *Nationalism and the Genealogical Imagination: Oral History and Textual Authority in Tribal Jordan*, Berkeley: University of California Press
- Sider, Gerald & Gavin Smith (eds.)  
(1997) *Between History and Histories: the Making of Silence and Commemoration*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press
- Şimşek, Sefa  
(1998) *Törelere Aynasında Doğu ile Batı: Kan Davası ve Düello Gelenekleri*, Bursa: ASA Kitabevi
- Sirman, Nukhet  
(1990) "State, village and gender in western Turkey", in Andrew Finkel & Nukhet Sirman (eds.), *Turkish State, Turkish Society*, London, New York: Routledge  
(1996) "From economic integration to cultural strategies of power: the study of rural change in Turkey", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 14, pp. 115-125
- Slyomovics, Susan  
(1998) *The Object of Memory: Arab and Jew Narrate the Palestinian Village*, Philadelphia: Philadelphia University Press
- Smeets, Henricus Joannes  
(1984) *Studies in West Circassian Phonology and Morphology*, Leiden: the Hakuchi Press
- Şöenu, Mehmet Fetgeray  
(1923), *Çerkes Sorunu Hakkında Türk Kamuoyu ve TBMM'ne Sunu*, Ankara: Nartların Sesi Yayınları
- Starr, June  
(1984) "The legal and social transformation of rural women in Aegean Turkey", in Rene Hirschon (ed.), *Women and Property - Women as Property*, London: Croom Helm
- Stewart, Frank Henderson  
(1994) *Honor*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Stirling, Paul  
(1965) *Turkish Village*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson
- Stirling, Paul & Emine Onaran Incirlioğlu  
(1996) "Choosing spouses: villagers, migration, and kinship and time", in Gabriel Rasuly-Palczyk (ed.), *Turkish Families in Transition*, Frankfurt-am-Main: Peter Lang
- Stokes, Martin  
(1992) *The Arabesk Debate: Music and Musicians in Modern Turkey*, Oxford: Clarendon Press
- Stone, Frank A.  
(1973) *The Rub of Cultures in Modern Turkey: Literary View of Education*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press

- Subaşı, Muhsin İlyas  
(1994) *Dünden Bugüne Kayseri* (third edition), Kayseri: Selçuklu Yayın Dağıtım
- Sutton, David  
(1998) *Memories Cast in Stone: The Relevance of the Past in Everyday Life*, Oxford: Berg
- Swedenborg, Ted  
(1991) "Popular memory and the Palestinian national past", in William Rosebury & Jay O'Brien (eds.), *Golden Ages, Dark Ages: Imagining the Past in Anthropology and History*, Berkeley and Oxford: University of California Press
- Szyliowicz, Joseph S.  
(1966) *Political Change in Rural Turkey*, the Hague: Mouton & Co
- Tachau, Frank  
(1984) *Turkey: the Politics of Authority, Democracy, and Development*, New York: Praeger
- Tapper, Nancy  
(1985) "Changing wedding rituals in a Turkish town", *Journal of Turkish Studies*, 9, pp. 305-313  
(1991) *Bartered Brides: Politics, Gender and Marriage in an Afghan Tribal Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Tapper, Richard  
(1994) "Blood, wine, and water: social and symbolic aspects of drinks and drinking in the Islamic Middle East", in Sami Zubaida & Richard Tapper (eds.), *Culinary Cultures of the Middle East*, London: I. B. Tauris
- Tapper, Richard & Nancy Tapper  
(1992/93) "Marriage, honour and responsibility: Islamic and local models in the Mediterranean and the Middle East", *Cambridge Anthropology* 16(2), pp. 3-21
- Tavkul Ufuk  
(1992) "Etnik özellik taşıdığı adı değiştirilen Çerkez köylerden bazıları" *Marje*, Nov., p. 47
- Taylor, Anne Christine  
(1993) "Remembering to forget: identity, mourning, and memory among the Jivaro", *Man*, 28, pp. 653-78
- Taylor, Charles  
(1985) "Person", in M. Carrithers et al. (eds.), *The Category of the Person*, Cambridge: University Press
- Taymaz, Erol  
(1996) "Düzce ve Pınarbaşı'nda sosyo-ekonomik değişme" in *Türkiye Çerkeslerinde Sosyo-Kültürel Değişme*, Ankara: Kaf Der Yayınları  
(1998) "Diaspora ve kimlik", *Nart*, 17, pp. 28-30
- Tekeli, İlhan

(1994) "Involuntary displacement and the problem of resettlement in Turkey from Ottoman Empire to the Present", in Seteney Shami (ed.), *Population, Displacement, and Resettlement: Development and Conflict in the Middle East*, New York: Center for Migration Studies

Temel, Mehmet Ali

(1973) *Kuruluşundan Cumhuriyetin 50.nci Yılına Kadar Pınarbaşı*, Ankara: Elif Matbaacılık

Thomas, Julian

(1993) "The politics of vision and the archaeologies of landscape", in Barbara Bender (ed.), *Landscape: Politics and Perspectives*, Oxford: Berg

Thomson, Alistair, Michael Frisch & Paula Hamilton

(1994) "The memory and history debates: some international perspectives", *Oral History*, autumn, pp. 33-43

Tilly, Christopher

(1994) *A Phenomenology of Landscape: Places, Paths and Monuments*, Oxford and Providence: Berg

Timur, Selim

(1981) "Determinants of family structure in Turkey", in Nermin Abadan-Unat (ed.), *Women in Turkish Society*, Leiden: E. J. Brill

TI'ıŖe, Sleyman

(1989/90) "Uzunyaylalı aydınların tarihsel sorumluluęu", *Kafdaęı*, 3(33-36), p. 21

Toledano, Ehud R.

(1998) *Slavery and Abolition in the Ottoman Middle East*, Seattle & London: University of Washington Press

Tonkin, Elizabeth

(1992) *Narrating Our Past: The Social Construction of Orality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Toumarkine, Alexandre

(1996) "Forced migrations in the north and south Caucasus", *Boęazięi Journal: Review of Social, Economic and Administrative Studies*, 10(1-2), pp. 115-26

Traho, Ramazan

(1991) "Circassians", *Central Asian Survey*, 10(1-2), pp. 1-63,

Tucker, Hazel

(2000) "Tourism and the loss of memory, in Zelve, Cappadochia", *Oral History*, autumn, pp.79-88

Tuna, Rahmi

(1977) "ęerkeslerin Kafkasyadan Gę", in *Kafkasya zerinde Beę Konferens*, Istanbul: Kafkas Kltr Derneęi Yayınları,

Trkkan, Reha Oęuz

(1995) *Ykselen Milliyetçilik: 21. Y.Y. Trk Milliyetçilięi*, Istanbul: Trk 2000 Vakıf

nal, Muhittin

(1996) *Kurtuluę Savaęında ęerkeslerin Rol*, Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi

- Ünsal, Artun  
(1995) *Kan Davası*, Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları
- Valeri, Valerio  
(1990) "Constitutive history: genealogy and narrative in the legitimation of Hawaiian kingship", in Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney (ed.), *Culture Through Time: Anthropological Approaches*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press
- van Bruinessen, Martin  
(1994) "Genocide in Kurdistan?: the suppression of the Dersim Rebellion in Turkey (1937-38) and the chemical war against the Iraqi Kurds (1988)", in George J. Andreopoulos (ed.), *Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press  
(1997) "'Aslını inkar eden haramzadedir': the debate on the ethnic identity of the Kurdish Alevi", in Krisztina Kehl-Bodrogi et al. (eds.), *Syncretistic Religious Communities in the Near East*, Leiden: Brill
- vom Bruck, Gabriele  
(1998) "Kinship and the embodiment of history", *History and Anthropology*, 10(4), pp. 263-98
- Wachtel, Nathan  
(1986) "Introduction" to Marie-Noelle Bourguet, Lucette Valensi & Nathan Watchel (eds.), *Between Memory and History*, a special issue of *History and Anthropology*, 2(2), pp. 207-224
- Watson, Rubie S.  
(1994) "Introduction" to her (ed.), *Memory, History and Oppression under State Socialism*, Santa Fe: School of American Research Press
- Webber, Sabra J.  
(1991) *Romancing the Real: Folklore and Ethnographic Representation in North Africa*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press
- Weiner, James F.  
(1991) *Poetry, Space, and Being among the Foi of Papua New Guinea*, Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press
- Weir, Shelagh  
(1985) *Qat in Yemen: Consumption and Social Change*, London: British Museum
- Weiss, Brad  
(1999) "Good-for-nothing names: powers of recollection in Northwest Tanzania", *Ethnos*, 64(3), pp. 397-420
- White, Jenny B.  
(1994) *Money Makes us Relatives: Women's Labor in Urban Turkey*, Austin, University of Texas Press
- White, Haydon  
(1981) "The value of narrativity in the representation of reality", in W. J. T. Mitchell (ed.), *On Narrative*, Chicago and London: Chicago University Press
- Wikan, Unni  
(1984) "Shame and honour: a contestable pair", *Man*, 19, pp. 635-652

Williams, Raymond  
(1988) *Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society*, London: Fontana Press

Yalçın-Heckmann, Lale  
(1991) *Tribe and Kinship among Kurds*, Frankfurt-am-Main: Peter Lang

Yalez, Suat  
(1997) *Çerkez Etem*, Istanbul: Yalaz Prodüksiyon Yayınları

Yamba, C. Bawa  
(1992) "Going there and getting there: the future as a legitimating charter for life in present", in Sandra Wallman (ed.), *Contemporary Futures: Perspectives from Social Anthropology*, London: Routledge

Yeğen, Mesut  
(1996) "The Turkish state discourse and the exclusion of Kurdish identity", in Sylvia Kedourie (ed.), *Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics*, London: Frank Cass

Yelda  
(1998) *Coğunluk Aydınlarında Irkçılık*, Istanbul: Belge Yayınları

Zerubavel, Yael  
(1995) *Recovered Roots: Collective Memory and the Making of Israel*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press

Ziraat Vekâleti Neşriyatı  
(1938) *Uzunyayla At Yetiştirme İşleri Tektik ve Mesai Raporu*, Istanbul: Ekspres Basımevı

Zonabend, Françoise  
(1984) *The Enduring Memory: Time and History in a French Village*, Manchester: Manchester University Press

Zürcher, Eric J.  
(1998) *Turkey: A Modern History*, London: I. B. Tauris

#### **Periodicals related to Circassians in Turkey**

*Alaşara*

*Derduru*

*Kafdağ*

*Kafkasya Kültür Dergi*

*Merje*

*Nart*

*Yamıç*

*Yeni Kafkas*


#### **Turkish Newspaper**

**Milliyet**

FIGURE 2 LAND DISTRIBUTION OF 1953 AND BENEFICIARIES

1840      50      60      70      80      90      1900    10      20      30      40      50      60      70      80      1997

Migration & Settlement      WWI & TR (1923)      Land Distribution




\*Xs denote members of a *xexes worq* lineage (*K*), who settled in Karakuyu around 1950.

\*\* The size of land they received from the Land Commission (1 *dönüm* = 1,000m<sup>2</sup>).

Figure 2.1 Consolidation of Land to a *Xexes Worq* Lineage

1840      50      60      70      80      90      1900    10      20      30      40      50      60      70      80      1997

Migration & Settlement      WWI & TR (1923)      Land Distribution




\* Numbers (1-3) denote three former slave families in the Lower Quarter.  
 \*\* Xs denotes three *xexes* families that settled in Karakuyu, relying on Family 3.

Figure 2.2 Some *Xexes* and Slave-Descendant Beneficiaries of Land Distribution

FIGURE 3 HAJJI HUTA & SOME KARAKUYULU NARRATORS

1840      50      60      70      80      90      1900    10      20      30      40      50      60      70      80      1997

Migration & Settlement      WWI & TR (1923)      Land Distribution



\* Numbers (1, 4-6) denote four families in the Lower Quarter rumoured to have been the Jenaks' slaves. None of them are, however, among the 24 families officially registered as slave in the early-1900s village census book. During my field work, Families 4 and 5, wealthier, were referred to by respective patronymics, which served as their "lineage name". On the other hand, Families 1 and 6, still in poverty, did not have such "nicknames". Family 1 here is the same as Family 1 in Figure 2.2.

**agents of memory production**

identification  
 viewpoint of narration  
 symbolic resource (status)  
 economic resource

**Worqs**

“possessors of speech” (*söz sahibi*)  
 direct  
 unified, “a community of memory” (*worq toplumu*)  
 rich, “the right to speak” (*söz hakkı*)  
 varied

**Karakuyulus and Slave Descendants**

a muted category  
 indirect (non-*worq*), imposed  
 unsettled, doubt about the imposed identity  
 poor  
 varied (*nouveaux riches*, *gariban*, *fakir fukara*)

**meaning of history**

its relation with the present  
*Adygagha\**

the golden age  
a common heritage  
*worqs/slaves*, nostalgic

the dark age  
the bygone era/time passed (*geçmiş*)  
elders/youths, sanitised

**mode of memory production**

major theme  
social boundaries (us/them)  
temporal dichotomy (now/then)  
level of articulation  
voice

highly formalised  
the decline of *worqs* and the rise of slaves  
*worqs/slaves*  
before/after the abolition of slavery  
highly articulate orally  
*seemingly* homogeneous

discourses of negation, woven from scratch  
the time of community  
the locals (*yerli, ilk gelenler*)/the outsiders (*xexes*)  
past poverty and present affluence  
inarticulate, expressed in non-verbal practices  
individuated/fragmented

**mnemonics**

slaves-as-objects (*Kimlerdensin?*)

*hatıra* used for re-membering/active forgetting

**realm of discourse**

broad, including meta-memory (slave's *hatıra*)

narrow

**issue of debate**

contestation over details

lack of detail

\**Adygagha*: the traditional order of Circassian society, founded on the exchange of “love” (*sevgi*) and “respect” (*saygı*) between the senior (*büyük*) and the junior (*küçük*).

## FIGURE 4 *WORQS'* MEMORIES AND SLAVES' MEMORIES

Glossary (Circassian words are underlined)

<i>adam</i>	real man, good person
<i>âdet</i>	custom
<i>asalet</i>	nobility; nobleness
<i>asil</i>	(n.) origin, root; (adj.) real, genuine
<i>asil</i>	of noble birth
<i>asilzade</i>	noble man
<i>aşk</i>	“love”, passion, longing, desire
<i>atmak</i>	to toss
<i>ayyp</i>	shamefulness
<i>azat</i>	manumitted slave
<i>başlık/wase</i>	bridewealth
<i>benlik davası</i>	“I’-ness dispute”, ego dispute
<i>büyük</i>	the social senior
<i>cariye</i>	female slave
<i>cemiyet</i>	community of believers
<i>çekmek</i>	to draw; to suffer; to endure
<i>çekememezlik</i>	envy; intolerance; discord; the “dog-in-the-manger state of mind”
<i>Çerkez/Adyghe</i>	Circassians, Cherkess
<i>Çerkezlik/Adygagha</i>	“Circassianness”; the traditional order of Circassian society, founded on the exchange of “love” (sevgi) and “respect” (saygı) between the senior (büyük) and the junior (küçük).
<i>denk</i>	balance
<i>dönüm</i>	1,000 m <sup>2</sup>
<i>-ey</i>	suffix forming the possessive case. -’s
<i>fakir fukra/fakir zavallı</i>	the “poor fellow”
<i>gayri-sahis</i>	non-person
<i>gariban</i>	social outcast
<i>geçmiş</i>	past
<i>gelecek</i>	tradition
<i>götürmek</i>	to take
<i>gulam</i>	male slave
<i>hafıza</i>	preserved memory
<i>hak</i>	rights and duties
<i>hatır</i>	mind/thoughts; heart/feelings; memory; self
<i>hatıra</i>	memory object; memory account
<i>hatırlamak</i>	to remember
<i>hatırlatmak</i>	(causative) to make someone remember, to remind
<i>hatırı sayılır kişi</i>	“person who has his feelings and thoughts; respected”, influential person
<i>hicret</i>	emigration for the Islamic cause
<i>icar</i>	rent of land for a fixed payment
<i>içmek</i>	to drink; to take in
<i>ileri gelenler</i>	notables
<i>kajer</i>	runaway slave; ex-slave
<i>kapı</i>	door, gate; place of employment
<i>kök</i>	root
<i>köken</i>	origin, basis; descent
<i>köle/pshul’e/unaut</i>	slave
<i>kölelik</i>	slavery; slaveness

<i><u>köy/kwaje</u></i>	village
<i>küçük</i>	the social junior
<i>kul kaçkın</i>	runaway slave
<i>laf</i>	talk; words; “hot air”
<i><u>lhakwel'</u></i>	freeman
<i><u>l'akol'ash</u></i>	highest-ranking noble between <i>pshu</i> and <i>verk</i>
<i><u>mahalle/hable</u></i>	quarter (of a village)
<i>mal</i>	property, possession(s)
<i>mevlût</i>	gatherings for the communal recitation of commemorative
poems	
<i>meydan</i>	arena, field; open space; public square
<i><u>misafir/xasa</u></i>	guest
<i>misafir odası</i>	guest room
<i>muhabbet</i>	“love”, closeness through affection; friendship; friendly
conversation	
<i>muhacir</i>	Muslim refugee
<i>muhtar</i>	village headman
<i>nesil</i>	generation, genealogical depth
<i>oda</i>	guest room
<i>orta</i>	centre, middle; public space
<i><u>pshu</u></i>	prince
<i>rahat(lık)</i>	a state of being at ease, comfort
<i>rahatsız(lık)</i>	discomfort
<i>rakı</i>	strong aniseed-scented liquor
<i>samimiyet</i>	intimacy, affection
<i>saraylı</i>	slave girl who returned home from service in Istanbul
<i>saygı</i>	respect
<i>saymak</i>	to respect
<i>sevgi</i>	“love”
<i>sevmek</i>	to love
<i>sofra</i>	dining table
<i>sohbet</i>	friendly conversation; exchange of thoughts
<i>söz hakkı</i>	the right to speak
<i>söz sahibi</i>	the master of speech
<i>sülale ismi/unagots'e</i>	lineage name
<i>şahis</i>	person
<i>şahsiyet</i>	“personhood”
<i>şövalye</i>	cavalry
<i><u>tamada</u></i>	influential elder; leader of a wedding procession
<i>tohum</i>	seed; semen
<i>toplum</i>	society, community
<i>toplumun adamı</i>	“man of society”
<i><u>unafe</u></i>	meeting
<i>usul</i>	established manners, rules of good behaviour
<i>uyum</i>	harmony, accommodation
<i><u>worq</u></i>	noble person; noble family
<i><u>xabze</u></i>	established manners ( <i>usul</i> ); custom ( <i>adet</i> ); tradition ( <i>gelenek</i> ),
etiquette	
<i><u>xexes</u></i>	settler from a different village
<i>yemek</i>	to eat
<i><u>yemuk</u></i>	impropriety
<i>yeni/sonradan</i>	
<i>zengin olan</i>	nouveau riche
<i>yer</i>	place; seat
<i>yerli</i>	the local

*zengin*

the rich

**TABLE 1 POPULATION OF PINARBAŞI DISTRICT 1935-1997****Table 1.1 District population divided according to town and village population**

Census year	1935	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1997
Town	2885	3946	4064	5631	6328	8698	9503	10503	11448	11364	12046
Village	28810	37702	39805	43912	42267	42716	43597	40193	40105	36295	23861
District Totals	31695	41648	43869	49543	48595	51414	53100	50696	51553	47659	35907

**Table 1.2 Ratio of town/village population**

Town %	19.1	9.5	9.3	11.4	13.0	16.9	17.9	20.0	22.2	23.8	33.5
Village %	90.9	90.5	90.7	88.6	87.0	83.1	82.1	80.0	77.8	76.2	66.5

**Table 1.3 Village population according to sub-districts**

Merkez	10739	13081	14202	15485	14519	15717	15012	14503	14235	12597	7892
Pazarören	7608	11638	12143	13612	13218	13732	14967	13653	13379	13887	9864
Kaynar	4730	5937	6210	6689	6723	6051	7056	5736	6558	5544	3242
Örenşehir	5733	7046	7250	8126	7807	7216	6562	6301	5933	4267	2863
Village	28	37	39	43	42	42	43	40	40	36	23

<b>Totals</b>	810	702	805	912	267	716	597	193	105	295	861
---------------	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----

**TABLE 2 DISTRICT POPULATION DIVIDED ACCORDING TO CIRCASSIANS AND TURKS**

**Table 2.1 Circassians and Turkish\* population total and ratios**

Census year	1935	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980	1985	1990	1997
<b>Total</b>	27 620	36 135	37 945	41 763	40 221	40 221	41 026	37 621	37 468	34 109	22 359
<b>Circassians %</b>	54 .4	51 .7	51 .1	49 .8	50 .7	47 .0	45 .9	45 .0	46 .3	40 .7	38 .1
<b>Turks %</b>	45 .6	48 .3	48 .9	50 .2	49 .3	53 .0	54 .1	55 .0	53 .7	59 .3	61 .9
<b>the number of population excluded from the total*</b>	11 90	15 67	18 60	21 49	20 46	24 95	25 71	25 72	26 37	21 86	15 02

\* Turkish population in the district consists mostly of Avşars.

**Table 2.2 Circassian population according to sub-districts**

	1947	1960	1962	1963	1962	1959	1955	1952	1952	1944	1926
<b>Merkez</b>	47 92	60 12	62 68	63 50	62 23	59 94	55 90	52 55	52 09	44 55	26 86
<b>Kaynar</b>	44 98	56 27	58 76	63 15	63 66	56 87	66 96	53 75	61 97	51 70	29 65
<b>Örenşehir</b>	57 33	70 46	72 50	81 26	78 07	72 16	65 62	63 01	59 33	42 67	28 63
<b>Totals</b>	15 023	18 685	19 394	20 791	20 396	18 897	18 848	16 931	17 339	13 892	85 14

**Table 2.3 Turkish population according to sub-districts**

<b>Merkez</b>	48 92	56 63	62 56	71 80	64 41	73 91	70 01	68 28	65 25	61 01	37 91
<b>Pazarören</b>	76 08	11 638	12 143	13 612	13 218	13 732	14 967	13 653	13 379	13 887	98 64
<b>Kaynar</b>	97 9	14 2	15 0	18 0	16 6	20 1	21 0	20 9	22 5	22 9	19 0
<b>Totals</b>	12 597	17 450	18 551	20 972	19 825	21 324	22 178	20 690	20 129	20 217	13 845

The figures are modified by omitting five villages whose Circassian population was replaced entirely during the 1950-60s by Sunni Turks (3 Avşars and 1 Türkmen) or Alevi Kurds (1). Four of these villages belong to Merkez sub-district, one to Kaynar sub-district. There are other Circassian villages where the Turkish population outnumbers the original Circassian residents, though the populations of these villages are not excluded from the tables. As a result, the Circassian population is under-represented in the period before the 1950s, and the Turkish population after the 1960s. The fall in the ratio of the Circassian population and the rise of the ratio of the Turkish/Avşar population is sharper than shown here.

**TABLE 3 CIRCASSIAN VILLAGE POPULATION AND CAUCASIAN LANGUAGE-SPEAKING POPULATION IN RURAL KAYSERI**

	19 27	19 38	19 45	19 50	19 55	19 60	19 65
<b>Circassian village population (modified)</b>	n. a.	15 023	n. a.	18 685	19 394	20 791	20 396
<b>Caucasian language-speaking population</b>	13 617	14 931	14 681	13 583	16 965	14 968	17 110
<b>ratios of underrepresentation</b>	n. a.	6. 1%	n. a.	27 .3%	12 .5%	28 .0%	16 .1%

**TABLE 4 KARAKUYULU POPULATION**

	19 35	19 50	19 55	19 60	19 65	19 70	19 75	19 80	19 85	19 90	19 97
<b>Karakuyul</b>	36 9	44 7	62 1	57 8	65 7	57 8	52 4	49 7	50 0	40 8	27 9

**TABLE 5 1995 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS**

**Table 5.1 Votes cast according to party**

	P	MH	P	DY	RP	P	CH	DSP	AN	HA	Tota				
									AP	DEP	l				
<b>Pınarbaşı District</b>	3	446	2	437	2	405	3	210	4	206	6	170	169	29	189
<b>Town</b>	8	129	2	111	796	749	486	564	42	7	504				
<b>Villages</b>	5	316	0	326	6	325	4	135	8	157	2	114	127	82	138

**Table 5.2 Votes cast according to percentage of total vote of each unit**

	P	MH	P	DY	RP	P	CH	DSP	A	HAD			
									NAP	EP			
<b>Pınarbaşı District</b>	%	23.6	%	23.1	%	21.4	%	11.1	%	10.9	%	9.0	0.9%
<b>Town</b>	%	25.7	%	22.0	%	15.8	%	14.8	%	9.6	%	11.	0.8%
<b>Villages</b>	%	22.8	%	23.5	%	23.5	%	9.6	%	11.4	%	8.2	0.9%
<b>Kayseri Province</b>	%	18.2	%	14.9	%	33.8	%	6.9	%	10.8	%	14.	0.9%
<b>Turkey</b>	%	8.3	%	19.5	%	22.4	%	10.9	%	14.8	%	19.	4.2%

**Table 5.3 Votes cast according to ethnic group among selected village population**

	<b>P</b>	<b>MH</b>	<b>P</b>	<b>DY</b>	<b>RP</b>	<b>P</b>	<b>CH</b>	<b>DSP</b>	<b>AN</b>	<b>HAD</b>	<b>To</b>
									<b>AP</b>	<b>EP</b>	<b>tal</b>
<b>Circassians *</b>		81		513	638		42	103	133	2	15
<b>Avşars **</b>	0	189		968	498		797	789	332	20	52
<b>Alevi Kurds ***</b>		1		17	2		75	0	4	66	16
											5

**Table 5.4 Votes cast according to percentage of total vote of each ethnic group**

	<b>P</b>	<b>MH</b>	<b>P</b>	<b>DY</b>	<b>RP</b>	<b>P</b>	<b>CH</b>	<b>DSP</b>	<b>AN</b>	<b>HAD</b>	
									<b>AP</b>	<b>EP</b>	
<b>Circassians *</b>	%	5.4	%	33.9	%	42.2	%	2.8	%	6.8	8.8
<b>Avşars **</b>	%	35.7	%	18.3	%	9.4	%	15.1	%	14.9	6.3
<b>Alevi Kurds ***</b>	%	0.06	%	4.2	%	1.2	%	45.5	%	0%	2.4
<b>All villages</b>	%	22.8	%	23.5	%	23.5	%	9.6	%	11.4	8.2
											0.9%

MHP *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* (Nationalist Action Party)  
DYP *Doğru Yol Partisi* (True Path Party)  
RP *Refah Partisi* (Welfare Party)  
CHP *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (Republican People's Party)  
DSP *Demokratik Sol Partisi* (Democratic Left Party)  
ANAP *Anavatan Partisi* (Motherland Party)  
HADEP *Halkın Demokrasi Partisi* (People's Democratic Party)

\* Circassians are represented here by the votes cast in Örenşehir sub-districted, without modification (See the note for Table 2).

\*\* Aars are represented here by the votes cast in Pazarren sub-district, without modification (as above).

\*\*\* Alevi Kurds, originally from Sarız district, have obtained a village in Merkez sub-district from Circassians. It is the only Kurdish village in Pınarbaşı district.

TABLE 6 THE SCALE OF THE LAND DISTRIBUTION IN KARAKUYU (1953)

Table 6.1 The size of the distributed land according to the social categories of the beneficiaries

<b>Total (dönüm/person)</b>	12295 dönüms/ 66 person (186.3 d /p)			
<b>Karakuyulu / Xexes</b>	36 <i>Karakuyulus*</i>		30 <i>Xexeses</i>	
<b>Sub-total</b>	K 6170 d. (171.4 d/p)		X 6125 d. (204.2d)	
<b>Status categories</b>	<i>Worqs**</i>	<i>Slaves</i>	<i>Worqs</i>	<i>Slaves</i>
<b>Number of beneficiaries</b>	19	17	9	18
<b>Size of distributed land</b>	A 3150 (165.8 d/p)	B 3020 (177.6 d/p)	C 2200 (244.4 d/p)	D 3246 (180.0 d/p)

1 dönüm (d.) = 1000m<sup>2</sup>

\* K : X (including 3 Turks) = 50.2 : 49.8 (%)

\* T (Turks) = 685 d/3 p (216.7 d/p)

\* *Worqs* : *Slaves* = 46.1 : 53.9 (%)

*Worq* Total (A + C) = 5350 d/28 p (191.1d/p), *Slave* Total (B + D) = 6260 d/35 p (178.6 d/p)

Table 6.2 Social boundaries (Us/Them) presented by Karakuyulus belonging to different categories

<b>Karakuyulu <i>Worqs</i></b>	A local <i>worqs</i>	Z 9145/47 (209.2d/p)	
<b>Karakuyulu <i>Slaves</i></b>	K the locals	X	the outsiders

\* A : Z (B + C + D + T) = 25.6 : 74.4 (%)

\* My research is incomplete. The figures do not include 11 Karakuyulu beneficiaries (9 *worqs* and 2 slaves) whose allotment I failed to learn during my research. Karakuyulu *worqs* are especially underrepresented here.

\*\* "*Worq*" is used here in the broadest sense to denote those usually accepted as "non-slaves" by their fellow villagers.